SALT I negotiations
Beyond Arms Control
Negotiations on weapons systems for SALT I
Diplomacy between the US and the Soviet Union

SALT I negotiations

Interviewer

the first question is did you and the Soviet leadership in general react to President Nixon's call for an era of negotiation in 1969?

Timerbaev

Well, it was a positive answer. Uh, we did think that the time has come to uh, start uh, serious negotiations on uh, controlling uh, nuclear arms race. Especially because at that time there were uh, new developments in the technology of weaponry, and it was high time we should uh sit down and discuss seriously what to do with the nuclear arms race.

Interviewer

Were you skeptical about American intentions?

Timerbaev

Well, of course, we did have a lot of skepticism, and uh we think uh quite founded one. Um, because um, uh, when we first-- we were first approached by the Americans, we thought that they would like to uh, to limit uh, those areas of Soviet uh, strategic might in which we were perhaps ahead, and they wanted to keep those areas of the United States strategic weaponry in which the United States was ahead. So we thought that uh, it was not fair enough.

Interviewer

Do you think that the increasing Soviet offensive capability and the Vietnam war were what helped the United States to come to want an era of negotiation?

Timerbaev

I uh, I think that many factors uh, uh, were instrumental. Uh, one of them was of course, the mm, speedy development of the Soviet uh, capability, uh, which was of course uh, in uh, follow-up of our uh, Sputnik, the first Sputnik. Uh, um, um, secondly, it was the U.S. involvement uh, which deepened at that time in the Vietnam War. Mm, and eh, of course, er, an important factor was the realization of the United States establishment um, that mm, arms control, arms race, uh, might get out of hand, out of control. And that uh, some effort should be made in order to limit, at least to limit if not to, to, to, to start the downward uh, uh, um, movement towards um, stopping it. So there was a, a number of factors involved.

Interviewer

Initially, when Robert McNamara tried to convince the Soviet Union to bring about-- to start to limit the ABMs, the Soviet Union took the position that they didn't want to limit defensive systems. And then they changed their mind, you changed your mind for SALT, the beginning of SALT I. What brought about that change of mind?

Timerbaev

Well, of course at that time, uh, the important question was uh, whether, uh, we should limit uh, ABM uh, capability. At that time, uh, the Soviet Union started to establish its own ABM system around Moscow, which I think is called in the United States, the Galosh uh, system. And mm, American uh, uh, proposal to, to, to, to cut it down, to, to, to put an end to this was, of course, viewed with some suspicion. Uh, we thought that uh, it's important to create an ABM point system -- it's a point system of ABM, a point defense system -- mm, at least eh, because of the uhm, possibility of any uh, unsanctioned or, or a um, unauthorized um, uh nuclear uh, missile launching. Um, uh, and that's why we, we, we, we looked with suspicion. But then uh, uh we came to the realization of an important fact. Which I think one of the underlying reasons for, for the whole uh, uh, further development in this, uh, in this field. That defensive and offensive weapons are very closely interconnected. You cannot do away uh, with one uh, uh, category of weapons without doing away with the other category. This was a, an important realization, to which we come somewhere at the, at the end of the '60s. And that was the mm, theoretical background uh, for mm, a SALT I effort.

Interviewer

So for SALT I did the Soviet Union feel that you were basically making an agreement to agree to the whole strategical situation of mutually assured destruction? That that was the doctrine by which you would be going by?

Timerbaev

No, we didn't-- we never accepted this doctrine. We don't accept this doctrine.

Interviewer

Could you start again and say "Mutual Assured Destruction" so we'll know which doctrine?

Timerbaev

Uh, we, uh, we do not accept MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction as a, a worthwhile doctrine. We do not believe in this doctrine. We think that this doctrine is a, a -- very uh, detrimental. Um, uh, mm, and our efforts, mm, to promote uh, uh, SALT I, uh, exercise, SALT I operation, was because we thought that this effort will um, limit the uh, reliance of the United States on this doctrine. This, this effort will start the trend, the movement towards the complete abolishment of nuclear weapons.

