The Lisbon Goals

Interviewer

...on the president's thinking was about nuclear weapons, when he was trying to decide what to do in 1953.

Goodpaster

Well, of course, he brought with him from his service in, in SHAPE as Supreme Allied Commander for NATO in Europe, uh, some ideas uh, pretty well formed ideas, about uh, the role of nuclear weapons. I'd worked with him, uh, over there at uh, during his time at SHAPE. Some of this went back to the time of the, the formation of the command, when we were trying to reconcile as the, as the term was, the requirements of effective defense with the political economic capabilities of the member countries. There was a big study, three wise men, uh, Harriman, Monet and, and uh, Gateskull initially, then Ploudon for the United Kingdom, made a study uh, which culminated in the so-called Lisbon goals. Now, those Lisbon goals were well beyond what any of the countries were prepared to provide.

Interviewer

What were the Lisbon goals?

Goodpaster

Uh, the idea there was that uh, the NATO countries would provide 30 divisions on active duty, and up to 90 divisions, total active and reserve. And that was far beyond what uh was uh in prospect. At that point, account was taken of the possible role of nuclear weapons. And in fact, in uh late 1952, early 1953, we made a major study of what, what the role of nuclear weapons could be and indeed would be likely to be in case conflicts should occur. After uh, a small uh study group, of which I was a member, made that study, we then presented the findings to the higher NATO authorities and in-- indeed came back and presented the findings to President Eisenhower, who was by that time the President. This being I think in uh, sometime in 1954.

Interviewer

And what was the result of that study? That they really were useable military tools?

Goodpaster

Yes, that they uh, had to be taken into account, and, if used, really could have quite a stunning and halting effect on any major attack uh launched uh, uh against the NATO uh, forces. And, of course, having the capability to do that added to the deterrent, gave confidence that this war was not likely to occur. And, indeed, that was the role of uh nuclear weapons, a primary role, uh, over the years, and, and has remained so.

Dwight Eisenhower and SHAPE

Interviewer

If you can describe how things looked to you and to General Eisenhower when you were in Paris at SHAPE, how did the situation look to you there?

Goodpaster

Initially, when uh, General Eisenhower took over the command, we had almost nothing in the way of organized uh, uh forces. Uh, one anecdote that was told was uh, to ask, what do the Russians need to move to the Channel, and the answer is, all they need is shoes. Uh, because there were very few weapons that would be opposing them. Now, we went to work in the planning immediately to see what uh, forces would be required in order to mount a respectable defense and, and an effective deterrent. Out of that uh came a determination that we needed something like 30 divisions on active duty and as many as 90 total active and reserve. Now, that was much more than the countries had any plans to provide. And in order to deal with that uh, uh, gap, so to speak, that disparity, uh, we planned to rely on the nuclear weapons that were then coming into existence, recognizing that if those weapons were ever used against a massed attacking force, it would have-- they would have devastating effect. And uh, their existence meant that uh there was a powerful deterrent uh, to the Russians, thinking about moving by force against any of the countries of, of uh, Western Europe. So that entered into Eisenhower's uh, uh, thinking. We did some uh, planning, uh, a small planning group of staff officers of whom I was one, uh, set about to determine what the role of the nuclear weapons uh, would be, would be likely to be, in case uh, conflict were to occur. And it was clear that they would have a very powerful effect against any attacking force. We then moved that into our uh planning, which of course was basically deterrent planning. Eisenhower himself carried that back uh to the States in his own thinking when he became President, and it entered into the so-called new look, uh, the idea that nuclear weapons had to be taken into account in any uh major uh, uh, conflict. Our little uh, planning group in fact came back to the United States sometime in 1954, during his, uh, the second year of his presidency, to present the results of our, of our studies. In the meantime, of course, he had uh, done a lot of studying and had had many uh, very uh, uh careful analyses made of nuclear weapons, not only in the regional uh, application, possible regional use, but also in the uh, in terms of their use uh, in the strategic forces.

Interviewer

Talking of strategic forces, what did the phrase "massive retaliation" mean for the president at any rate?

Goodpaster

Well, he like Dulles, uh, uh, the President, like Dulles, always made a differentiation between massive retaliation and a capacity for massive retaliation. Uh, the idea being that the existence of that capacity would impose restraint on, certainly on the Soviet Union or anyone else planning to make a major attack uh, against uh, uh, American interests. Now, I think Secretary Dulles went a little further, uh, thinking that the existence of those weapons and uh, the threat of their use could uh, dissuade uh, other uh, powers than the Soviet Union and uh, and Communist China. Uh, I think uh, Eisenhower himself felt that their main significance was to impose restraint on, on those two great powers.

Dwight Eisenhower's policy of limited aggression

Interviewer

So what was the president's reaction to the criticism, especially from the army, that by relying too heavily on massive retaliation and especially on S.A.C., and by allowing the army particularly to lose in terms of manpower, that he was not going to be able to respond to more limited aggression and it was an unrealistic threat.

Goodpaster

It was a very uh fixed part of Eisenhower's view to avoid uh, commitment of our forces uh, in every way possible, uh, in such uh, limited or small-scale, operations. The lesson of Korea had been a very bitter one to our country. Uh, he was able to accomplish the disengagement from Korea, and he had no desire to be drawn into interventions of that kind. And this remained a continuing difference between him and the army throughout his whole term of service.

Interviewer

So his answer really was, it isn't a problem because it isn't going to happen?

Goodpaster

He didn't intend to allow it to happen. And I have to say, he was rather skillful at finding ways to uh, avoid that kind of uh, of uh, commitment. He recognized that, that this might occur. And I know that he discussed it with uh, Secretary Dulles uh, at uh, a later point of his administration. And he recognized that uh, the possibility existed that uh, through minor operations of that kind, our position around the world could erode. But he felt it was really up to the countries of the area in the first instance to provide for their security, and his notion was to limit any support that we gave-

Interviewer

Just repeat that again.

Goodpaster

And Eisenhower's uh, idea was to limit uh, any support that we might decide to give to material support, to training support and that kind of thing, without becoming involved. And particularly without becoming involved with troops on the ground.

Quemoy and Matsu

Interviewer

One example where it might have happened that the United States might have found itself involved in a limited war was, of course, the Quemoy and Matsu crisis of 1955, which you yourself were involved in. Can you give us an idea of especially how close you think the United States came to using nuclear weapons on that occasion and what the president's attitude was there?

Goodpaster

The background of that was that uh, the mainland Chinese had uh, mounted uh, threats uh, against uh two other sets of islands uh, along the Chinese coast. And uh, we had uh, uh, persuaded I think would be the right term, uh, Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate those islands. He then uh, moved uh, to Quemoy and Matsu, and he, he felt that those were under, under threat. At that point, uh, uh, President Eisenhower uh, sent me out to uh, uh Hawaii to Pearl Harbor to talk to Admiral Stump, who was our commander in chief in the Pacific, to get his assessment of whether the mainland uh, Chinese could successfully attack Quemoy and Matsu. Uh, Admiral Stump's assessment was that if the nationalist Chinese on Formosa and on Quemoy and Matsu, had as much as three weeks to prepare a defense, then it was unlikely that the Chinese from the mainland would be able to uh, overrun the island, uh, islands. Now, in the meantime, we would be in a uh, difficult and uh, and vulnerable and uncertain situation. As it turned out, they did not uh, uh, press the attack. And the nationalist Chinese built up a considerable force, which would have made the islands uh, quite an expensive thing to take. Had the mainland Chinese attacked in that early period, then we might have been confronted with a situation where the nationalist Chinese could have been defeated or destroyed uh, barring our uh, intervention. That would have uh, presented us with a very uh, difficult policy decision, and it was to assess that likelihood that Eisenhower, uh, President Eisenhower, uh, had me go out and, and talk to our commander out there.

