McMahon Act and the Sharing of Nuclear Information
Development of the Polaris Warhead
Storm in a Teacup
Ernest Bevan's Policy for US Involvement in Europe
British and American Nuclear Scientists
Indian Nuclear Program

 
 

McMahon Act and the Sharing of Nuclear Information

Interviewer

First of all, Lord Sherfield, what would you say were the British reactions to the passing of the McMahon Act?

Sherfield

Well, the pa... uh, passage of the McMahon Act was very bad news. Uh, and it came as a considerable shock, um. After all, we had been negotiating uh, to try and uh, establish the same sort of uh, relationship in uh, in exchange of information and collaboration on atomic energy, uh, for about a year. And uh, it was quite clear that when we saw the terms of this act, uh, that uh, it was going to be a major obstacle in the way of re-establishing such collaboration. Um, eventually, uh, one or two ways were found round it, uh, but while it was in effect, it was a very serious obstacle. Now, uh, collaboration went on in certain fields in which the Americans were interested, but ah, particularly in the control of raw materials from which we got benefit and also in the intelligence field, which is really quite important. Uh, but uh, by enlarge, it was a, it, it was a, it was, it was very bad news and it did complicate uh, the relationship to a very serious extent for, for several years.

Interviewer

Now, you were in Washington at the time or shortly after that act was passed. Were you involved in any lobbying activities, attempting to get that legislation changed that you can remember?

Sherfield

Uh, well it, it's very uh, delicate business, uh, for an embassy in Washington to go around uh, the back of the State Department and the White House and uh, lobby in uh, the Congress. And uh, um, so uh, uh, we didn't, did not as I remember do a lot of lobbying. Of course, we had no idea that the, the uh, the American government, the administration was not going to inform the Congress of the wartime agreements and the wartime association. It was only later that we discovered that they had kept these agreements from the Congress and when those, some of the senators found out uh, uh, that this had happened, they were very they were considerably upset, I think, by it. Whether it would have made any difference, I'm very doubtful because at that time, the um, the eh, large number of Americans, particularly in the Congress, felt that atomic energy was an American secret which could be kept. And of course, that was uh, uh quite a false judgment, but they've, that was the, that was their opinion.

Interviewer

Do you think that was the only motive for the passing of the McMahon act? That it was an American secret that could be kept?

Sherfield

I think that was the main one, yes, I do.

Interviewer

Atlee's government took a decision to go ahead with atomic-bomb development, in quite considerable secrecy. But it was remarkable, in fact, that the public announcement of that program didn't really cause any significant amount of uproar, in the press or whatever. What do you think the reason for that was?

Sherfield

Well I think that, the, the, the, the, uh, decision to go ahead, well, first of all, of course, the decision was to go ahead with an atomic energy program, particularly in the civil field, and of course the, the, the, the, the route, uh, to, uh, uh, the, uh, the, the, the reactor, and the route to the bomb, is the same, over a great part of the way. Uh, I think the people who knew the, uh, the informed opinion, uh, uh, scientific and political, uh, uh, regarded it as a natural, and indeed an inevitable step, that we at, at, as we were then placed in the world at that time it's... We were, after all, we were the center of the Commonwealth, we'd just won, won a war, we, uh, it was, uh, it was a, it was a perfectly natural development. And there was really no opposition, uh, to it in the scientific community, except with the two notable exceptions of Professor Blackett and Sir Henry Tizard. And they, for v... different reasons, uh, uh, uh, opposed the decision to go ahead, uh, with the, uh, with the weapon. Uh, but the prime minister, and Ernest Bevan, were quite determined that this was the, the, something that had to be done, and, uh, they arranged that it should be done. And, I uh, of course it was not, uh, uh, public knowledge, although it had, it was announced in the House of Commons, in Parliament, but, uh, but no, nobody really picked it up; it was just, I suppose, uh, in the mood of the time, thought to be, uh, uh, uh, a natural development.

Interviewer

Do you think the American attitude of the time as exemplified by the McMahon Act, had any decision on Attlee's view about the...

Sherfield

Well, it was quite clear that, uh, I mean we were going to have to go ahead on our own, uh, uh, uh, because we were not going to get within, anyway, in the foreseeable time, uh, the, the, the type of technological help from the United States which we, uh, were, uh, uh, on which at one time we were relying.

