Robert McNamara gaining defense expertise
Raising the Nuclear Threshold
US and Soviet first strike capability
Single Integrated Operation Plan
Discussion of commencement address given by Robert McNamara in 1962
First-strike capability and responding to a theoretical Soviet first strike
Assured destruction and flexible response
Superior nuclear military power and deterrence
Anti-ballistic missiles and deterrence
Mutual assured destruction and dealing with crises

 
 

Robert McNamara gaining defense expertise

Interviewer

Mr. McNamara, what was your mandate from President Kennedy when he asked you to be secretary of state?

McNamara

It was a very simple one uh... As far as-- It was a very simple one uh...as far as force structure was concerned is...was to examine the military forces which the US had at its disposal uh...taking account of those of its allies as well and determine whether they are adequate in relation to our security requirements.

Interviewer

Did you say you had an anecdote?

McNamara

You may remember that uh...during the campaign the issue of the missile gap became uh...very prominent. Uh...although I didn't understand it until later, there were two different intelligence estimates of the relative balance between US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. One prepared by the air force and one prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. And at that time there was no uh.. central director of intelligence within the government as there was later in the '60s and as there is today. These two different estimates, therefore, stood independently of each other. One of them, the airforce estimate, was leaked uh...to the congress. It became known publicly. It indicated that the Soviets had a substantial advantage uh...in strategic nuclear forces vis a vis the US. And this became a...a major issue in the campaign. And therefore I felt responsible in accordance with the President requirement that I examine the adequacy of the US military forces to determine the size of that missile gap and the way in which we should uh... act to eliminate it. That was my first order of business when I became secretary on January 20, 1961. And it took me and my deputy, Ross Gilpatric about uh..3 or 4 weeks that yes, there was a gap. But it was exactly the reverse of what had been understood. Uh...the balance was substantially in favor of the United States. The total strategic uh...nuclear offensive force of the US at the time, as I recall, was on the order of 6,000 warheads compared to the total Soviet strategic nuclear force of on the order of 300. Now I want to emphasize that this in each case included a small number of missiles. But even with respect to missiles, I think it was clear the US had an advantage. But in total, strategically, the US was much stronger in nuclear offensive forces than was the Soviets. Uh...I made the terrible mistake of meeting with a group of the members of the press at the urging of my assistant secretary for public affairs about the time I came to this conclusion, 3 or 4 weeks after I'd been sworn in as secretary. He urged me to become acquainted with the press. I did so. I thought it was clearly understood, the session was off the record. The first question of course, was Mr. Secretary, you've been secretary 3 or 4 weeks, surely you must have been looking at the missile gap. What do you propose to do about it. And I said, Well gentlemen I have been. It was clearly the first requirement. Uh. . . and I found there was a gap. And there was a dead silence. I said, but it's in our favor. You couldn't hold the door locked. They broke the damn door down. They went out and the headline on the late afternoon edition of the <>Evening Star</> says: McNamara declares no missile gap. And the next day, perhaps with tongue incheek, the Republicans asked that the uh...election be rerun. They asked the President to resign and that I resign. They claimed he had been elected on false premises. Now I want to emphasize that the airforce put forward that intelligence estimate in good faith. They weren't inten...intentionally trying to mislead anybody. It was illustrative of how little we knew about the Soviets at the time. The amount of information we had on their force structure was very, very limited. And there was room for difference of opinion. I thought then, and I believe today the airforce uh. . . misinterpreted the data. My view coincided with that of the Central Intelligence Agency. And I think with hindsight it's very, very clear that we had strategic nuclear superiority at the time.

Interviewer

You didn't know a lot about nuclear strategy or weapons systems or things when you...

McNamara

I did not.

Interviewer

Who did you choose to hire and to bring into the secretary"s office to educate you?

McNamara

I was very reluctant to accept President Kennedy's invitation to become Secretary of Defense. And I did so only on the condition that I would be allowed to bring into the department the ablest people I could find. I clearly was not an expert on defense and I felt I needed the brightest minds in the country to assist me to become an expert on defense and I fully intended to be one. He promised me that uh... I could select whomever I chose without any regard to partisan politics. He never once deviated from that promise. And the result was that I recruited uh...what I considered the ablest group of individuals that have ever served in a single cabinet office in the history of our republic. At one single time in the Defense Department we had Mr.s Gilpatric, Vance -- later Secretary of State, Brown -- later Secretary of Defense, Califano -- later Secretary of HEW, Charles Hitch -- the former uh...president of the University of California, Paul Nitze -- the uh...current arms control negotiator, Bill Bundy... A host of other extraordinarily bright imaginative experience individuals. And they became my tutors. And I hope I was a fast learner. In any event, uh...I made it my business to quickly uh...endeavor to understand the fundamentals of uh...strategy in a nuclear age.

Interviewer

You turned to a lot of people who had occupied postions at RAND. What did they bring to you?

McNamara

Well, there were a number of people from RAND, but uh...I recruited them not because they'd been at RAND, but rather because they were extremely bright able people. Charles Hitch uh..was the first I brought in from RAND. He had been a tutor. As a matter of fact he had been a Rhodes scholar and then a tutor at Oxford. He was a tutor of uh...of Harold Wilson who later became Prime Minister of uh...Britain. And I mention this only to indicate the quality of his mind and the level of his experience in international affairs. He then went to RAND and he became a security expert at RAND. He was an extraordinarily able tutor of me.

Interviewer

I need a way to lead into our discussion with Enthoven on force structure. He did play a key role on some of these decisions...

McNamara

In addition to uh...to Charlie Hitch uh...we brought in from RAND uh...Allen Enthoven and Harry Rowan who I didn't know and who Charlie Hitch did and who he recommended and whom he brought in to work with him. And the three of them were extremely able. Very knowledgeable, very expert in uh...nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy and uh...and they quickly uh...brought me up to speed.

Interviewer

What were the goals of the force structure decisions?

McNamara

The uh...following Kennedy's uh...request that we examine the military forces of the United States in relation to our foreign policy objectives and taking account of our allies forces uh... determine whether they were adequate in relation to those foreign policy objectives. We.. .we translated the foreign policy objectives into military strategy, translated the military strategy into force structure, and that into defense department budgets. And with respect to the nuclear forces we uh..considered uh...how those forces might be used and in relation to... to that possible use, considered the size of force we needed and then compared that with the size we had or the size that we were planning to have in the years covering the procurement cycle. Uh...let me go back a bit to stress that...that nuclear weapons uh...almost since the formation of NATO have been a...a major element of the NATO military force structure. NATO was formed as I recall, in 1949. Early in the 1950's the NATO powers sought to determine the size of the forces they needed to defend against uh...the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Uh... at that time it was estimated that the Soviet Union could field...put into combat a hundred and seventy five divisions, combat divisions. Against those divisions, NATO believed it would need 92 divisions. The reason for the lesser number was that the NATO divisions were larger and stronger, had more fire power etcetera. And the 92 division goal for NATO was accepted in 1952 at Lisbon and became known as the Lisbon Force Goals. However, very quickly, uh... by 1954 it became clear that NATO was unwilling to finance the recruitment and equiping of uh... 92 divisions. And Secretary Dulless, the then US Secretary of State proposed in 1954 that nuclear weapons in effect be substituted for conventional forces. Because of budgetary reasons. And he stated quite frankly uh...that that was the goal. Uh...get a bigger bang for the buck was the way it was phrased. And at that time, the NATO force goal was reduced from 92 divisions to 30 divisions and in effect the reduction of 62 divisions was justified by uh...the proposal to introduce and build up nuclear forces.

