Let's start off with the subject of what condition was the Army in coming out of Vietnam.

In the period right after Vietnam, we found that we had an Army which was searching for a mission, in conjunction with its role as part of the nat... all of the forces of our national defense. We had an Army in which we had lost the basic unison and cohesion that exists within organizations. We had lost ours non-commissioned officer corps, and there was a lack of understanding about the role that the non-commissioned officer and the officer played.

We had an Army which was not certain about where it was to go in the future, and about the equipment that was needed. So we came out of Vietnam in a... what I would call a somewhat confused, uh, position, one in which, uh, we had to decide exactly where we were going in the future.

Why did that happen?

I think that happened because there was not a clear appreciation of what we wanted to do in Vietnam. We started in there and thought it would be a short haul; it ended up being a long haul, it ended up being one in which we did not have the support, the total support of the American people, where the soldiers felt that they were off by themselves.

It happened because we asked officers to go over and assume short tours as commanders so that they never had that linkage between the soldier and the officer. Uh, we, that happened because the non-commissioned officers went back and forth so often that they decided to leave the Army or else were killed, and so that we destroyed the very basic fiber of the Army through some of our policies as far as people are concerned.

On a... in terms of the objectives in Vietnam, do you think that the Army had any sense in what it was doing...

Uh hum.

...Do you think the leadership of the Army knew what they were trying to do in Vietnam?

Well, I think that the leadership of the Army had a view of what they believed the political leadership wanted them to do, and that was to be able to sanitize South Vietnam so that the South Vietnamese could run their own country.

But I don't believe that there was a clear appreciation between the administration, the politicians, and the military as to exactly what military force could do so that the politicians then could decide whether or not that was adequate to whatever their long range goals were for the region, and concomitantly, the military developed very short range programs and short range plans which, when you look at it in the aftermath of what occurred, indicate several failures.

First, uh, that it is not possible to take on their, to go into a combat, or an int-, it's not possible to go into conflict where there's not a clear delineation of what the goals and objectives were, where those goals and objectives aren't clearly understood by both military and the civilians.

Where there are restrictions placed upon the military that prevent them from winning in the classical sense, such as the inability to be able to attack the heart and soul of North Vietnam. I think one of the great lessons is that if you want to win in the classical sense, that you can't have those kinds of restrictions placed upon the military in the future.

The other is, the other great lesson is that there must be support of the American people for the cause that the soldiers are performing, and when that's not there, when that lack of support exists, then you find you start to break down in morale, you start to find a breakdown in the way in which soldiers go about doing their day to day business.

Would you go, can we stop for just a moment?

Sure.

I want you to go back over...

All right. Well, the two principal points that come out of Vietnam from a strategic point of view are, first of all, that there has to be a complete understanding between the military and the civilian leadership on what the strategic purpose is, and one of the points which the military must continually make to the civilian leadership is that they must endanger the heart and soul of the enemy and not provide them a sanctuary to which they can retreat. And the second is that soldiers must have the support of the American people if they're sent off to represent the American people anywhere around the world.

What about the political leadership? Can you look back and comment on [inaudible]...?

Well, I would go back, uh, to my own experience, which in Vietnam, which began in the summer of nineteen hundred and sixty four.

I started in the...

Just a moment.

My first experience in the Vietnam arena was back in nineteen hundred and sixty four and I remember that what I consider to be the critical decision was in the summer of '65 when the issue had to do with whether or not the Reserves and Guard of our country would be called up as part of national mobilization as we became involved in Vietnam. And President Johnson at that time took the decision not to call up the Guard and Reserve.

The Chief of Staff of the Army at that time had recommended it because he felt that unless there was that linkage with the nation and unless he had that capability, that it would, uh, end up with having a delinkage between our nation and our people. And so the, it seems to me that that was a very critical political decision that was taken. President Johnson, I'm sure, felt for political reasons he didn't want to mobilize the Guard and Reserve, but I would say that that is a lesson to be learned from the politics of the time.

Let's go on to how you went about to rebuild the Army after Vietnam.

Well, to, again, we have to take a look at the condition that the Army was in. The Army was in search of a mission because there were questions being raised at that time as to why an Army? I was the Deputy Commandant at the Army War College in 1973 and was called by the Chief of Staff of the Army and said, we need to be able to articulate why we need an army.