Interviewer

It was just during that period that the president made his famous statement at a press conference that when used for military purposes, there's no reason why you shouldn't use atomic weapons just like bullets. That had a great effect on European allies among others. Do you think he really meant that?

Goodpaster

At that time, uh, Eisenhower's thinking very much was that any kind of military conflict that he would allow our country to be drawn into uh, would uh, uh, if necessary, be pursued by the weapons at hand. And at that time, I, I believe it was part of his thinking that if necessary we would uh, uh, employ them. Uh, understanding Eisenhower, you have to know that he would be thinking of something else at the same time. And that is, the fact of his saying that would exercise a considerable deterrent uh, on uh, the mainland uh, uh, Chinese. Because, of course, we had the background of his uh, uh, similar uh, action making clear a, a threat of possible nuclear uh use in Korea in order to bring that uh war to an end.

Interviewer

Do you think it was the case that if the Chinese had attacked during that three-week period, and if the president had decided that those islands should be defended -and of course neither of those might necessarily have happened -- was the United States capable of defending those off-shore islands without using nuclear weapons in fact?

Goodpaster

Well, there was, there was uh, argument at the time as to whether we had the capability of defending them by conventional means alone. We had had uh considerable uh, statements to the effect that we had reduced our conventional capability because of this policy, part of the new look of relying on the uh, nuclear weapons. And I recall Admiral Radford, who was then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling the President, ìnow Mr. President, if that is not our policy we had better know that, because that would imply having a greater conventional capability than we are now uh planning on and providing for.î I think as the years went along, uh, we began to rebuild some of our uh, conventional capability, because uh, it, it came to be recognized that uh we would have to exercise considerable restraint uh, in terms of the actual use of nuclear weapons uh, for anything but uh, an all-out uh, or a life or death situation.

Thermonuclear Weapons

Interviewer

So there was in fact an evolution in the president's thinking about nuclear weapons, and particularly the Soviet H-bomb was involved in that. Could you describe how that happened?

Goodpaster

I would say that Eisenhower's thinking evolved very considerably over this period, and a major event in that evolution was the uh, attainment of the uh, thermonuclear weapon, the H-bomb, by the Soviet Union. On our side, he had been-- he had had studied uh, the significance of the uh thermonuclear weapon. That came after his time over at uh SHAPE. But we were even during that time, subsequent to his departure at SHAPE, we studied the, the uh, significance of the, of the thermonuclear weapon. He was doing the same back here in this country. And in particular, he had a study made that showed that the thermonuclear weapon, in combination with the long-range rocket and the improved uh, accuracy uh, of the long-range rocket, that made a, a new weapon, a weapon which really created a new strategic situation, the possibility of very sudden and just completely devastating attacks against uh, going right into the homelands of the two uh, largest powers. So he, he became increasingly concerned about that and looked for ways of trying to turn back, to reduce, to eliminate, to control uh, this uh buildup in these uh, uh, terribly threatening and terribly powerful uh, weapons. And it was out of that that his interest grew in uh, Atoms For Peace, uh and in disarmament, uh, arms control, uh, negotiation to try to eliminate the likelihood of, of a uh, surprise attack, the so-called knock-out blow.

Geneva summit and open skies proposal

Interviewer

So if you could describe how the advent of the Soviet H-bomb affected the president's thinking?

Goodpaster

Well, that takes us back uh, it was in uh, in 1952 that our own uh, device was uh, uh, was uh, exploded. And then this was uh weaponized, as the saying goes, in uh, in about the next year. But it was really when the Soviet Union exploded their H-bomb that uh, Eisenhower began to, to concentrate on what this meant in terms of the prospects of war. The H-bomb combined with the long-range rocket, and more accurate uh, uh, means of uh targeting, meant that a devastating and sudden and tremendously destructive blow could be delivered by each country uh, against the other. He began to think about that, and more and more his thoughts turned to some kind of arms control or arms reduction. The uh, uh, one uh, uh, element of his thinking was uh, the Atoms For Peace, trying to convert the use of the, of the atomic power to peaceful means uh, uses alone. The other was to introduce uh, disarmament efforts, arms control efforts, negotiations, uh, to eliminate the likelihood of a knock-out blow, as the, as the term was, against the forces or the uh, uh industrial uh, uh industries and populations of uh, of the two countries.

Interviewer

One of the fairly early attempts at arms control was the president's open skies offer at the Geneva summit in 1955. Did he really expect that that would be accepted? And can you go on to tell us about its reception by the Soviets and the president's reaction to that?

Goodpaster

Uh, the President thought uh, that there was at least a chance that: the Soviets would enter into negotiation. And if we could not attain the complete uh, uh, results uh, that he proposed, that is, the open skies and the exchange of military blueprints, uh, to ease the tension and, and reduce the causes of, uh, of uh, concern on both sides, that uh, if he couldn't attain all of it, he could at least attain some of that. So he was hopeful that there would be a positive response. In addition, he wanted them to see that uh he was reaching for uh, peaceful uh, measures. Now, he presented that uh to them. It was rather a dramatic thing. And the initial reaction was uh, expressed by Bulganin, who uh, temporized and said, well, they would have to talk about it and, and think about it. We broke up uh, shortly after that from the formal uh, session, and went into tea, where there was always some informal discussion after the uh, after the main meetings. And during this tea, Khrushchev, uh, who was the co-leader of the Soviet delegation, came up to Eisenhower and he said, no, no, no. Uh, and uh, Eisenhower said uh, later that at that moment he knew where the power really uh, was in Soviet delegation, that Khrushchev was the man in charge.

Dwight Eisenhower and the threat of a surprise attack

Interviewer

How did he think about Khrushchev, and did his thinking about Khrushchev develop over the remaining years that he-

Goodpaster

Uh, he, he uh, saw Khrushchev as a very uh, strong, decisive, volatile, astute, uh, well grounded, uh, greatly experienced uh leader. Quite a, quite an able and effective leader. I think eh, that Khrushchev's unpredictability and volatility troubled Eisenhower, as it troubled uh, as they troubled uh, uh, many other uh, uh, people. But he also felt that it was important to have uh [an] exchanges of views and, and build an understanding on Khrushchev's part that we the United States really saw no, no merit in uh, uh, resort to the military uh, mode of uh, of interaction with them.

Interviewer

How seriously did Eisenhower regard this threat of surprise attack, especially against S.A.C., against our means of retaliating. And if you could answer that question both before, while the threat was still one of bombers, and then later on missiles.

Goodpaster

I don't think that Eisenhower was too deeply concerned with the uh, uh, threat of a knock-out blow uh during the time of uh, that uh, of the bombers, so to speak. Uh, we had a air defense at that time. No attacking force could be sure how many would get through, what the results would be and so on. So the notion that there could be any kind of a, uh, of a devastating first strike uh, that would uh, completely destroy our ability to retaliate uh, that didn't seem practical. Uh, he wanted us to have uh, uh, capable air defense, that was part of his program at that time. Now, that changed, and changed quite uh, decisively when the long-range rockets began to appear. Uh, there then became the possibility that uh, these uh could be launched, with a high p- uh, prospect of uh, uh, success. High enough that he had to be concerned that the possibility might be tempting to the Soviet Union, if they got themselves into some kind of thinking that uh, this was something that they wanted to do or had to do, and so on. That then became a matter of concern, and of such concern that he sent uh, uh negotiators to Geneva to open up discussions with the uh, with the Russians. Two very highly qualified uh, scientists, uh, uh, went there and conducted discussions for quite a long period of time.