Interviewer

Now by 1954, there'd been some moves to make an amendment to the McMahon Act. But people have told me that it didn't result in an appreciable flow of information from the United States. Could you tell us a little bit about the way the act had been amended, and why it didn't...

Sherfield

Well, I, I forget the exact details of, uh what those amendments amounted to. Uh, but by that time, the situation had changed, uh, considerably. Uh, a, a lot of information had been, had been released, through a process of declassification. And, uh, in fact, the declassification process, was really, gave us sufficient to enable us to make, uh, uh, agreements and exchange agreements, uh, with, uh, the members of the Commonwealth, uh, with Belgium, uh, with France, and so on. So there was enough information, as much as people wanted, really, at that time, available. Then, after all, we'd, we, we, we, we no longer needed, uh, uh information on diffusion, on separation of uranium, uh, uh, uh, 235, because we'd built, very successfully, the diffusion plant at Capenhurst, and so on. Uh, what we did get at that time, which was very important, uh, was the specifications and design of the, of the, the nuclear submarine reactor, the PWR, and that was a very, uh, that was a very valuable step forward in the exchange of information.

Interviewer

You were saying earlier that it didn't work out quite right at the time. Why was that?

Sherfield

What, the, uh, the, the, the, uh, the, the submarine reactor? Well, as I remember, the, there was a British admiralty thought that they could improve on the design, and so they made certain alterations to it, but then it, and then they didn't turn out to be quite, uh, as successful as they hoped.

Interviewer

Eventually, in '57, the amendment of the McMahon Act went to the Senate and went to the Congress and was eventually passed in '58. What do you think were the main reasons for that shift in American policy?

Sherfield

Well, I think that, uh, the, the, the, the, the, the whole, the, the, uh, the reasoning behind the McMahon Act, the idea that the Am... it was, it was something that the Americans could keep to themselves, and have a monopoly on, and so on, was, was, was patently wrong. I mean, after all, we'd by that time not only had our diffusion plant; uh, we were building a, a, nuclear power reactors, we'd exploded a couple of bombs, and, uh, the Russians were, uh, well ahead with their program, the French were beginning to; there, the, there, the, there wasn't really any, any point, in, in the, uh, uh, in the, uh McMahon Act restrictions. On the other hand, the Americans, um, um might hope to gain something from the collaboration, as they did when the, uh, when the, uh, uh all the information was available, under the weapons program, uh, uh and, uh, therefore it was possible to make an, uh, uh, a comparison between the progress that had been made, uh, in our weapons establishment, and the progress that had been made in the American weapons establishment. It turned out that as far as the basic work and the basic science, and early applied science was concerned, we had not only kept up, but in, in, in some respects had gone ahead. Where we were lagging miles behind was in the engineering. So we got the benefit of the engineering, uh, uh, uh, technology, uh, from the Americans, and they in turn got some, uh, basic information which was value to them. So that it wasn't a completely one-way street. And anyway in the context of NATO, in, that, uh, the context of the changed world situation, uh, the, uh, uh, there, there, there really wasn't [anyway], uh, uh, by, uh, by 1955, uh, the, the American government changed their policy, uh, and General Eisenhower launched the atoms-for-peace program, and, uh, and the conference at Bermuda, and, and so that, the, the whole atmosphere changed.

Interviewer

Some people have suggested that the shift in policy in '57 was triggered by the explosion of the British hydrogen bomb in '57. Would you say that that was very important or only a subsidiary element?

Sherfield

Well, I would have thought it was a subsidiary; it really just, uh, adds another factor to what I've been just been saying, that, uh, uh that, uh the fact that, uh, we had our bomb, and we knew how, we can make it and do it, made it very pointless, really, for the Americans to try and withhold information.

Interviewer

Several people have suggested that there was some vague collaboration with the French program with the British. Do you think that there was any possibility of collaboration with the French nuclear program at any time?

