Post World War II international relations
The irrationality of the arms race
Nuclear weapons as a deterrent
Prospects for future disarmament and peace
Space and Strategic Defense
Dean Rusk's impressions of Mikhail Gorbachev
Foreign policies of the US and the Soviet Union
Balance of forces between the US and the Soviet Union
Budgetary issues affecting national security
Lessons of the nuclear age

 
 

Post World War II international relations

Interviewer

I want you to consider this your opportunity. Any lessons that you feel passionately about, that the public ought to know, just let us have them.

Rusk

Well I might. I've decided to turn things over to younger people and not brood on lessons too much. Let them, let them make their own mistakes.

Interviewer

Yea, but it's too dangerous. I just wanted to ask you about being in the war in the 40's, during world war II. Oh, this is the first tape of an interview with Dean Rusk, secretary of state from 1961 to '68, I believe. O.k. during the war. What was the impact that you felt personally of the atomic bomb?

Rusk

The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima came as somewhat of a surprise to me. I was not in that part of the general staff which was in on the know. But, ah, it made a powerful impression. As a Colonel sitting next to me said, ah, war has now turned on itself and is devouring its own tail. From this time forward it will make no sense for governments to settle their disputes by military means. Well, that was very much on our minds. It, it, had a, of course a powerful affect on the Japanese fortunately, but ah, ah, we realized that this was entering a new phase of warfare and that ah, we have to give fundamental thought to the differences that it made.

Interviewer

I would like to ask you to do it again. Since we want to take the whole answer and take from right from what he said to how you felt and how you looked at ...... warfare.

Rusk

Well, well don't, don't ask me to, to repeat things because ah, I'm not very good at that. But ah, where, where do you want me, do you want me to start the whole thing over again?

Interviewer

Yeah. See what we'll have to do is less detail on it, that you were not on the general staff at the time.

Rusk

When, ah, we in the General Staff in Washington ah, heard of the bombing of Hiroshima. It made a profound affect upon us because ahm, as one Colonel sitting next to me said ah, war has turned upon itself and is devouring its own tail. From this time forward it will make no sense for governments to try to resolve their differences by military means.

Interviewer

Was your feeling at that time that maybe war would become obsolete? That in fact the nuclear weapons would change the way?

Rusk

Well, we ah. Some of us had that feeling ah, as nuclear weapons grew and proliferated but at the same time ah, the United States and other western democracies made a fundamental mistake. After VJ day we dis, disarmed almost totally and almost ah, overnight. By the summer of 1946 we did not have one division of our army nor one group in our airforce ready for combat. Well now Joseph Stalin sat over there in Moscow and looked out across the West and saw the divisions melting away. So what did he do? He tried to keep the northwest province of Iran, Azarbayjan the first case before the U.N. Security Council. He converted Eastern Europe into a colonial empire. He ah, had a hand in the communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. He blockaded Berlin. He supported the guerillas going after Greece. On other words, those adventures of Jos, Joseph Stalin at a time when we were disarmed, ah, was the beginning of the Cold War. And it was not until 1950 that we began to build up our armed forces in a, in a significant way.

Interviewer

What do you think was our role in the cold war? Were we purely defensive or do you think that at times we might have exaggerated the threat or propagated the cold war feeling?

Rusk

Ah, we ah, ourselves were, as I say, disarmed. Our defense budget had come down to a little over eleven billion dollars a year. Ah, we brought our veterans home in ah, almost a panic. Ahm, we were ready for the kind of world that is sketched out in the Charter of the United Nations. Ah, but these advenutres by Joseph Stalin ah, created the Cold War and forced us to take steps to ah, ah, meet the common danger. And ah, we began by resisting the, oc, the, the blockade of Berlin, by helping the Greeks deal with the guerilla problem and then came the attack in, ah, in, in, by the North Koreans and so things changed almost fundamentally at that time.

Interviewer

Could you describe to us, how the, how the policy of containment was developed and particularly how, at the time it was conceived that military force could be used to counter what Stalin was doing?

Rusk

Containment was almost a, ah, an inevitable reaction to the moves that were being made by Josef Stalin. Ah, we simple couldn't sit still and allow him to succeed in all the moves that he was, that, he set out to ta, take. Ahmm, so containment was in effect forced upon us. Now we did not think that it was our job to use military force in all parts of the world just because there was a threat. But we did feel that we ought to, to, ah, consider those areas that we considered vital to our interest beginning with NATO and Western Europe and ah, be prepared to used military force if necessary in those areas.

Interviewer

You had a special role, I believe, in the 50's in charge of U.N. matters at the state department.

Rusk

I, I was the first Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs, yes. In, in, in the ah, Truman Administration.

Interviewer

Was there sincere hope after the war that in fact the U.N. could become a body that could enforce international law.

Rusk

We, ah started out on that basis. Although our expectations were probably ah, somewhat too rosy.

Interviewer

Excuse me. When you say that basis, they won't have heard my question so I just want you to state that...

Rusk

Alright, will you state it again?

Interviewer

You had special responsibility for the U.N. what were the hopes what the U.N. could do after the war?

Rusk

We tried our best to get the United Nations off to a good start. We, we participated actively in drawing up its rules of procedures, dealing with its organizational matters. Ahm, we wanted a world that was sketched out in the U.N. Charter, which was a very good, succinct, ah, outline of American foreign policy at the time. That's no accident because we played a major role in drafting the Charter. But, ahm, I think our hopes and expectations were unreasonably high. We, we expected a degree of cooperation from the Soviet Union that was not forthcoming and we were bitterly disappointed, disappointed to, to, ah, witness a, series of Soviet vetoes which paralyzed the Security Council, and would not allow it to ah, carry out its functions. And so, although the, the, ah, beginnings of the U.N. were very optimistic it did not take long for second thoughts to prevail and settle down into the realities of the real world.