Raising the Nuclear Threshold

McNamara

So from early in the '50s the nuclear forces became an essential element ofthe NATO force structure and the NATO strategy. And the strategy at that time, as it related to Europe was what was called massive retaliation. It was thought that the conventional forces would serve as a trip wire. That almost the smallest conceivable Soviet uh...incursion uh...into NATO territory would trip that wire, trip the conventional forces if you will and lead to an all out nuclear assault upon the Soviet Union. So the first question we had to ask ourselves in 1961, was this a viable strategy and if so were the forces adequate. And we very quickly came to the conclusion it wasn't a viable strategy. I recall that there was a group named,I believe, the Joint Evaluation Subcommittee which had been appointed by President Eisenhower and which consisted of four, four star officers. And they did nothing but examine the results of a nuclear exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, presumably intiated by NATO. Uh...and there were....their conclusions were so devastating that only, literally only one copy of their report was prepared and it was almost impossible to gain access to it. The president and later I as secretary of defense were allowed to have access to it. But essentially no one else. And what the report the showed was: there was no conceivable situation in which NATO could intiate the use of nuclear weapons without the destruction of both the Soviet Union, and Western Europe, and the United States. And that, quite obviously, caused us to doubt the desirability of the strategy of massive retaliation. And it wasn't long after uh...it was early in 1962 that we concluded that strategy should be changed. And President Kennedy authorized me to put forward to the NATO ministers, foreign and defense ministers of NATO meeting in Athens in I believe April 1962. I proposed [a] new strategy known as flexible response. The purpose of which was to insure that it would not be necessary to uh...confront uh...a small Soviet uh...conventional force aggression with the launch of uh...NATO's nuclear forces, but rather to respond to Soviet conventional force aggression with NATO conventional forces. And utilize NATO's nuclear forces only as an action of last resort in the event that the NATO conventional forces were in danger of being overrun. What we were saying to NATO in Athens in 1962 -- and it was very, very, contreven... controversial was that massive retaliation was a bankrupt strategy. We should move away from that. We should raise the threshold of nuclear retaliation. We should depend primarily on conventional forces. This was extremely conroversial. Some exaggerated the danger of nuclear war. Others said uh...that uh... the... the uh...withdrawal of the threat of early use of nuclear weapons would uh... would damage the deterrent and uh...increase the likelihood the Soviets would engage in war. And a third argument was that NATO couldn't afford the increase in uh...conventional forces that would be required. With respect to the latter, I should say that it was true then, and it's true today, that the United States and the western world has consistently overestimated the strength of the Soviet conventional force and consistently underestimated the strength of NATO's conventional forces and therefore exaggerated the imbalance, the conventional force imbalance between uh... Warsaw Pact and NATO and that has...has contributed to the support of what I'll call the nuclear option. The nuclear strategy.

US and Soviet first strike capability

McNamara

The argument was so great in April of '62 over the proposed shift from massive retaliation to flexible response that it wasn't until five years later that the proposal was acepted. It was accepted in 1967 after five years of debate and argument. And moreover, it was accepted in a substantially diluted form. When it was accepted the NATO nations failed to agree to increase their conventional forces as had been proposed even to the limited levels we thought necessary uh... evaluating properly the relative balance of Soviet and uh...NATO conventional forces. And as a result, the uh... the threshold of nuclear war was not raised as high as we believed desirable. And to this day, it is far lower than I find acceptable. There is an unacceptable risk of nuclear war today because NATO has failed to carry out the strengthening of conventional forces which we recommended in April of 1962. And the NATO commanders will say today and have said publicly, that they would expect that in the early hours of any military confrontation between east and west to request authority to use nuclear weapons. I think that's a disgraceful state of affairs.

Interviewer

Let's go back to some of the strategic force decisions. You came in on the cusp of a new age. The force structure was mainly bombers. What did you do about the bombers? What did you think about the bombers? What's the case for missiles over bombers?

McNamara

At the time uh...the administration came in uh... missiles were just being put into production. The Eisenhower administration had initiated the design and development and deployment of missiles, quite correctly I think. And it was obvious to...to us that uh...regardless of what role the bombers would play -- and we thought they would continue to play an important role as they are today. But at that time it was clear that while we needed the bombers and we needed to modernize the bomber force uh... needed to protect it and needed to reduce its vulnerability, nonetheless uh...we should place primary reliance on missiles. And therefore we put great emphasis on the Minuteman missile and the Polaris missile.

Interviewer

What was the utility of the missile?

McNamara

We were placing such emphasis on the missile because uh... two reasons: number one, they were fast. Uh...they responded quickly. They would reduce the uh... ability of the adversary to respond with certain of their weapons if our weapons were targeted on theirs. And uh... secondly, there was no known defense against them. The bombers uh... while we believed they could penetrate defenses, those defenses were becoming stronger at all times and they carried the risk that uh... increasing number of bombers would become vulnerable to those defenses. So for both reasons we put great emphasis while, as I suggest, strengthening the bomber force.

Interviewer

Didn't you inherit a force structure design for a first strike?

McNamara

The uh...issue of uh...whether we did or didn't have first stike capability and if we didn't whether we should or shouldn't have a first strike capability was a very very important issue, indeed, in the 1960s. It is today, one of the fundamental problems uh... standing in the way of uh... arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. To this day, the Soviets believe that we have over a period of years, uh...starting if not in the '50 certainly in the early '60s had a first strike strategy. And we today, and for a number of years have believed that the Soviets have or are seeking to achieve a first strike capability. I know the Soviet belief is wrong. We did not have, we do not have, we never intended to have a first strike capability. I don't believe the Soviets have or are seeking to achieve a first strike capability. However, each side believes it, and even though the beliefs are irrational and in my opinion incorrect, they must be treated as reality. And this has a tremendous impact on strategy and particularly on arms control agreement. But to go back to the early '60s -- At that time we had on the order of uh...6,000 strategic warheads. The Soviets had on the order of 300. There were many in the US, some in the military and some not in the military, but many in the US administration who believed that with our 6,000 if we targeted them on uh...the Soviet uh... military forces, particularly their nuclear forces, we could achieve a first strike. By definition, a first strike is not only first use in the sense that you initiate the use of the weapons before the opponent has intiated the use of nuclear weapons. But the difference between first use and first strike is that, by definition, a first strike is first use that is so overwhelming it det... destroys such a high percentage of your opponents retaliatory nuclear force that he cannot inflict unacceptable damage on you. Now. . .

Single Integrated Operation Plan

McNamara

...Now under that definition, we did not then, do not today, and never had had a first strike capability.

Interviewer

Did you feel that the SAC or the airforce at the time you came into the Pentagon had a first strike plan?

McNamara

The Strategic Air Command was perhaps the most highly disciplined element of the military force. General LeMay did a fantastic job in shaping that command uh...to a standard of perfection that was unequaled elsewhere in the military and that included a very very high standard of discipline which means that uh... the strategic air command operations were...were uh...managed to conform to the directions it received from the highest political authority, the president. However, given the then balance of force - uh...say at 20 to 1 numerical advantage for the US -- there were certainly some in the Strategic Air Command that thought we should...they should develop what might be called a first strike plan, which would be a plan uh...targeted...uh... targeting our whole force against the Soviet retaliatory force and designed to inflict such damage on it that the uh...the uh...force that survived would uh...not have sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on us. And there was such...such a plan. But, it didn't meet the requirement. The President's requirement or my requirement as to... or call it acceptable damage. Even a small number of surviving Soviet nuclear weapons if delivered on targets in this country, particularly uh..cities uh... would cause such uh...numbers of fatalities as to be totally unacceptable to any responsible political leader. And surely uh...that particular SlOP plan was unacceptable to uh... to the president as it was to me.

Interviewer

Let's talk about the SIOP. Do you remember your first briefing in Omaha in February 1961, when you first learned what the war plan was?