Interviewer

So would you repeat the key reason why you were opposed to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction?

Timerbaev

The, the MAD -- the Mutual Assured Destruction -- is the doctrine based on nuclear deterence, based on the mm, maintenance of nuclear weapons. We believe that uh, nuclear weapons should be abolished, not maintained. And mm, of course you cannot do it overnight. It's a, a, a, uh, difficult and strenuous effort uh, that can uh, uh, make this effort to be uh, to be achieved. Um, and uh, but we thought that SALT I uh, effort was the first step in the right direction. To do away with this uh, uh, reliance on nuclear weapons.

Interviewer

Now, how did the recognition, the general recognition by the United States and the world at large that the Soviet Union had reached a state of relative parity with the United States in terms of nuclear capabilities, how did that affect the position of the U.S.S.R. in the world?

Timerbaev

I think this, the realization that there is a parity, a rough parity or approximate parity -- there cannot be a total i-identical situation, total identical situation -- this realization I think was helpful uh, in an effort to come to first agreements in the field of limitation of both ... offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This was an important factor behind this effort.

Interviewer

What were the Soviet objectives in terms of SALT I? Why did you come to the talks and what did you hope to get out of it?

Timerbaev

Uh, we, we, our major objective was to start the process of nuclear disarmament. And uh, we thought, and we still think, that SALT I, uh, was a very good way to start this process. Um, and um, it was a successful start. And uh, I, I, I uh, believed then, as I believe today, that we were able to do this in a mm, historically short time. Uh, it took us, uh, I think about uh, two and a half years, uh, I think, to reach SALT I. It was a short time for a, a new exercise, for a completely new operation.

Interviewer

Was there anything specific going on in the United States at that time that the Soviet Union really wanted to reach some kind of agreement to stop?

Timerbaev

I'm looking at you. Mm, well of course, uh, uh, any-- I wouldn't say anything specific. I would say that there is uh, in our view, the United States has been mm, constantly trying to, to go ahead of us in uh, nuclear weapons. Not, not only in nuclear weapons, in uh, in the delivery systems, in uh overall military situation. Because um, whatever weapon you take, the United States was the first to develop it. So there was nothing specific at that time. This has been a constant process. We wanted to mm, prevent the United States, prevent the world from another spiral in the arms competition.

Interviewer

Now, about the negotiations themselves. Why didn't the Soviet Union really push for a ban, some kind of agreement on the MIRVs at those talks?

Timerbaev

Well, we, we did want uh to put an end to MIRVs then. Uh, but we uh realized soon that um, the United States was so intent on going, going on with this, so we were not able to, to, to reach that uhm, goal. We, we did uh, reach uh, uh, to some extent, that goal later on, during SALT II.

Interviewer

When we talked with Secretary Kissinger, Henry Kissinger, he said that if the Soviet Union had been really interested in making an agreement on MIRVs, they would have really pushed for it at SALT and made a more realistic proposal. Because the Soviet Union had really pushed for other things they really wanted at SALT.

Timerbaev

Uh, you see, at that time, we, we, we did have some hope for, for a time, that the United States might not go along, might not, might not uh, uh, go on with the, with the MIRV project. Of course, MIRV project did uh, uh, mm, uh... did uh, m-make the whole th-- thing uh, more difficult. Mm, but we were, uh, we knew very well that the United States were not uh, prepared to do uh, to do and uh, go along with the idea of uh, eh, limiting it's MIRV program.

Interviewer

How did you know that?

Timerbaev

It's off the record, because I just don't know this. So don't ask me this, I don't know. I knew-- I, I knew that there was a realization that the United States will not accept this. Um, I, I say it not for the record, because we wanted to have a start. And if we uh, brought into the picture the MIRV eh, thing, we wouldn't have achieved anything.

Interviewer

So you basically think it was too difficult, too big a step to try to take at SALT I?

Timerbaev

Yeah, it was, it was, it was a too big a step. Uh, it was a too big a step. Uh, and we knew then that the United States was not prepared to do uh, away with the MIRV project.

