Germans to the Front
Nuclear Technology in Germany
US Involvement in Germany's Nuclear Development
Military Decision Making in Europe
A Multi-lateral Nuclear Force for NATO

 
 

Germans to the Front

Interviewer

General, what was the attitude of the German military towards tactical nuclear weapons versus conventional defense at the time that Herr Strauss took over as defense minister in 1956? What was the general atmosphere then in the German military?

Schmuckle

Our original idea was to build up a conventional force. At ah that time, suddenly the Americans changed their attitude and uh, thought in the category of massive retaliation. So we had first to convince the Americans that we need a middle way, choose a middle way and not to go to the extremes. So we saved the conventional element uh, in NATO. At the time, uh, uh minister of defense, Strauss and uh, the highest uh, German general to um, to, to Washington to convince uh, the Americans about uh, necessity of a strong conventional force in Europe and he succeeded. Then we started to introduce uh, nuclear means of delivery. Not uh, nuclear weapons, nuclear means of delivery only. That uh, stimulated a tremendous political fight in, in Germany. Was it right? Was it wrong?

Interviewer

Before we get on to that, I mean when you say to retain some conventional strength, was the American idea to almost do away with conventional strength altogether then?

Schmuckle

Nearly. At the time, it was a strong uh, element in America to put the whole defense on nuclear weapons only. That was in our opinion, wrong. So when we came to the second step, to introduce nuclear means of delivery in the German Bundeswehr, naturally it was a surprise for many German officers. They were uh, used on conventional defense, that was a new, new element, the element of deterrence. And the new element of deterrence, I think, was the most important educational process we have to undergo in Germany at the time.

Interviewer

But Franz Josef Strauss is very much associated with the policy of making the German army dual capable and giving it nuclear delivery capability. What were the main factors that influenced him in going for that ability in the Bundeswehr?

Schmuckle

The main element, I believe, was the fact uh, that Strauss thought uh, that the time of wars is over in Europe and only deterrence makes real, real political sense. And we thought nuclear wek... weapons deterrence could not work in a convincing uh, way. At that time, we started to try to develop or to, to ask ourself it would be possible to develop a European nuclear deterrence, together with the French. Uh, but this was finished when General de Gaulle came into power. It was clear that the French uh, nuclear deterrence was exclusively a French one. So this was finished. So we went uh, uh, along with Americans who asked us to introduce nuclear means of delivery in the German Bundeswehr and we did so. It was a parliamentary fight, tremendous fight because the opposition was strictly against it. The opposition at that time thought in purely conventional defense uh, in Germany. Also Helmut Schmidt, who has afterwards changed his attitude.

Nuclear Technology in Germany

Interviewer

So what did Strauss and Adenauer argue against the opposition at that time? What were the arguments that they used?

Schmuckle

The argument was, at first that there was a tremendous conventional superiorality of the Soviet forces on the continent. And that our conventional forces were still too weak to work as a convincing uh, deterrence.

Interviewer

Can you just elaborate on that a bit more, though? You see it seems to me there were various reasons influencing Strauss. It wasn't only deterrence, was it? I mean, after all there was a massive superiority in nuclear weapons on the American side. Arguably, the German capability added very little to that.

Schmuckle

If we would not have uh, uh, introduced nuclear weapons uh, or nuclear means of delivery into Germany Bundeswehr, I think the whole, we would not have any influence on the nuclear position making process in NATO. Only when we uh, introduced these weapons, we, the Americans opened their books to tell us what their targets are for nuclear means of delivery. And we were very interested, uh, to see what happens with our country. What happens with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Russia, and so on. And I think we took uh, slowly.

Interviewer

We'll have to wait for the -- Ok, keep going.

Schmuckle

I think we took slowly a certain influence in this field.

Interviewer

And what did you actually find when you did get into the books?

Schmuckle

No comment.

Interviewer

Well, let me ask you this. It has now been declassified in the United States that both the US army and the US navy did studies of the air force war plans in Europe at this time, mid '50s. And the army, for example, discovered that if strategic air command and tactical air command plans had been ever carried out, on their estimation, US army's estimation, especially thw attacks on airfields with surface bursts of large weapons in Eastern Europe, they said three hundred and fifty million casualties from fallout alone, including the whole of the US army. Have you any comment on that?

Schmuckle

Well, let me say so, at that time, I believe we gleaned something. But I make not any other approach to the Americans officer school who planned the targeting things. Because, I think it's a European arrogance uh, if we had to plan in America for nuclear targets, I think we would make similar mistakes, as Americans have made on the continent. But I think, this time, uh, at the time, we could improve something uh, that nuclear weapons are not uh, used in a, in a overwhelming uh, manner on our, on our continent.

Interviewer

Do you think that originally at that time they were planning to use them in an overwhelming way?

Schmuckle

Well, it's ah, it's like using uh, element nuclear weapons. And uh, sometime military people believe that they only use such weapons on their side, and are not taking into account that also the enemy has the same weapons and can use them in the same way.

Interviewer

Strauss was quoted as saying some time around this point, that if the German army did not get nuclear weapons or access to nuclear weapons, they would be, I think it was "the cook boys and baker boys of Europe" or some phrase like that. Was that another consideration, that the German Bundeswehr had to be at least equal to other forces?

Schmuckle

This was always a consideration when Strauss built up the German Bundeswehr. We had not the intention to be inferior to other uh, armed forces and to other ambassadors and other generals. It was the intention that we are on a equal level with the Brits, with the French, uh, with the Greeks, with the Turks, and Norwegians and Danes and so on. And I believe we succeeded in this respect. Don't forget. We were totally defeated in World War II. It was also a, a way back in the family of free nations. And uh, for this, without any doubt, also the German Bundeswehr was one of the leverages.