McNamara

In...in 1961, after having concluded that there was no missile gap or if there was a gap, it was a gap in our favor uh...i visited the uh... headquarters of the strategic air command at Omaha with some of my associates, met with the commander of uh...of the air command at the time and went through the SlOP alternatives. I wanted to understand the targeting. The numbers of weapons that would be brought on the targets. The operational plans. The degree of control that the political authorities could exercise over those plans. And I can recall to this day my shock and amazement uh...because basically they were uh...all out plans. Designed to unleash our total force against uh...particular targets. Uh... and that would carry with it, so it seemed to me, the results that uh... the joint evaluation subcommittee -- this committee of four 4-star officers had pointed to. That is to say the destruction both of the Warsaw Pact of nations, particularly the Soviet Union, but also the uh...destruction of the...of the United States. Uh...and hence, the plan, from my point of view was totally unsatisfactory. Moreover it carried with it uh...uh...an extraordinary amount of peripheral damage. Damage to countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union across which our bombers would have to fly. Uh...endangering the bomber uh... because of the air defenses in those countries which led our targeters to plan to take out those air defenses either by missiles or by bombers in advance of the time that our bombers would pass over. And that caused immense uh..damage to the surrounding nations. So I... I found the plans quite...quite unsatisfactory. And it led me to conclude that it was going to be necessary to introduce flexibility into the plans -- what I'll call flexible retargeting. So that very quickly, following a presidential decision to launch a part of the uh...or all of the strategic air command, targets could be changed in accordance with whatever wishes the president uh...proposed to follow and apply at the time.

Interviewer

As I understand it, the entire SIOP would go off and not only the Soviet Union, but China and Europe...

McNamara

Well I don't...I don't recall this. And if I did uh...I wouldn't wish to remember the specific coutries that would have been involved in a SlOP attack. Uh...even in an attack that was planned as far back as 1962, '61.

Interviewer

We...

McNamara

....By...by the way, I don't think that China was included, I don't recall that at all. But certainly, as you might expect, it was one might think reasonable when you're sending in an attacking force to attack targets in the Soviet Union, if it had to pass over anti-aircraft sites on the way in uh...it would only be thought to be reasonable to take out those anti-aircraft sites and they might or might not be within the Soviet Union.

Interviewer

Were you horrified?

McNamara

Well, I was horrified because uh...it seemed so senseless to me. There was no way that I could conceive of our nation uh...coming out a winner from such an exchange. There was no way in which I could conceive of our nation benefitting from such an exchange. And it...it led me to conclude then there could be no way to either limit or win a nuclear war.

Interviewer

When you first understood what the war plan was, weren't you convinced that this was simply too massive a response without -- I mean Tony Power didn't convince you what they were going to do back to us?

McNamara

No, he didn't, but the joint evaluation subcommittee did.

Interviewer

Were you privy to that at that time?

McNamara

I think so. I think I became privy to that before I went to SAC -- I don't recall exactly. But one didn't have to be a -- didn't have to read the joint evaluation subcommittee report to know that the Soviets would launch all out. There's no question about that. So you could make your own judgement. It was a, you know, they went through extraordinarily uh...onerous uh... approach to obtaining the results. You could do it in two hours on the back of an envelope. It would be just about as accurate.

Interviewer

But you were horrified?

McNamara

Abolutely.

Interviewer

I want you [to] say that.

McNamara

Well uh...I was shocked at the uh...approach that was being taken. Or let me phrase it differently, I was shocked at the...the uh... result that would accrue from initiating any one of the SlOP plans each one of which was certain to lead to Soviet retaliation with all the power at their disposal. Now, the power at their disposal, after we had struck them, would be less, substantially less of course, than the power before we struck them. But the power that they very possibly would have after we had struck them was more than any responsible US leader would voluntarily accept directed against his country. It was more than any US leader would draw upon himself by a decision to launch against the Soviets. And it convinced me then that there was no set of circumstances in which we could benefit by uh...initiating an attack on the Soviet Union. A nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

Discussion of commencement address given by Robert McNamara in 1962

Interviewer

What was your message to the Soviets in your commencement address at Ann Arbor in 1962?

McNamara

Well, there were in a sense, 3 messages. Uh... the first and the main purpose of the speech was to say, as I had said, I think, a month previously in Ann Ar...in Athens that uh...the US had proposed to NATO a massive shift in nuclear strategy away from massive retaliation to flexible response. And that we believed that this would greatly reduce the risk of nuclear war. It raised the threshold of the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons very substantially. It thereby uh...reduced the risk that those weapons would be used and reduced the risk that uh...the two sides would be destroyed as a result of a nuclear exchange. B, it was to say to the Soviets that uh...it wasn't phrased exactly this way - it was to say that uh...given the tremendous uh...force imbalance, the tremendous force superiority that the US has today of superiority in the ratio of 20 to 1. 6,000 US warheads to 300 strategic offensive nuclear Soviet warheads. We believe it's very much in the interest of both powers were we ever to find our way in a...into a nuclear war that we seek to limit that nuclear war. And that uh...certainly it would be our hope and intention to try to limit it by holding the numbers of warheads launched to far below the total we had available and launching then solely at military targets and we would hope that the initial exchange could be limited to a relatively small number of warheads focused on military targets. And that after that, in some fashion, the uh...the war can be terminated. And thirdly it was to say to the Soviets that uh...we thought uh...independent nuclear forces, such as those possessed by France, could be dangerous. Uh...and uh...while we didn't put it quite this way, in the speech there was a strong indication that we would not permit the US nuclear forces to be triggered by an independent decision made by France which was withholding its nuclear force from NATO at the time. An independent uh... decision by France to launch uh...part or all of its force against the Soviet Union.

Interviewer

This is a direct message to De Gaulle isn't it?

McNamara

Well, it...it was more a statement perhaps, than a message. Uh...and it was a statement for which I was severely criticized at the time. And as a matter of fact, it's a statement that the French haven't forgotten to this day.

Interviewer

But you couldn't hope to limit damage in a war if there are rowdy people with their fingers on the button.

McNamara

There was then and I think, to this day, there is danger that if allies take independent decisions with respect to initiating the use of nuclear weapons, there will be unintended responses uh... And uh...any decision to use nuclear weapons in defense and alliance, whether they by French nuclear weapons, or British nuclear weapons, or US nuclear weapons uh...should uh...represent a decision by the alliance.

Interviewer

Some people have interpreted this speech as an indication that a war could be fought in a tidy little way by avoiding cities.

McNamara

Aboslutely....absolutely not. Uh...with hindsight I'm not even certain uh...that the speech was appropriate for the time. I'm inclined to think on balance it was. But uh...if it was appropriate for the time, it was a very uh... narrow window in the nuclear age -- a very small window in the nuclear age and a very peculiar uh... period in the nuclear age. It was the period when we had this 20 to 1 nuclear superiority uh...and it was a period when uh...we wanted to make clear that it would be in their interest and ours to avoid an all out nuclear exchange by either side. And that was in effect the theme of... one of the three themes of the Ann Arbor speech.

Interviewer

So was it damage limiting?

McNamara

It was damage limiting, in that sense. It was -I don't like to use the term damage limiting because it has other connotations. But it was an attempt to...to ensure that a nuclear war once started would be limited. And as I suggest, I'm not even certain with hindsight that uh...that was possible at that time I know it is impossible today -- not with the huge numbers of forces and the wide deployment of forces and the detailed war plans uh...for their use that exist today. It's absolutely impossible. I don't know anybody who thinks that a nuclear war once started today can be limited. But that was our hope then.

Interviewer

But a few months after Ann Arbor you told Stewart Alsop that you thought that a counterforce move would be more likely if the Soviets -- when they developed a secure retaliatory capability...

McNamara

Well...

Interviewer

...It was sort of a long range strategy...It wasn't centered on the imbalance...