Preemptive strike and authority to launch weapons

Interviewer

He also of course took measures -- well, we'll come to that in a minute perhaps. Did he give any thought at any time to protecting the United States by preemptive strike if it was clear that the Soviets were going to attack, rather than waiting for them to attack and retaliating?

Goodpaster

Well, we had had uh, in some of the uh, uh, statements by some-- in some quarters uh, proposing such things as preventive war. He thought that was just uh, errant nonsense, and I think those are probably the exact words that he, that he used. The idea of, of escalatory preemption if you were in a war situation, his idea always was that it becomes very, very difficult to predict in advance how military operations will uh, develop once the uh, there has been uh, resort uh, to war. But the idea of deliberate, calculated preemption from our side as uh, to initiate uh, conflict, I never saw any evidence that he seriously entertained that. But I, I make a difference there between that and escalatory preemption if you're engaged in a, a uh, a struggle, then no one can predict which weapons will be used at what time on either side.

Interviewer

Somebody, well, Robert Sprague to be precise, says that General LeMay told him in 1957 that he, General LeMay, if he learned from his own intelligence that the Soviet Union was massing for an attack, would, as he put it, get the bastards before they could get off the ground. And when Robert Sprague said to General LeMay that is not national policy, according to Mr. Sprague, General LeMay said, well, it may not be national policy, but it's my policy. do you have any reaction to that story?

Goodpaster

I think there was an awful lot of nonsense being purveyed at that time. The law says that the President has the authority to determine the uh, uh, firing of nuclear weapons, and only the President. And President Eisenhower certainly knew that. He held that authority to himself. The, the serious point about ideas of that kind, uh, as it uh, as it developed during our inquiry into this, was that S.A.C. might not be prepared for the kind of thing that might happen. Uh, instead, they were preparing for the kind of thing that was very unlikely to happen. And uh, so this also entered into Eisenhower's concern about the uh, knock-out-- uh, possibility of a knock-out blow. He wanted to take steps to eliminate or reduce that possibility, because he simply did-- was not about to be placed in a position of, of permitting uh, that kind of anticipatory uh response.

Interviewer

It is presumably true that at that era there were no actual physical constraints like the that came in later that could actually physically have prevented-- I mean, I suppose if you want to conceive of it, that it would have been physically possible for General LeMay to have unleashed these bombs without the president being able to stop him?

Goodpaster

Uh, in any period subsequent to Cromwell in uh, the English-speaking uh countries, I find it very hard to uh imagine-

Interviewer

Oh yes, politically it's almost impossible to imagine, but what I'm saying is that there are now, as I understand it, physical constraints which mean that without the codes you can't do it. whereas at that time that hadn't been brought in had it?

Goodpaster

No. But there was a very clear understanding at the time that any authorization to use these weapons had to come from the President. And uh, regardless of any uh, uh, internal uh, planning or uh, or uh, concepts that might have been developed, uh, Eisenhower was the man that would control that. I think everybody understood and accepted that.

The Gaither Report

Interviewer

What was the presidentís reaction to the Gaither Report, and also can you go on and tell us about his reaction to the private meeting that happened in the oval office afterwards, when Mr. Sprague gave his warning about mobility?

Goodpaster

The Gaither, uh, the Gaither study and then the Gaither Report, uh, began with the concern as to whether we were-- we had uh, uh, sufficient and adequate uh civil defense program. That if there should be attack on the United States, had we done what we should do to protect our people and uh, to enable them to, to survive uh, and recover from such an attack. As the study proceeded, they got more and more into this question of the knock-out blow, and uh, our abilities to uh, to uh, retain our forces as a retaliatory force in case of such uh an attack. Now in preparing their study, they had access to all intelligence information, some of it of the most sensitive kind in terms of uh, the sources and the methods that were used to produce it. And that was reflected, it was interlayered through their report. They came in and gave their report to Eisenhower, and uh my own uh, reading of his reaction was that they're simply telling me a lot of things that I knew perfectly well already and uh, jumping from that to proposals for crash actions that uh, don't seem to me to follow. And uh, so he was not uh too strongly persuaded. Then we got into the problem that uh, because he did not plan to take any crash actions, the people, many of the people who participated in the report were dissatisfied. It began to leak, and calls began to arise for the report to be released. Well, it turned out that you couldn't release it without sanitizing it, as the saying goes, to, to remove this very sensitive material. If you remove the sensitive material, uh, the thing didn't make any sense; it, it would just riddle the report. Then there was the thought, well, we will uh, have a sanitized version rewritten. Well, of course, that would have no credibility at all. Uh, so, we were really uh in a difficult situation. And the result of that was that Eisenhower came under a good deal of pressure and he found it very difficult to respond to that pressure.

Interviewer

What was his specific reaction to the private or semi-private meeting after the big N.S.C. meeting on November the 7th, when Mr. Sprague warned the president that in the case of attack with only tactical warning, not a single bomber of S.A.C. could be guaranteed to get off the ground with a full bomb load and be able to retaliate? How did the-- because Mr. Sprague recalls the president just sitting there and saying nothing for two minutes and he was very embarrassed.

Goodpaster

The President uh, I think, felt then, as uh he had felt about the Gaither Report as a whole, that this was well known to him, and he was interested primarily in what could be done about it. One of the things done about it was to institute a uh, program of airborne alert for a very limited number of aircraft. That's very wearing on the aircraft in terms of maintenance and, and uh, spare parts and uh, keeping up the readiness of the, of the force. But in, in order to get around that -- that's what he was interested in. The uh, the people that participated in this saw a much more dramatic uh effect uh than uh, than Eisenhower did. And of course, I th-- I think that was part of his uh, uh, normal reaction. He, he did not like uh, did not respond when people tried to dramatize or uh, alarm him. Uh, instead, he looked for the practical steps that could be taken that might alleviate this. And where he parted company uh, with them, was when they pr-- uh, somehow, uh, coupled the idea of a crash program of producing uh, intercontinental uh, missiles to the uh, the findings of the Gaither Report. He, he did not see the reason for a crash program. And on that position, uh he came under pressure and under attack uh, from people, uh, who wanted such a program, for the remainder of his whole administration.

Dwight Eisenhower and pressure for militarization

Interviewer

What did the president[Eisenhower] say to you immediately after that meeting with Mr. Sprague?

Goodpaster

My recollection is that as, uh, as, uh, just after the meeting, uh, he was talking about it and he said, "Hell, these people come in here and they tell me things I've known all along. " And, uh, then, uh, either then or at a later time, he coupled that with, uh, uh, "I'm not going to dance at the end of these, the string of these people that come in and try to give me, uh, uh, all these, uh, scare stories that I've known about all along," and ... his whole method was to reserve to himself for very sober reflection and consideration, the actions to be taken and... he was just adamantly opposed to militarizing, increasing the militarization, if I can use the term, of the confrontation of the, um, of the struggle, uh, between the Soviet Union and the United States. That ran exactly counter to one of his major efforts throughout his whole administration.

Interviewer

One of the other pressures on him to increase that militarization were the intelligence estimates coming through right through this period. Can you tell me about his reaction when the intelligence community started prophesying the bomber gap?