Interviewer

So you mean the Bundeswehr was a lever to get Germany accepted back into the --

Schmuckle

Without any doubt. We all thought at that time, the relationship to our western friends is only in good order when uh, German soldier can walk through Paris, London, Oslo in uniform and nobody would say, "Well, w... what a, that is one of these bad German chaps who did so much harm to us in World War II?" And I believe we succeeded. The French were very fair in this respect, and also the Brits when we sent the first German soldiers uh, to England. And there were some demonstrators against us. The British population took uh, took uh, position on our side and they throw tomatoes and eggs against the demonstrators. That was really British fair play at the time. And uh, we were very touched about this British attitude. So I believe we are now through in this respect. It was not so complicated with a... greater countries like France and Germany. Their [resentments] were much stronger in the smaller countries. Like Denmark, Holland, understandable. And I believe this time is now over.

Interviewer

But, at the same time, even those bigger countries, and especially Britain, the population at any rate, the press, if not, the government, were continually questioning German access to nuclear weapons. It was a big issue every time -- we have film of Strauss going to England and the press are asking, "Do you want nuclear weapons?" Were you conscious of that fear or suspicion on the part of your allies?

Schmuckle

Oh yes. It was clear to us that there is a lot of mistrust still alive. Uh, but the basic question was, uh, is this a basis for our politics, or is the basis for our politics a future rela... relationship between Germany and the bigger powers, particular England and France, Italy, America naturally. And, well also, our allies had different opinions. In America, there was not much in, mistrust against German nuclear development. On the contrary, they pressed us to do it. In England it was stronger. In France it was stronger. But I think uh, as I said, these times are over.

Interviewer

What was the reaction to Sputnik in Germany? Was that anything that people --

Schmuckle

Well it was a shock for the whole west. It was a shock that suddenly the west realized, in particular with the Americans, that the Russians are capable to use the same things. What they are planning and they are, they even overtook uh, the Americans in this respect. This was a shock for all of us.

Interviewer

Was Sputnik an important element in the decisions that were taken in the December NATO meeting in 1957 which I think you attended yourself.

Schmuckle

I attended. Yes.

Interviewer

Can you tell us about that meeting and what was decided there?

Schmuckle

Well the meeting was um, it was curious, it was, the decision was taken that the European uh, armed forces should be equipped with nuclear means of delivery. Not only the Germans, uh, also the Italians, the Turks, the Greeks, uh not the Scandinavian countries. They refused it. And uh, I believe there was no... much discussion about it. I felt in, during the meeting that the decision was taken before the meeting, which was good. And afterwards, Eisenhower said, "Let us stand up and now thank the Lord that we have done such a good job." Well I thought, uh, I don't know if this is such a good job. To introduce nuclear weapons in Europe, but it happens.

Interviewer

But surely that was something that you or Strauss, at any rate, have been wanting and asking for a year, wasn't it?

Schmuckle

Uh, thinking in the terms of um, deterrence, we felt that it was necessary to do this thing. And still I believe that deterrence is basically based on nuclear weapons, on the threat of nuclear weapons and on the knowledge that the use of such weapons, uh, does not make any sense in Europe any longer. It means, uh, not a, it has not political. I cannot imagine a political aim which would be worthwhile to use nuclear weapons and to stroy... to destroy the continent.

Interviewer

What was your attitude, Herr Strauss' attitude, Adenauer government's attitude to the argument put forward by the SPD at the time of that big debate? That the rearmament of Germany and especially the nuclear armament of Germany made any chance of reunification disappear. And that for that reason, nuclear weapons should be refused.

Schmuckle

Well, the SPD at that time took over the idea of Rapatski's uh, Polish uh, minister for foreign affairs, who had the intention to develop a nuclear free zone in Europe. We thought that does not make any political and military sense, because if you would have such a zone you can only, you can also hit in this area with nuclear weapons. The Americans would do it. The Russians would do it. And we would be the victim. We thought it's better to be on one side, to be strong on one side, and to take some influence on the, on the nuclear planning. That was our position at that time. I think it had nothing to do with the German reu... reunification. Because, the chances for a... a... German reunification at that time were practically zero.

Interviewer

Why was that?

Schmuckle

Well ... th... NATO did exist, there was a pact that exist. I think neither the Poles, nor the French, nor the Brits nor other countries were too much interested in German reunification. At that time. Nobody liked it.

Interviewer

Ok. Um ...

Schmuckle

Except us.

Interviewer

The rivalry between, you'd been talking earlier about the Americans actually wanting the Federal Republic to acquire nuclear delivery capabilities. Now, there was this big rivalry between the French Mirage III and the German F10... sorry, the American Starfighter. It's been suggested that, and I wonder if you can either confirm or deny this, as the Americans say, that there were hints given to the defense ministry that unless the Germans chose the Starfighter they might find it difficult to get hold of the nuclear weapons when the time came to use in the aircraft.

Schmuckle

Well, there were, there is, was a tremendous fight between the French and the Americans who could sell, uh... uh... the aircraft, the first interceptor to, to the Germans, because it was a big business, without any doubt. No, the decision was taken by Strauss, because Americans were willing to tell us all the wrong developments they did in the technological field with the Starfighter. The French didn't tell us what they did wrong until they had the end product. And for us this was very important. To a certain degree, the Americans I think did not realize that what they did at that time, led directly, to the airbus to the airbus of our times.

Interviewer

Sorry, we'll have to start that one again.

US Involvement in Germany's Nuclear Development

Interviewer

If you could just talk about that rivalry and also whether the Americans were effectively saying, "if you don't buy our starfighter, we may not supply the weapons that you need."