McNamara

Stewart Alsop came in to see me one day and said, Bob, I have word that the CIA had information that the Soviets are uh...beginning to harden their missile sites. Isn't that a heck of a mess? And I said, Stu, I never comment on CIA reports, but I'll tell you this: If the Soviets are beginning to harden their missile sites, thank God. He thought that was absurd. He went ahead and printed my statement. And uh... I remember Senator Dirksen and perhaps with his tongue in his cheek, uh...demanding my resignation. He said, My god, we have a Secretary of Defense that's pleased when the Soviets become stronger. Get him out of there. Of course that isn't what I meant at all. What I meant was -- that what I believed then and believe today is that we must seek to increase what I call crisis stability. And let me take a second to tell what I mean by crisis stability. There's a great danger that in a period of crisis, one side or the other may fear that the other's about to initiate a nuclear attack. And the person who is likely to be the recipient of that attack may feel that in the face of a high probability the attack will be directed against them, they would be better off to launch what's known as a preemptive attack. Seeking to blunt the attack that they expect will be initiated. Now that was exactly the situation that we the US faced in the early 1960's because we had this numerical superiority of 20 to 1. The Soviet missiles that were part of their strategic offensive nuclear force were what were called soft. They were unprotected. They were highly vulnerable to both our missiles and our bombers. Andd if you had been a Soviet political or military leader sitting there, facing 20 uh. ..US strategic offensive uh... warheads for every one of yours inferring that those 20 would be directed to your 1 and you knew your one could be destroyed by one, or two, or three of those 20 you'd be scared to death. And you would think, Well it would be a horrible thing to have a nuclear exchange, but I will be much better off if I launch my 300 before their 6,000 are launched against me. And that's what I call crisis instability. Uh...a stimulant to preemtion. And what I was trying to convey to Stu Ar...Stewart Alsop was that if the Soviet 300 uh... warheads uh...were less vulnerable to our attack there was less likelihood that in a crisis they would fear our attack and less likelihood they would preempt. And more likelihood that together we could avoid a nuclear war. And I believe that was exactly the correct judgement then. And I believe it's the correct judgement today.

Interviewer

You also said that when the Soviets have the security of a stable retalliatory force, then a counterforce war would be more likely because they wouldn't have to go for cities.

McNamara

Well, if they felt that they had uh...weapons that were going to survive, there was less likelihood they'd direct them initially against cities. They might be willing particularly if we were -- as we were suggesting at Ann Arbor - using only a small portion of our force against their military targets, there was greater likelihood they would direct their surviving force against our military targets. Particularly if they could hold in reserve some survivable force which they later could direct against our cities if this limited exchange didn't prove limited.

First-strike capability and responding to a theoretical Soviet first strike

Interviewer

Was your--the extent you had to think about these things, did you ever think that the-can you imagine any situation where the U.S. might want a preemptive strike or a first strike, or was it your idea to be--to absorb a first strike and be deliberate?

McNamara

In 1962, as I recall, uh, I uh, a bomber, I think it was a B-47 bomber on a training mission carrying a nuclear bomb...

Interviewer

Let's start over. Would you mind putting your pen in your pocket.

McNamara

In 1962, uh, there was a--a bomber I believe, a B-47 bomber which was carrying a--a nuclear bomb that uh, crashed in I think South Carolina. And in examining the uh, what happened, uh, it became clear obviously that the bomb didn't detonate. However, uh, the safeguards against detonation were several but, uh, a number of them had been uh, in a sense by-passed by the effects of the accident and it led me to focus on uh, what would have happened had uh, for example the chief of staff of the air force, called me, or the President and said, "Request authority to--to uh, launch the SIOP." And I then went to the president and said, "Mr. President uh, someday General X may call you and say 'Mr. President we're under attack, the Sovietd have uh, launched a nuclear attack against us, uh city X has been destroyed, we request your authority to launch SlOP.'" And the President said, "Well Bob, what do you think I ought to say?", and I say "Well, Mr. President I suggest you say to him, 'General, thank you for calling me, uh, collect the other chiefs, ask uh, Bob McNamara to join you and come over and meet me in my office.' And the general's likely to say, 'Mr. President you're crazy uh, before I get there you'll be destroyed.' And you say, 'Well General don't worry about that we've got our airborne command post, we have means of insuring that in the event that the president is destroyed, or the White House is destroyed, we may nonetheless uh, retaliate, use our forces to retaliate against the Soviet Union, they know that, that's one of the strengths of our deterence. But as I told you, you get the hell over here and get here fast, and we'll sit down and talk about this." But, I say, "Mr. President, before uh, hang up, tell him that--what you're going to do when he gets here." "Well what is that," the president said, and I said, "well you say to General X, 'Now General when you get here, let me tell me what we're going to do. We're then going to drive out to Andrews air force base and we're going to get into an airplane and we're going to go down there and look at the results of this Soviet attack.'And he'll say 'Mr. President you're insane, you're absolutely insane, we're under attack, we got to get going, the damn place will be blown up before ah you even launch.' And you say, 'Well that may be General but I want to be absolutely certain I know what happened. I want to know that a Soviet senior leader consciously attacked the United States. I want to know this is not an isolated attack, I want to know what's going to happen next, I want to know whether more missiles are going--or bombs are going to detonate, I want to know what they're trying to do. I am not going to start a nuclear war which I know will destroy this nation if what has happened to date is an accident so you get over here and let's start talking about it.'" Now, the point I--I was trying to make then, and I think is very relevant today, is there should never, never, never be the launch of a nuclear weapon unless you know what you're hoping to achieve by doing so. I think we can agree that there's no way to limit a nuclear war. Once you start a nuclear war, your society is going to be destroyed. That isn't to say one shouldn't launch in the face of an attack, but it is to say, you better never launch other than in the face of attack and you'd better be certain that you know the size of that attack and how it started and what the intent of it was.

Interviewer

What was the air force, or SACs reaction to the Ann Arbor speech--to the--counter force was a term that we--was in--used briefly then and--and what was their reaction, did that mean they wanted more weapons to counter...

McNamara

Well, the--the air force at various times has--has thought it would be possible to develop a first-strike capability. The Ann Arbor speech was I--as I remember in May of 1962, in November of 162, I wrote a memorandum to the president and the only reason I recall this is, it was a very, very highly classified memorandum and perhaps a year ago, a man came into talk to me and ask me about uh, uh, about the events of 1961 and '62 which I couldn't recall, and he said, well perhaps this will stimulate your memory and he showed me, my memorandum to the president this highly classified document. I said "I can't imagine where you got that." He said, "Well I got it out of the Freedom for Information Act." Now in that memorandum and the reason it was so highly classified among other things was the statement that I made to the president regarding the air force's request for uh, a strategic offensive nuclear force. The--the document subject was a military budget to be put to the Congress in uh--in January 1963, I guess it would have been for fiscal year uh, uh, 1964. And in that document I was making certain recommendations regarding Minuteman missiles and Polaris submarines and uh, B-52 bombers. And I said, "Mr. President I'm going to recommend the following to you but, but you should understand the air force differs with these recommendations and the air force said to me recently in a memorandum the following..." and then I quoted from the air force memorandum. And in the airforce memorandum to me it said: We believe we should procure X number of missiles uh... as part of a first strike force. And I said, "Mr. President, I don't believe we could achieve a first-strike force procuring the number of missiles recommended by the airforce or any other number of missiles. Moreover, if we could achieve a first-strike force, I don't believe we should, so I recommend against that." Now I mention this because uh...there was a difference of view among military leaders and among civilian leaders at the time. Some believe that we have or should have or could have a first-strike capability. Others, including me, did not.

Interviewer

How many missiles did the airforce want?

McNamara

I've forgotten what they were re...recommending in uh...in uh...November 1962. But I do remember uh...an episode that indicates the number that they were thinking about at that particular time. It was perhaps in May of 1962, the University of California at Berkeley was awarding President Kennedy an honorary agree. Because I had graduated from there, they asked me to join him and receive a degree as well. We flew out together. Uh...as we were leaving he said, Let's go down to Vandenberg, which is an airforce base in California and uh...and observe a missile launch. We did. The commanding general of SAC met us on the air strip. We got into his car -- I can still remember the vehicle. It was a large open convertible car. He was sitting in the middle of the back seat. And the president was on one side or the other and I was on the other and the general said to the president, "Now Mr.President when we get the 10,000 Minutemen we'll"...And at that point President Kennedy said, "General what did you say?" "Well," he said, "you didn't let me say it. I was just getting started. I said, when we get the 10,000 Minutemen we will. The president said, "I thought that's what you said." But Bobby said, "We're not ordering 10,000 minutemen are we?" And I said, "No Mr. President, we're ordering uh... 1,000. Now I mention this because that particular officer had recommended that we procure 10,000. The airforce chief had cut that back from 10,000 to 3,000. And he was recommending 3,000. And I had recommended 1,000 to the president.And that was the number we procured. And by God, that's the number we have today.