Goodpaster

Well, the bomber gap was a public term; I don't think the intelligence community itself used the term, but, uh, the, uh, they were showing the possibility of a large buildup in Soviet long-range bombers. And. .. I discussed this with him, and over a period of about a year, maybe two years, he... asked, and, and I looked back to see what had they predicted the year before. And, ah, in looking into that, I found that what happened was that the estimate had remained very much the same but had just ah, slid for about a year, and the reason for that, as it turned out, was that they were estimating that the Soviets might employ some of their industrial capability to increase this, uh, their productive facilities for... bombers. They did not in fact do that, and because they didn't do it, the rate of production remained really quite low, and there was no bomber gap. By the time we came to the missile situation, and the proposals for a crash program, because of some anticipated missile gap, we began to look at the same thing: Let's look to see what actual facilities they seem to be using to produce these or to deploy, ah, these, ah, missiles, and our intelligence did not show them engaged in any massive or very rapid buildup. And it was for those reasons that he, uh, concluded that there had never been a bomber gap, uh, that had always been a, uh, a fiction, and, uh, as he put it, "The missile gap shows every sign of being the same."

Dwight Eisenhower's assessment of Soviet capabilities

Interviewer

Some of his critics, for example, Joseph Alsop, accuse him of relying on intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions, rather than on the worst-case estimates.

Goodpaster

The, uh, if you took the... If you took the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, you could speculate on what they could produce if they used it for bombers, if they used it for, uh, rockets, if alternatively they used it to increase their ground forces or if they used it to increase their submarines and so on. And depend on, depending on what, uh, assumptions you used in that particular area of worst case, you could get, uh, kind of a horrifying result. Thereís nothing like... a little bit of hard evidence, and that's why... we prized very highly the evidence that we were able to get through photography of what they were in fact doing, because that would show which of the, of these possibilities they might, uh, be, uh, following. I would have to say that there's an implicit, uh, estimate of intent on the part of those who, who say, Well, this is what we've got to plan against, because that assumes that it is the intent of the Soviets to direct their limited, uh, very great, but, but nevertheless still limited, uh, industrial and technological, uh, capability, into a particular area. We preferred to try to get hard evidence as to just what they were doing, rather than speculate that they were going to throw all of their, uh, uh, or so much of their industrial, uh, capability, in, into the production of these weapons.

Interviewer

And you had sufficient evidence in the late 50's to make that judgment.

Goodpaster

We had a considerable amount of evidence -- you never have as much as you would like, and there's always a margin of uh, uncertainty. But if you, uh, check back on this after a few months to see, uh, were, they in fact, uh, doing what we estimated they were doing on the basis of hard intelligence, we found that our estimating process was really pretty good. Uh, b- basing it on, on, uh, information of that kind.

Interviewer

What was the president's reaction to people like Alsop, particularly their access to intelligence?

Goodpaster

Well, I recall one time he cooled me down a little bit -- I was, I got a little exercised at some of the charges being made against him, which I knew were quite untrue on the basis of information, intelligence that I had, uh, in fact briefed him on, and he just said, "Don't get excited about that." Uh, he said, uh, he knew that the American people just had an awful lot of trust in him to look out for what was best for them in terms of their safety. Now, he did resent, very, very strongly, anybody who had access to official information, and then used it in order to try to heat up and to, to, uh, uh, alarm our people over, uh, the need for further military forces. That he resented very, very strongly. He felt that he had a great responsibility there; he was trying to deal with it responsibly.

Interviewer

He resented very much...

Goodpaster

Well, yeah... See, he resented very much anyone who had access to official information, and then used that in order to, uh, generate, uh, public alarm or, uh, uh, concern, uh, attack on the programs that had been worked out by those, uh, bearing responsibility, uh, in the government. And uh, the, that was true, uh, some of the people in the Congress were, uh, pushing for these crash programs, some of the people out in industry, uh, were pushing for the crash programs, and some of the people in the military -- of course, that's the origin of the famous military-industrial complex: it made a dual point, "We have to have these weapons; we have to have a very powerful force," but because we do, and because these are powerful elements in our society, then it's up to the people to keep a, a careful watch to see that they don't have undue or unwarranted influence.

Interviewer

Do you think there were specific examples of unwarranted influence that he was thinking of when he made his speech?

Goodpaster

Oh, yes! Ah... he felt that, uh, the kind of pressures that were being exerted were unwarranted; they were not warranted by the facts, and they were not warranted by the, uh, position that the people held -- he held the responsibility, as the, as President, uh, recommending these, uh, uh, programs, and, uh, he felt that for others to, to try to, uh, influence, uh, these decisions was unwarranted and improper.

Inside the Oval Office

Interviewer

On a slightly different subject, was this continuous interservice rivalry that went on during this period as well. What was his reaction to that and how did he try to cope with it?

Goodpaster

Well, he knew that the services, of course, were each trying to get as big a military budget as they could; uh, they were trying to modernize at -- excuse me -- at, at as rapid a rate as they could; he felt that it was necessary to some-, for someone to maintain control over that. He felt that no one was in better position to do that than himself. In detail, of course, it would be the Secretary of Defense, but out of his own experience, he, he was completely confident that ah, he had a very good appreciation of just how much was really required. He then... understood that there would be this, uh, rivalry for budgets and there would be some undercutting of each other. Now that's, any time there was, uh, uh, criticism by one service of another, in order to try to enlarge their own budget and, and program, that, he felt, was improper. Also, I think he felt that because of this rivalry, we were not, uh, putting the, uh, the strategic plans and the policies as uppermost but that the rivalry itself had become a dominant factor, and it was with that background that he, uh, then made his proposals in 1958 for the reorganization of the Defense Department, to clarify and strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense, to, uh, clarify and strengthen the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their joint role, their national role, rather than their service role, and to establish commands in the field, which would not be linked to a particular service, but would be responsive to the overall direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Interviewer

But he didn't really succeed in checking that rivalry very much.

Goodpaster

He... he had what I would call a, ah, a fair measure of success; uh, the, the, uh, authority of the Secretary of Defense was greatly strengthened, and when Secretary McNamara came in, he made clear how much it had been strengthened, because he did exercise, uh, strong, uh, control. I think he would have been disappointed in, uh, what was achieved with regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; their joint role never became the, uh, the, uh, driving or guiding factor to the extent that he would have liked, uh, to see. I think he felt that the field commands were well set up, uh, but, of course, during his period there wasn't time for them really to, uh, evolve or develop, uh, too far, so it was a partial, uh, it, it was a partial attainment of what he had in mind.

Dwight Eisenhower's views on arsenal expansion

Interviewer

Between 1957 and 1961 the strategic arsenal nearly tripled. what was the president's reaction to this?

Goodpaster

He... increasingly he felt that, uh, we were going beyond the bounds of anything that was sensible at all, and that's the... kind of uh, uh, term that he would use in, uh, talking about this. He had by that time, uh, set up the, uh, his science advisory committee -- after Sputnik, uh, that was restored and, uh, and greatly strengthened, and he was increasingly looking to them to make... rational overall analyses of what was required. In addition he had a net assessment, uh, uh, group, which was responsive to the National Security Council, that investigated what the effects of a nuclear, uh, uh, nuclear, uh, uh, conflict would be, and out of that, uh, more and more he felt that we were... going, reaching the point where more just didn't make very much sense. Now, one thing he did support was to go to, uh, modernized, uh, better, more controllable, uh, systems, such as the.... And... he was, uh, strongly in support of the naval system, the Polaris, because it had this invulnerability, and therefore would be, in his view, a stabilizing, uh, element of the force. Also, the Minuteman -- it was a, it was a solid, uh, rocket, uh, and, uh, he regarded that as much more dependable, much more reliable than the early forms, the Titan and the, Atlas, that were in the, uh, initial generation. But, uh, he felt that, uh, uh, increasingly, that, uh, additional forces in this, of this kind, simply didn't make much sense.

Interviewer

And yet he did authorize that tremendous increase in the nuclear arsenal, and particularly the bombers.