Interviewer

In light of that experience that you had, what judgment would you make about the viability of future, stronger, international regime of law and order that nations would ascribe to that would replace the use of military force?

Rusk

Well I think the unfinished business of ah, the world is ahm, to ah, allow international law to deal with the vital points which it has so far failed to do. For example in the use of ah, law and charter to prevent international armed conflict, as a matter of fact, most nations, most of the time comply with international law. The United States itself has more than seven thousand agreement and treaties with other countries. And in the course of a single year, less than one percent of those come up for any discussion between us and another government as to whether we or they are complying with those agreements. So, ah, there's a vast range of human affairs which is successfully controlled by international law. But, ah, we have not yet been able to use international law to ah, ah, at the point where it is most needed. That is to curb the use of violence among nations.

Interviewer

Are you optimistic that we could use international law for that purpose eventually?

Rusk

Well, for the last ah, sixteen years I have been a Professor of International Law and I'm naturally ah, hopeful that ah, the role of international law will continue to grow and spread even though slowly. And, I, I, feel that ah, in, in a nuclear world there is no, no real alternative. Because nuclear war is simply that war which must never be fought.

The irrationality of the arms race

Interviewer

Go back a little bit again. Our nuclear arsenals grew tremendously during the 50's and 60's and I wanted to ask you from your point of view at that time, what was the conception that our nuclear forces could serve us for. What was they're purpose?

Rusk

At the beginning we felt that ah, there might be a use for nuclear weapons which ah, would make sense in the rational sense, in the rationa, rationally considered. But, ah, as nuclear weapons grew ah, it became increasingly obvious that nuclear war was simply that war which must never be fought. Because a nuclear war would not only eliminate all the answers, it would eliminate all the questions. Kruschev put it very well one time when he said that, in, in the case of nuclear war the living would envy the dead. Shortly after he took office President Kennedy called together half a dozen of his senior colleagues, including myself, into the Cabinet room and we spent most of a day going through the, ah, results of a nuclear war, both direct and indirect, and it was a very sobering experience. At the end of the meeting, President Kennedy asked me to go back with him to the Oval office to talk about something, and as we went through the door, he with a strange little look on his face, said "And we call ourselves the human race." Those who understand nuclear weapons know that they must not be used.

Interviewer

We pledged to Europeans that we would come to their aid with nuclear weapons if necessary to defend them against the Soviet threat. What was your feeling about that at the time?

Rusk

When we organized NATO, ah, and faced the large conventional superiority which the Russians had in conventional weapons, ah, we ah, considered that, ah, one response to the, to, to a Soviety attack on the West would be, would have to be nuclear weapons. Ahm, that has been a part of the NATO strategy ever since. Now, ah, let me add that I have never seen any evidence of a Soviety intention, ah, to attack the West in strength. Ah, one comes to that threat by the consideration of ah, capabilities. The military commander in the field has to give thought to the capabilities of his enemy and the worst that his enemy can do to him. Otherwise he might face the destruction of his own forces. But that's a very different thing than, than, the consideration of intentions. I myself do not believe that ah, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, ah, have any intention whatever of attacking Western Europe in force. They realize that will produce the war which must never occur.

Interviewer

Why is it then we hear so much about how we have to keep putting new forces in and modernizing our forces in Europe and what a risk it is and how they're ready to pounce and the Europeans are always asking us for more guarantees that we will come to their aid. And our leadership is often asking the American public to pay for more and more weaponry and support more sophisticated weaponry in defense against that supposed Soviet intent?

Rusk

We have ah, participated in [an] arms race, which fundamentallY doesn't make any sense either for ourselves or the Soviet Union because these arms, which [must] never be used. But, ah, the race occurs because of the, then necessity for deterrence. For make, trying to make it clear to the other side that any attack by him is not on and ah, this, ah, is ah, matter which affects the attitude of both sides. Ah, and there's the qualitative race in terms of more accuracy and better capability on the part of missiles and that continues on both sides. Ahm, we and the Soviet Union ought to pause and sit down and bring this arms race to an end. And I hope the INF Treaty is the first step in that direction.

Interviewer

I wanted to go over that because I was unclear about one thing that you said. The core of this question is going to be what in your opinion drives the arms race? If both sides recognize that the nuclear war cannot be fought, why do we keep building more and more sophisticated weaponry? Why do we have fifty thousand weapons in the world?

Rusk

Well, that is to some extent, a mystery to me. How.. I'm sorry.

Interviewer

You need to start by.........

Rusk

We and the Soviet Union have allowed ourselves to get into an arms race ah, which ah, at bottom makes no sense. But, ah, I think each side is a little afraid that the other side will achieve a superiority in numbers or in quality that will tempt the other side to deliver a first try, to think that they can get away with something that they could, could not in fact get away with. Ah, its, ah, a failure in fact to keep the deterrence under reasonable limits and ah, for that reason, I, I myself am in favor of ah, the nuclear treaties which will go as far as one is able to go within the limits of veri, verification. But, ah, its a little bit like ah, ah, a bank balance.

Interviewer

I'm going to stop here because I want to do this as a separate response. If you can try to remember to look at me more often, I think it would come across better than you looking down. I know it's hard because of the lights. I love the analogy you do with the bank balance wanting to be even but a little bit above the other side. So let's do that one and ask the question again which is what do you think drives the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Rusk

Well when you ask me that question direct..

Interviewer

Sorry, that's difficult for you to...