There's questions today as to what role the Army will play in the future. Uh, there were those who felt that the Army should only have a role in Central Europe and not have a role world wide. So there's a question as to what role the Army should play, what kind of tactics and doctrine should be involved, what kind of personnel policy should be involved to ensure that we were able to overcome the kinds of problems that existed in Vietnam.

So we took a look first at what role the Army should play, and were able to come up with the requirement to have a global need for the Army, which meant that we had to have a combination of varied forces that can operate at low intensity warfare all the way up through the role that they play as part of the NATO alliance in Central Europe. That then laid out for the future the kind of equipment that we would need.

We didn't do that in isolation, we worked with our NATO allies, so that there was an agreement there, and also with allies around the rest of the world to ensure that there was an agreement as far as the tactics and doctrine, because there's the opportunity to improve our capabilities by getting our allies to carry a larger share of the role. Then we had to address the most difficult problem, and that problem was how to correct the manpower issues.

In 1979, we had a situation in which we truly had a hollow Army we had zeroed out over one third of the squads in the United States Army because we didn't have enough people to man them. We were some 15,000 short in non-commissioned officers. And by some standards, the quality of the young men and women that we were receiving were not all high school graduates or of aptitude areas that were competent to be able to carry out some of the tasks we were asking them to perform.

Oh, so we had to take a look at how we went about resolving those basic issues. The first was working with the administrations, both the Carter Administration and the Reagan Administration, to ensure that there was a clear understanding between the Army and the civilian leadership as to what they wanted the Army to do.

And I think that's reasonably clear now that they want an Army that's flexible, able to respond across the full spectrum of warfare, from the very low intensity counterterrorist all the way through their role as part of the mobilized force. Greater reliance upon National Guard and Army Reserve.

Uh, second, then is the tactics and the doctrine that are necessary so that we're not guilty of preparing for WWII now instead of ensuring that we have a force in being that's perceived by the Soviets, by our allies, by our American people as being a good quality force, because that's what's going to deter war and prevent us from ever having to use that force if it is that kind of force, and that's of course what we all pray for. And then the third is the issue of people.

The lessons from Vietnam are quite simple, and they are that you don't fight as individuals, you fight as a unit. People have more loyalty it's not just from Vietnam, I shouldn't say that, it's lessons of wars past and will always be a lesson, that people fight for one another, the flag is beautiful but you still fight for your buddy. And so, what we have attempted to do is provide stabilized leadership by putting people out in command for long periods of time, up to three years.

Before they were commanding in Vietnam, as you'll recall, for six months. The association that existed between commander and lead wasn't able to mature. So the importance of having a leader in there long enough that he is not just trying to get credit for command, but understands that he has responsibility to train and develop and teach and for those soldiers now can occur.

The second is that we had to rebuild the non-commissioned officer corps, because the non-commissioned officer corps had been decimated, and so it's taken a lot of training, we've developed schools to teach the non-commissioned officers, both first sergeants, sergeants majors, across the board, and given them time to develop.

And that takes time, that's someth-, that's not something you can do overnight, you can't create a sergeant overnight. We tried to do that in Vietnam, where we called "shake and bake" non-commissioned officers. The smartest guys who came out of the basic training were immediately put into a non-commissioned officer corps, and nine months later they were sergeants, leading, so if you wonder why we had problems in the latter stages of the Vietnam War, it's because of that lack of experience.

[Inaudible]

And of course the biggest problem that we faced was recreating a non-commissioned officer corps. Uh, it had been totally decimated by the Vietnam War, and so it required that we add educational programs, development programs, to ensure that we were able to recreate that essential middle leadership that no army can exist without. So that took a large portion of our time.

The next big problem was how to attack the problem of stability in units. And so what we have done in that area is to assign individuals to a company, and they will stay with that company for as long as they're in Europe . That will probably expand into battalions or may expand into battalions.

In addition, we are creating a regimental system so that whenever a young person or officer comes into the Army, they are associated with the 5th Cavalry or the 187th Airborne Regiment, or whatev-, another regiment, so they have a feeling of belonging, and, uh, I had believed that by providing stability to the Army, we could overcome the biggest problem of readiness today in all armed forces, and that's turbulence.

Today the United States Army turns over in a division once every eighteen months overseas and once every fifteen months back here. You can't get the kind of readiness you need and the type of cohesion you need, the type of unit readi-, unit, uh, togetherness that you need when you have that type of instability.