Goodpaster

Well, he supported the B-52. He thought that was a very, uh, fine, uh, uh, uh, system, uh -- he was not persuaded by the, uh, I think it was the B-70 that they were, uh, proposing at that time. Uh... so, um, uh, he wanted to keep, uh, a diverse force; at the same time, uh, he wanted to, uh... and, but he wanted to concentrate on the, uh, improved systems. He authorized what he called a "bulge" in 19... say, 1958, 1959... uh, because the, uh, the military... services came to him and said, "We now have these improved systems that we are bringing into existence, but we have to maintain and continue the old ones at the same time." So he authorized what he called a "bulge" of three billion dollars in the defense budget, authorizing it to go from 35 to 38 billion. Uh... I recall talking to him on occasion and asking whether he thought he would ever see that, uh, uh, three billion, uh, go down again, and, uh, uh, I think it's fair to say that he really expected it to stay at that higher plateau. But what I'm...

Dwight Eisenhower and arms limitation

Interviewer

So was there anyone at that level of the White House actually deciding how many bombers were to be produced?

Goodpaster

Only indirectly. Uh... you had the, uh... Well, on how many bombers to be produced, yes, that, uh, uh, would be contained in the budget and, uh, it would be contained in one of these budget issues that would go to the top of the Pentagon, to the secretary of defense, and, uh, in all likelihood, would come over and be argued before the President. With regard to the, uh, weapons themselves, the warheads themselves, that argument generally came in terms of the, uh, what capacity for production of nuclear material did you, uh, require, and, uh, specifically opening up a new reactor, or something of that... kind, that's when those, uh, decisions would, would, uh, come about. Now Eisenhower was, uh, resistant, uh, very resistant uh, to the continuation of, uh, the, the production of large numbers of these weapons. But of course, he, he had, uh, arguments being made against him, coming from many, many directions, from the Congress and from the military services and, and, uh, and elsewhere.

Interviewer

The impression's rather given though, that he didn't take much interest in the actual war plans that were being worked out down at Omaha... if deterrence failed. Would that be right?

Goodpaster

Uh, he, uh... took an interest in the sense of wanting to see that we had coordinated plans for very reliable and effective operations in case they should ever be required. And with that in mind, he, uh, authorized and under... Secretary Gates there was set up the, uh, single integrated operational, uh, plan. Uh, he had been concerned over the fact that different people were planning on different bases, doing... different things, so in that respect he was interested in it. Uh... he had a saying, though, which he, uh, attributed to... von Moltke, as he attributed a great many things, that uh, "Plans are nothing, but planning is everything"; in other words, uh, having the mate-, the information at hand, having the process by which the plans were made, that was very important. But the plans, he had no idea that they would ever be carried out exactly as written.

Interviewer

So, was he alarmed for example, when Dr. Kistiakovsky came back in the fall of 1960 and told him that the new Syop(?) plan involved massive amounts of megatonnage and radiation and so on?

Goodpaster

I think he found that confirmation of the, of the view that he had, uh, uh, developed. Uh, we often talked about the effect of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and, uh, if you think of multiplying that by any factor at all, those effects are, are devastating. And the notion that, uh, uh, talking about a thousand or, or more of these, uh, warheads made any kind of military sense, uh, uh, that, that notion was, uh, he just didn't accept that at all.

Interviewer

And yet he didn't do anything about it when it comes down to it.

Goodpaster

Uh, except, uh, uh, initiate, his work in the direction of arms control, arms reduction, arms limitation -- he felt that that was the way to try to bring this thing back under some kind of control. He recognized that the pressures from the military would always be for more, more, and more, and from the Congress they would have their friends in the Congress, from the industry, and then there would be some people, the publicists and so on, who would certainly be supporting them. And he was trying to generate a, a counter-action that would have a lot of, uh, uh, public appeal, as indeed it did, and, uh, I think that his, uh, his initiatives in the field of disarmament and arms control were very well regarded, very well, uh, received by the American people. He certainly had that view.

1960 summit meeting and the U-2 affair

Interviewer

But most of them didn't get very far, because of the Soviet reaction. One that might have done, of course, was the summit meeting of 1960. do you think that was a chance that was missed?

Goodpaster

Oh, I think so, and he did as well. He was... ah... that was one of the very disappointing effects of, of the U-2 affair and the breakup of the summit conference, and the, uh, withdrawal of the invitation for him to visit Russia. He had thought that he might really have an effect in, uh, conveying his views and those of the American people to, uh, to the people of the Soviet Union. He was, uh, he was, uh, deeply disappointed, uh, because of the results of the U2.

Interviewer

So you would say that it was a missed opportunity.

Goodpaster

Yes, I... it was, uh, a missed opportunity, and I think he saw it as a missed opportunity; it was the, the price that we paid, for having, uh, conducted this, uh, operation. On the other hand, uh, uh, when, uh, when this was discussed, uh, shortly after the U2 affair, he said, "Now, I want anyone of you who think that the U-2 program was a mistake, to tell me that he would have been willing to give up all of the intelligence information that we gained through that program." And I can tell you there was silence all around the room. And, uh, he better than anyone else, I think, foresaw what the effect would be if we lost one of these, uh, U-2's. Ah, but even so, he felt that it was so important to, to know what we needed to do in the military field, and, uh, to know what would be excessive if we, we went beyond that... ah, it, that he was willing to pursue that.

Interviewer

Without the U2, in fact, the United States armament program would have been a great deal greater than it was, would it not?

Goodpaster

I think that it would have. Uh, the... it was uh, even though we did not disclose the, uh, U2 operation -- it was held to a very small circle -- it gave him ah, added, ah, reassurance that, ah, what we were doing, uh, met his view of, of what our, what the security of our country required.

Overview of Dwight Eisenhower's presidency

Interviewer

Finally there's been an attitude toward the Eisenhower presidency, that he'd been complacent and didn't really know what was going on in his own administration.

Goodpaster

Well, I think the... more recent scholarship now has, ah, given a much better picture of Eisenhower. He was a very complex man; uh, I myself, uh, felt that, uh, I never saw his whole card, so to speak, and I, I suppose in this field I was uh, the closest to him of anybody. Uh, though he was, uh, he followed it very, very closely; he didn't like his hand to show; uh, he oftentimes, uh, uh, made clear that he expected others to, uh, carry the public, uh, presentation of these policies. One of the best examples of that, I think, uh: one day, uh, Jim Hagerty, who was his press secretary, uh, came to him and, and, uh, uh, uh, on some problem, and the President told Hagerty what to say, and Hagerty said, "If I say that, the press is just going to eat me up," and the president clapped him on the shoulder and said, "Jim, better you than me." Ah... so, I think more and more it's understood that here was a man who had a deep understanding of the processes of government; he was using them -- You can make a question, Could he have pushed harder in many of these areas? but to answer that, I think, would require very serious and deep inquiry "to, to understand the whole complex of pressures that existed in our country at that time. And those pressures were reflected in his, uh, comment about the military-industrial complex, for example, in, in his final, um, address to the nation.

Interviewer

As you said, he was trying always to demilitarize the relationship with the Soviet Union -- that spectacularly hasn't happened, since 1961. What do you think his speculations about the present era would be, were he alive today?