Schmuckle

Well, many elements in this uh,

Interviewer

Speak to me.

Schmuckle

Ah, big bargain at that time without any doubt. The first was um, that we as Germans had the intention to develop a small but effective but armament industry. In the beginning of the German Bundeswehr had to in ... int... the intention to, not to develop any armament industry. But then we have seen that uh, uh, we were asked for prices which were so high that we thought if we have no competition, we cannot control the prices we have to pay for this, or for tanks and aircraft and other things. So we asked ah French and, and the Americans if they are willing to tell us all the wrong things.

Interviewer

Sorry, we'll have to start again. Oh, this flipping clock.

Schmuckle

There were many elements in this big bargain or, when we had to buy the first interceptor for the German Bundeswehr. Different elements. The first element was that uh, the Starfighter gave us a possibility for the biggest uh, standardization program NATO ever had had at that time. Also the Japanese uh, bought this aircraft. Second was, that all pilots and all people of the financial field, economic field said that the Starfighter is the best one. If, we uh, Strauss would have taken the French um, Mirage he would have acted against advice of all experts. So he could not do this. Next part, was that the Americans were willing to tell us all way, wrong ways they have chosen to develop this aircraft. The French didn't. And the Americans did not realize what they did at the time. Because we were very interested as Germans to come, come on the same technolog... technological level as Americans were or the Brits were, or the French were. And to a certain degree, this decision uh, was a start of what German uh, airfo... um ...

Interviewer

Aviation. Aircraft industry.

Schmuckle

Aircraft industr... aircraft industry. And if you want, it was the beginning of, of the air, European airbus that we could work together with you, and with the French to develop such an aircraft. Um, also the nuclear,th... the Starfighter could carry nuclear weapons had a, a certain influence, without any doubt. Because, as I said before, we had the intention to see uh, what the targets are we, we had the intention to be involved in nuclear affairs, to learn what it means and to see the possibility and the limits for nuclear weapons.

Interviewer

So taking all those things together, was there a pressure amongst the pressures that were put on you...

Schmuckle

Oh, there was all the pressure by the French, and by the Americans, naturally. Everybody tries to make a good uh... uh... good business uh. That is normal. Uh, the French uh, worked very hard on us as Europeans, uh, that we could start a European cooperation. But at the same time, they were very reluctant to tell us everything. The Americans were more open-minded. And uh, it was the only chance to come, as I said, to a big standardization program. The first big standardization program in Europe.

Interviewer

Just to go back to something you talked at the beginning of the interview about, the French-German cooperation, possibly of a nuclear industry, maybe even nuclear weapons. What was Strauss' intention during those negotiations in the '57?

Schmuckle

There was a test by Strauss, if it would be possible to develop a European nuclear deterrence together with the Brits, with the French, and he thought that he should start uh, the talks with the French. But as I said, it was finished as soon as General de Gaulle came into power.

Interviewer

A lot of people suspected, especially in Britain and America, that this was an attempt by Strauss to find a way out of the pledge that had been given in 1954, that Germany would not develop nuclear weapons on its soil. That he was attempting to find a back door through...

Schmuckle

Oh, not at all. That was not the intention. The basic question was, can we trust in the long run to the American, uh deterrence alone. Or was it necessary to develop also on, on European soil, a deterrence. And therefore, we were always happy about the British and the French deterrence without any doubt. We did not mistrust the Americans. But in the long run, the politics can change. And I don't know if it's, it, it's acceptable that American will also, always make a suicide for Europe.

Interviewer

But, there was a feeling, certainly for many years in the United States, in the state department especially, that especially as de Gaulle developed his own, not only his own nuclear force, but his very vocal doubts about the American nuclear deterrent. That inevitably, whatever it might have promised in 1954, Germany would want nuclear weapons of its own. And that's what the MLF was about. Was that not a sensible fear?

Schmuckle

There were many fears in the, in the nuclear field without any doubt. But, I must say, the Americans have opened their books. The Americans have uh, let us uh, opened the door that we could uh, at least, to a certain degree influence uh, nuclear targeting and other things. Up to now, we have no idea about the French targeting. And now we have uh, 1980... uh... 86. We don't know, know anything about the nuclear deterrence of, of the French except that it does exist and what kind of weapon they have. So, in this respect, the Americans were much more generous than the French, at that time, and still they are.

Interviewer

To go back again to the 1957 period, what was the reaction of the German Ministry of Defense to the British white paper of 1957 which involved substantial troop reductions in Germany and a great emphasis on nuclear deterrence.

Schmuckle

Well, we never liked this great emphasis on nuclear deterrence, because we thought it is a black and white uh, game. Ah, and it's too dangerous. We're always were interested to have a strong international uh, conventional presence in, in Germany uh, and in Europe on the continent. Uh, so we, we did not like such uh, reduction of conventional weapons at all.

Interviewer

Were you convinced by the British argument that its contribution to NATO was essentially a nuclear contribution and therefore it didn't need to contribute so much conventionally?

Schmuckle

Well I don't know. I think your officers uh, thought uh, most of your officers thought in a different way.

Interviewer

Sorry. If you could avoid saying "your" because a lot of people who will be watching this are Americans and not British. So if you could say British instead of your. Could you start that answer again?

Schmuckle

Um I, I don't think that uh, all officers thought into the same direction, as you have mentioned it. I think the British Rhine army, the American contributions, Canadian contributions, the Dutch, the Belgian contribution uh, is very important for the defense of Europe and also for the defense of America. Because I think uh, the Americans are not here stationed because we have such nice blue eyes and, and blonde hairs. They are here because they have the interest to defend America also in Europe.