Sherfield

Well of course in a sense there was a collaboration with the French, from the very beginning, I mean, in 1940, uh, three French scientists, uh, uh, came over from France at the time of the fall of France, with, uh, uh, with some, uh, heavy water in, uh, baggage; uh, and, uh, uh began immediately to collaborate with our, uh, scientists on slow neutron work, which led on to the civil reactor. And, uh, then, uh, the same scientists went to Canada, uh, where they were working, uh, in the Canadian, uh, uh, facility, uh, run by Sir John Cockcroft at Chalk River, uh, and they were fully integrated into their program. Uh, they then went back to France, uh, and, uh there, there they, a collaboration continued with the British scientists, with whom they were by that time intimately involved. Now, uh the, the, it was not possible, uh, to, uh, uh, to have a formal collaboration with the French, uh, for the reason that we had agreed in the war, uh, to, uh, uh, that we would, uh under the Quebec Act, uh, agreement, collaboration with the Americans, we agreed that we would not, uh, release information without prior consultation. Uh, now the Americans were strongly opposed to, uh, uh, uh, giving any information to the French, for the very simple reason that the, uh, very distinguished French scientist Joliot-Curie, uh, who was the, uh, uh, was the head of the French organization, was a Communist. Uh, and therefore under the atmosphere of the time, the Americans wouldn't have. We, on the other hand, had had agreements with the French; they'd joined the war, and it was very embarrassing for us, uh, in fact, that we couldn't, uh, we had great difficulty in honoring those agreements. Uh, then later, uh, there evolved very friendly collaboration, uh, when I was chairman of the atomic energy authority in the early '60's, um, I had very good relations with my French colleagues, and uh, un, by that time, of course, Euratom was coming into play, and we had very good relations with them. So, although there wasn't any formal collaborative agreement, in fact the relations with the French were, were, between us and the French, were good throughout.

Interviewer

So in a sense, I suppose what I'm trying to find out is... The French program, from '54 to '56, had clearly started at least at the technological level, started on a road towards plutonium development and working towards a weapons program and by then you see there were still restrictions on your information exchange with the United States. Was it ever considered that the collaboration between the French and the British would be perhaps a way forward? Was it ever considered at any level do you think?

Sherfield

Well, oh, yes. I mean, we were, we, we were always, I think, thinking about, uh, collaboration with the French. Of course, the French, uh, uh, I mean, we're talking about plutonium work, uh, didn't really need, uh, information, because Bertrand Goldschmidt, uh, who was one of their leading, and, uh, the, the scientists, uh, was a the, that was his subject, so, uh they didn't have a, really, a need for the information. Uh, and also, you must remember that this was in de Gaulle's, uh, uh, uh time, and, uh, the, the, the, that by that time, the very highly nationalist attitude of the French towards, uh, all defense matters, uh, were, was, uh, was predominant.

Interviewer

How important was it to the UK that the special relationship in nuclear matters with the United States was restored? Was there any serious diplomatic effort to the repeal of the McMahon Act?

Sherfield

Oh continuous, uh, negotiation in which I was personally involved, practically throughout, uh, from 1946 onwards, uh, to, to reestablish the collaboration, and, uh, various steps were taken, uh, uh as I've said previously, the McMahon Act was a big obstacle, and there was also, uh, uh, a, a, a, quite a hostile element, uh, to any collaboration in the, in the American Senate, and of course the, the, uh negotiations were continuously bedeviled, uh, by the, uh, appearance of the British, uh nuclear spies, and so that the Americans had a very, a fairly valid excuse, on security grounds, against giving us a lot of information. But there was a continuous effort, uh, which finally succeeded, in, in 1958. Uh, but, uh, but, uh but, uh, there was a, as I say, it was almost a continuous negotiation for nearly ten years.

Interviewer

As you say you were personally involved in those negotiations, is there anything that springs to mind, sort of personal stories or anecdotes from this period?

Development of the Polaris Warhead

Interviewer

You were quite intimately involved with those negotiations with the Americans over the repeal of the McMahon Act. Can you think of any anecdotes or stories that would reveal the mood of the times and the mood of the Americans?