Goodpaster

Well, ah... I, I have to go to your, to your first, uh, statement there. I think that relation has been demilitarized; it's much less harsh than it was at the outset of his, uh, uh, term; it eased during his term; I think the, uh, the facile references to war, and nuclear war, and so on, that existed in the early 1950's -those are gone now, and, uh, occasionally there may be some, uh, excessive, uh, uh, rhetoric, but, uh, there's a much deeper understanding on both sides of, just the, uh, uh, terrible catastrophe that a nuclear conflict would, uh, represent; and... there are negotiations and discussions of many, many kinds, which I think... do serve as a restraint, and do move in the direction that he had in mind -- we're certainly not as far along as he would wish, and, uh, the, but, uh, we're better off than we might have been, and we have survived, uh, what, uh, 40 years now of the existence of the bomb, without it being used other than in the case of the, uh, the final use in, in Japan -- and that is no small achievement, uh, in a world, uh, as dangerous and as fractious as this one is.

United States and Western Europe defense relations

Interviewer

In 1947, the McMahon Act was passed, effectively preventing any nuclear collaboration with Great Britain. what was Eisenhower's view of that?

Goodpaster

Well, I first became acquainted with the McMahon Act, and, uh, and particularly with Eisenhower's views about it, uh, in early, the early 1950's, after SHAPE was formed, and when I was a, uh, a staff officer, serving with him. Uh, he was very concerned about it, on a couple of grounds. First that he thought it was a breach of the understanding that we had had with the British and the Canadians during the war, in which this was a collaborative effort in which all shared in the burden of the task and, uh, they, uh, and all were to share in the results of it. That was the first thing. The second thing was that it was a constraint or restriction that prevented, uh, working with our allies on a fully, uh, cooperative basis in which they would be able to share with us in providing some of the nuclear, uh, capability.... I'd been a... staff officer, uh, in the Pentagon, briefly, under Eisenhower as the Chief of Staff, and had worked on a group studying the implications, the possible future implications, of nuclear weapons. So that, uh, uh, when I was with him in SHAPE, uh, I was acquainted with the kind of thinking that he had done about the role of nuclear weapons as they had been developed up to that time.

Interviewer

When Eisenhower was at SHAPE, there were United States troops stationed in Europe. what was the general impression about the future of these troops?

Goodpaster

Well, once, uh, once SHAPE was formed, and, uh, the, uh, and work began to create the collective force, uh, then a part of that was the... reconstitution, the realignment of those forces which had been a constabulary, uh, type force and an occupation-type force to a part of a, uh, ready military, uh, force, which would join with the forces of the other nations, France in particular, Britain and the Low Countries at that time, uh, to provide a force in being, uh, in, uh, uh, Western Europe, and particularly... with the forward elements in, uh, western Germany, that would be a deterrent, or if, uh, the need were ever to arise, a, uh, capable of providing a defense, and of course that capability to provide the defense was indeed part of the deterrent. And there was, along with those forces that were, uh, built from that time on, there was the idea, the commitment on the part of the alliance, that there would be an effort to bring Germany, uh, western Germany, uh, into that, uh, association, that they should be part of that defense.

Interviewer

It wasn't until 1954, in the Paris accord, there was an overt commitment to maintain... United States troops in Germany. Are you saying that that decision had been made long before 1954?

Goodpaster

Well, from the outset of the creation of SHAPE, Eisenhower recognized that there would have to be a substantial American force there, and he took initiative, he, he took a very active part, in obtaining the return of four divisions to Europe to constitute a, a significant part of that, uh, uh, defense force. Now Eisenhower always had the idea that they would be there for a limited period; as he said, to cover the time while Europe itself rearms. That was changed, of course, in 1954, at the time of bringing the German forces in as part of the package of agreements made at that time -- I think the major European countries, particularly France, but Britain and the Low Countries as well, wanted the assurance that there would be... continued American force participation.

Interviewer

That decision at the Paris conference marked a really fundamental change in American foreign policy. was it seen so at the time?

Goodpaster

Eisenhower did not see that, uh, so much as a change in policy and others did not, uh, because others, even more than Eisenhower, really saw the American commitment as a commitment of indefinite duration and, uh, of long duration. That, uh, the, the presence of the American forces there was a kind of guarantee, a kind of assurance, uh, that the Americans were, and would continue to be, uh, involved, and were a part of the deterrent, and in a sense a very... very major part of the deterrent, because their, the, their sheer presence there met, meant that if there were to be an attack from the east, Americans would be deeply involved in it, from the outset, so that, uh, there would be, uh, working on... any aggressor, the thought that he, he wasn't going to be able to pick... European countries off one at a time, but he would be taking on the United States as well. I think you asked there whether the, uh, Paris accords were in some sense a fundamental or a major change. Right... The, the Paris accords were a change in American policy, but perhaps not so drastic a change as, uh, they might appear. Uh, Eisenhower, of course, had thought, always thought, in terms of these forces being there for that limited period of time, but I think many other Americans, and, indeed, the American government as a whole, both in the Truman Administration and, I have to say, in the Eisenhower Administration as well, thought that a continued American presence there was going to be a major part of the deterrent, because it conveyed the message that, by their sheer presence there, any aggression from the East would involve and engage American resistance from, from the outset; and that, of course, is a powerful contribution to the deterrent.

The buildup of nuclear weapons in Western Europe

Interviewer

The problem of German entry into NATO and the rearmament of Germany was a continual problem for European parties. When did Eisenhower become convinced that the rearmament of Germany was absolutely necessary?

Goodpaster

Eisenhower, from the outset, uh, understood that part of the American decision to join in creating the collective defense force, and indeed, part of the decision of the United States to ask him to go to Europe to organize it and to command it, was predicated on German rearmament or German association, participation in the collective defense. That, in fact, had been a condition expressed in the fall of 1950, uh, to the American, uh, uh, participation in this enterprise, and... he then was quite aware of that, and worked at that to try to find ways of bringing that about; working particularly with the French, because they had the greatest, uh, problem with that, uh, really from the outset of his period of command, which began in January of 1951, and extended 'til May of 1952.

Interviewer

By the time the Germans actually entered NATO, in 1954, there was quite a rapid buildup of nuclear weapons in the European theater. what was the prime justification for that buildup?

Goodpaster

The buildup of nuclear weapons was beginning, uh, as early as 1951 and perhaps even before that; my own... uh, participation in SHAPE began at the beginning of 1951, but when we studied, in the fall of 1951, what it would take to provide a, uh, a, uh, a defense, uh, in which we could be confident in Western Europe, against the, uh, estimated Soviet forces of that time... this culminated in the so-called Lisbon force goals that were, uh, laid down in, uh, early 1952, and those Lisbon force goals appeared to exceed by a considerable margin anything that was likely to be, um, to be provided; those would be conventional forces, as we call it today. As a kind of a make-weight, as a kind of a way of, uh, filling that gap, uh, account was taken, in very general terms, of, uh, the significance of these nuclear weapons, which at that time were the, were the fission-type weapon, not the fusion-type, uh, weapon, and, uh, it became necessary then, or... over a period of time, uh, necessary and desirable, to study how those could be associated with the, uh, operations of the, uh, of the, uh, conventional land, air, and naval forces. And, a lot of planning effort went on along those lines, and in the meantime, uh, the... nuclear weapons were indeed being, uh, shipped over to Europe to add to the, uh, add to the deterrent and, in a sense, to fill that gap.

Interviewer

There was a feeling, among several people, that by 1960 there were far too many warheads actually in place. Who was in charge of that program?

Goodpaster

It's really very difficult to say, uh, uh, just who was making the key determinations there. The principle of utilizing the nuclear weapons as part of the military capability, that had been accepted, uh, in, from the Lisbon time on. Uh, a group of us, uh, formed a small planning team at SHAPE, to study how substantial, uh, numbers of weapons could be used, uh, uh, in conjunction with our forces to, as we put it, "stun and stop any kind of an aggression...against us." But... even that planning, uh, which took account of how many weapons were, uh, there, and how many were coming along in the, in the near future, even that planning did not attempt to specify, uh, how much would be enough. Uh, so that the, the providers, uh, uh, kept sending the weapons over, and it wasn't until, really until the early '60's that people began to ask, have we now reached a level, uh, a sufficient level, and, uh, uh, are we about to, uh, exceed that, or are we about to have some, uh, uh, more than we need?