Rusk

It isn't easy to explain why the arms race ahm, each side wants to balance off the other. Each side, wants, if possible, to get a little edge on the other. And its a little like a bank balance which, where, each, each side wants a plus in its favor. Ahm, and so that continually feeds the arms race and then also there are innovations ah, technical innovations that tend to ah, fuel the arms race. Somebody gets a new guidance system or somebody gets a new, larger, ah delivery weapon or something of that sort. Ahm, Senator Nunn has complained about the ahm, redundancy of weapons in the American arsenal. We have a great variety of weapons which can reach the Soviet Union where everyone would think that a relatively few would, would, do the trick. Ahm, but ah, it gets caught up in the indus, military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned us about. Ah, when something looks like its technically feasible there are people in our armed forces who want to have it and so ah, but I must say, ah, there's a lot of mystery to me as to why the arms race and I cannot answer the question directly as to what are all the factors that go into the arms race.

Interviewer

What do you think is the impact of the military-industrial complex? Do you think that it has tended to exaggerate the threat and has an impact that is detrimental to the American people?

Rusk

I think we're inclined to ah, ah, give maximum credit to the other fellows capabilities and, and, and, arm, arms potential. And to minimize our own strength and readiness. I don't believe myself that ah, the, disparity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is nearly important as many people do. But I think the Russians would have a heck of a time bringing the Poles and the Hungarians and the Czechs the East Germans to fight with them in a war against Western Europe.

Interviewer

Then why is there so much paranoia that their forces are so overwhelming and they could beat us in conventional war and therefore we have to use nuclear weapons?

Rusk

Well, it's probably true if one makes a deliberate calculation ahead of time because it would be very unlikely that the NATO forces would be able to repel an all out Warsaw Pact attack, ah, if they were serious about it. And ah, they would not be long, maybe two or three days, before Soviet forces would be back where the tactical nuclear weapons of the United States are stationed. No American President will allow the Warsaw Pact forces to capture those weapons if they were threatened with capture they would be, they would be used. So all that adds up to the fact that such an, such an invasion, such a war must-never, never occur.

Nuclear weapons as a deterrent

Interviewer

I'm going to ask you if you can just make the short statement again about the bank balance analogy. I think it was very long and drawn out. Do you mind doing that?

Rusk

Yeah, I do.

Interviewer

O.k. I would like to ask you what you think the purpose of our nuclear arsenal should be and how that should change what our policy is in Europe in terms of our commitment to using nuclear weapons to balance conventional threat.

Rusk

The only rational use of nuclear weapons, in my mind, is to try to insure that other nations will not use nuclear weapons against us. The one exception at the moment is the use of nuclear weapons to counter a massive conventional strike by the Warsaw Pact countries against Western Europe. But if Mr, Gorbachev chould provide ah, western europe with an assurance in some way, that Warsaw Pact countries would never attack Western Europe then the question of first strike would take care of itself, it would disappear. Ahm, now if we move ahead on nuclear disarmament, somewhere along the way, there would have to be an agreement on nuc., on conventional weapons to redress the balance between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. See, it makes no sense for the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries to stare at each other across that dividing line in Europe. With such large forces on each side, they could do the same thing with far fewer forces than they have now.

Interviewer

Are you saying that right now America is pledged to defend our vital interests around the world including Europe and the Persian Gulf with nuclear weapons.

Rusk

I have not ah, been aware that we have committed nuclear weapons to the Persian Gulf. I would doubt very much that they would be used in that situation.

Interviewer

Oh it was just the Carter doctrine where he said we would use whatever force is needed.

Rusk

Well, I think that was an exaggeration.

Interviewer

You made a comment about how you felt the Europeans wouldn't want to go to nuclear weapons in Europe because they would realize what the consequences were. Can you describe that?

Rusk

Our friends in Europe tend to rely l00 percent on ah, deterrence. And they think less of what would happen if deterrence failed but I'm quite sure that ah, if ah, we got into an actual situation of an attack and a confrontation of armed forces on each side that the heads of government, in, in, Western Europe would be very reluctant to turn their own countries into a pile of ashes. Ah, for, for, trivial reasons. Ah, I think that if they looked at the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons ah, they would not be gung-ho to get started on that trail.

Interviewer

Is it hard then for us to really make credible to the Soviet Union that in fact we have this powerful deterrent force of nuclear weapons? How could they believe that the Europeans would really want to initiate the use?

Rusk

The Soviet Union has to give thought to ah, ah, the presence of those nuclear weapons in Europe and the, unlikelihood that an American President would allow them to ah, capture those weapons. Ahm, if you want to put it, in, in one way ah, the Soviet leaders must take into account that we Americans are God damn fools and that those weapons might be used and so they have to take that into account. As a matter of act, the chances are very high that if there were an all out attack on Western Europe there would be ah, nuclear weapons in the play. And that is something that Soviet leaders know and I think would cause them ah, to hesitate, to. to launch such an attack.

Interviewer

I wanted to ask you about the risk of nuclear war. You're someone who has lived through a time in which that risk was brought to the forefront a little bit stronger than usual and perhaps relate that to our reliance on nuclear deterrance today where we have tinder boxes set out in various parts of the world.

Rusk

The most important single thing which one can say about this post-war period, is that we have now put behind us more thant 42 years since a nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. Despite many serious and even dangerous crises which we have had during that period. I think the leaders on both sides ah, recognize the, ah, that nuclear war is simply not to be fought.Ahm, and that ah, ah, has been a saving feature in this post-war period. After all, dur, the most dangerous crises we've had since 1945 has been the Cuban Missile Crisis and we came through that without the use of nuclear weapons. Ahm, I think that is a strong proof that ah, nuclear war; is not liklely to occur. I'm, I'm sorry that so many of our young people are being battered with doomsday talk about nuclear matters. Ahm, much more than the traffic will bear, much more than is necessary.