Interviewer

And so, but you --

Schmuckle

But not only with nuclear weapons, with conventional weapons.

Interviewer

What did you, what was Herr Strauss' attitude to the suggestion by General Norstad that, well there were two things that he began to suggest as early as 1957. One, that there should be a pause, that the object of defensive strategy should be to force a pause during which there would be negotiations and possibly the end to the war and that that initial stage would be conventional. Which essentially was perhaps a precursor of flexible response. What was your attitude to that?

Schmuckle

Well, Norstad's idea was uh, to make NATO as a fourth nuclear power. And we supported him very much. But after a certain time, we have seen that it is a illusion, that the Americans are not willing to go this way. It was a good idea to make NATO to a fourth nuclear power, and everybody has to talk about it. But the decision-making process in such a tremendous uh, alliance with fifty nations at that time, is, I think, an impossibility. So we gave it up.

Interviewer

That was this idea of the --

Schmuckle

Special forces idea.

Interviewer

The Polaris force, the land-base Polaris force and so on? The MRBM force that was --

Schmuckle

No, ah, the nuclear force at sea was ah --

Interviewer

No. I mean, sorry, land-based polaris missiles.

Schmuckle

Land based. Or Polaris or other things. We were not so much interested what kind of weapons these are. We were interested in the political element of uh, of the idea NATO as a fourth nuclear power. Uh, this was interesting idea, without any doubt. But it failed.

Interviewer

What was your reaction when the Kennedy administration came in and you began to get these young men coming over from the Rand Corporation and from the Pentagon, the whiz kids as they were called. What was the reaction in Germany to those initial briefings by all these people of McNamara's?

Schmuckle

Well, these young people were very young, without any doubt. Uh, not much experience in the political field. Most of them were very intelligent, very clever, ah but uh, well as many young people, they had dreams which could not be realized at all. So Adenauer was an old man at the time. Kennedy was a very young man. Was very good and, and, had uh, intelligent ideas. But I think there was uh, certain uh, certain bad feeling that such young people could change uh, could try to change the whole world. And the world can not be changed in such a short time. So a certain uh, a certain bad feeling ah was in existence in, in Germany, without any doubt.

Interviewer

Were their ideas actually quite new to you? I mean the ideas that they had about, for example, that in an age of parity it was quite impossible to rely on early use of nuclear weapons. That it would escalate immediately. The idea that perhaps the conventional strength of the Soviet Union had been exaggerated, and so on. Were the ideas as new as they believed them to be?

Schmuckle

Well, uh, if there were a hundred of such young people they had a hundred different ideas, so I cannot answer your, your question. It was not possible. Some of them are very close friends to mine, and uh, very nice people. But there was not a clear idea what they have in mind. Only that they want to change something, and maybe a lot. At the time we were not uh, too much into what they asking for changes because Germany still was not on the same level with England, France, and Italy and other countries at all. So, we waited and uh, we said, "Well, let us wait and see. After a certain time, there will uh, be more calm as in the time being, and uh, then all, some of the new ideas will, will vanish, without any doubt."

Interviewer

But one thing that was an idea that they had in common, certainly McNamara had, was there should be less emphasis on, less reliance on an immediate nuclear response, whether it was tactical or strategic, more conventional forces. A longer time before the use of nuclear weapons in the case of war. Flexible response in other words. What was Herr Strauss' reaction to that?

Schmuckle

Well it's, it's a nice idea to have more conventional weapons, but can you tell me who did it in the last 40 years? Who strengthened his conventional weapons in the last 40 years? It's always a dream. Everybody asks for more conventional weapons, but nobody does it. Uh, even since the German Bundeswehr exist, we did not, we equipped it with modern weapons. That is all. But not once order was at it ah, to, to the conventional deterrence uh, in the last 40 years in, in Europe. So it's a dream. And uh, McNamara was a very intelligent man, without any doubt. He knew the price of everything, but not the value of everything.

Interviewer

What do you mean by that?

Schmuckle

Well you ... didn't we at ... [Speaks in German]

Interviewer

I understand.

Schmuckle

He knew the price of everything, but not what the value is of everything.

Interviewer

I understand the phrase, but I'm asking as it applies to the situation.

Schmuckle

Well, for example, in the alliance is much more important to have a good relationship among all members, than to put through own ideas, at the cost of others. I believe even if we, we had difference opinion about weaponry and other things, it was more important to, to save the solidarizations uh, the collaborate uh, collo... colo...

Interviewer

Collaboration.

Schmuckle

Collaboration among all members; the political element is much more important than weaponry or other things.

Interviewer

Herr Strauss did have a particular objection, I won't say a particular objection but, one argument that he used against flexible response.

Schmuckle

Well I think Strauss was never against uh, the strategy of flexible response that is in existence now. He was against the strategy of two flexible response. Uh, so that uh, the nuclear deterrence would uh, decrease to zero. That was the only point. The only man in Europe who was really strictly against flexible response was General de Gaulle. The French were strictly against it. Also in NATO at that time, we were not against it. We tried no, to avoid the things are now running in a other extreme again, and that nobody uh, is thinking that uh, also the Russians have nuclear weapons and will use them as a threat.

Interviewer

So, I mean, you were concerned that there was a danger that the Russians might not believe that nuclear weapons would be used at all.

Schmuckle

Well, the Americans at that time had certain ideas like, there must be a, a if a Russian attack should occur in, in, on the continent, there must be a pose. A pose and we thought that is a ridiculous theoretical ideas. Uh, because if, I know, the Americans will make a pose, then I could attack and say, "Now I have a certain a, a, part of the German territory and I can now negotiate. I will not uh, go further, but here I, I have kept a Volkswagen works other things, and now I'm satisfied." This was our danger. We thought that a deterrence must be on the demarcation line as it was ah, ah, the original planning of NATO. Here we had no interest to change anything at that time.