Interviewer

That left you in a situation where the United States was trying to limit your only on-going offensive program -- offensive programs, ICBMs and SOBMs, but you weren't going to try to limit the only U.S. on-going offensive program, which was MIRVs.

Beyond Arms Control

Timerbaev

Uh, we wanted mm, in a nutshell, we wanted a start. We wanted to find a solution that would uh, be a quick solution, so that we could, after reaching the first agreement, we could go on further to uh, uh, to next agreements, to the whole series of agreements, one following the other, one more radical than the previous ones. That was our, um, our major goal. Uh, that, that's why we didn't want to place-- to put before us too ambitious a, uh, uh, ideas. We wanted eh, something which would be realistic. And uh, we did have quite a good idea as to what uh, could be feasible then. And uh, as I, as I uh, I want to repeat again that uh, we did it in a, uh, in a quite a short time, overall.

Interviewer

So was there a sense that it would make more sense for the Soviet Union to get to the same stage that U.S. was in testing MIRVs before trying to talk about them at SALT? And was the Soviet Union aware at that time what later caused a big controversy, that because of the larger Soviet missiles that once Soviet missiles were MIRVed they would actually be an advantage on the Soviet side?

Timerbaev

See, uh, uh, in general, uh, we did realize quite soon that United States would be prepared to do something with this or that category of weapons when they did see for themselves that the Soviet Union was on a par with the United States, or close to being on a par with the United States. That mm, was the idea uh, that was uh, advocated by many uh, United States uh, um, representatives then. So uh, that's why mm, we uh were trying to reach uh realistic goals. And uh, I think that is the right way to proceed.

Interviewer

So, but were you aware that once you had MIRVed your missiles that you would actually have an advantage against the American MIRVs?

Timerbaev

No. We never tried to reach any advantage. We uh, the whole uh, process uh, over the post-war era, over the post-war period, was that we were catching up with the United States, in different areas of uh, of weaponry. Uh, we, we never were ahead of the United States. We always uh, caught up with them. And uh, this process has been going on for forty years, and perhaps uh, uh, it's about to put an end to this and to, to abolish everything at the same time in a short period of time. Um, uh, and uh to put an end to this continuous process of uh, one country trying to get ahead, the other country trying to catch up.

Interviewer

So let me see if I'm getting what you're saying in a nutshell. You're saying that it would have been one step at a time, and you could do what you did in SALT I, and then move on to MIRVs as a next step, and that the thing that would give the United States the incentive to make an agreement on MIRV would be Soviet development?

Timerbaev

Well, at that time we thought that uh, we should uh, do in a step by step way to reach one goal after the other. Now, uh, after uh, about fifteen or seventeen years since then, we come to a conclusion that this approach, uh, is not the right approach. Now we have come to a conclusion that we should try to work harder to wi-- to work faster to accelerate the whole process. Because we cannot catch up with the development of technology. Uh, that is the basis of our recent uh, ideas of how to uh, to stop the arms race in a short period of time.

Negotiations on weapons systems for SALT I

Interviewer

Why was the Soviet Union initially opposed to making an offensive as well as a defensive agreement in SALT I?

Timerbaev

Um, ah, we had some...some suspicions of ah, the United States because we thought that they might wish to ah, put an end to our modest, ah, ah, project of ABM defense around Moscow. Um, um, and um, that's why we -- for the...in the beginning stages of these negotiations we were trying to find out what was the real United States, ah, ah, goal and intention. And, ah, and then we ah, come to a...came to a conclusion that we could agree to some ah, joint ah, effort which would limit at the same time both defensive and offensive ah, systems. That was the, ah, the rationale behind the SALT I ah, agreements.

Interviewer

But initially the Soviet Union said, we just want to make an agreement on ABM's for now. And maybe we'll do offensive in the future. Why was that?

Timerbaev

Um, ah, cut it out. I just don't know. I don't recall.

Interviewer

What was the argument that your delegation presented about including the US foreign bases in NATO in the SALT I agreement?