Interviewer

Do you think that we can rest assured that because we've had 42 years of peace, living with all these nuclear weapons, that we should continue to rely on that force in the future to keep peace?

Rusk

I think there's a good chance that ahm, ahm, these 42 years demonstrate that ah, nuclear powers are not likely to resort to nuclear weapons because they, after all they know something about their destructive power. Ahm, no I'm very optimistic about the prospects of avoiding a nuclear war. Ahm, but ah, I, I wish I could be optimistic about our being willing to cut down the nuclear arms race to reasonable proportions. We could, we could achieve the benefits of nuclear weapons, if there are any benefits, ahm, with just several hundred on each side, rather than the tens of thousands that we now have on both sides. But, ah, I, I'm optimistic that at, we, we, we'll be able to avoid nuclear war.

Interviewer

Some people have questioned the morality of keeping the peace by relying on the threat to obliterate the world. How do you feel?

Rusk

Well, that is, that is an important question. Ahm, keeping the peace is one of the, one of the, the very great moral obligations of mankind. Ahm, we should not be in the business of killinq off each other. But ah, how you get peace is, is, is a more complicated question. You cannot get peace simply by wishing for it. You cannot get peace by unilateral disarmament, whereby the armed battalion will march and take what they want in a short run, ah, peace has to be built brick by brick. It has to be earned. Sometimes it may be necessary to sacrifice for it. But ah, we must never, ah, ah, back away from the objec, objective of preventing war. That is the, one of the principle moral oblications of the human race.

Prospects for future disarmament and peace

Interviewer

I would like you to describe the world that you would like us to move toward, this world in which nuclear weapons would only deter nuclear weapons rather than other forms of miltary force and that we would only have a few hundred on each side.

Rusk

It would be very difficult to negotiate ah, disarmament to that extent. But I think we must keep at it and try our best to move in that direction. But, ah, these..

Interviewer

I'm sorry. When you say that, you have to say what you're referring to. O.k.

Rusk

Nuclear weapons ahm, do not fire themselves. They are fired by human beings and usually would, would, expect about something. The ah, overwhelming need in this present world situation is to try to avoid crises, like the Cuban Missile Crisis, to try to resolve regional disputes in such a way as not to involve armed force, ah, the, ah, the road to peace is ah, is a road which must be marked by the, by the settlement of, of, outstanding political issues. Ah, to remove the causes the war rather than to think that ah, weapons themselves cause wars. Ahm, and so we should concentrate bit by bit on the regional differences that tend to ah, stimulate wars. Not, not only between the great powers but between the lesser power, smaller countries.

Interviewer

I would like you to be able to state that you think we should move toward a world in which there are just a few hundred weapons on each side and that they are only used to prevent, for deterrent use of nuclear weapons.

Rusk

As far as I am concerned ahm, I would go just far in reducing nuclear weapons as the capabilities of verification would permit. If one could show me how you protect yourself against hiding these warheads away in salt mines in Utah, in Siberia, in the Hunan province of China. I would go for nuclear, for zero nuclear weapons tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock because it's obvious that the American people are less safe today than they were when no such weapons existed. But I cannot imagine any system of verification that would protect against ah, ah, such hiding away of warheads. So I think that we are likely to ah, at, at the very best come down to a few hundred missiles on each side which could clearly carry out the, the only rational use of nuclear weapons which is to prevent nuclear weapons being used against us.

Interviewer

So you would like to go away from the situation in which we use the threat of using nuclear weapons to defend our interests around the world be it against a conventional force or a nuclear force?

Rusk

I've, I've talked about ahm, the ahm, impossibilies of starting a nuclear war among the great powers. But I think it's equally true that, if a nuclear power used nuclear weapons against a mnon-nuclear power, that country would wear the mark of Cain for many generations to come. Ah, we must not, ah, expect that nuclear weapons will be used by a nuclear power against a non-nuclear power just, would, would have no, no purpose and ah, and the effects would be disasterous to the country that was using them.

Interviewer

Harking back to your experience about dealing with crises under tremendous pressure that results when small groups of men have to make decisions about what to do next, not knowing what's happening on the other side. Does that make you more worried about the fact that we do have nuclear weapons sort of on shipboards around the world, that we have such big arsenals in that they are on such immediate alert?

Rusk

I am not concerned ahm, that a, an American President would give any real thought to the use of nuclear weapons on our own initiative. Ah, I've seen several presidents in action where, in theory, this ah, option is on, on the table and could be considered, but ah, I've seen them all, re, reject that idea. Now we don't have nuclear weapons around the world, in, the control of the President of the United States. And we have elaborate safeguards against their accidental firing, or against their unauthorized firing. And so I don't lose much sleep over the, the pros, prospect that some general, or admiral, or someone would launch nuclear weapons without the President of the United States.

Interviewer

I guess what I want to know is after you came through the Cuban Missile Crisis, did you form some opinion about what it's like to actually have to make those life and death decisions for the world, or for our two nations under time pressure?

Rusk

During the Cuban Missile Crises we learned some ah, what to me were, valuable lessons. I think both we and the Soviets came out of that crisis more prudent, more cautious than we were before we went in. And we came out of it with ah, a recognition that we must not allow such crises to develope because they're just too damned dangerous. Ahm, now,now that mood ah, does not necessarily transfer from political leader to political leader over time. And so we have to be careful that that sort of sense is maintained. But ah, we both had a chance to look down the cannon's mouth during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We did not like what we saw. And ah, so that made a profound impact. As a matter following the Cuban Missile Crisis the two sides, ahm, negotiated some very important agreements and ahm, made, made considerable headway, in, in so doing.

Interviewer

Maybe you could tell the story about drving through the streets of Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis. When you thought about the Westminster Shorter Catechism.