Interviewer

So the idea that you only use nuclear weapons as a last resort when you have been defeated conventionally, was one that you didn't accept.

Schmuckle

We never thought on such uh, ideas. What will happen when this office has happened? Uh, this is military thinking and military people can be occupied with such uh, games uh, uh until eternity. Uh, from the political standpoint, we were only interested that the Russians know on the demarcation line, the deterrence starts. If it starts with conventional defense, or if it starts with nuclear defense, nobody should know it.

Interviewer

Fine. But, at any rate they should be sure that it might start.

Schmuckle

It should be absolutely uncertain what happened.

Interviewer

Is it true that around this time the air force, and I'm talking really both about the German airforce and the American airforce, were advocating preemptive strike as the only way in an imminent war to limit massive damage to Germany.

Schmuckle

There was an American school of thought who had this idea. We never accepted it. Uh, this was a idea of preemptive strike, was, I believe, if I remember in the right way, a McNamara idea.

Interviewer

I think it was probably...

Schmuckle

Earlier?

Interviewer

Mm.

Schmuckle

No. I believe it was at the time of McNamara. But I'm not quite certain. In any case, it was an American idea. And there was a lot of literature about it in America. We couldn't accept it. We thought it is wrong. It's too dangerous. And we refused it.

Interviewer

And the German airforce never did a study which suggested that that might the --

Schmuckle

No. I, I don't believe that the German airforce, uh, was in favor of this idea. The German airforce was more nuclear oriented than the German army at the time. Now, it's consolidated. But in the beginning, we're, without any doubt, uh, the head of the new, uh, German airforce was much more nuclear oriented than the head of the German, uh, army. That is true. But I think this idea uh, which was also studied, uh, in our, in our Ministry of Defense, if it is good or, or bad, was refused.

Military Decision Making in Europe

Interviewer

During the, this matter of flexible response was debated, for after all, about five years --

Schmuckle

Well it started uh, '61 or such a thing, uh it was not called flexible response at that time. It started so '6l and then uh, it came into NATO I believe '64, '65.

Interviewer

But the final document --

Schmuckle

Or '67.

Interviewer

'67, so a long period.

Schmuckle

We negotiated two years at least under Hogerty's chairmanship

Interviewer

What did you think about the final document? Mr. Hogerty himself has said that the document, he doesn't know about the strategy, but the document is certainly flexible.

Schmuckle

I think we used in the document only once about flexible. We were not too much in favor of flexible, uh, flexibility altogether because it's a dangerous world. Uh, but I think the document which was developed under the chairmanship of Hogerty is a very, very good uh, political document, without any doubt. A very uh, political, politically very convincing document to me. And I think still, if you read it today, uh, it, it, it holds water. It is the right English word?

Interviewer

Yes indeed. Robert McNamara had commented on this program for us, that that document was a very watered-down version of the doctrine that he had wanted accepted, but that even --

Schmuckle

That is true. That he is right. And we, we, we fought against him. But uh, McNamara is a man who lost the war. The first war for America in, in Vietnam. And we had no intention to, to repeat such uh, uh strategic ideas as he had in mind at the time.

Interviewer

He says now that even the conventional force levels called for in MC14-3 were not produced, that it is still the case in 1986 that if a war were to break out in Europe, that most commanders expect that nuclear weapons would be used, within two or three days and that this is, and I quote, "a disgraceful state of affairs." What's your comment on that?

Schmuckle

Well I said it's always American dream that more conventional weapons were d... uh, forces should be developed, but who does it? Nobody does it. I cannot base my strategy on a dream. And uh, MacNamara is right. Uh, not one uh, additional soldier is, is, is stationed in Germany since that time. Not American, nor the Brits, nor the French, nor the German. Uh, nobody did it. And I think uh, McNamara thinks much too much in uh, the category of warfare. We think in category of deterrence because whatever a war will look like, it will, for us, unacceptable uh, the damage which will be done to Germany on both uh, sides. So we think much more in deterrence. If the deterrence works, we are happy. We don't think so much in, in war fighting uh, categories.

Interviewer

So you don't think it's a particularly useful thing to say what will happen if deterrence fails.

Schmuckle

I think that is a ridiculous question, because, uh, and not, excuse me, then a ridiculous question from you, that is a ridiculous idea to, to, to foresee what will happen in a war. Nobody knows what's happened in a war. A war can start in Norway, it can start at sea, it can start in the air, it can start in Turkey, uh, everybody believes it must start in Germany. I believe it will not start in Germany because we have a r... really here incredible deterrence.

Interviewer

You wrote a famous article in about 1961, which actually got Mr. Strauss into some trouble, I understand, in which you said in a newspaper article, that the idea of a conventional war in Europe is a military alchemy. What did you mean by that and do you still stick by it?

Schmuckle

I thought it, impossible to, to think that uh, uh, both sides have nuclear weapons, and a conventional war will be conducted uh, until the end. One side will, then use uh, nuclear weapons. At least as a deterrence factor. And I thought it was uh, I was against ideas at that time, of some Kennedy -- young Kennedy's people, who thought uh, we can uh, go back to World War II pic... war picture. The world has changed. War does not make any sense. If it was, some people were upset about it, then I said war does not make any sense any longer in Europe. I don't know where people were upset about that. But they were, without any doubt. They felt that, that, that is an attack on Kennedy's idea and to a certain degree, it was, without any doubt. Uh, so I was guilty that Strauss run into trouble at that time, but he was generous with me and so I, it was finished after a certain period. But nobody, if somebody reads this article; I have it published now again in a book, nobody would be upset about it.