Timerbaev

Ah, the reason is obvious because ah, we have ah, geographically asymmetric situations. Ah, the United States is ah, divided from the rest of the world by oceans. And we are surrounded ah, by United States ah, forward ah, based ah, weapons, ah... in Europe and in Asia too. So this has been a perennial problem with us. Ah, and this problem stays, because we ah, have ah, geometrically, ah, geographically different ah, situations. Um, for instance the. ..the present Pershings II can reach the Soviet territory in a matter of minutes. While ah, say the Soviet ah, I...ICBMs can reach the United States only in a matter of ah, half an hour or so. So this is the situation in which is of concern to us. It has been, and is still of concern to us.

Interviewer

So what did you think would be necessary to redress that in SALT I?

Timerbaev

In SALT I we wanted ah, to discuss the forward-based ah, weapons too. But then we, when we saw that it is impossible to ...to reach that goal, then...then we without ah, giving up this position. Without ah, ah, relinquishing ah, our right to raise this matter in future, we agreed to the ah, SALT I. But also saying we shall take up this matter later on.

Interviewer

I understand that one of the big questions at the beginning of SALT I in Helsinki was just the two delegations agreeing on what the definition of a strategic weapon was.

Timerbaev

Yes, that's correct.

Interviewer

Could you talk about that a little?

Timerbaev

Ah, yes, of course that was important to agree. Ah, it was a difficult thing to agree. Because for the United States strategic weapons is something which may be over 5,000 kilometers ah, ah, ah, ah, but for the Soviet Union, ah, United States weapons close to the Soviet territory may be just 500 or 1,000 kilometers. This is the...ah, a difficult problem, ah, which is based on the objective situation in the world, because of the geographic asymmetry. Now ah, after a long wrangling, they did agree to a definition of strategic weapons ah, that was a definition for the purpose of a SALT I agreement. That... that may not be a...a...a...a...a definition forever. But for a SALT I agreement that was the definition accepted ah, I believe it's ah, 5,500 ah, kilometers. That is the...I think the shortest distance between the Soviet Union and the United States. But we still believe that the problem of forward-based ah, weapons ah, ah, exists and ah, of course we...will be discussing and trying to reach agreement on this ah, ah, problem in the future.

Interviewer

Now in the United States after the agreements were signed there was a lot of protest by people who thought that it was unfair that the Soviet Union got a higher level of SLBM's and ICBM's, especially SLBM's over in the interim offensive agreement. What was the justification for that?

Timerbaev

Ah, well ah, it was not ah, I don't think it was ever officially discussed. Ah, I can give you my personal view on that. Ah, I believe that this ah, justification of ah, slightly more ah, numerical numbers of the Soviet ah, SLBM's is that ah, again here we have a different ah, geographic situation. I mean ah, in order to be in an equal ah, status with the United States as to the numbers of SLBM's ah, adequately placed ah, in the oceans, ah, we have to cover longer distances, ah, and that is...that was ah, the...reason behind -- and that was the reason which was understood by the United States side. That is, ah, why it was possible to reach agreement on SALT I.

Interviewer

Was it also in some way a compensation for the forward bases, and the binding parts?

Timerbaev

I...I...I don't know. I don't think so. I think this is the -- the main is a geographical factor, but ah, again as I said, ah, this was never ah, officially discussed by the Soviet authorities and ah, this is my personal explanation.

Interviewer

Were you sitting in on the sessions when the United States presented that series -- after they had sort of withdrawn the oneto-one NCA, ABM agreement proposal that the Soviet Union actually agreed to? And then later on in the sessions they submitted the four-to-one, the three-to-one, the two-to-one and the zero-zero again? Were you there at that time?

Timerbaev

No, I was not.

Interviewer

Do you know what the reaction of the Soviet delegation was to getting this new set of proposals that was so different from the original one?

Timerbaev

Ah, ah, I'm sorry. Either I was not present there or I just don't recall this. I'm sorry about that.