Interviewer

There were people in the White House who felt we could get away with fewer?

McNamara

Yes, that's right. I think Carl Kaysen, if I remember, who was working uh...as part of the national security council staff at the time, believed we could get by with -- I don't recall -- 400 say. And he may well have been right. I...I'm not arguing that I was right and he was wrong. But I think the difference in approach was that uh...we were dealing with uncertainties. We were procuring missiles, proposing the procurement of missiles in November 1962. Not for November '62 or 1963. We were proposing that we buy missiles that would be produced and deployed at some date in the future which would take roughly 5 to 7 years to translate our order into design and production and deployment. And we had to anticipate the size of the Soviet force that would exist at the time those missiles were deployed 5 to 7 years in the future. It was difficult enough to know the size of the Soviet force that existed in November of '62 at the time we were planning the order. It was next to impossible to know the size of the force, with any accuracy, that would exist at the time our missiles were em... deployed. And therefore, what we did was estimate the Soviet capability to produce missiles during that 5 or 7 year period. And that of course, uh...was a very difficult figure to estimate. It led to quite a range of potential error. And within that range of error there was, I'll say, the most probable position. And then there was -- I'll call it the worst case. Well not really the worst case, but the most probable worst case. And uh...as Secretary of Defense I had to take account of the possibility the Soviets would not choose the most probable force level, but the most probable worst case. So I built my proposed procurement of 1,000 missiles on that most probable worst case. I suspect Carl Kaysen built his recommendation on the most probable case, which is understandable but not the basis on which the Secretary of Defense should be making recommendations.

Assured destruction and flexible response

Interviewer

At some point we stopped talking about counterforce and began talking about assured destruction. What did that mean?

McNamara

Assured destruction is the uh...the foundation of our deterrent. Uh...the rationale goes this way: No uh...rational political leader uh... would intitiate the use of nuclear weapons uh... if the other side had nuclear weapons. Uh... but --Cut that out. Let me start again. Uh... assured destruction uh...means this: That uh... in this nuclear age uh...we don't believe -- at least I don't believe -- that the Soviets wish large scale war with the west. But uh...confrontations have arisen. Three arose during my 7 years: the uh...Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Middle East Crisis. They'll undoubtedly arise in the future. It is absolutely essential that in a period of confrontation, tense relationships between east and west that the Soviets understand that were they to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, that that would lead to their destruction. That's what assured destruction means. It's our ability to destroy the Soviet Union and our complete confidence that they understand that we have that ability to destroy them that gives us the deterrent. They are deterred by their recognition that no matter what they do or how they do it, with the nuclear force they have if launched against us, our forces will survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on them. I'll call it to assure their destruction. That's the way the word...uh...the words apply...

Interviewer

Now is this a capability or.... you said that if they were to take action acainst us that we would..

McNamara

It is...

Interviewer

Is this a strategy or a capability?

McNamara

...Deterrence uh...is both a capability and a state of mind. And it's essential that both elements be present. If we have the capability to absorb a Soviet offensive nuclear strike against us and survive with sufficient power to destroy them, but they don't believe it -- That is not a deterrent. They must believe that we have the capability to destroy them and that we will use it to destroy them in the event they strike us. So it is both -- Deterrence is both a capability and a belief and I have every con fidence that today A, we have the capability, and B, the Soviets know we do and believe we will use it and therefore they are deterred and will continue to be deterred.

Interviewer

But when you began talking about assured destruction was this accompanied by any new instructions [from] Omaha, any changes in the SIOP? did the war plans change?

McNamara

No...no...no...What changed was uh...the introduction of greater flexibiltiy in the targeting. We found for example that Polaris missiles uh... could not be retargeted easily and quickly. And we changed the design...changed the design of the uh...the missile uh...and the electronic gear in relation to it so that uh... it could be retargeted quickly. And we did...we made similar changes in uh...in the Minuteman missiles and to some degree in the bomber operational plans to insure that in the event of a situation where the president would wish to launch, that he could very quickly uh...change the targeting. He could withhold forces for example. He could say uh... "Don't uh...target any cities." Or uh..."Don't target anything other than forces ABC" or "don't launch more than one tenth of your force and target it as follows." And the...the... both the war plans and the uh...and the hardware were adjusted to as to permit that greater flexibility in targeting.

Interviewer

But nothing changed between the Ann Arbor speech and the time you started talking about assured destruction?

McNamara

Uh...what...what changed was uh...an increasing understanding that uh...the NATO strategy, if you will, was bankrupt. That massive retaliation was not a strategy which a US president would wish to follow.

Interviewer

Now wait a minute. We've already gotten rid of massive retaliation.

McNamara

No...no. Massive retaliation...massive retaliation in effect as NATO strategy wasn't uh... superceded until 1967 when uh...flexible response was finally... finally uh...accepted. But throughout that period, our understanding was evolving uh...I'll give you an illustration. In...at some point, I've forgotten exactly when I...I believe in 1962 with President Kennedy and later perhaps in '64 with President Johnson -I had long discussions with each president and said in effect that I didn't believe there was any circumstance without any qualification what so ever, in which we should ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Now that was contrary to the NATO strategy which we had proposed for flexible response, not yet accepted by NATO. Uh...but even in the strategy we proposed, there were certain circumstances -- those that I call uh... circumstances of last resort -- in which the use of...the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons was called for. But I was saying to the presidents that even in those circumstances, I cannot conceive of a situation in which it would be in the interest of NATO for you to authorize initiating the use of nuclear weapons. And without qualification, I recommend against this. Now, I mention this because it's an illustration of the evolution of our thinking during those days. And those views were uh...quite heretical and...and to a considerable degree, are today.

Interviewer

I just want to go back to the assured destruction. Whether this is a procurement criterion or a strategy.

McNamara

Oh, no.. .no. It...it was both a procurement criterion and a strategy. It was a basic uh... philosophic uh...uh...foundation of our military force structure and our military strategy.

Interviewer

But that doesn"t mean that if deterrence fails that we would launch the entire SIOP a la massive retaliation. There could be no measured response?

McNamara

Well, it doesn't mean we uh...we wouldn't have a measured response. But uh...we did not believe as the forces grew large that a measured responseuh...uh...would lead to any significant reduction in destruction of our society. Because when you're...when you have forces as we did in the latter part of the '60s of something on the order of uh...then we had on the order of 4800 warheads -- something like that. A lesser number of warheads than we had had at the beginning of the decade. The strategic offensive nuclear warheads, but a much much higher number of uh...of uh...those warheads launched by missiles. And therefore a much higher probability that even a relatively small number of them, say 300. uh...delivered on almost any set of target in the Soviet Union, would destroy the Soviet Union and...and similarly a small percentage of the Soviet force which was much smaller than ours at the end of the '60 but must have been on the order of -- oh, I've forgotten --say 1500, 1800 -A relatively small percentage of that, say 20 percent of that, launched against this country would uh..,for all practical purposes, destroy our nation. So, at that point, limiting the size of the launch was relatively unimportant. What was important was never, never, never initiating the launch. That's the way to avoid nuclear war. Don't ever start it.

Superior nuclear military power and deterrence

Interviewer

How did you determine how much is enough in terms of how big a force structure to build? I mean what constituted unacceptable damage...