Sherfield

Well, uh, uh, as, uh, as so often in negotiations of this sort, um, there were, uh, different views held in various parts of the United States administration; uh, the, the State Department and the people we were talking to, uh, were on the whole very sympathetic and were anxious to, uh, make progress in these negotiations. Uh, but on the other hand, uh, there were certain senators, uh, who were quite hostile, uh, to any further collaboration. Um, and, uh, the, uh, uh the American negotiators of course had to take account of the, of the political atmosphere in which they were working. And of course a lot depends on personalities, and, uh, some of the personalities were, were, were braver, shall I say, in, uh, what they were prepared to, uh, uh, concede, uh, than others. Um, and, uh so it was a, it was a very interesting time, and, uh, uh, if a little frustrating, uh, uh, nevertheless, uh, uh, there was a great deal of goodwill on the American side.

Interviewer

Can you remember any particularly important American political actors on the stage you had to deal with quite a lot?

Sherfield

Uh, um well, there was, uh, just hold it for a moment while I think. Um, uh names don't always come very easily.

Interviewer

Don't worry. how much did Aldermaston, in your view, rely on United States assistance for the actual design of the polaris warhead?

Sherfield

Uh, well, I, I, but the, the Polaris, uh, uh, warhead came after my time. And so I'm really not informed on that at all. What I think is clear is that after 1958, uh, the collaboration in the weapons field between, uh, the, uh, uh our weapons establishment and the American weapons establishment was pretty well complete, and as far as I know it continued to be so. Um, so, uh, you may say that there was a, a great deal of benefit, uh, from the collaboration, uh, to us, and I think some advantage to the United States.

Interviewer

You told us a story a little while ago about the transfer of the design for the nuclear submarine reactor, the PWR, from the United States to Great Britain.

Sherfield

Well, I, it was, uh, of course, uh, very largely due, I think, to the influence of Admiral Rickover, who was the, the, one of the strong men on the American side, uh, and, uh, uh, it was of course a very valuable, uh acquisition for us, to have the, uh, the specifications of a, of a working reactor; um of course the, uh, uh, I think the Admiralty and other British institutions, uh, tend to be a little bit, uh, uh, uh affected by what is, uh, sometimes called the "not-invented-here" syndrome, um, and I, I think they, as I remember, they did think they could improve, uh, on the American design in certain respects. Um, and this held up the, uh, uh, the development, I think, uh, a little while, because, uh, the improvements turned out to be, uh, not as great as had been hoped.

Interviewer

You were clearly very friendly and had a lot of contacts with some of the people in the French program and whilst this country, whilst the United Kingdom was getting considerable support, despite the McMahon Act, in reactor design and so on and so forth, for its military program. There was a considerable amount of information and technological exchange. What was the mood, in your view, of the French scientists and technicians who were perhaps slightly, were they at all jealous?

Sherfield

Oh, I suppose they felt, uh, rather in the same way as we felt, in relation to the Americans holding back on us. Uh, but, uh, I think they understood perfectly well that it wasn't we who were holding back on them; it was the Americans who were holding back, uh, on both of us. Uh, and, uh and they also knew perfectly well that under the agreements that we'd made with the United States, we were not in a position to transfer information without any American agreement. I mean, I think it was a perfectly clear situation, which the, the French with their usual clarity, uh, understood perfectly well. Uh, meanwhile the relations between the people involved, uh, in London and in Paris, uh, were very good, because they were by that time old friends.

Storm in a Teacup

Interviewer

You accompanied Attlee when you went to Washington, when Attlee went to Washington and you spent four days on the presidential yacht.

Sherfield

This was the time of the Korean War. Indeed I remember it very well.

Interviewer

How, first of all... I mean there's two or three questions I'd like to ask you about that. How alarmed was Attlee really about the potential threat to use the atomic weapon in Korea?