Rusk

Oh, yeah, I see. Well we did not think that Mr. Khrushchev would ah, use nuclear weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis but we could not know it. And therefore we had to take that into account as a possibility. Ah, I remember as I drove through the streets of Washington during that critical week and saw people walking along the sidewalks and driving by in their cars. My mind went back to the Shorter Catechism, the Westminster Shorter Catechism which I had memorized as a young boy. The first question of which is, "What is the chief end of man?" Well the catechism had a theological answer but ahm, ah, I remember thinking about that question and realizing that this most fundamental of all questions. What is life all about. Had become an operational question before the governmentsof the world. And that made a considerable impact upon me.

Interviewer

I would like to hear what you think about the current development in technology that are leading us to be able to think about developing weapons that we could put into space.

Rusk

As far as ah, putting space into space is concerned. I have some rather primitive and fundamental ideas.

Space and Strategic Defense

Rusk

Back in the 1960's, we developed a basic treaty on outer space subscribed to by all the nations of the world. And, it, it is clear under that treaty that outer space was to be an area reserved for peaceful cooperation and scientific exploration. We called astronauts, and cosmonauts, envoys of all mankind. We agreed to make available to everybody the information that we got out of such space activities. We prevented any nation from claiming outer space bodies such as the moon, as national territory. Ah, we prohibited the use of space for weapons of mass destruction. Now, the world was dreaming at that time of a clean outer space. And I would hate to see us ah, spoil that dream by stationing weapons in outer space and moving the arms race into outer space. I have serious doubts about its feasibility anyhow. But my feeling is that ah, the SDI proposals are politically inflamatory, militarily useless, economically absurd and asthetically repulsive. And I hope we never go down that trail.

Dean Rusk's impressions of Mikhail Gorbachev

Interviewer

You may refuse to do this but that was a very long answer and I think it's a very good answer. I was wondering if you could give us a shorter summary of the earlier stuff about the outer space treaty?

Rusk

Well, I'll let you I'll let you shorten it if you want to.

Interviewer

Well, it's hard for me to do that. I don't want to cut into your statement. Do you...

Rusk

No, I don't, I don't, I really don't like to try to go over material.

Interviewer

That's fine. O.k. I want to talk a little bit about the Soviet Union. The question is, what should we make of Gorbachev? It seems like this is probably the most biggist change that has happened in East-West relations in a long time, the way he's talking about things. What's your take on how we should respond?

Rusk

I think we ought to approach it, ah, carefully and, oh, I'm sorry.

Interviewer

Maybe you'll want to start by saying what you think is motivating him.

Rusk

Mr. Gorbachev has ahm, aroused a good of speculation about what he's trying to do and what he's all about. I think we have to approach that with a, an open mind but with a certain amount of care. Ahm, he obviously has some problems at home in his own country. But ah, he also may be opening up possibilities for better relations and agreements with the West and with, with the United States. If so, we should not let the slogans of the Cold War stand in the way. But on the other hand we must ah, keep our wits about us. After all, Mr. Gorbachev is a dedicated communist. He has not thus far seen fit to give up any of the loot that his predecessors gathered along the way, and he's very active in places like ah, ah, Nicaragua and Angola and ah, other places around the wrold. So I think we ought to give him a chance but we ought to keep our eye on what he does and not just on what he says. He's a very able man. He's very good at public relations. Ah, he's different from his predesessors in important respects. So let's give him a chance, take those chances which are ahm, promising but, ah, keep up our guard.

[END OF TAPE El3044]

Foreign policies of the US and the Soviet Union

Interviewer

In your opinion, what is the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union about?

Rusk

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union derives from ah the ah activities of the Soviet Union outside their own country. As far as ah communism in the Soviet Union is concerned, we've lived with that since 1917. And we haven't fought a war with them over that subject. But when they reach out to ah control other nations, and impose their will or their system on other nations, that is a concern to us. And ah we...we have to be, we have to be careful about that. Ah in a sense that is a part of their own ideology. The ah Marxist/Lenin view that ah communism is the way of the future, and that in due time the whole world will be communist. But we can't accept that and we... we can't accept the outward activities of the Soviet Union to bring that about.

Interviewer

In what ways are we still in conflict with the Soviet Union today?

Rusk

We have ah today ah regional issues with the Soviet Union in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Cuba. Ahm some of these hopefully can be resolved. But ahm there cannot help but be a degree of competition between the two of us in the third world. See our view is that ah. ..ah where there's a nation which is concerned about its own people and is cooperating internationally, that there's a situation that's in the interest of the United States. But we do not like a situation where various countries become clients of the Soviet Union and engage in this world-wide effort to spread their system. And so that leads to unresolved conflict. I hope some of them can be worked out in the near future.

Interviewer

Do you think both systems of both countries have been sort of messianic in trying to spread their influence around the world sort of the way the great powers have always done and that the United States also has used force to try to impose its ideas?

Rusk

Ah that... it may be possible that Soviet critics of the United States can point to situations where they think we abuse the use of force. But ah from their own ideology, anyone who stands in the way of the world revolution is an enemy. And ah so that makes it very difficult for usto resolve these problems with them. But ah on the whole, if you look back over the entire post-war period, the ah policy of the United States, has been rather grand in character. It is... no one really thinks that we are interested in taking what doesn't belong to us. That we're trying to overrun their countries. Ah I think that's generally felt around the world. By the way ahm one tends to exaggerate the use of nuclear weapons as a political tool. Because most of the countries of the world can live in complete assurance that the United States is not going to use a nuclear weapon against them. And so that doesn't translate into influencing places like Burma, or Uraguay, or Malaysia, or some place like that. The role of nuclear weapons has been greatly exaggerated in that respect.

