U.S.-China relations and the stalemate with Vietnam

VIETNAM
Brzezinski/lp
SR #12
Tape 2, Side 2
Uh, this is a head of uh, sound roll #12 to pick up with camera roll #20 for WGBH Vietnam, Viet 13, Legacies. And at the head of this roll is several seconds of reference...recorded at minus ATV...4.2. We're using internal crystal which is uh, according to all indications operating properly. Again, head of sound roll 12, camera roll 20, coming up an interview with Brzezinski.
Turning. Marker please.
Slate 33.
Interviewer:
Let's just go up a deck first. Write about what kind of a policy did you inherit.
Brzezinski:
In the Far East?
Interviewer:
In Southeast Asia, yes.
Brzezinski:
I would say essentially a stalemate. There wasn't...
Interviewer:
Sorry. Once again. If you could just mention the subject.
Brzezinski:
Alright. The policy we inherited at the end of 1976, was essentially that of a stalemate. The Vietnamese war had come to an end.
The American-Vietnamese relationship however, did not take off as a consequence of the end of hostilities. There was in effect an absence of any relationship and moreover, the American-Chinese relationship, which of course was much more important, was in the doldrums.
There was a period of movement in the early 70's, but by the mid 70's again, there was some retrogression, the last visits by President Ford and Henry Kissinger to China had not gone well and there was considerable uncertainty as to what might happen in the relationship in the future.
Interviewer:
So, what were the, the foreign policy aims of the Carter Administration as it went into office?
Brzezinski:
We, when we went into office, very deliberately sat down and defined for ourselves about ten objectives for the four years. And I remember quite vividly that the fifth objective was that we would normalize relations with China during the first term and we even set for ourselves the objective of normalizing relations by 1979.
In fact, the announcement of the resumption of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States was made on December 15, 1978 to become effective January 1, 1979.
Interviewer:
Could you describe, the way you described in your book but more succinctly, your concern that the normalization recognition of Vietnam was going to prejudice or interfere with the establishment of relations with China.
Brzezinski:
As in all things, it is terribly important to have a sense of priorities in what you do. And to make certain that priorities do not clash.
When we began to cope with American Chinese relationship, which required a great deal of domestic effort, we were conscious of the fact that China and Vietnam were at loggerheads. They were in a condition of severe hostility with some limited fighting. Not of the kind of fighting that developed later in February, March of 1979, but still, in effect, shooting.
And thus, it was out of the question to try to normalize relations with both at the same time. It would also diminish the importance of the new American Chinese relationship and therefore I made certain that we moved in a deliberate fashion, purposeful fashion, in normalizing relations with China but that we would put aside, while doing that, any improvement of relations with Vietnam.
Interviewer:
And what kind of problems did you have dealing with, uh, Vance and Holbrooke on this?
Brzezinski:
Not too many problems. Uh, occasionally...Okay, we do not have too many problems in dealing with the State Department or Vance or Holbrooke over the Vietnamese issue. Occasionally they would raise it but when reminded of our basic strategic priorities they would desist.
Interviewer:
Do you think that (cough), if we had had normal relations with Vietnam, the Vietnamese might not have moved deeper into the Soviet camp?
Brzezinski:
The Vietnamese were in the Soviet camp. So, I think the causality is wrong. The point is would our ability to genuinely and significantly improve relations with China be jeopardized. And on that I'm quite clear in my mind that it would be.
And that it was much more important for us to improve relations with China than with Vietnam. For that matter it doesn't matter much whether relations with Vietnam were improved or were not. It's really of secondary nature.
Interviewer:
Okay, looking at it now, does the absence of a relationship with Vietnam deprive us of anything, either in our foreign policy or domestically like the issue of MIAs and refugees or that sort of thing?
Brzezinski:
I don't think it deprives us very much. The Vietnamese are pursuing their own policies. They have their own national priorities. They have their own good reasons for a relationship that is very close with the Soviets.
I don't think that the relationship with Vietnam would alter these matters a great deal. If it could be improved without any major American concession, sure, I wouldn't be against it. But I certainly wouldn't sacrifice very much for it.

Lessons of the Vietnam War and considerations for Central America

Interviewer:
Let's, let's...looking back, kind of your general feeling, what are lessons of the American experience in Vietnam?
Brzezinski:
Are you asking me about the lessons of the totality of the American experience?
Interviewer:
Yeah, in a general sense.
Brzezinski:
You mean the totality going back to the '60s including the war?
Interviewer:
Yeah.
Brzezinski:
I would say the fundamental lesson is that one has to define very clearly what one's objectives are, determine in advance how much one is prepared to pay to achieve that objective and then act accordingly.
It seems to me that we never made it very clear to ourselves whether we were prepared to win that war, whether we felt that this was truly or not in our national interest to try to win it and we never took stock of what it would take to win it. We tried to win it, so to speak, on the cheap without even defining what winning would mean.
Interviewer:
Do you think it was winnable?
Brzezinski:
Yes. I think a certain kind of a war. Ask Colonel Sumner in his work on strategy outlines. A war directed directly against North Vietnam was certainly winnable. Of course it was winnable.
The United States can certainly defeat North Vietnam, but the United States cannot defeat a guerrilla war which is being raged from a sanctuary through a pattern of penetration, intervention, evasion, which is very difficult for a technologically advanced country like the United States to combat.
Interviewer:
Okay now, could you just take that and apply it to the issue of today which is Central America? Is there a lesson that we learned in Vietnam that is applicable?
Brzezinski:
I think the lesson is again, applicable, in a sense. The Vietnamese lesson, in a sense, is applicable to Central America. And that is that we have to define for ourselves what it is that we're trying to achieve, we have to make some reason judgment as what is the balance between goals and means and then act accordingly.
When I listen to President Reagan's address to the special session of Congress, I almost had the feeling that he was going to end the speech in which he described the issue as being strategically of the most urgent character by calling upon the American people to support some policy of interdiction against Nicaragua and blockade of Cuba.
Instead, he ended up by asking for thirty million dollars more. He was either asking for too little or he was exaggerating the danger vastly. There was clearly a disproportion between his analysis and his recommended action.
My own view is that the situation really is quite different from that of Vietnam. Not only is the geographical locale altogether different, the problem is altogether different. There's nothing like North Vietnam nearby. There's nothing like China and the Soviet Union nearby. And we have to take a longer range more patient historical view of the problem.
It is to be sure in part a matter of Soviet and Cuban involvement, abetment exploitation. But the revolutionary violence in Central America has deep indigenous roots. Social, political, economic. And if we adopt a more patient outcall historical posture, work with the neighbors that have a common stake in stability in the region, I think we can work this out.
I don't favor a policy of urgency, of making the issue into a massive strategic challenge. I don't believe the conditions warrant it. But if it is a massive strategic challenge, then we ought to be reacting differently than the way the President has called for.
Interviewer:
Cut. Okay, I think you did it, what did you come in on?
Hit. Head for tone Brzezinski interview. Head tone.
Tail.