Interviewer

Was Eisenhower aware of that process?

Goodpaster

Along with the buildup of the nuclear weapons in Europe, of course, there was a buildup of the strategic weapons, and I th-, I think from my own observation and work with Eisenhower, because... I stayed on at, at SHAPE until mid-'54 and then, in late '54, joined Eisenhower as a staff officer in the White House -- by that time, the thermonuclear weapon had come into existence, and also, in 1954 or 1955, uh, the studies were made that showed the military viability of a weapon which combined the thermonuclear, uh, weapon with the long-range intercontinental, uh, rocket; at that point Eisenhower's views, I think, uh, began to change, because he began to grapple... with the import of this weapon, which was tremendously more devastating than anything that we had had, uh, before. I think he... continued to feel that the nuclear weapons in Europe filled a, a significant deterrent role; I know that he did, because, uh, uh, we presented the results of our, uh, study to him in mid-1954, and it was something that I discussed with him often during, uh, the time I was with him in, in the White House; but, uh, he, he did not, uh, he, he didn't have great concern about the numbers in and of themselves; uh, he began to ask, in the late '50's, uh... how many of these things are we building, and what are we building them for? and he didn't get very good answers, and he was increasingly dissatisfied with, uh, uh, recommendations to continue to produce and, uh, to deploy these when he saw no, uh... real logical, or rational, uh... kind of calculation on which the, those numbers were based.

Interviewer

From 1954 onwards, was it envisaged that they would be used prior to the deployment of SAC's strategic weapons, or was it envisaged that they would be used at the same time?

Goodpaster

Well, there was a wide range of views, uh, from the mid-1950's on, uh, we began to be... concerned about the possibility of a so-called "knock-out blow," either delivered by long-range bombers or, uh, we became increasingly concerned that they might, that that blow might be delivered by the long-range, uh, rockets. And... because of that, uh, uh... because of that concern over the, uh, over the, uh... knock-out blow, that became the focus of our, uh, of our attention. Eisenhower himself always felt, and was very free to say, that if we ever got into a major war, it would be fought with everything that we had, and at that point, uh, I think it was his feeling that you would have to look to the principal commanders to make the most effective use they could of whatever we had, uh, across the whole spectrum of, uh, weaponry, in order to bring the war to an end, and in order to halt and overcome the aggression.

Interviewer

It had quite a traumatic effect on French opinion, the United States' attitude toward it. How did Eisenhower view that operation?

Goodpaster

Of course the Suez affair was something completely out of the pattern, within the alliance; Eisenhower felt that, uh, this was not the way allies, uh, should behave with each other; uh, I think he was, uh, uh, very, um, he was disappointed, uh, that this was done, uh, in a way that surprised us deliberately, uh, uh, was, uh, calcu -, uh, was, uh, designed in order to obtain surprise and, perhaps, to immobilize him at the time of the American election, uh, so that, uh, we started from a situation in which, uh, quite apparently, uh, there had been no resolution of a common, uh, line of policy; uh, there had been, uh, uh, an exchange between Eisenhower and, uh, uh, and Prime Minister Eden, uh, prior to this time, in which the two men, in a... in essence, talked past each other; uh, Eisenhower, uh, continuing to say, ask, uh, how any military intervention could be brought to a successful, uh, conclusion, what the ending would be, uh, and, uh, Eden taking the stand that, if something was not done, uh, uh, the future of, uh, Britain would be jeopardized, and it was against that background, then, that the, uh, that the operations, uh, uh, began, and Eisenhower's, the focus of Eisenhower's, uh, disappointment, and his effort to remedy the situation, was very much with Britain, because of his past close association, uh, with, uh, Britain, primarily, I believe -

US relations with France under Dwight Eisenhower

Interviewer

To continue with the Suez affair, was there any concern at the time about the extent to which this would. ...the attitude of the United States' government ....would disrupt and cause severe problems for French foreign policy?

Goodpaster

Well, there was great concern over the damage that this might do in NATO, uh, in terms of the association, uh, of the French with the alliance. Uh, working through the problems with the French in the early fifties had been extremely difficult. First of all, because of the, uh, residue of attitude growing out of the war and then second because of the difficulties, uh, they were facing and involved in Indochina, in particular in the early fifties, and then the situation in Algeria, uh, coming along later than that. Uh, so it was seen that there would be considerable, uh, stress, uh, and even possibly a rupture of the alliance. That was taken into account in, uh, deciding, uh, what had to be done... And essentially Eisenhower felt it was imperative to take action along the lines that he, uh, that he pursued then.

Interviewer

How much did you...how much were you aware and how much was Eisenhower aware of the development of the French nuclear force in that period. was he concerned about it?

Goodpaster

We had some knowledge of the development of the French, uh, nuclear, uh, forces, uh, uh, during the fifties. Eisenhower himself had wanted to provide nuclear information and nuclear assistance to the French. And he was frustrated in that because of the McMahon Act and because of the opposition of um, the joint committee of the congress to, uh, giving away our secrets in the terms that, uh, they viewed the thing. He felt that that was not the proper relationship to have among allies and that our allies who wished to participate in this and were capable of participating in it should do so and should accept part of the burden and part of the responsibility of maintaining a nuclear, uh, force. Uh, he was...he tried to move that on several occasions and, in essence, got nowhere with the congress and clearly saw that the outcome of this would be that the French would be likely to do it on their own.

Interviewer

In 1958 there was perhaps Eisenhower had the possibility to change that position. De Gaulle wrote suggesting a triple alliance with Great Britain, France and the United States all exercising a common veto over the use of nuclear weapons. How did General Eisenhower view that? What was his attitude?

Goodpaster

When, uh, he received the proposal of uh, uh, uh General De Gaulle, he gave it very careful attention because he knew De Gaulle well and he knew that those things were not, uh, done lightly and De Gaulle was very serious. Um, this came to be called the directorate of proposal, and Eisenhower felt that it would be fatally disruptive to the conduct of affairs within the alliance. Now Britain and, uh, France and the United States had provided through the standing group of NATO on the military side. ..they had provided the day to day policy direction, uh, within the alliance insofar as alliance activities were concerned. But to enlarge that, uh, to the scope suggested in De Gaulle's, uh, uh, proposal, uh, Eisenhower felt would be unwise and, in fact, unworkable in the alliance...And the second thing that there should be a three party control over, uh, nuclear weapons. Uh, that was seen as wholly impractical, uh, insofar as United States' law and the role of the congress...the position of the congress, uh, was concerned. So in his reply to De Gaulle and contrary to much of what has... was then said and later said that he failed to reply to De Gaulle. He did reply. He replied at length...made a counterproposal for the meetings of ambassadors for consultation in London. And that was, in fact, done but that was not a full substitute for what President De Gaulle had in mind of course.

Dwight Eisenhower's attempts to collaborate with European allies

Interviewer

In 1957 there was an amendment to the McMahon act which reestablished the collaboration with the United Kingdom. what were the reasons for that change?

