So ah, how do you feel about the state of the situation with the MIAs?

Well, I think it's still a sad report that...

If you could mention the subject of the MIA's and then answer the question.

Ok, uh, I am... in my opinion I feel that no Americans are still being held captive in South Vietnam or in Laos being held by the North Vietnamese or even by the Laotians. I wish I was totally wrong and when I first became Chairman of the Select Committee on Missing Persons for the Congress of the United States I thought there was a very fine possibility that some Americans could be still prisoners in that part of the world and we started on working on this report on instructions from the House of Representatives in 1975 and finished the report in 1976.

But it fell in the sad place that we could find no evidence that any Americans were still being held captive. This does not mean that we should not keep continuing to talking to the North Vietnamese. They haven't done a good job on returning of remains and returning of personal effects of Americans. We know they do have more remains.

They do have personal effects. But ah, it's a sad report but I believe no Americans are still being held captive in Southeast Asia. There could be three or four deserters. We've had American deserters in every war we have fought and there could be a handful of deserters in that part of the world.

What uh, at the present state, what more could be done, you think, to get them to deliver up the remains?

I don't agree with the figure of 400 remains are being held. That seems like a rather high number but I do think they have some more remains. They ought to give them to us. We're entitled to those remains but we have to continue to talk and work through the official government of the United States working through ah the government of North Vietnam.

That's about the only way that I know that we can get information on what happened to these Americans that didn't come home during the Vietnam War and also getting remains returned and also personal effects. You have to go through this government through their government.

Will you think the administration is handling this properly? For example, occasionally the administration seems to create the impression that there might even be Americans still alive there.

I would certainly hope that this administration would not give encouragement to the families of the missing in action or those who have been declared dead in Vietnam or in Laos because that's giving the families false hopes. I do think the Reagan Administration has gone too far in some cases and have indicated that there could be some Americans alive and this is not right, this administration shouldn't do it, those fellows are not coming home.

What about the testimony of General Tighe?

What I was, he said his personal opinion, General Tighe said in his personal opinion, that as I recall it, that he thought that some Americans could be alive over there, and then right after he said it, but the official position of the United States government and of the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which he headed up, is that officially no Americans are still alive.

So I don't know, I think that uh if he felt like that he sure didn't push it far enough that it carried through that he officially wanted the United States government to declare that Americans were still alive.

Cut. We have to change magazines.

Go ahead.

Pick it up with your reference to General Tighe.

I was disappointed when General Tighe, or I was I guess more surprised, not disappointed, when General Tighe testified before a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee stated that in his personal opinion there could be some Americans still being held as captive in that part of the world.

I wish General Tighe was right, was correct, that would suit me fine. But then the Defense Intelligence Agency has taken the position that officially no Americans are still be held captive, but then they add another paragraph onto that by saying, but there is a possibility that some Americans could be held captive in that part of the world.

But it was a surprise to me when General Tighe made that statement, but yet the... really the bottom line position of the Defense Intelligence Committee Agency is that no Americans are being held captive over there and that’s the official position of our country.

Do you think that uh, that it would help if we had diplomatic relations with Vietnam?

I don't see any problems with that. That's the only we are going to get any... I don't really see any problems with having a... talking a diplomatic relations with the North Vietnamese. That's the only way we're going to get any information about what remains the Vietnamese might have, what personal effects they might have. What happened to these Americans.

Uh, you have got to talk to your potential enemy or your enemy to get the information we need. I would say uh, not normal relations but uh, on a diplomatic level, I just don't see any problems with in effect doing that now. And I think if we had it would have had diplomatic relations....

I'm sorry, could I ask you to begin that again, please. Just your last sentence.

And I've always felt if we would have had diplomatic relations with the North Vietnamese that uh, a year after the war, we could have gotten better information on the missing in action. We might have had some effect of keeping the Soviets from moving into Cam Ranh Bay and the Soviets moving into North Vietnam and we might have had some effect there and also the boat people coming out of Vietnam, we might of been able to control this situation better and save some lives. So talking, I just can't see any problems with it.