Sherfield

I don't know what his inner thoughts were; I know what mine were. Uh, I thought that it was a storm in a teacup. Uh, it ha... it happened in, it was a, it was a, it was a crisis which blew up, uh, in the, uh, in, in the course of a, a House of Commons debate. Uh, when a, a, a message came, a message came from, uh, uh, Washington to the effect that, uh, the Americans were considering the use of the atomic weapon, uh, against the Chinese, uh, in the Korean War. Now, I don't believe that whatever the military, Amer... certain members of the American military might have been thinking or planning, that the president had the slightest intention of using the uh, nuclear weapon. But, uh, and I suspect, but I don't know, that, uh, Attlee realized that. However, it was a very good move, of Attlee's, he immediately, uh, the, the, arranged this meet... trip to Washington; uh, that, uh, calmed the House of Commons. Uh, uh, we went to Washington, we had, uh, took the opportunity of three days of going over a whole number of issues, which, uh, had been under discussion with the Americans, such as economic issues, the, the, uh, um strategic position, Europe, and there were a, a great many things were covered. Uh, the actual, uh, the actual issue which took us there, namely the use of the weapon, was not taken up until the conference was at an end, uh, when, uh, the prime minister and the president, uh, went to, went, uh, into a, a, a, a room together for a, a, a, a, a while and then came out, and announced that they'd agreed that they wouldn't use the bomb without consulting each other. Well, uh, Dean Acheson, who was there, and the, uh, other Americans realized that this was a, this was impossible, they, uh, that to, that the effect on the Congress would be very serious, if Con... uh, Congress being already very suspicious about this whole negotiation. So, um, uh, a form of words was found, uh, which, um, uh it, which was, were put in the communique, I can't quote them, uh, a form of words was found, uh, which enabled uh, Attlee, uh, to, uh tell the House of Commons that he was quite satisfied with the assurances that he'd got from the president. And enabled the president to tell the Congress that he hadn't given Attlee any real assurances. So, they, uh, they, they, it was a very successful operation it calmed, uh, the incident was over. Uh, and it was a useful, it was a useful conference from this point of view, that there had been a lot of differences in Anglo-American relations at that time, over Palestine, and, uh, there are other difficult issues. Uh, and, uh, but, uh, this, um, uh, conference, in a way, reestablished, uh, the idea of a special relationship with the United States, not a word I, expression I use much. Nevertheless, it was, it was clear to the world that, uh, the British and American leaders had had a long conference together, and had come out with a, a certain measure of agreement. It sort of put them, it, it put the record rather straight, and erased the, uh, dissentions which had been created over Palestine and other matters.

Ernest Bevan's Policy for US Involvement in Europe

Interviewer

So, really, what you're saying is that the nuclear threat in Korea was never as serious as perhaps other people have made out.

Sherfield

I never thought so myself. I didn't think that there was, uh knowing Truman, and, uh, um, the Americans involved, uh, I, I, I was quite convinced in my mind that there was no, really no risk of them, uh, agreeing to that. Now, there are, may be, as I say, there there may have been those in the American...

Interviewer

Could you actually say that there was no risk of the use of a nuclear weapon or something? Can I get, can we start it again, start the question again. How important was that threat to use nuclear weapons, in your view?

Sherfield

Uh, in my view, uh, the, uh, American president and his advisors, uh, had no intention of sanctioning the use of an atomic weapon in the Korean War. Now, there may have been other views in the American military establishment, uh, but, uh, uh, but, uh, uh, the, President Truman, uh, showed very very clearly the, that he had complete control over his military advisors, because very shortly afterwards, he, um, uh, he recalled MacArthur, uh, from the battlefield, so, uh, I myself, I can't, I don't know what, uh Mr. Attlee, the prime minister, thought about it, but as, as an advisor, I was, I, I, I did not believe that it was a real crisis.

Interviewer

You mentioned Dean Acheson being present in those negotiations with Truman on that yacht. What would you have said was his view and his role in the relationship between the United States and Great Britain over the whole question of nuclear matters and defense.

Sherfield

Well, I mean, he was a, he was the most important influence, uh, in American foreign policy, uh, for a number of years. And, uh, so his role was, uh, extremely important; the president had complete confidence in him, uh, and, uh, uh, he was a, he was the, he was the, one of the, the architect, one of the principal architects of American foreign policy in that, at that time.

Interviewer

Was his influence on the president perhaps a benefit to the United Kingdom's position?

Sherfield

I think it was a benefit. I, because Dean Acheson was at, at heart a great friend of this country, but also a candid critic, uh, and, uh, that's a, that's a, that's a good thing for a friend to be, from time to time.

Interviewer

You spent four days on that yacht. What was that like?