McNamara

In--in--in principle it was very simple. Uh, we--we considered, we must have a force large enough to absorb their attack. Assuming it was a well planned, well executed attack with uh, missile with the accuracy that we ascribe to them, and bombers with the penetration capability we ascribe to them. We determine the number of our weapons that would be destroyed and then we determine the size of force that we would require to inflict unacceptable damage on them and we added those two together and that was the size force we needed to start with. A force large enough to absorb their attack, survive with sufficient power to in-- inflict unacceptable damage on them. Now, what's unacceptable damage to--to the Soviets? Well, frankly uh, I am certain it was far less than uh, the uh, the uh, damage that we defined as unacceptable. In order to insure that our deterent was sufficiently large to lead them to believe that we would survive with a force sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage to them. We--we in effect exaggerated their ability to absorb damage and I--I don't recall the exact figures, I think I defined unacceptable damage as destruction of something on the order of 50% of their industrial capability and something on the order of a 100 or a 125 million of their citizens. I--I [have] forgotten the exact figures. But I know, I believe then and I'm certain now that uh, the uh, I'll call it acceptable damage limits to the Soviets were far below what uh, we defined as unacceptable which simply meant we bought and maintained a much larger force than we needed for deterrence. And we did this uh, to be absolutely certain that A, they knew we were capable of inflicting this damage on them, and B, that we had the will to do it, and C, that they accepted that as uh, unacceptable and therefore as a deterent.

Interviewer

Mc Bundy tells a story about how when President Kennedy was going to Dallas on November 22. You know he had been there on a campaign and said, you know "we're going to be #1... but #1 period." And he was going back to tell them we were #1. Were you aware of the speech that he was...

McNamara

I uh--I must have been. I don't recall it today.

Interviewer

In November of 1963, did you have any assurance that we were #l?

McNamara

One of my constant problems uh, was with the Congress, uh, which contrary to conditions today was pushing us then to buy more. Today the Congress is pushing uh, the Defense Department to buy less. Uh, and there was a constant uh, pressure from the Congress to buy more particularily uh, uh in the area of strategic offensive uh, nuclear weapons. Uh, and it was necessary for us to continue to repeat that uh, uh, we had more than we needed or we were superior, we used various way--various forms of expression. Uh, but I think uh, the words, while technically correct, we certainly were superior in--in November '63, we must have had whatever, say 500 uh, stragic offensive nuclear warheads and they probably didn't have more than maybe 600 uh, by that time. So we had a ratio of uh, 8 or 9 to one, which was surely superior in nu--in numerical terms but it was not superior in strategic terms, it was not superior in usable military power. Because neither one of us could initiate the use of that strategic power with benefit to ourselves. So uh, part of what the president uh, might have been planning to say in Dallas and part of what I had said at the time to the Congress, while technically correct was uh, perhaps connoting something we didn't have, usable power. We did not have usable nuclear military power. We had nuclear power to sufficient to fulfill its purpose which was to deter the Soviets from nuclear attack, but we did not have nuclear power that we could use, despite our superiority of 8 or 9 to one, that we could use to achieve political purposes and superiority therefore, in that sense was an--in-- incorrect uh, statement. But uh--uh,...

Interviewer

You said 5--500, they had 600, you meant 5,000. Well we've covered the same point several times, I think we're okay...but that wasn't the megatonage going down...

McNamara

...When I'm

Interviewer

Warheads...

McNamara

...Discussing superiority I'm talking about superiority in terms of numbers of warheads. Uh, it's--it's very difficult to use any single measure uh, to uh, to define uh, adequacy or superiority and offensive nuclear forces. But the most important measures are numbers and accuracy. Frequently megatonnage is used. Megatonnage is a--is a much less important measure because the destructive power is far more a function of uh, improvements in accuracy than it is in increases in megatonnage. Moreover the Soviets uh, many years ago because they were not as technically advanced as we were particularily in the miniaturization of navigation devices uh, and electronic gear chose to build very large launchers which permitted them to de--put into uh, into flight very heavy warheads with high megatonnage. So the Soviets, traditionally have had uh, per warhead much larger megatonnage than we have had and at times not only have they had uh, larger megatonnage per warhead but they've have larger megatonnage in total. But that did not give them uh--uh larger destructive power.

Interviewer

What at one point in the evolution of strategy, the posture statements talk about assured destruction/damage limitations...What uh, what was the--what did you mean by damage limitations?

McNamara

Damage limitation uh, could come about either by uh, destroying uh, some of their offensive nuclear forces before they were launched, uh, or by uh, strengthening our defenses, the uh, anti-air craft defenses, or by uh, introducing civil defense. And at various times we--we sought to limit damage by each of those measures. I would say very ineffectively.

Interviewer

Was there a--did you recall ever asking commissioning a--from Harold Brown or anyone else a comprehensive damage limitation study that would give an indication of how much we can protect the population?

McNamara

Over the years, we periodically uh, examined ways to--to reduce fatalities to the U.S., in the event of a nuclear exchange. At one point in the early 1960s when uh, we had that tremendous numerical advantage of some 6,000 to 300 uh, we considered civil defense as a damage limiting factor. This came as a result of a study of how we might limit damage to the U.S. in the event of a--a nuclear exchange. At other times we uh, made damage limiting studies uh, associated with increasing the strength of our air defense. Uh, by the way I should say, that-- that uh, after 2 or 3 years of pursuing a civil defense program we quite rightly uh, judged we'd made an error or at least the circumstances had~ changed and we withdrew support of the program. Similarly after many years of supporting a strong air defense program we concluded that given the substantial increase in the percentage of the Soviet offensive nuclear force represented by missiles that uh, air defenses were not likely to be significant and therefore in contrast to the Soviets which to this day are spending tens of billions of dollars a year on air defense we substantially cut--cut back on air defense uh, in the mid to late 160s. I think it was very wise. All of this was part of a continuing series of damage limitation studies. Those studies included examination of the possible use and deployment of uh, anti-ballistic missile defenses and we concluded those as well, would not uh, significantly reduce the damage to this country from a Soviet missile attack. And we were therefore very very much opposed to-to putting in place a--uh, anti-ballistic missile defense directed to defend the country against Soviet missiles.

Interviewer

The Air Force General Glenn Kent for one did a comprehensive study that concluded that the--it would be possible to save--assure 70% population survival with a--all these measures. Do you remember what your reaction to that was?

McNamara

Well, studies that showed uh, uh, 70% survival showed by definition uh, 30% loss. And 30% loss of say 200 million people in this country is 60 million. It was inconceivable to me that any president uh, would uh, initiate action which was likely to lead to the loss of 60 million people. And I couldn't conceive of us therefore, benefitting from-from expending funds uh, to insure that the loss was quote only unquote uh, 60 million and we didn't.

Interviewer

These studies were also postulated on the fact that the Soviets wouldn't do anything about them...

McNamara

Well, the--the uh, it was very important uh, when--when uh, tailoring our offensive nuclear force to our requirements, to our strategy uh, of--of uh, maintaining an invulnerable retaliatory capability. It was very important to consider how the Soviets would react to our--our force additions and summarily when considering possible defensive deployments it was very, very important to consider how the Soviets would react. And the Soviets are no different than we are. They feel they must have a deterent against our use of our offensive nuclear capability against them for either military or political advantages. Uh, as I have said, we never have had a first strike capability. I know no U.S. president who has ever thought of initiating the use of strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, however, the Soviets feel they must deter us from doing so and therefore uh, if--if we put up a defensive shield to in some fashion reduce the damage to us from a Soviet offensive attack, they are going to fear that that defensive shield is designed to reduce and weaken the their deterent and they're going to respond to our defensive shield by expanding their offense. Such an old question, but what--that's the way they would react. That's the way we would react. That's they way we told Kosygan in 1967 uh, at Glassboro that we'd react. At that time the Soviets were deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow. We believe they were planning to extend that defense across the face of the Soviet Union. We told Kosygan that were he to do that, perhaps the Congress might think the response should be an anti-ballistic missile defense deployed in the U.S., but that would not be our response. We would respond by expanding our offensive force. If we had the right size offensive force to maintain a deterent before he put up a defense, by definition when he put up the defense and made that offensive force less of a deterent we had to increase the offensive force to maintain the deterent and that's what we would do.