What was your... we should go back to your feelings that they’re not cooperating fully with turning over the remains. You've spoken to them more...

I've been... I have been over to North Vietnam after the war more than any other member of Congress seeking information about the missing in action and each time we have been over there, we have been given American remains by the North Vietnamese, in an effect, as a bargaining chip. We're doing something for you, now you do something for us. Our committee recommended we stop that.

That ah no Americans going over as members of Congress...other government officials or private sources should receive these remains. It should be done on a government to government level between the militaries of both the North Vietnamese and the United States and that's what's been taken place recently that the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand or, is the official route to receive these remains and this is one of the recommendations that I made, that we don't go over and receive these remains and then we talk some more.

This should be handled by the American military and the North Vietnamese military. But the North Vietnamese should just open up and give us all the information they have on the remains... whatever information they have on the missing in action.

In your talks with them did you... if you're not satisfied with that they're turning over remains, why do you think they are withholding any?

I don't have a good answer. They ah, they've always in effect given out remains as different groups would go over there. They should have given them all to us. When, all the ones they had in 1973 when the Americans came out of there. But I will have to say that I'm sure they are collecting some remains around the country and in South Vietnam and also in Laos and they will continue to gather American remains.

In fact, as I recall, we got five Americans back from Europe this last year that were located and discovered over there. So we will be recovering remains for a long time in that part of the world but I don't have a good answer of why the North Vietnamese have been dwelling at the remains. They ought to give them all back to us.

What were some of the... having been there so many times since the war in Vietnam, what kind of impressions do you have about the place?

Well, it seems that in Vietnam, North Vietnam, the people we dealt with there were very suspicious of Americans. It seemed like a group of old men were running the country and it was just slow and hard to do ah negotiations with them or just talk to them about the MIA issue and also about other matters pertaining to our countries.

They were always slow and they were always coming back and lecturing to us about they were right and we were wrong. I remember Henry Kissinger saying of all his negotiations, they were the toughest group to deal with and I agree with him. It's just pull, pull, pull in trying to fool with them.

I wonder if you could recall a little bit of jogging through the streets of Hanoi.

Yes, it was of interest. You sit all day across a table and you're trying to say the right things, to do best for your country, that you really need to get out in the afternoon. And ah it did cause some attention of jogging in Hanoi. It was the only relaxation that we could get. There were no sports arenas around there, no gyms and the climate is good for running and a tall American running through the streets of Hanoi did attract some attention.

Let's go on now to the lessons of Vietnam. When you look back on it all or look back in relation to today, what have we learned from it all?

In the lessons learned in Vietnam, for me is, is one: if we're going to get involved like we did in Korea and Vietnam, that we have to be totally committed to win the war. We can't fight a limited war. That's sad. That's just won't work. You have to be totally committed and you have to attack the enemy at his home base. I think that's a lesson we've learned.

We also tried to fight a war, in my opinion, of two infantry battalions forward and one in reserve and you were fighting a guerrilla, jungle type enemy and so we have to break down the units in my opinion and fight, in effect, like the enemy fights and I don't think we did that enough. And we tried to take over the war in Vietnam. When I was there, the, I went over there eight times during the war, and I could see in Saigon that we'd taken over that city.

We were picking up the garbage. We were handling the police traffic. We were doing it all and the Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese just kind of, in effect, laid back and said, well let the Americans do it all. Therefore, we didn't instill in the South Vietnamese or they didn't have it, the will to win and no matter how long we'd of stayed there, not having that will to win by the South Vietnamese, I guess that would be the key issue that I would be concerned about.

Now in comparison with El Salvador, I think that we have ah learned a lot from Vietnam that we can move forward into El Salvador in that the will for El Salvador to survive is up to the El Salvadorians, they have to do it.