Interviewer

The Soviets say that we want to be number one in the world and dictate to other people. We want to be the number one militarily. And that they have been catching up with us and have had to in order to have their own say about their own defense.

Rusk

I think the Soviet Union ah claims that ahm they have a job of catching up to do. That may be true on the economic side. But ah I don't think that it's really true in strategic terms. We have not established a colonial empire such as they have in eastern Europe. We ah...ah have been in a position of live and let live so long as they're willing to do so. Ahm I think their...their propaganda ah more or less picks us out as enemy number one. When ah the problem is they have themselves created the basis for that emnity, for that hostility.

Interviewer

Do you think that we ought to help Gorbachev? Would it be good for us if the Soviet Union were the stronger rival economically?

Rusk

It would be in our interest if Mr. Gorbachev succeeds in reorganizing the Soviet Union and putting it on a more liveable basis. We have no interest in the grinding poverty that exists in some parts of the Soviet Union. We ah I think ah would be more than willing to compete on the economlc, soclal, political scale and not on the military scale if they would let us do it. Ah I'm rather hopeful that ah the changes that Mr. Gorbachev thinks is needed for his own purposes at the Soviet Union will have a beneficial effect on their foreign policy and on our relations with them.

Interviewer

How could that happen?

Rusk

I'm in favor of an increase of trade with the Soviet Union. Provided we ah take from them which we ourselves need and can use, such as minerals, and for... forest products. Not just vodka and caviar. Ahm but I'm rather opposed to our shipping them high technology in exchange for just loans. Because ah those loans are in effect a subsidy to their economy. We ought to work out ah a trade based upon goods for goods. And services for services. And I think on that basis I'd be glad to see an expansion of our trade with the Soviet Union. And there's some signs that that is going to be possible.

Interviewer

Gorbachev has talked about how there really isn't a conflict between the Soviet Union and the U.S. anymore. And we often turn our energies away from the military sphere to working together on common problems like ecology, and third world development, hunger and so forth. What's your feeling about that?

Rusk

I think there are some problems which are common to all mankind on which we and the Soviet Union can profitably work together. The environment is a prime example. They have done some very interesting things to protect the environment in their own country. And we ought to exchange experience on that as much as possible. Then I think the field of health and disease. We and they ah can profitably work as closely together as possible. Ahm on the food stuffs, I think we have along range interest in the ability of the Soviet Union to ah, as with everybody else, as to ah producing more food. Because the. ..the numbers are such that the growth of the human race means that we're going to face an increasingly severe food shortage. And the Soviet Union used to be the bread basket of Europe. Well we ought to encourage them I think to grow more food and if we can find ways to be helpful, through technical assistance or otherwise, we ought to do so.

Balance of forces between the US and the Soviet Union

Interviewer

My question is, it seems to me that if we trust ourselves and our motives in the world, and we can't quite trust the Soviets, why shouldn't we strike to be superior militarily? Have the power to be able to counter any potential move on their part. Why settle for the situation of parity?

Rusk

The idea that ah there is such a thing as nuclear superiority, is ah illusory. Ah we've reached the point where there's no such ah rational concept. Ahm secretary George Marshall used to say to us, "Let's don't start talking about our problem as a military problem. Because that tends to turn it into a military problem. And the use of a military ah option must always be the very last resort. And so ah I think we should proceed on the basis that we're not looking for places to intervene. We're not looking for chances to employ our armed forces. But we look at every other alternative first. And ah be very reluctant to use our armed forces. I might say that I know something about the decisions made by the United States to use its armed forces for the last fifty years. And on no single occasion ah has that been at the initiative of our own armed forces. Ah our armedforces are not beligerant. They're reluctant ah to ah to... to take action.And I think that's a very wholesome and healthy situation.

Interviewer

You had made a comment in one of your speeches about how we had to learn to inhabit the speck of dust. And I wanted to relate that to my question about why... that I certainly would feel safer if we were in control, that we're clearly superior militarily. Is there some lesson that we have to learn?

Rusk

I don't think that we can aspire to a build up on the idea that we can ever be militarily superior in this world. As a matter of fact the relative power position of the Soviet Union and the United States as being diminished by the spread of power among so ma... so many places in the world. There are just a lot of things that they, that we and they cannot do militarily. And I think that's all to the good. Ahm, no Henry Kissenger once said, "what on earth is nuclear superiority?" Ahm it just makes no sense to think in terms of being number one, anymore than... well...well, as a matter of fact, we never have been number one in a real sense because even when we had a nuclear monopoly so called, we had only a handful of nuclear weapons in our stockpile, and we knew that Mr. Stalin, by espionage, had learned how few we had. And so we've never really been number one, and don't really aspire to be, or should not aspire to be.

Interviewer

The part, didn't Kissenger say, "What on God's name is nuclear superiority?

Rusk

Yes.

Interviewer

I think you said military.

Rusk

Did I say, military?

Interviewer

Yeah, you want to just do that part of it.

Rusk

When we think about being number one we ought to remember Henry Kissenger's remark that ah, "What in God's name is nuclear superiority?" That is a very searching question although he tended to back away from it later on. But ahm it just makes no sense because only a few hundred of these dreadful weapons can ah...ah wreckindescribable horror on the other side. And yet we have tens of thousands of them. So we are in a wholly irrational situation.

Interviewer

What do you think we ought to do about the conventional balance? Do you think that...what is the relationship of these nuclear weapons to conventional forces? And how do we alter it by either... some people say we should bolster our conventional forces in Europe and be willing to spend money. Is that what you think too?