Are you getting better people and why?

I think...the...yes, several reasons. Uh, the, the people that we have today are very high class young men and women. Starting with our officer corps, we've been able to attract high quality young men and women into ROTC. The test scores for all of the young men and women going to the military academies of all services and the ROTC have gone up by over 120 points just within the past couple of years.

Uh, we now are able to bring into the Army almost all high school graduates. We were about fifty percent three years ago, today we're nearly 90 percent high school graduates. Uh, additionally, something which is not well known, is that today we're bringing in about eleven percent of young men and women who have from one to four years of college, and of that, four percent are college graduates.

Now why? The answer's two, there are many reasons. One reason is the economy, clearly, that has an impact. Other reasons are that it's not out of favor today to be in the military, I believe uh, that that's happening. Second is, uh, we're doing a better job of providing an environment in which young men and women are able to develop their skills, and I think that's important, because then when they go back home, they're able to explain to other young men and women what opportunities exist. So I believe that all of those have contributed and of course the President's support for the military has been one of the major factors as well.

Just sort of try a, maybe try a philosophical point is that you say that make some judgment about the respectability of the military and how it's...

Uh hmm.

...evolved ever since in the last ten years?

Uh hmm. Well, I think that in Vietnam, I think there was a clear concern on the part of the American people that the military was truly responsive to the leadership and was responsive. I don't know whether that was well founded or not, but at least that was the perception of many and it came from many sources.

I think today, as a result of uh, the, emphasis on discipline, the emphasis on training, the emphasis on response to civilian leadership, I believe all of those have brought about a greater understanding on the part of the American people that the Army is a part of American society must be a part of American society, and therefore that uh the better we are, that, uh, the better we can represent American society all over the world.

Let's get into the whole issue of your reservations you have about getting involved in Central America. Oh, why do you have some reservations?

Well, the reservations go back to the concerns that we've talked about. As far as the reservations concerning our entrance into Central America, revolve around the concerns that I've outlined with regard to Vietnam. First of all, that we have a clear identification of what the purpose and role of force is. Second, that there be support on the part of the American people.

Oh, now if you take a look at, uh, Central America, you'll understand that the problems there have existed for many, many years; they're not new problems, they're problems which have been exacerbated in the near term, perhaps, by the introduction of communist or supported forces into Nicaragua. But the problems are long standing problems of uh, economic problems, social problems, problems that have to be addressed as a total. And my concern is that...

Sorry.

The two great lessons learned from Vietnam, the lesson of ensuring that there is an agreement on what the purpose of the force involvement is, and also the importance of ensuring that we have support of the American people for that involvement obtain in spades in Central America. Uh, it's absolutely essential that we have a clear identification of what mission the armed forces are to play, if they are to play a role.

I'm sorry, could we start again?

Sure.

...go ahead. I'm sorry.

No, no. The two great lessons learned from Vietnam are, first, that there's a clear identification between the military and the civilians as to what the purpose behind the use of force is to be, and second, that there be support on the part of the American people for the role that the military are playing in that area. Now the purpose behind, uh, first of all, the problems that exist in Central America are not problems which have developed within the past year or two.

They're long problems, they're endemic problems. They relate to the social fiber of the area, they relate to the economic problems that are existing there, and there are military aspects of it. They've been exacerbated within the past few years by the introduction of a communist supported regime in Nicaragua, but that is only a part of the problem that exists within that area.

So the approach towards solving the problems in Central America has to be one in which we take into account all of the arrows in the quiver of national security the economic arrow, the social arrow, the political arrow, as well as the military arrow. And the military arrow ought to be the last arrow that's taken out of the quiver, because it is one which has to be used very precisely and very accurately, if you will, if it is needed at all.

Uh, our principal focus first of all, many ask the question as to whether or not there are similarities between Vietnam and Central America. The answer is, clearly there are similarities. There are nations there which have internal subversion, which have problems internally from counter insurgency, but...

Could I ask you to begin that, that section again...?

All right.

From similarities.

All right. Many ask whether or not there are similarities between Vietnam and Central America, and clearly, there are similarities. There are similarities that relate to the way in which the countries are run, there are similarities which relate to the counterinsurgency movement, there are similarities which relate to the human aspects of the nation itself.

And for us, there are also dissimilarities. One, it's much, much closer to the United States. It has far, in my judgment far more vital impact upon the future of our country and upon the future of our children. So that there are, in the similarities, there are similarities as well as dissimilarities in the region.