Sherfield

Well, we spent, uh, two days on the yacht, and a couple in the White House, or in, uh, somewhere else. Uh, well, it was a, it was a very agreeable conference, uh, uh, uh, the atmosphere was extremely good, very friendly, we knew, we disagreed about a number of things, but, uh, that was, that's normal, uh, but they were, but, uh, they, they were good discussions. Um, the, there is, uh, uh, uh, a brilliant description of that conference in Dean Acheson's memoirs, uh, which, uh, anybody who is really interested, uh, in the subject would do well to read.

Interviewer

When we met last, you spoke to me about the role of Bevan in British foreign policy. What would be your views of the development of his policy about United States involvement in Europe?

Sherfield

Well, uh I, I, I think Ernest Bevan had a quite clear policy. Uh, it was to build up Western strength, and he started with the treaty of Dunkirk, with France: that was the first step. Then he formed a Western European union. Uh, uh, that was the next step. Uh, then came the Marshall Plan, and, uh, uh, uh, uh Ernest Bevan was, uh, we in the foreign office were, were, had previous knowledge that this was going to come, so when it, the Harvard speech of General Marshall was made, we were ready to go into action. And, uh, it was, it was clearly something which, uh, was a major development in American policy, and one which we must immediately take up and welcome. Uh, so that was the Marshall Plan. Well, then the next step, of course, was NATO. Uh, now, uh, uh, through all this period, uh, there was, uh, an, an element in the two elements in American policy advocated by different people, one, one of which was that, uh, that, uh, they should press, uh, for a federal Europe, or a, with which they could then deal as a entity, the implication being that they could then withdraw a little from it. Uh, and, uh, the, there were those who, on the other hand, I think, understood the sort of attitude which the labour government at that time were taking. Uh, now, I think that was always a concern, uh, uh, in the British administration, uh, that, uh, the Americans might withdraw, and, uh, that would be a very unfortunate development; after all, uh, two wars had occurred because the Americans were not involved in Europe, and, uh, there was a, certainly there was an anxiety that this shouldn't, American involvement shouldn't cease, uh, for a third time, as you might say. So I think that, uh, that, uh, under, the, that, uh, explains, uh, there was quite a lot of hard argument and negotiation with the Americans at that time, uh, but, uh, that was one of the reasons why, uh, um, Attlee, uh, certainly, uh, was not willing, uh, to, to contemplate a federal solution for Europe. Now, a federal, uh, uh, the, uh, the, the, that's not the same as, uh, full collaboration with Europe in every field, but that, uh, it, it was a, it was an important distinction, uh, which in the end, of course, faded.

British and American Nuclear Scientists

Interviewer

By '58, the McMahon Act had been officially repealed. What sort of impact did that have on relationships on the British scientists over here? How did that affect their relationships with their US colleagues?

Sherfield

Well, I think there was a, a measure of obvious satisfaction, particularly with those scientists who were, who were, who were, uh, dealing, uh, particularly in the, in the weapons field, uh, on, in the, in other fields, uh, we by that time had, uh, had, uh, got our nuclear, uh, uh, uh, weapons, our, our, uh, civil part program going, we'd got our, uh, diffusion plant going, we'd got a, first reactors were operating; uh, uh, it was a completely different, uh, situation. Uh, but of course the object of relations between the American and British scientists were good throughout, uh personal relationships, I mean, at the end of the war, the British scientists who were working in the United States went back to, uh practically all of them came back to, and went on with, got on to their work in England. Uh, but the relationships between them, I'm sure, remained at a very friendly and, and very friendly. Can't say more than that.

Interviewer

You said something just now that was quite amusing, about the fact that when scientists meet they don't spend all their time discussing the weather. Could you say that for me now please?

Sherfield

Uh well, uh, and, and, of course there were continual contacts between the scientists on both sides, and, uh, um it, uh, in conversations, uh, uh, between scientists, uh, they don't or, uh, necessarily talk about the weather, so, uh, uh, some information, uh, filters across, I think, in any circumstances. And also uh, and also, of course, the, the collaboration in the intelligence field continued uninterrupted. And, uh, you can't really talk about monitoring the effects of atomic weapons without learning quite a bit about the atomic weapons themselves.

Interviewer

So what was the most important element to the United Kingdom, with the repeal of the McMahon Act?