Rusk

I was a member of the NATO foreign ministers when we took the first step in the late sixties to ah initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union on conventional forces. But we realized at that time that these would be difficult negotiations because the Soviet Union undoubtedly believes that for its own purposes in Eastern Europe it needs a substantial force in Eastern Europe to ensure the loyalty of the countries of eastern Europe. And there is a... the high probability that the scale of forces that they feel for their own purposes cannot help but be perceived as a threat to NATO if they faced west and started marching. So these... it will not be easy to work out an agreement on conventional weapons. But I think we have to try and we have to, we have to get some headway in that field before we can get very far in further nuclear disarmament.

Interviewer

You don't think the solution is for us to just build up our conventional forces vis-a-vis the Soviet level?

Rusk

If we tried to build up our NATO forces including our own to the level of Warsaw Pact forces, it would be a highly wasteful and hopefully unnecessary if we can get an agreement for them to reduce their own forces substantially. No, I think we should not turn ourselves into a military camp if we can avoid it. Because we're not that kind of people. And that's not the kind of society we want or the world we want to live in. So I would hope that we would not try to equalize the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces by massive build up of NATO forces. It would be, it would be, it would be wasteful.

Interviewer

Does that mean we need to continue to rely on nuclear weapons to balance those forces?

Rusk

On the present circumstances of the ah the scale of nuclear weapons we have in Europe which we have, tactical and otherwise, helps to reduce' the threat of the overwhelming conventional strength of the Soviet Union. But ah I think really our best reliance in that field is the ah, is the lack of intention on the part of the Soviet Union to launch an all-out attack against ah, against Western Europe. I just don't believe they have that in mind.

Budgetary issues affecting national security

Interviewer

I'm curious about whether in the changing geopolitical conditions in the world today whether in a sense the cold war is ending and what's rising in its place are a more complex series of a potential issues between lots of different nations that are developing. And what you think we ought to do about that?

Rusk

Future historians will marvel at the ah rapidity with which colonial empires disappeared, and over a hundred independent nations arrived on the scene to take their place. This complicates our own foreign relations considerably because we have to take into account the attitude of more capitals, many more capitals. Before WWII you could talk to about seven capitals, and you would have covered the continent of Africa. Now you've got to touch base with fifty capitals. So ahm, well there are 159 members of the United Nations. We started out with 51. So that increases our diplomatic burden very considerably. But that's all to the good, I think. Because I think there's safety in numbers. Safety in a world in which no one or two powers can...can divide the world up and exercise control over it. That would not be a role that the United States would find comfortable. And so I think that development is on the whole good. Although some of these tiny states are not viable. And ah we could look forward to more regional cooperation among the, within the third world. But ah I'm content with ah the way that problem is developed.

Interviewer

What about other potential real powers, super powers? Challenges from Japan, China, and so forth.

Rusk

There are some third world countries that are far more important than others. For example Japan is a dominant economic power these days. There's India with hundreds of millions of people. There's Brazil which is determined to become the United States of South America. We ought to develop our relations with such countries on a fair and equal basis. And ah learn how to live with them and not be in conflict with them. And I think we'll find that that is relatively easy to do and should give us a comfort for the the long run. I don't think there's much chance at any country, including the Soviet Union, wants to buy into the problems of India. Because their problems are too numerous to count. They... they... they've done a pretty fair job in taking care of their own problems. But on trade matters, we have some, and will continue to have some sharp differences with Japan. But ah we'll have to work at those and try to work them out.

Interviewer

Is there a sense that both superpowers have enough internal problems to concentrate on that we don't need to be in conflict all around the world?

Rusk

I think that is, that is true. I think, I think it is true that the two superpowers have enough problems of their own so that they could be, they could spend most of their energy and attentionon those, and not go prowling around the world looking for other places in which to intervene. It is still to be shown that that is indeed the.. .the judgement that Mr. Gorbachev derives from his own analysis of his own situation.

Interviewer

Are you worried about the relative economic decline of the United States vis-a-vis other nations, and what should our national priorities be with respect to them?

Rusk

I am very concerned about the, ah, massive public debt and the deficit that we've run up in our national finances as well as the very negative trade balance. Ah, it bothers me that we have almost tripled our national debt in the present administration. I personally believe that ah, the American people, even thoughthey might vote against it or speak out against it, the American people are sensible enough to ah, pay taxes if we have to pay taxes to get our situation in order. And I would expect that ah, in the next Congress or two, we'll be seeing more revenue producing steps taken. But, ah, to me, there are so many tasks which need attention and which will cost money in this country that ah, we've got to give thought [to] how we, how we manage our own affairs. For example, ah, to me the biggest drug prob, the biggest threat to this country in the late 80's is the drug problem. I consider that a more serious and urgent problem than our relations with the Soviety Union for example. Ah, it's going to take a major effort and perhaps a good deal of money to get that problem under control. But it will, it will eat us up if we don't, if we're not careful and ah, so to me that's an urgent, overwhelming issue. But ah, the United States, ahm, has ah, weathered forty Presidents and we'll weather some more. It has great resilience and strengthin our constitutional system and ah, I think, we'll, we'll work our way home when we, when we decide to do it. And I believe myself that the time to decide is now.

Interviewer

What should we decide. What is the biggest threat to our national security and our integrity?

Rusk

Well, you know, the ahm, the large deficit that we are running is itself a threat to our national security. Ahm, we've suddenly become the largest debtor nation in the world instead of the largest credit, creditor nation. We, ah, are depending upon ah, foreigners to carry our debt for us, to a considerable extent. Well, that creates a dangerous situation because if they ever start withdrawing their funds on a large scale, we'd be in very serious trouble. So, I think ah, national strength is a combination of military, economic, political, and social and morale problems of the American people and I would hope that we could get to work on those in the next Administration.