Interviewer

Just a question of sort of mirror image perception or something...

McNamara

It's a question of action and reaction.

Interviewer

We can say, look we're only doing this to limit damage to us, but this threatens the other guys assured destruction...

McNamara

Limiting damage to us threatens their deterent and they as we, will under all circumstances maintain a deterent.

Interviewer

Say that again.

McNamara

Uh-

Interviewer

Just the way--limiting damage...

McNamara

Uh, We're we to seek to limit damage to ourselves, the Soviets would consider that those actions we can bear deterent and they would seek to offset our defense by expanding their offense to maintain their deterent at the same level at which it was before we put our defense in place. That's exactly what we would do in the face of uh, Soviet action to deploy a defense. Each side must maintain a deterrent. A deterrent sufficient to insure that the other under no circumstances feels it would benefit by launching an offensive strike.

Interviewer

So you came to the conclusion that defense is really not going to work...

McNamara

A--They probably won't work,technically they're far too complex. B--They're far too costly. C--They will~simply draw the reaction of the other side which will negate them. And D--they run the risk of introducing instability in a crisis because they lead the other side to believe that they are part of a first strike strategy and therefore the other side is tempted to pre-empt, to dull that first strike capability.

Interviewer

Couldn't--don't some people say that you do introduce some uncertainty and by introducing uncertainty you know, they don't know how many other missiles are going to get through...

McNamara

I don't want any--

Interviewer

That that makes for a better deterrent.

McNamara

I don't want any uncertainty in connection with nuclear deterrents. I want only certainty. I want certainty in the Soviet mind that if they ever, ever launch they will be destroyed. Under all circumstances there's no set of circumstances that they can hypothesize associated with a Soviet launch that will lead to anything other than destruction. I want that certainty in their minds. That's the foundation of deterrence.

Interviewer

If the Soviets were making a move in the uh-the Persian Gulf and they knocked out one NATO base in Turkey with one weapon, that they would be destroyed completely, ball game's over.

McNamara

Well, if we're talking about, we're talking an exchange of nuclear weapons with respect to--to Europe uh, and uh, under those circumstances I want absolute certainty in the Soviet mind that if they launch a nuclear attack on western Europe or North America they will be destroyed. I don't want any uncertainty there. Now, in the case of uh, use of one nuclear weapon by the Soviets against Turkey, uh--uh I want them to feel certain that uh, they're going to get more than they gave. And I think they do and we don--defenses don't enter into that kind of a calculation.

Interviewer

Well then, why didn't we go back to the massive retaliation SIOP...if that's the way you feel?

McNamara

Because--because uh, it was increasingly apparent to the Soviets we were unlikely to respond to let's say uh, their pressure on Berlin, in August of '61 with an all out launch against the Soviet Union, of--all out launch of our strategic offensive weapons when we knew that were we to do that uh, the remaining Soviet forces would be launched against us and would destroy us. That's not a credible deterent. You cannot make a credible deterent out of an incredible action. And massive retaliation by the early 60s was an incredible action.

Interviewer

But if the Soviets had launched one nuclear weapon or something or if there's limited exchange in Europe would that have triggered the entire--the destruction of the-

McNamara

Well...

Interviewer

Is that credible?

McNamara

Well...well I--uh...Quite frankly I think uh, it's very unlikely they would ever think about launching one nuclear weapon in Europe. But, I want to say to you that that is a very dangerous thing to do in a nuclear age, 'cause how do we know it's one. Uh, we don't know, what--what's happened. One of these things uh, blows up, electronic communications uh are severed because electro-magnetic uh, uh, effect on the atmosphere, we can't get in touch with our--co--with our commanders uh, their exaggerated reports of what happens. Uh, emotions rise uh, uh, the likelihood is we think it's not one that nobody can conceive of an attack of one, we think it's ten or a hundred or a thousand. We think that they're going to launch. If they launch one, they'll ten tomorrow or today. Uh, so we think, you have to respond with a hundred. That is a very, very dangerous set of circumstances which I hope uh, they'll never uh, move into.

Interviewer

I want to talk about Glassboro--

Anti-ballistic missiles and deterrence

Interviewer

Mr. McNamara, what did you tell Kosygin at Glassboro?

McNamara

The Glassboro meeting occurred in June of 1967. At that time, the Soviets were deploying an antiballistic missile defense around Moscow; uh, moreover, our Congress had already authorized and appropriated funds for the production and deployment of an antiballistic missile defense in the United States. That made absolutely no sense whatever to me, although the chiefs were in favor of it - uh, Cy Vance..who was my deputy at the time, and I were very much opposed. The president had agreed that we should seek to initiate negotiations with the Soviets leading toward a treaty that would prohibit each side from deploying an antiballistic missile defense. And the Kosygin meeting at Glassboro with Johnson was for the purpose of persuading the Soviets to start those negotiations. Uh...

Interviewer

Make it a story.

McNamara

The, the, uh, uh, morning session concluded, we moved into lunch; the luncheon took place around a small table, perhaps, uh, 12, maybe six on each side. Uh, the president sat, uh, on my left, uh, directly across from Kosygin, and the president was becoming very, very frustrated, seeking to make his argument, uh, with Kosygin; finally, uh, he turned to me and said, "Bob, uh, for God's sakes, you tell Kosygin what's wrong with their plan." So I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, you don't seem to understand that, uh, well, perhaps it's not your intention to initiate large-scale war against the West; we must assume that in other circumstances you would; in any event, we are determined to deter you from ever, under any circumstances, launching your nuclear weapons against the west. Uh, we believe in order to deter you we must have a force sufficiently large to absorb your strike, survive with sufficient power to inflict unnacpeptable damage on you. That's the way we size our offensive strategic forces. Now, if we had the right size force to achieve that objective before you built your anti-ballistic missile system, then we must expand that force after you build it._And therefore what I'm telling you is, if you proceed with that anti-ballistic missile system deployment, our response will not be, should not be, to deploy a similar system. That would be a waste. I hope we don't do that. But our response will be to expand our offensive weapons in order that we may maintain that deterrent, in order that after you strike us, we'll now have sufficient weapons to launch, against you, to penetrate your defense, accepting that some of them will be destroyed by that defense, and a sufficient number will penetrate to inflict unacceptable damage on you. That will be what we will do. It's not in our interest or in your interest to do that. The way to stop that is for both of us to agree today that we will engage in talks leading to a treaty that will prohibit deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, and which, by the way, we hope, will be followed by a treaty that will limit offensive systems." He absolutely exploded. The blood rose into his face, his, his veins swelled, he pounded the table, and he said he -- he could barely talk, he was so emotional -- he said, "Defense is moral; offense is immoral!" And he blieved it! Now, fortunately they've changed their plea. And apparently so have we -- we're the ones that are saying that today. And we're as wrong as today, we're as wrong today as he was then.

Interviewer

In Berlin you didn't hesitate to say, in public, that if we had to we would use nuclear weapons. Was that a bluff?