Interviewer

That's ok. On to another subject then. In 1968, the United States cancelled the SALT talks that had been planned after the Soviet Union went into Czechoslovakia. however the USSR didn't cancel the talks when the United States invaded Cambodia in 1970 or just before the summit we bombed Hanoi and mined Haiphong Harbor. Why didn't you react to these other advances?

Timerbaev

Ah, ah, we do not believe in reacting in a...on a quid pro quo thing. Ah, we do not want -- we do not believe in that kind of reaction because we believe that the matters of ah, SALT of the nuclear disarmament is so important that it should not be linked to any other considerations. We were ah, then as we are now, against any... any linkages here. We ah, are -- I recall very well we had specific instructions from the government during the SALT I negotiations not to link them and not to... not to ever discuss any ah, extraneous matters. Extraneous and alien to the... to the discussions that we held on ah, during SALT I negotiations. We are against linkages and that is... was our ah, very consistent policy.

Interviewer

How did you feel when President Nixon and before SALT I was agreed to, wanted to link American participation in SALT to Soviet help on ending the war in Vietnam and in the Middle East?

Timerbaev

I'm sorry. I didn't quite get this point?

Interviewer

Ok, when... early in '69 before Nixon had agreed to enter into SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union, he announced that American participation would be dependent on progress in other areas. And he was referring to Soviet help perhaps in...in ending the war in Vietnam, and maybe in straightening things out in the Middle East.

Timerbaev

I think we come to the same area of linkages. We were... ah, we are... against any linkages when discussing ah, arms control issues. I believe that should be taken at their face, really on their merits, without linking them to any other problem.

Interviewer

Were you at the summit in May of 1972 in Moscow?

Timerbaev

No, I was not.

Interviewer

Do you remember where you were at the time of the signing?

Timerbaev

'72? I...I was at the '74 Summit.

Interviewer

I see. Do you remember how you felt when the agreement was finally achieved and the accords were assigned. What was your feeling?

Timerbaev

Well, I was ah, not ah, present when the SALT I was ah, signed because I did not participate in the first -- in that ah, last round of talks. But I was very ah, I was elated. Ah, it was a ah, very happy occasion. It was the most important agreement ever achieved in the field of ah, arms limitation. And it still is the most important agreement. Ah, the whole ah, debate now is around ABM treaty as... as... as is known by everybody. And this is um, I was very much happy about that.

Interviewer

What do you feel was the most significant achievement?

Timerbaev

I think -- I thought then as I think now that it is the ABM treaty. This is the most significant achievement. But also of course the interim agreement was also important, because it... for the first time it established certain limits on ah, on offensive ah, nuclear weapons.

Interviewer

Could I just interject one thing? Some people say that SALT I was not all that significant because both sides were prepared to give up ABMs. It was not hard to give up ABMs. ABMs as a technical system were questionable. And on the offensive side it was not all that significant either. The levels stayed as large as they were. And in fact somewhat larger than they were at the moment that the agreements were reached. How would you react to that?

Timerbaev

I would react to it in this way. I think that ah, we must look at these things from a historical perspective. Ah, um, um, and the present day situation does ah, prove that the assessment by the two leaders in '72 when this was signed was a correct one. They looked -- they both of them looked into the future of ah, arms limitation. Um, I agree that both agreements are very limited in...in... in...in...in their dimensions. But they were the first agreements. They ah, um, they were the first agreements which put an end, number one to any attempts for territorial ah, ah, ABM defense, which is why it was very important. Many people in the United States wanted the territorial defense which I think was called the safeguard system. Um, then, if you take the...the offensive part of it, it was the first time the figures were set... the first time the figures were set. Ah, it was only a quantative limitation, not a qualitative. But it was the first ah, limitation. And after that we started to discuss the qualitative ah, limitation. So it was, I think, an historical act of tremendous importance, which is -- this importance is felt and um, and recognized even today after about 15 years.

Interviewer

What did you hope at that time, after SALT I was signed, what did you see as happening next in SALT II?