What... could you go a little more deeply into how you think we should approach it. I mean, do you think, for example, that we're getting... looking at it too much from a military standpoint?

Uh. Clearly, in any approach that we take in Central America, we have to begin with trying to resolve the problem with non-military means in my view. I believe the Marshall Plan, which is being proposed for economic solutions, is a very solid first step. I believe we have to continue to hold the regimes in the various countries responsible for human rights to the individuals within the area.

I believe that we have to provide political pressure through the organization of American States, to ensure that everybody understands that Central America is important, vital, critical to the United States, and that we need their support because it's also critical to the other nations in the Americas. So we need to focus on all of those elements of national security policy in addition to just the military.

Looking, hmm, at the situation today, uh, your own comments have been that you don't feel that the American public...

Um.

...would support intervention.

Sure. One other aspect of, uh, involvement in Central America is insurance that we have support of the American people for any military involvement. I believe that the American people can understand the importance of economic, political, social pressures and steps that we take in that region.

The military step is one which I believe we should continue to hold the nations of the region responsible for. We should continue to hold the countries in that area responsible for the defense of their own area, rather than introducing American soldiers into the area. If we go back to the Vietnam analogy, it ends up like this: it ends up that we ought to ensure that...

There have been many analogies made between Vietnam and Central America. And it seems to me that several things ought to be remembered.

Can we start over please? Many analogies.

There was a little mike problem.

John, pull your loop up.

Don't lean quite so far forward. You're fine General.

All right. Many analogies have been made between Vietnam and Central America. There are several points that I'd like to list that it seems to me are critical for the American people to understand concerning the differences or concerning the similarities. First, that it’s absolutely essential that there be a clear understanding between the military and the civilian leadership as to what the purpose of the force is and what the force can and cannot do.

Second, that there be support of the American people for the effort. Third that the host government be totally committed to the same purposes that our nation is committed to in the region. And finally, that we are able to insure that we have support of other nations within the region as well. That it not just be the United States committed to what is truly an American problem.

Could you envisage putting American combat troops in Central America?

It would be very difficult for me to identify a scenario in which I would go forward and recommend that American ground combat forces were committed into Central America. An overt aggression on the part of Nicaragua into Costa Rica or Honduras where you have democratically elected governments, it seems to me it would be one of the instances in which the President would have to address that issue very, very seriously.

Aside from that it seems to me that the use of American combat forces in that region, except by, except for Naval forces and air forces, to sanitize the area and prevent equipment and goods from outside flowing into that region, seems to me to be not very productive.

Are these views shared within the military, or....

I would that that the bulk... uh most of my peers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and most of the senior military that have been involved in this type of operation over time, both Vietnam and now have addressed the Central America problem would agree with the basic thrust of the points I've made.

Let me just throw one last one at you. Again, in retrospect, do you think Vietnam was a winnable war?

Well, you'd have to define winnable. I think that if... in the very... yeah, uh, was Vietnam, one of the questions that is often asked is could we win Vietnam. Was Vietnam winnable? And I don't believe that Vietnam was winnable with the kinds of restrictions, political restrictions and military restrictions that were placed upon the way in which, upon the forces that we committed there. So I don't think in that context they were winnable. Oh, would it be possible to have won in the classic sense the war in Vietnam with other parameters at the start. Perhaps.

But it would be difficult to go back and be able to lay that out and be very confident of the results. There is one other point that I think I'd like to make that you didn't hit upon if I may. Oh, one thing that has change dramatically since Vietnam has been that Congress has passed a War Powers Act. And that places the onus upon the President, if he decides to commit American forces anywhere in the world to have support of Congress, hence the American people within 90 days or he can be required to withdraw those forces.

I think that's an important aspect for the military, the civilian leadership and for the American public to understand, that it’s not possible for the President to put us into a Vietnam war for a long period of time without the support of the American people.

Let me kind of... Are you saying this approvingly?

Uh, I, uh, is that a good that or is that a bad thing since I personally believe that it's absolutely essential that soldiers not be sent off to war without the support of the American people. I believe that from in the long run, that is a good thing. There are many military who do not feel that, but I believe that it's absolutely essential that we have that support and that that support be up front by our Congress in any future operation. In any future situations in which we might commit American soldiers.

Cut. Good. That's good.