Interviewer

What's your reaction to the fact that people like McNamara, George Kennan, and so on are now calling for an open declaration of no first use in Europe, no first use of nuclear weapons.

Schmuckle

Well ... if there should be a war, who decides afterwards who used first nuclear weapons. The man who believe he, he is the victor. You see what I'm saying the man, this side who believes she, she wants a war. But nobody will want a war. I believe such declarations are, are not practical in political uh, life. And they are particularly not practical if our, [I'ms] inferior in conventional weapons if the West is, I would never uh, use such phrases ah, it's a smoke-screen phrase, uh in, somebody is in trouble, he will use all the weapons, uh thinkable.

Interviewer

Flexible. Ok. Can I just go on to the various schemes that were supposed to reassure the Europeans and especially the Germans that the deterrent would be used and schemes like the MLF. What was your reaction to those mainly American ideas for providing a strategic capability to Europe in some form?

Schmuckle

I was against this idea of uh, uh sea-based uh, international nuclear force, which was proposed by the Americans at a time when the French made some offers to us. And I believe the first idea was to, to declassify uh, the French nuclear deterrence. And, to a certain degree, also the British nuclear deterrence. I always said, if this thing should work and should be realized, I'm convinced that we Germans will provide the cook on such a ship. Not more. And uh, but it was clear the fleet come never come into existence. It was a political uh, dreamship uh, fleet. A dreamship which was sunk before it was uh, it was workable at all. It is, was the first fleet which really was sunk before it was uh, in existence. And uh, within such dreams, you can make uh, little political uh, games uh, and gambles. In NATO what the American did at that time. But it was a, it was a idea which could never work. How would you develop a nuclear decision-making process for such a fleet? Impossible.

Interviewer

But the German, your ministers --

Schmuckle

Oh, they were very keen on it.

Interviewer

Could you say that again for me?

Schmuckle

They were very keen on it. The uh, the Germans liked it. They thought suddenly, they are now on the same level with the Americans in the nuclear affairs, and I thought after a fair experience, I have made with NATO as a nuclear force, that it would never happen. And it cannot happen. To a certain degree, nuclear weapons are in the hand of the man who developed them. And that's the American president. That is your prime minister. And that is uh, uh French president.

Interviewer

If you could say the British prime minister not your prime minister for me. because as I say, when you talk about the British if you'd say British rather than "your." What was the ultimate objection to the MLF? Was it a question of, did it... Stop the tape for a minute will you? All right. We're running. What were these two ideas then?

Schmuckle

The two ideas, Strauss' idea to have a stronger German voice in the decision-making process. If possible, a European voice. And the second idea was from Helmut Schmidt who developed the idea to have a German veto against the use of nuclear weapons. Both ideas failed. And then we had the idea of the multi-lateral uh, nuclear force, uh a NATO force, which I think was also a failure from the beginning. First it was a submarine force and it was a surface uh, force and it was clear out of the decision-making process for this force could never work in the right way. Nuclear weapons are in the hand of those people who have developed them. That is American president, that is British prime minister, and that is m... uh, French president. The three are the decisive people.

Interviewer

So you don't think there could ever be a German finger on the trigger. It was a phrase that used. We must make the Germans feel that they have a --

Schmuckle

We never had the intention to have uh, German finger on the trigger, but we had the intention to have a finger on the security uh, level. Level?

Interviewer

Button, or whatever.

Schmuckle

Button. Security button. This was our intention. Yes.

Interviewer

The safety catch as it were.

Schmuckle

The s... yeah.

Interviewer

Surely one of the doubts though that was always being expressed was "will the American president when it comes to be prepared to sacrifice Washington to save Bonn." In other words, when we need him to fire, will he fire. That was the doubt, surely, that was being addressed by things like MLF.

Schmuckle

Maybe uh, that this was one idea. There are so many ideas developed in the nuclear field that I cannot say that was the basic idea for the whole thing. Uh, there was mistrust uh, I think particularly in Great Britain and France if the American president will uh, sacrifice uh, his country for, for the continent or for the island of Great, of, of England. That is true. Uh, so uh, the Brits developed their own devi... uh, nuclear uh, deterrent. Uh, the French developed their own nuclear deterrent. And I believe the Germans uh, have a certain, but very small influence on the decision-making process. Uh, because uh, the decision-making process in NATO is based on the [ethnic] guidelines, which tell us that uh, the Europeans will be consulted if there is time. And consultation does mean, does not mean that the president must follow the European yes or no. He can decide what he wants. But that's a very weak, uh, uh formula in the [ethnic] guidelines. And I think the American president must make the decision by himself.

Interviewer

And that's an inevitable situation.

Schmuckle

It is not inevitable if we find a better structure in Europe for the nuclear decision-making process. But we didn't do anything in this respect.

Interviewer

I h --

Schmuckle

They have developed their own ideas about it but uh, I failed.

Interviewer

During this whole period there was this enormous increase in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in general from a few hundred to seven, eight, nine thousand. I'm not quite sure how many. Was that number necessary? Who was taking those decisions? Were you?

Schmuckle

The Americans. They take the decision and I think there were too many nuclear warheads, without any doubt, in, in Europe. And I also feel that uh, the two world powers have too many nuclear weapons. Everybody has a right to defend his country, without any doubt, with all means available for defense. But I think no country has a right, not the Russians and not the Americans, to have so many nuclear weapons, if they use them, if they use all of them to destroy our planet.

Interviewer

Why do you think there were so many weapons introduced into the, do you have any idea what the reasoning was for that?