Timerbaev

Well, next we wanted to come ah, to grips with the qualitative ah, ah, ah, limitation on ah, on nuclear weapons. Additional, quantitative and qualitative. And this was ah, it took us many years, though, about seven years to reach this agreement, but we did reach it. Unfortunately this was never ratified, but ah, but it was a great achievement too, in '79.

Interviewer

What -- maybe you can comment about what was different about President Nixon's style of conducting foreign policy and approaching the Soviet Union than his predecessors?

Timerbaev

I think ah, the major factor was the realization ah, of the fact, ah, that ah, the...the world then as the world today ah, cannot develop successfully without ah, arms limitation and disarmament. The realization that ah, both countries cannot live ah, ah, in a constant ah, competition. The realization of the fact that there should be ah, some kind of peaceful coexistence ah, between the two superpowers. This was realized by the then...United States administration, and that ah, realization made it possible to reach all of these agreements.

Interviewer

Did you have any personal dealings with Henry Kissinger?

Timerbaev

Not at that time. I did ah, have a chance to um, participate in the concluding um, stages of the negotiations on the threshold test ban treaty in '74, which was two years after SALT I. And um, ah, I was impressed by the way that the two negotiators, that is ah, Minister Gromyko and Secretary Kissinger were putting the finishing ah, touches to the agreement on the threshold test ban treaty on the limiting ah, of... of nuclear ah, ah, explosions.

Interviewer

Do you know how Kissinger was regarded in Moscow at the time of SALT I?

Timerbaev

I think he was ah, respected and he was respected as a responsible and reasonable ah, United States ah, statesman and politician ah, which was ah, quite instrumental in ah, making these agreements ah, reached and implemented.

Interviewer

How did you regard Nixon and Kissinger's overture to the People's Republic of China? Well um, ah, overall we believed that there ah, there should good relations between the. ..the three of us. So we ah, have no ah, um, no problems with ah, United States ah, overtures to China. Ah, because we believe that ah, China should have good relations both with the United States and with the Soviet Union. So we believe that all three of us should have good relations.

Diplomacy between the US and the Soviet Union

Interviewer

Did you feel that President Nixon and Kissinger were trying to gain some sort of leverage over the Soviet Union in making this overture to...to China?

Timerbaev

Um, personally, I...I do not think so. I...I do not exclude that some people might have ah, felt that way. Ah, of course there are...there are efforts on the part of some politicians to play these different cards and different games. I don't believe in that. I think that ah, whatever efforts are made to use certain ah, leverages the overall -- the end result ah, would be an objective improvement. There should be an objective improvement because ah, I feel that...that the realization of the necessity to live in peace and in respect of each other is growing. It is ah, there may be some ups and downs, but this realization is growing. So irrespective of the fact that someone might use this or that for any kind of leverage, the overall result, the end result would be the...the genuine improvement.

Interviewer

Did you think there should be some allowance made for the fact that the Soviet Union -- I mean at that time there were some border clashes with China, and there were some threatening words back and forth between the Soviet Union and China. Was there a sense that the Soviet Union was having to deal on both flanks, on the eastern flank and also with the United States?

Timerbaev

Ah, you see the point is that the Soviet Union has a -- historically been in the... in the situation when they had to deal on... on both fronts, or on three fronts or on many other fronts. During the civil war in ah, 1918 - 1920, we had against the Soviet Union something like perhaps 14 different ah, adversaries, different enemies, and still we did win. So we... we... we were... we are historically prepared to ah, to have ah, both front situation. So for us there is no special concern about this.

Interviewer

What do people in Moscow make of Watergate? What did that seem like?

Timerbaev

I think the... in Moscow there is a...a...a... a constant general feeling that there is a lot of -- well, politicking, corruption and ah, um, unfair ah, ah, treatments and policies in the... in this country. Because ah, we have a different system. Ah, you have one system of government, we have a different system of government. And ah, we have a feeling, in general -- I mean the public, the...the Soviet people have a feeling that from time to time something has gone... is going wrong, something is rotten, ah, ah, here in this country. So ah, whenever something happens ah, we... we look at this in a... I would say in a philosophical way, as something which is imminent, and ah, which is ah, inevitable, in this society. Ah, so ah, overall this is a... we look at this ah, I would say with olympic quietness. So after Watergate there may be some other gate, and ah, we would not see anything sensational about that. It is your problem. We don't want to get involved in this problem. Ah, maybe you will solve this problem, maybe you will not, but this is your business.