Lessons of the nuclear age

Interviewer

Is there anything, just looking over the dominant lessons in the nuclear age through your own experience that you feel very passionately about. A message you want to get across?

Rusk

To me the principJe and simple and fundamental ah issue in the nuclear age is to be sure we, we never use these dreadful weapons. Ahm , I, I take some satisfaction out of being able to help add to the forty-two years since a nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. Now there have been lots of mistakes made and there have been lots of crises that are not resolved, but ah, that is the, by all odds, the most important thing we can say about this post-war period and I think there's a very good chance that that situation can continue.

Interviewer

A lot of nuclear strategists think about the reason that we need 25 thousand nuclear weapons in our arsenal has partly to do with being able to develop elaborate strategies of counterforce and so forth. Of being able to use these weapons to play a game of chicken or brinksmanship that they are what backs our military power around the world is the usability of our nuclear weapon and I would like to know what you think about that.

Rusk

In a discussion of nuclear questions a good deal of ah, phony theology has developed. I would include in that the notion that there can be a limited nuclear war or there can be a general nuclear war from which one side can emerge with some advantage. I even think that this counter force strategy makes no sense. The, the idea in that seems to be that if we aim our missiles at only their military targets that will send them a message and they will then leave our cities alone. Well the best way to send a message is to pick up a telephone and talk to somebody. And you try to envisage a telephone conversation between the President of the United States and the First Secretary of the Soviet Union about the counter force strategy and you, you're immediately in the world of the bizarre. You, ah, I think also that we are guilty of exaggerating the accuracy of missiles. Ahm, you've got the geodetic problem of exactly where the target is on the earth's surface. You've got ah, variations in the magnetic and ah, gravitational fields of the earth. You've got the wobbling of the earth on its own axis. You've got weather conditons at point of launch and point of impact and ah, I personally am very skeptical about the ability of ah, nuclear weapons to be precise within a hundred yards of their target. There are all sorts of phony discussion in this nuclear field and I want to keep it down to the very essential fact that this is a war which must never be fought.

Interviewer

How bizarre would that conversation be between the president and the general secretary?

Rusk

Well, let's think of that conversation ah this way. The president picks up the telephone. "Hello Mr. Secretary, this is the President speaking. I want you to know that we've just launched a several thousand of our nuclear missiles but I want to emphasize that we are aiming only at military targets and therefore we hope that you'll reciprocate by leaving our cities alone. How many did you say we, you ask that we launched? Well, we launched about five thousand but there will be some misfires so let's say 4500. What targets? Well, we, of course your missile sites, your submarine bases in Murmansk and Vladivostok and by the way Mr. Secretary, since Moscow is your central commanding control center I want to keep this conversation short so you can get down in your bunker." You know, can you imagine what such a conversation might be, just, just leads you into a crazy world. And, ah, so I don't give any credence to the counter force strategy.

Interviewer

I want to ask you about that because those kind of theories are what many people have explained to Congress. We need to have weapons to pursue. Congress has been told that in order to make our nuclear deterrent strategy credible we need to have those kinds of limited options. Nuclear options. James Schlesinger was a big proponent of those. What should congress say? What should the public say about to the people who are the experts who say we know how to take care of this?

Rusk

There's a lot of ah, bad advice being generated by so-called experts in the nuclear field. Ahm, by people who ah, don't understand politics. A friend of Einstein used to say that he was a genius in mathematical physics an amateur in music, and a baby in politics. Well there's too much of that going around these days. Ahm, I think, the Congress itself is ahm, allowing itself to become complicated by some of this discussion. I been, I listen to the hearings that are held in the Congress these days. Ahm, you know I think we ought to ship all the fluff off these problem again keep our eyes on the main, the main purpose and that is, ah, to consider our nuclear force as simply a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons against us and to scrap most of this esoteric discussion of what what, this nuclear situation might be.

Interviewer

What is the role of the American public and this is such an obstruse issue, it's very hard for them to understand. They are told there is a threat from the Soviet Union and we should build up and match it.

Rusk

I think the, the American people are ah, wiser than we give them credit for. If we will explain to them what the problem is, ahm, I think they, they have sense that we have needed to ah, strengthen our military capability in the last several years. But that we should not go overboard about it and turn ourselves into an armed camp. I think that, my guess is that, that if it is fully explained to them that they will ah, react against moving the arms race into outer space. Ahm, I think they are opposed to ah, to the known waste in our military establishment. I believe that at the end of the day they prepare to pay more taxes for the things which have to be done on a national scale such as the war against drugs and things like that. But I have great confidence in Americans at the grass roots. I do not accept the ah, theory that foreign policy is to be ah, run by the elite. I've seen a lot of the elite in my day and ahm, I ah, think that in terms of practical judgments, sense of direction, common sense, ah, that there's not much difference between the elite and my country cousins in Cherokee County, Georgia.

Interviewer

Do you share with Eisenhower the sense that there is undue influence on our policy on the perception of threat and so forth and where our national resources, our money goes and from the defense establishment?

Rusk

I think we have some problems in our Defense establishment still. Ahm, for example the inner service rivalry where we have the three major departments, vying with each other. Ah, back in ah, the Johnson years, the asking price of the three services usually came to about 120 billion dollars and the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of Defense and President Johnson would work to cut that back to about between 70 and 80 billion as something which we could afford. Well I have the impression that ah, here lately the, the Secretary of Defense has put forward the asking price of the three services rather than a critical examination of what was really necessary. And I have a feeling that majors and Lt. Commanders are searching through the bottom drawers of their desks looking for ideas that have long since been disapproved in order to learn how to spend that kind of money. I may be wrong in that. I hope I'm wrong but ah, I think the American people are capable of ah, accepting common sense on these things.