Schmuckle

I believe the reasoning was a military planning which was based on uh, World War II uh, experience. Uh, as I said, without any reproach, uh, our reconnaissance went better and better. We, so the military people found more and more targets. In my opinion, not all of them nuclear targets at all. So if you want, then you can uh, even hit a bridge with a nuclear weapon which is totally senseless. Uh, and I believe these plans must be cleaned again and again.

Interviewer

Were you conscious at the time that you and the Defense Ministry in Germany in the late fifties and early sixties, did you know about how many weapons there were in Europe? Where they were aimed?

Schmuckle

No. At that time we had very little influence or, or no influence at all on, on the stationing of nuclear warheads. We naturally had influence on the nuclear means of delivery, but not on the nuclear warheads and in the depots. I did not know at that time were there nuclear warheads in the depots or potatoes.

Interviewer

But you did have presumably an idea of what targets you, the German forces --

Schmuckle

Well. Slowly. It is. is not so easy to, to get uh, a clear view about the nuclear targets in uh, in Europe because I always felt that is a political uh, question. Many people thought that's a military question. And if the political, uh, politicians come in, they change too much. Uh, I feel today there's a political question of highest importance. And I feel the polit... po... uh, politicians would make the decision. What are the targets, uh worthwhile for nuclear weapons and what are the, are the targets not worthwhile at all for nuclear targets.

Interviewer

But those main decisions about the force levels of numbers of nuclear weapons were being taken at SHAPE mainly, or in the Pentagon or --

Schmuckle

I think mainly in the Pentagon. And in SHAPE. In cooperation with SHAPE. But uh, to a certain degree, this uh still a rather exclusive American job.

Interviewer

And did you feel that you were properly consulted, the German, did the German military feel it was properly consulted by the US army, for example, that was going to be fighting on German soil about the style, and how it was going to be doing that fighting.

Schmuckle

I think it was uh, improved more and more without any doubt. But still, I think that is, should be a question of uh, the chancellor, the British prime minister, the American president, the French president. What are really nuclear weapon uh, targets in our time?

Interviewer

But many of these are short-range weapons which are by definition, you can't target them before the war happens.

Schmuckle

No. We have not so many short-range uh, weapons now uh, on our side. The Russians have more now, than we have uh, we have uh, deleted Honest John. We have withdrawn, I think now two thousand warheads from the continent, uh, so that is a decrease in tendency in, in the West which I think is the right uh, development uh, for defense. We need not so many nuclear weapons for defense that uh, I c... can hit each target with a nuclear weapon. I think that's the wrong philoso... philosophy.

Interviewer

Can you give us an idea of the political atmosphere in Germany at that time? Was there throughout that period a genuine sense of threat and if so, what was the threat?

Schmuckle

There was uh, uh a continuous uh feeling of threat by, by the Soviets. Uh, particularly in certain crisis. Uh, the crisis of '53 in East Berlin, uh, the crisis in Hungary particularly was a tremendous uh, threat to us too. And later on in the sixties, uh, the threat in uh, or, or and the, and the threat in Poland uh, too. There were real revolutions in these countries and we did not know how the Russians will react. Nobody knew it at the time. There was a feeling of threat and uh, I think a political threat is still in existence. Even if we uh, we have a period of detente. But I think you cannot give up uh, uh competition between two uh antagonistic uh, systems. It's a dream. It will continue and also maybe the Russians feel that there is a threat from our side.

Interviewer

Well, might they have felt that? After all, you had --

A Multi-lateral Nuclear Force for NATO

Interviewer

Perhaps you can tell us what your recollection of George Ball's visit, to talk about the MLF.

Schmuckle

George Ball came in the Minister of Defense, presented the idea of a multi-lateral nuclear force at sea. I was rather reluctant, uh, and I found it uh, I found it understandable that my high-ranking officials were so enthusiastic about this idea. Because I had the uh, experience which NATO as a nuclear forth, uh, forth nuclear fo... as a nuclear fourth in this field totally. So I uh, told afterwards one of the men who was really responsible for the uh Ministry of Defense um, "You should not believe what is proposed uh, to you. I think that's a smokescreen, because the Germans can never be on the same level like the Americans in the decision-making process or in such an area. If something happens for us, I think uh, we will be allowed to provide the cook for such a ship and not more." But the man uh, said to me, "You're absolutely wrong. Uh, imagine what this would be for a marvelous picture if such a submarine in the port of New York, with a German flag on board." Uh well, I said uh, "That is the most unimportant, uh, element for an, in the nuclear affairs, I believe if we have a flag on board, a German flag on board or not." But um, the German government, the minister of defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were very keen on this idea. And the, they followed the idea, I believe, three years and then it was a tremendous setback when we suddenly realized that the whole thing was finished.

Interviewer

Why? Was it in your view, was it ever really sincere?

Schmuckle

I never had hoped when I started my job as a military advisor of uh, Ambassador [Krever]. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, please release me from this job. I will not do it. I don't believe in this fleet at all." So he took a, a Navy officer to, to, to, as advisor for, for the MLF. I didn't do it.

Interviewer

Do you think, to back to the atmosphere, what was the threat that say, Herr Strauss was most concerned about in the fifties. Was it that the Soviet Union would launch an aggression against Germany, an armed aggression, or were there other kinds of threats?

Schmuckle

No. Even in 1957, Strauss said, "I don't believe in a major attack of, of the Russians against West uh, Europe." Uh, the tremendous build-up of the forces is a background for offensive politics. And this policy is dangerous for us. For example, in Berlin and in other areas of Western Europe. It could uh, we could be blackmailed uh, by this tremendous superiority in, in military, in the military field. And really, afterwards, Khrushchev blackmailed us. Khrushchev said uh, during the Berlin crisis, "I need five nuclear bombs to destroy Germany. I need five to destroy England and I, I, I need uh, five to destroy France." He said it. He said, uh and ah, I will detect even uh, uh the, the nuclear bases in Italy, even if they are hidded in olive hinds. I don't know.