Interviewer

Do you see that Watergate affected the process of detente in negotiations?

Timerbaev

Ah, it might have affected, ah, I...I think because ah, um, when such things as Watergate, or ah, Contragate, ah, happens...

Interviewer

I'm going to ask you to start and not mention that because we can't use contemporary...

Timerbaev

I see.

Interviewer

And I'm going to ask you also, if you could instead of saying this country, when you mean the United States, if you say the United States because the viewer doesn't know where you are. What the feeling was at SALT between the delegations about the back channel between Ambassador Dobrynin and Henry Kissinger?

Timerbaev

Um, we did know that there was such a channel, and um, we hope that this channel would lead to successful results. I don't think that everybody was very happy about some other channel, but ah, the realization that this channel might help us, ah, was stronger than any ah, sort of parochial interests, if...if we may call them parochial interests that might have existed among some members of ah, U.S. or U.S.S.R. delegations.

Interviewer

Can you talk -- when you say that Smith and Semenov shared a sense that they would rather have the satisfaction.

Timerbaev

Well, of course both delegations and especially their heads, that is Ambassador Semenov and Ambassador ah, Smith, of course they... they wanted very much, and it is humanly understandable, to... to have all the credit for any success that they could have had in reaching agreement. So they wanted very much to be the ones who were most instrumental, most ah, ah, important in reaching the agreement.

Interviewer

Can I ask one more question about -- before we had the break you were talking about Watergate, was there any feeling on your own part on in the Soviet Union of sorrow that Nixon was losing his control in the United States because so much had been accomplished during his presidency?

Timerbaev

I...I wouldn't call it sorry, because in policy...in diplomacy you have to ah, ah, be realistic. And ah, to ah, to ah, add on the basis of the existence of realities. Ah, so of course the... ah, dismissal of Mr. Nixon, his ah, leaving the White House, ah, ah, did create certain difficulties, but we couldn't do anything about it. We had, at any moment in diplomacy you have to deal with the facts of life, with the realities. So whether you were sorrow in the bottom of your heart, or you were happy in the bottom of the heart, you... you... what you had to do was to deal with facts. That's how you have to do -- to deal with, you have to deal with facts.

Interviewer

What did you make of -- in the United States, in congress of the kind of power that a man like Scoop Jackson, Senator Jackson had? And attacking detente really and the policies of negotiation? For instance in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that was attempting to moderate Soviet immigration policies?

Timerbaev

Well, of course ah, we... we did, we were not happy that ah, any attempts were made to ruin the possibilities of agreement, to ruin the... the results of the agreement as was the case ah, with ah, ah, Senator Jackson and some other ah, ah, opponents of agreements. Ah, this was an unhappy fact. Ah, but what could you do about them? Of course you had to again here as in all other areas, you had to deal with the facts of life, and this is the fact of life.

Interviewer

What did you think about the attempts to -in order to grant the most favored nations status of trade bill that was up that the attempts to really direct Soviet behavior on the immigration issue?

Timerbaev

Ah, ah, we don't like to be interfered with. We don't like that someone wants to impose on us their...their way of life. This is something which is very contrary to our ah, concepts, to our ah, feelings and so on. So whenever one... anyone wants to say how we should live, ah, we were very unhappy on that, because we cannot accept this. We never want to impose on anyone our way of life, our way of thinking. We don't want the United States ah, to act the way the Soviet Union acts. Ah, but ah, um, of course we accept um, any... any attempts to do... to tell us what to do with great ah, ah, concernment [sic], and great I would say, indignation.