We can not do it. So therefore, I see no reason to put thousands of Americans on the ground in El Salvador. It didn't work in South Vietnam and it won't work in El Salvador.

We ah can learn that in the training that we give the El Salvadorians, not to train the conventional type wars that we're used to, but break the battalions down into small units and teach them to fight like the enemy fights and that's the only way that we're going to help the El Salvadorians in that part of the world. I guess those troubled areas that I've mentioned from Vietnam then moving it to El Salvador and in El Salvador.

We ran out.

Go ahead.

Uh, people in my state of Mississippi are very pro military but when I was home recently a number of those people talked to me and are very concerned about committing Americans into El Salvador, uh, even into the Middle East. Um, most Mississippians that I represent don't want Americans, uh, soldiers committed especially in El Salvador.

And uh, I think c... actually by economic aid to El Salvador and also, uh, military aid will give that government of El Salvador a chance. I'm not sure whether they can make it or nor or even they have the will which the South Vietnamese didn't have the will to make it and stand on their own.

But while we have to help now is is because it we don't and that government does tall down there and other governments fall such as Costa Rica, Panama, uh, Honduras, uh, we would have such an influx of refugees into this country, we can't handle it.

In fact, uh, we have a very, very large number, almost a half a million, of El Salvadorians already in this country and most of them are here illegally. So, the best interests of our country is to try to spend some money down there now and maybe get a stabilization of that government and not have those people coming into the United States.

Now, the El Salvadorians are not coming into the United States by boat. They come right up the peninsula and come right through Mexico and come right in through Texas and other ways and come into the United States.

Are you ah, are you satisfied with the way the administration with Central America?

I have been supportive of President Reagan the way he has handled, uh, the Central America situation. I think what he's tried to do and is doing makes sense and its really the only logical, uh, approach, uh, to uh, take, uh to that situation uh down there.

Of course I wish the human rights element the government, uh, could do more on human rights, but uh, uh we can't expect miracles and have the same type of government we have here in the United States in El Salvador and I think the Reagan Administration realizes that and I think they're taking a logical, uh, reasonable approach of trying to save El Salvador.

Dick, have you got any more questions?

Yes. Ask the representative it there are any other veterans, if there are any veterans issues that are of present concern to him that he'd like to comment on.

Yeah. I’m uh, I'm vitally interested in the veteran's programs being chairman of the House Veteran's Affairs Committee. And a number of my colleagues have asked me in recent days are we going to be able to take care of the large number of WWII and Korean veterans that will reach the ages of 60, 61, 62 years of age, take care of them in our veterans hospital system. I think we can.

I think we can give the acute uh care necessary, uh, for all of the WWII veteran and also the Korean veteran and I've also had these veterans to express some concern. We moved to the outpatient clinic care now. We've also moved to nursing homes. So, I believe that in the near future we will be able to take care of these veterans that are reaching the ages of the middle 60's when they need acute care and other medical care that the veterans hospital system that we have can do the job.

What about Vietnam veterans?

Vietnam…

What about the issues like Agent Orange and such...?

On the Agent orange issue...

Can you start once again please?

I'd like to talk about the Vietnam era, uh, veteran and especially about uh Agent Orange. We're having hearings in the past veteran's affairs committee at this time if we can get good substantial strong evidence that, uh, uh, that Agent Orange is affecting a number of Vietnam era veterans we will take care of these veterans and see that they do receive some type of comp—compensation and whatever care they do need.

And on the Vietnam era veteran, I would like to concentrate more on the psychological problems that the Vietnam veteran seems to be having more than WWII and the Korean veteran. And I'm very concerned that more Vietnam era veterans are out of jobs than those who didn't serve in the Vietnam ah War or who were not called up. Something's wrong there and the government ought to help to see these fellas get jobs.

Something happened that they can't get jobs and we ought to help them. Ah we're moving toward some type of solution to job finding for the Vietnam era veteran. That's one of the major problems we're having, oh, in the uh Vietnam era veteran personality, or personnel.

Cut.