McNamara

I don't think it was a bluff, but it was simply a... statement of the then, uh, uh, accepted and official NATO strategy. It was certainly nothing that I contemplated doing at the time, and nothing that I believe the president would have authorized at the time, or nothing that would have been wise at the time. As a matter of fact, I called in one of the senior allied officers -- ah, you may recall that under, at that time the Soviets had dropped what's known as "chaff," which is in effect tin foil, in the atmosphere in order to, uh, cause malfunctioning in the navigations systems of our aircraft. And we had to stop all air resupply of Berlin because of this interference with navigation. To offset that, uh, reduction of air supply, we expanded the, uh, ground convoys along the ground corridors crossing East Germany into Berlin, and then the Soviets, uh, instructed the East Germans to stop the, uh, ground convoys, which they did, and then we added military escorts to the ground convoys, and on one occasion the Soviets, uh, instructed the East Germans to allow, uh, a militarily escorted ground convoy to enter the ground corridor into East Germany, but to prohibit it from exiting into, uh, West Berlin. We finally got it out, but, uh, following that, I asked, uh, this senior allied officer to speculate on how the situation would, would, uh, develop, uh, what would the Soviets do next and how would we respond? He said, Well, they'll do A and we'll do B, and they'll do C, and we'll do D, and they'll do E, and we'll do F, and they'll then do, uh, uh, G, and I said "How will we respond then?" He said, "Well, we'll have to use nuclear weapons." I couldn't believe it -- uh, it just seemed absurd to me. So I then called, uh, Lord Mountbatten, who was then chief of the British defense staff, into my office, uh -- I'd known him in the China-Burma-India theatre during World War II, and I'd known him, uh, while I was secretary, and I put the same question to him, and he went through A, B, C, D, E, F, and then G, and I said, "And what do we do then?" I said, "You haven't mentioned the use of nuclear weapons." He said, "Are you insane?" Now, Mountbatten, by the way -- that was in, uh, 1961 -- but Mountbatten was killed in, I believe, uh, November, December, 1978, and he made quite a famous speech in Strasbourg, uh, 1978, before he died, and in that speech he said that he never, under any circumstances, would have recommended NATO initiate the use of nuclear weapons. He believed that then, he believed it in '61 as I did in '61.

Interviewer

But it was still the policy.

McNamara

It was still the policy. It was the stated policy, absolutely.

Interviewer

But even though you didn't believe it, you still had to...

McNamara

Well, we were...

Interviewer

The threat is important, isn't it?

McNamara

Well, I think that, I think the threat is a danger -- but in any event, it was a policy and it was, uh, standard routine to refer to it.

Mutual assured destruction and dealing with crises

Interviewer

Is MAD a condition or a strategy?

McNamara

Oh, I think that's semantical, uh, I don't wish to argue the point. I think it's a condition. Uh, it is a fact that, uh, the human mind -- many human minds -- uh, know how to build nuclear weapons; it is a fact that, uh, nuclear weapons in the hands of some, uh, pose a threat to others; uh, it is a fact that the others wish to deter, uh, the possessor of those weapons from using them; and that leads to, uh, assured destruction, uh, a condition. I call it a condition, uh, brought about by, uh, uh, acquiring a sufficient number of weapons to deter, uh, one's opponent from utilizing theirs.

Interviewer

Some people like Wohlstetter or Rowan said that you helped create the condition by not building defense, or by not moving in the direction of refining weapons in terms of accuracy or pushing the cutting edge of technology.

McNamara

Well, there were certain individuals then, and there are today, who believe,uh, that nuclear wars can be fought. Ah, I didn't believe it then, I don't believe it today. I have never seen, on paper, a plan for fighting a nuclear war. I've never seen a piece of paper that says that we, NATO, will, uh, initiate the use of nuclear weapons by firing one, or ten, or a thousand, against targets A, B, C, D, E, and we expect the Soviets will respond not at all or in some fashion, and we will then do such-and-such, and they'll do such-and-such, and at the end of, uh, one hour, or five hours, or five days, we'll be better off than when we started. There is no such plan. It's impossible to conceive of such a plan. And the Wohlstetters, to this day, are trying to say that, uh, nuclear warheads are weapons, that they can be used in military operations.That is absolutely wrong! Nuclear warheads are not weapons. They have no military use whatsoever,excepting only to deter one's opponent from using nuclear weapons.

Interviewer

But if they happen to be used for whatever reason, nobody is going to take the steps to assure their own destruction.

McNamara

You, you take a step to assure your destruction when you initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and nobody can tell you how you can avoid that once you initiate it, not Wohlstetter, not anybody. I have never had a person dispute the statement I've just made: that there is not a single piece of paper in the world that shows how you can initiate the use of nuclear weapons with benefit to the initiator; that is to say, without a high probability that the society of the initiator will be destroyed. There is no such plan.

Interviewer

But is it more likely that you could use them if you had smaller and more refined...

McNamara

No. There is no more likelihood if you do that.

Interviewer

Is there utility to use options as a better deterrent?

McNamara

No. I don't believe so. The Soviets are not deterred because they think we have an artillery shell that, uh, we might use against, uh, one or two or ten divisions, instead of Moscow; they're deterred by the knowledge they have that we have a force such that we can absorb their strikes, survive, and inflict unacceptable damage on them. That's what deters them. There is no way to plan the use of a few artillery shells. A few ~ artillery shells will destroy tens of villages, will create a, a fog of war, a period of uncertainty such that God knows what'll happen. No human being can believe it can stop there. And I don't know any responsible human who does believe it will stop there. Many, many people who disagree with some of the statements I've made, uh, on this program, uh -- Al Haig, for example -- would nonetheless agree...that, uh, he can't conceive of a limited nuclear war.

Interviewer

Were you aware of Harry Rowan and Carl Kaysen's first-strike option during the Berlin Crisis?

McNamara

No, no.

Interviewer

You weren't aware that they had developed...

McNamara

I... have no recollection -- I don't want to say, "didn't," but I have absolutely no recollection of it. I doubt very much that, if they did develop it, it ever came to me, and if it ever -- and I doubt very much it ever went to President Kennedy.

Interviewer

Well, he did. but the important thing is, is there a difference between contingency planning and...

McNamara

Well... I, I, I think, ah, contingency planning, uh, uh, occurs all the time, and, and, uh, involves responses to, uh, a host of unlikely contingencies, in... including unlikely responses. So I don't want, wish to say that Carl Kaysen and Harry Rowan didn't develop a... plan for first use of, uh, nuclear weapons in connection with Berlin, but, uh, I have absolutely no recollection of it and I'm... certain that there was no discussion between me and the president on, uh, applying such a plan.

Interviewer

He didn't ask you to prepare a...

McNamara

He certainly, he certainly did not.

Interviewer

Was that a scary time?

McNamara

Well, it was scary in the sense that, ah, we were concerned that the Soviets might miscalculate, uh... The Berlin crisis began with the Bay of Pigs, in my opinion, which was a disastrous, uh, episode -- I won't go into why it was disastrous, uh, but it was disastrous -- uh, and that occurred some 60 or 70 days after the administration took office, in... late March or early April of 1961, and that was followed by... a meeting between Kosygin a... rather, Khrushchev and, ah, Kennedy, in Vienna, and I guess it was, ah, June of 1961, and I think Khrushchev made a, ah, serious misjudgment of Kennedy at the time -- judged him to be weak -- and he, in a sense, added that to, to the Bay of Pigs debacle, in which, ah, he, he concluded, and I think rightly so, that, ah, the administration, ah, following a CIA plan, ah, ah, grossly misjudged, ah, the situation in Cuba, and, and, uh, suffered a serious, uh, if not military defeat, certainly a serious political defeat. And he put those two, uh, episodes together and concluded that, ah, with little risk, the Soviets could wrest, uh, West Berlin away from the control of NATO, and he was just absolutely wrong -- uh, we didn't intend to allow that to happen, and we had sufficient power to prevent it from happening -- but, in the course of preventing it from happening, ah, there was a serious risk they would escalate, and they did escalate, uh, through a whole series of moves. They finally stopped when we called up reserves and moved ah, additional forces to Europe. But it might well have gone beyond that, and that was, uh, I won't say scary, but it was certainly a matter of great concern.

Interviewer

What if the worst had happened? the old SIOP called for massive retaliation.

McNamara

Well, there was no, there was absolutely no thought given, uh, by the president or me, or Secretary Rusk, to the use of nuclear weapons. Ah, but there certainly was thought... given to, uh... con-, conventional force escalation, which would carry with it very, very heavy risks, and potential costs.