Interviewer

When in your mind did detente really start to crumble, whether it was with the Middle East war or Watergate or the Jackson-Vanik Amendment or the trade bill?

Timerbaev

I ah, was involved in ah, the discussions and negotiations on the total test ban in...in the late '70s. And ah, sometime in '78, ah, I think in the middle of '78 or late '78, I did have a feeling that something was going wrong with the United States, because the negotiations on the ah, complete test ban, that we -- which we call CTB negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were developing then in Geneva. At some point in '78 we were becoming slower and slower, ah, with long ah, um, pauses, long intermissions, and I at that time had a feeling that the United States is backing up from ah, ah, agreement on the ah, nuclear test ban. That was when ah, I thought then as I think today the real change in the United States position began to materialize. But the ah, um, the. ..the major ah, ah, point of...of change came in...in 1980, after the elections in November 1980 when the republican administration came to power, Mr. Reagan came to power.

Interviewer

I just wanted to ask a couple more things about the SALT negotiation during the time that you were there. How did Ambassador Semenov and Smith generally get along? Was their relationship important to the success of SALT?

Timerbaev

I think they had very good personal relations between themselves, between other members of the delegations, between the families of the delegations. There was very good personal relationship. We spent a lot of time together, we traveled together, we spent ah, weekends together, ah, and ah, this human relationship was I think, to a... ah, large extent very instrumental in... in... in getting us ah, closer to agreement. Of course the agreement was ah, made on the instructions of the governments and the governments made the decisions, but ah, um, to... to reach decisions you have to apply your... your ah, personal qualities and this application of personal qualities is ah, better done in a... in a situation of human contact. Good human contact. And that was achieved by ah, both delegations during ah, those negotiations.

Interviewer

I know you weren't at the first session of SALT, but did you hear back that ah, what the mood was like in Helsinki? Did the delegates come to realize that this was going to be a really serious negotiation about to begin?

Timerbaev

Yes, I was not present during the first round. But I was told by my friends and colleagues ah, that ah, I think there was a general realization that we are starting a very important undertaking, very important, maybe the -- the first, for the first time in the history

Interviewer

You were describing how you weren't at the first session but when you heard... you heard that there was a great opportunity.

Timerbaev

Yes, I...was not present during the first round, but I was told by my friends and colleagues that ah, there was a general realization by the members of two delegations that we are embarking on a... very important ah, project. The first time maybe in the history of relations between the two countries, when they have come to grips with the most ah, ah, important issues of of, ah, of war and peace. Um, and ah, this realization was, I think, important. Because that realization ah, imparted to both sides, the sense of importance and urgency which made the...the whole project successful in that.

Interviewer

There are some American policy-makers who claim that detente would produce some American leverage greater American leverage over Soviet behavior through trade and relations and other involvements. What was the attitude toward that?

Timerbaev

Ah, we do not accept any leverages. Ah, never tried any leverages with...with regard to the United States and we are not going to do this. Ah, because we know that it...it is absolutely counter-productive to apply any leverages against such a great country as the United States. And ah, I hope that ah, those who still think that they can apply some leverages against the Soviet Union will realize one day that it's ah, counterproductive. Ah, relations, agreements between us can be based only on the general respect for each other's positions. We are diametrically different in many ways, in many ways, in our ideologies, in our ways of life, in our understanding of certain important things of life. But we must learn to ah, understand each other and to respect each other. And this is how we can reach agreements.

Interviewer

Anything from your time at SALT that you remember that was kind of humorous or was a good example of the delegations either getting along very well or not understanding each other?

Timerbaev

We were along -- we were going along very well, ah, almost in all respects. We spent time together, we confided to each other. We discussed ah, things with each other, and ah, many important ah, ah, agreements and parts of agreements were reached during those personal contacts. When we were say, ah, um, invited by the Austrian authorities or the Finnish authorities, we were ah, ah, on a lake um, or on a beach, or ah, on some sports events. Ah, during all these meetings we discussed ah, business. Ah, and ah, the pieces of business we agreed upon during ah, such social events, led to the. ..to the overall agreements.