Sherfield

Well, I think that, uh, there were two aspects to it. The first aspect is the technological one, of course; if we'd got the, uh, uh, uh, uh the advantage of the, of the great developments the Americans made on the engineering side. And secondly there was a, there was a uh, I suppose a sort of psychological, or perhaps political, aspect, uh, to it, in that, uh, by that time, by '58, we were in NATO, there was complete collaboration, uh, in all aspects of the war uh, the American bases had been established in England, uh, the, there, there was a complete military collaboration, except on the nuclear side, which was a, a notable and rather significant exception. And, uh, the, as it were, the withdrawal of that exception, uh, made the collaboration complete.

Interviewer

Could you give us one or two examples of the engineering you've mentioned?

Sherfield

No, I'm not a technical; I'm not an engineer.

Interviewer

Is there anything that you can think of, a story or an anecdote? You told me something just before the interview, about how you actually had to get the admiral to...

Sherfield

Yeah, well, I think I, I'm sorry, I think not, not that.

Interviewer

Okay. Is there anything else you can think of that would you know...

Sherfield

Not offhand, I don't think so. Well, perhaps I, um I was, um... Would you... Should I just tell you this?

Interviewer

Yes.

Sherfield

Well, uh, I was, uh, uh, being shown, uh, uh, uh, I was down in, uh, uh, in, uh what was the name of the damn place? Uh, uh, uh, I was, I was, uh, with my American colleague in Tennessee, um, where they were, had the, the, the, a number of, uh, uh, reactors which were making tritium, uh, uh, among other things, uh, and, uh, uh, they were very large installations, and, uh, my American colleague said to me, "Well, I'm not supposed to take you in here, but I'm sure you won't understand anything that's going on there, so I don't mind, I don't understand it myself."

Interviewer

Right. Now...

Indian Nuclear Program

Interviewer

The first question I'd like to ask you, you attended the ceremonial opening at Trombay. Can you remember that incident? Can you describe it for us?

Sherfield

Well, in, uh, I think it was in January of 1961 uh, the, uh, uh, the, uh, the Indian government, um, uh, opened, uh, their nuclear energy establishment at Trombay, which is just south of Bombay. Uh, the Canadian government had made a, uh, a present to the Indian government of a research reactor, uh, and this, uh, this was the, so to speak, the opening of the, of the station and of the reactor. Uh, and the Indian, uh, government, uh, made quite a, a, uh, uh, an event out of this, uh, and they invited, uh, scientists from allover the world, uh, and, uh, the Prime Minister Nehru, uh, was, uh, the host, so to speak, at this gathering. Um, uh the British, uh, representation consisted of Sir, Sir John Cockcroft and myself, uh, I then being the chairman of the atomic energy authority. So we went out, uh, to, uh, to, uh, Bombay, uh, the, uh, uh, Indian program, uh, had really been developed under the influence of a, uh, uh, of an Indian scientist called Homi Bhabha, uh, who I think is one of the most remarkable people I've met, and who certainly, uh, was the inspiration and architect, uh, of the American nuclear, uh, the, of the Indian nuclear-energy program. Uh, he was a, he was a, he was a very distinguished physicist in his own right; he was a fellow of the Royal Society; uh, he was a, uh, uh, uh, uh, a good artist, uh, a good musician, uh, and a man of singular charm. Uh, and, uh, uh, and he was, uh as it were, the, the moving spirit. Uh, and, uh, so we had this meeting and, uh, and, uh, uh, the, the, uh, establishment at Trombay was also, um, uh used as a sort of nucleus, uh, of the, uh, Indian electronics industry. They had, uh, uh, they were doing a lot of electronics work there, as well as the, uh, obviously in relation to the nuclear establishment, but still on a broader field. And so we spent, uh, I suppose two or, two or three days, uh, there; uh, um there were, there was French and Russians and a Chinese professor, and, uh, and, uh, there, there was a lot of entertainment and, uh, Nehru was the host, and a very attractive host too, and, uh, good opportunity to get to know him a little bit. Uh, and, uh, Sir John Cockcroft and I, um, did a, a, gave a press conference and a conference for young scientists, and, uh, uh, the, the, uh, as we were rather contrasting personalities, it was, uh, it must have been a rather hilarious event for those who were there, uh, but, um, uh, but the, uh, atmosphere was a, was a very, very good one; and, uh, of course the, the Indian scientists were very able people.