Interviewer

Olive Vines.

Schmuckle

Ya. Uh, "I will hit them. I will destroy them." He did it. He blackmailed really. Khrushchev was a blackmailer with, with nuclear weapons.

Interviewer

You didn't really fear an aggression, so why should you be frightened of blackmail.

Schmuckle

No. We felt when we built our bucher... the German Bundeswehr, uh within NATO, such an attack cannot happen. But if this deterrence would not an, be in existence, then we were convinced that the Russians would use the chance where it was, would be offered to them. And that's notm forbidden in politics. That is politics. Sometimes it, it happens.

Interviewer

What's your reaction to the ideas of people like Henry Rowen and so on in the Pentagon in the early sixties who said that we have been exaggerating because of the intelligence and the way it's been analyzed. We've been exaggerating Soviet conventional superiority for ten years. In fact, we can match them conventionally with only a little bit more effort.

Schmuckle

Well, uh the American intelligence or the American representatives told us always that there are hundred seventy five divisions uh, stationed against us in a, in a, in a time of crisis. We never believed it in Germany. We thought hundred twenty five. When Kennedy came into power, suddenly overnight, the hundred seventy five divisions was reduced to seventy five uh divisions. We thought that is also wrong. That is the other extreme. We don't believe in seventy five. We believe in hundred twenty five divisions, which could be used against uh, Europe. At that time, it started that all intelligence people came together in NATO to, to refine their figures. And that is now really very good. Everybody can talk about it. And we are now in NATO, I believe, on a firm ground as far as intelligence is concerned. Of the Americans accept whether Norwegian uh, intelligence officers tell the uh, them, and the same is with Germans or Turks or Greeks, because it's naturally complicated to, to see the right picture from America from Washington. Sometimes the Norwegians know much better what happens in, in, in the Kola peninsula or a Turk knows much better what a ... happens in the Caucusus, as Americans intelligence can do it. So I believe that's now ok.

Interviewer

What do you think really, do you think there was ever a possibility of there not being nuclear weapons in Europe, maybe just relying on strategic nuclear weapons based on the homelands or something. Was there ever an alternative, in other words? A viable alternative to the way things have turned out in the...

Schmuckle

Well in the time being we have the alternative, there's Gorbachev and Reagan believed that there should be no nuclear weapons at all in the world. That's another dream. Uh, but they believe in it, I believe. Both of them. So we must wait what will happen. Uh, if it happens, then we must change something. I never believed that uh, our strategy of flexible response will uh, will uh remain uh really until eternity. Strategies are changing from time to time. And I think normally, uh, uh, uh strategy li... in alliance like NATO will change all ten or twenty years. So, I'm not too much concerned if we are responsible enough to do the right thing in the right, uh, way at the right time.

Interviewer

But if there had been no nuclear weapons, do you think there would have been a third world war by now?

Schmuckle

I think the uh, Stalin would have used all possibilities uh, during his time. Uh, as a dictator of Russia uh to, to enlarge his empire. But now we have a different leadership in Russia. Gorbachev is not a Stalin. He's a different man. He's a well-educated man. He's a very eloquent man and uh, he's much more open-minded to Western ideas at uh, his predecessors uh, have been um, in my opinion. So we must wait what will be the outcome of the uh next summit meeting. There were dangerous uh, that they could, you know in nineteen, I believe was, in nineteen hundred forty eight or nineteen hundred fifty, I don't know exactly uh, when Stalin asked for uh, to have entrance to the, to the sea straits of Turkey. He asked for one province of Turkey and he, he, he had the intention to exe... to expand his uh, influence on, on the whole territory of, of Turkey. So he has really driven Turkey in the arms of NATO at that time.

Interviewer

Ok. Let's leave it there. Thanks.

Schmuckle

I believe that the last thing is...

Interviewer

Quiet for thirty seconds, we just get the room atmosphere. This is room atmosphere for the interview with General Schmuckle. Thirty seconds starting now. Do you recall the Soviet reaction to the decision to arm the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons?

Schmuckle

Well the decision of the Russians was a very uh...

Interviewer

Sorry. You said the decision. The reaction of the Russians.

Schmuckle

Yeah. Uh the reaction of the Russians was a very negative one, without any doubt. And I believe their counter-plan uh, was a Rapatski plan uh to develop a, a nuclear-free zone in uh, Europe. But it was always the same uh, with the Russians. They attacked uh the rearmament of Germany, when it was realized they accepted it and that was the same with the nuclear, uh, development as soon as we introduced the first uh, nuclear means of delivery, the Russians accepted this fact and they are very cool-minded people. They are, they are not a [adventuary] uh, people. They are cool minded and they make their policy based on facts and not on dreams.

Interviewer

But there are those who argue, in Germany and outside Germany, that if the nuclear, the threat of acquiring nuclear delivery vehicles had been used as a bargaining chip with the Russians, that it was possible that there could have been an agreement in Central Europe, de-nuclearized zone, whatever, which would have made Europe a much safer place than it is today. And especially Germany a much safer place than it is today. What do you say to those?

Schumckle

How will you ever save a place uh, then the place which had peace since forty years? One of the longest peace periods in, in Europe. I believe what we did, nobody knows if it was totally right or totally wrong. But I would say with Winston Churchill, I think it's clear that we did not make everything wrong.

Interviewer

Fine. Good. Ok.