Interviewer

You must have been quite interested in the Chinese program at that particular time. Did you try and elicit any information from the Chinese delegates?

Sherfield

Uh, yeah, we did indeed. Uh, Sir John Cockcroft and I, uh, uh, uh, cornered the Chinese professor, and we, uh, uh had a conversation with him, I suppose it might have been at least half an hour. Of course he spoke ex... excellent English. Uh, he, he spoke a great many words, and didn't tell us one single important piece of information.

Interviewer

What was your view, the British government's view of the atoms for peace program that Eisenhower proposed?

Sherfield

Tell, I, uh, uh, uh, I think we were very much in favor of it. Uh, it was a, it was a new, well, we were in, obviously in favor of, uh, of, uh, of, uh, atoms for, for peace, civil program, and, uh, it was a, it was a new departure in that the, the, instead of Americans trying to keep everything under wraps, they were, uh prepared to, to, uh, to, to, to give a great deal of their experience, uh, to the world, in the civil field, and in the, in the non-weapons, uh, aspects of atomic energy, so, I think they, it was a, it was a, it was a, it was a de... departure, which the British government welcomed.

Interviewer

Talking about the Chinese, what was the British government's reaction in '64, when the Chinese first exploded their nuclear device?

Sherfield

I don't recall that partic... uh, particularly, I, I, the, the, we, uh, uh all along realized that, uh, uh, that the, the, that, that the nuclear information, nuclear technology, uh could not be kept, uh, uh, to a single country. Uh, the, uh, uh, uh, the, the, in, the scientists in Russia, in France, in the United Kingdom, in the United States, uh, had all the information necessary, uh, to, uh, uh to develop, uh nuclear, uh facilities. And, uh, uh, it was, we, uh, uh, uh that was where we differed from Americans in the, uh, in the '40's, uh, because they believed, or many of them believed, that, uh, they would be able to keep it, uh, as a monopoly, and that, uh, if they kept tight security, uh, that the Russians and others would not be able to develop it, and they were not, able to develop it, and they were not, many of them, at all enthusiastic about the British program. Uh but, uh, we were, knew perfectly well, uh, that the Russians had the capacity, uh, to develop, uh, nuclear weapons; uh, the only, the only slight, I suppose, miscalculation was, I think that we thought it would take them two or three years longer, uh, than it actually did, but then two or three years is a marginal period. So, I think we were not surprised, uh, when they, the, uh, uh, the, the, the Russian, uh, uh, bomb was, uh, uncovered. Uh, uh only mildly surprised that they managed to do it in three years instead of five.

Interviewer

To get back to the Indian program, did the UK give any assistance to the Indians in their nuclear program?

Sherfield

Well, I know of very close relations between Bhabha and, uh, the, the, and Howell and, and, Ian Sands; I, I, I, specifically, I don't know specifically what, for it, but I mean, the relations were very close. And therefore a great deal of information must have flowed.

Interviewer

Could you tell us also, from your recollections, what the British position was to the nuclear proliferation treaty?

Sherfield

Well, obviously, we are, I, I don't, uh, recall the details of it, because I wasn't myself concerned with it. Uh, but, uh, obviously, we were strongly, uh, uh in favor, and supporting all efforts to limit nuclear proliferation; I mean an obvious thing, you know, the, the, there are many difficulties about it, but I, I, I, uh, I, I'm sure that, uh, that we were actively positively, uh, uh, working for the negotiation and the widest possible exception of that treaty.

Interviewer

What was the British reaction to the Indian explosion of the bomb, in '74?

Sherfield

Well, there again, uh, uh, it, it was, uh, it, it, it was something which was, uh uh, more or less inevitable. The Indian science is very good, and, and uh, their, their technology is quite good; they had the information, uh, uh, it wasn't at all surprising that they were able to develop a, a, a weapon.

Interviewer

And finally, I don't know to what extent you might have been involved with President Carter's initiatives with the nuclear fuel cycle investigation.

Sherfield

President Carter; I wasn't involved at all.

Interviewer

Okay.

Sherfield

I don't remember, I don't remember it very clearly, I, even, I mean, uh, it was, uh, by that time, I was, uh, mainly concerned with other things.