Goodpaster

Well, Eisenhower had been desirous of making a change in the McMahon Act to permit, uh, collaboration with our allies. The most...my, Im now speaking from memory, but my memory is that the most he was able to get was an agreement for collaboration in nuclear weapons with, uh, but...uh, he was able to get also, and I think it was at this time and in this connection, authority to enter into peaceful...into collaboration or cooperation on peaceful applications of the atom which was again one of his major interests. He was anxious to find anything... any way that he could to shift the, uh, utilization of the atom from, uh, military applications into, uh, peaceful uses. And I think he got that at the same time... ability to introduce cooperation in research reactors and also in power reactor applications. And, and we did go forward with memoranda of agreement, uh, with a large number of countries following ab... beginning and about that period.

Interviewer

Would you say that the reasons why it was possible to get that measure through congress to enhance collaboration with the British ....were perhaps first of all the launching of Sputnik and secondly the [Soviet Union] detonated its own H bomb.

Goodpaster

I don't recall what all entered into the, uh, getting those changes. But I think that, uh, uh, it began to become apparent that they....to the congress that they were protecting secrets that were no longer secrets, uh, that were no longer in effect denied to our allies...And the notion of our allies being put to the expense of duplicating the whole, uh, research and development, uh, process increasingly began to seem, uh, rather, uh, rather foolish and wasteful... And I think in retrospect...looking back on it I think that that, uh, uh, entered into it. My mem....I can't remember that that argument was used at the time but it could well have been.

Interviewer

Further to that point, do you recall the fact that the [amendment] applied to collaboration with the British. was there any concern that that might further enhance French fears of being discriminated against?

Goodpaster

Oh yes, I think that there was a...I started to answer that wrong so I'll start again. Uh, there was, uh, considerable concern that if we were able to do this only with the British this would certainly not help relations with France nor with the Netherlands...And we've engaged in the discussion of the possibility of assisting them in building nuclear submarines. They, of course, had a great interest in, in naval applications. And Eisenhower, uh, simply could not understand why, uh, he was denied...being denied the opportunity to share that kind of technology, uh, with, uh, with the Netherlands. But he thought that this would add strains and stresses within the alliance, and indeed it did.

Providing means of weapon delivery to European allies

Interviewer

In '57 the decision was taken that there would be the deployment of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the US allies in NATO with the United States still controlling the warheads. That in a sense represented a significant shift over the way that nuclear weapons were deployed in NATO. what was the reason for that?

Goodpaster

It was in late 1957, I believe, that the decisions were taken to, uh, deploy, uh...to enter into agreements with our allies where they would have the means of delivery, artillery, aircraft and so on...And we would position nuclear weapons to be available to them in case of need and in case of a decision by the president. I think that followed Sputnik, and I think that it was one of those majors taken to enhance, uh, the feeling of security among our allies, uh, among our allies after the Sputnik shock. I don't know whether the Sputnik shock was as great in Europe as it was in the United States but for a short period there was something approaching panic in the United States -- an awareness really for the first time that we had moved into the era of the long-range rocket and, uh, associated with the thermonuclear weapon and that everybody was now in, uh, under the, uh, under the shadow of this kind of, uh, nuclear threat. But, uh, and I think there was some concern of that kind in Europe. But this was seen as a means of, uhhh, strengthening the ties, uh, adding the ties. ..to the ties within the alliance and adding to the confidence of our European allies through drawing them into participation in the nuclear role. It was limited participation, but still it was a step in that direction.

Interviewer

Wasnt any regard given to the impact that what looked like the nuclear arming of Germany would have on the Soviet views...th[e] views towards....the attitudes of the Soviet Union.

Goodpaster

There was careful differentiation at the time, uh, between, uh, uh, the actions that were taken, uh, cooperation between the United States retaining possession and control of the nuclear weapon and the allies having, uh, uh, means of delivery for those weapons. Uhhh, of course it was realized that, uh, the Soviets' would be very attentive to this, and of course, they were then and subsequently very concerned over the status of Germany and insistent that Germany should not be armed with nuclear weapons. But I think that they saw that this was not arming Germany with nuclear weapons. And I think others, uh, in, uh, the western countries, uh, saw the same thing because there was still at that time, uh, concern over the... over the role of Germany and, and what weapons would be, uh, uh, in their possession. In 1954, when those agreements were reached and the German forces, uh, were brought into NATO, part of the package of agreements uh, wa...included a listing of certain types of weapons that would not be, um, part of the German forces. And of course, atomic weapons were, um, a major part of that.

Interviewer

Why was it that the way these weapons were deployed was actually via bilateral treaties and not through some NATO mechanism. What was the reason for that?

Goodpaster

I can't really recall why this was done bilaterally and not through a NATO mechanism. There was consideration in NATO and the planning in NATO for their utilization was, of course, on a NATO basis. But it...I... looking back I can only think that it was part of that, uh, uh, of that, uh, basic principle or shibboleth, uh, if, uh, one wants to call it that, uh, logistics, uh, were, uh, would be a national responsibility. And this was part of the provisioning of the forces. The employment...the issue of employment...all of that was handled on the NATO side...Planning for employment, I would say.

Flexible response

Interviewer

In '57 Norstad made a speech where he talked about the concept of a pause. Did you see that as being significant at any time in terms of the further debate about flexible response.

Goodpaster

Beginning even in 1957 and extending back into the earlier fifties. ...even back to the time when I had been involved in, uh, the planning group for the utilization of nuclear weapons, there was some disagreement as to whether they became primary and the conventional forces had an ancillary role...And that was unresolved and, and perhaps unresolvable. Uh, but the issue, uh, continued to exist and cause a certain amount of tension...And various formulae were developed over the years of which General Norstad's pause was one that would at least accommodate the idea that you would use your conventional forces, and uh, for some range of purposes whether simply to characterize the attack as the French were...want to say or to deal with the attack if, indeed, you're able to do so as others might feel was desirable...That was a part of it. Uh, you would use your conventional forces and then subsequently, uh, if necessary, use the nuclear forces...And uh, General Norstad came up with the rather ingenious idea of, uh, of a pause in which, uh, which...and this was welcomed by the NATO authorities who certainly did not want to see the use of nuclear weapons as automatic or uncontrolled.

Interviewer

Some people have said to us...actually General Richardson said this morning ...the real problem, one of the problems is the failure of military bureaucracies to actually recognize how fundamental a revolution has occurred because of the existence of nuclear weapons. what is your attitude towards that criticism?

Goodpaster

I think that, uh, two major changes occurred. One occurred as atomic weapons began to become available and you thought of how those might be employed in Europe. And that certainly changed the character of any confrontation, and it...any possible confrontation...And it, it raised the possibility that, uh, nuclear weapons would, in fact, uh, come to dominate, uh, any future battlefield and that they should be viewed as the primary deterrent. Uh, that's the first revolutionary change. The second one, uh, which I eluded to earlier is the, is the introduction of the thermonuclear weapon...vastly more devastating...And as Eisenhower said it made conventional ideas about...the traditional ideas about warfare, uh, absurd...ridiculous that, uh, you do not use weapons of such destruction to accomplish, uh, political ends. They are too destructive for that purpose. So you have to think in, in both of those terms. Now, it turns out that because of the timing of the thing that had the thermonuclear weapon not come along then I think you would've had, uh, a um, a, a uh, conceivable combination of conventional forces and atomic forces that would be mi1itarally, uh, would make military sense in Europe for, uh, deterrent purposes but because the deterrent finally has to rest on a capability for defense. That would be part....that, uhhh, would be really then the basis for, uh, uhhh, your deterrence and, uh, and defense. But when the thermonuclear weapon, uh, came along I think it changed the, uh. ...it changed the whole picture in, uh, quite a fundamental way. And you had then to reassess. Uh, and it was at that point then that....and I think rightly interest began to arise in the so called flexible response insofar as as operations in Europe were concerned with the idea that that then would be backed by the strategic capability, uh, primarily of the United States.

European confidence in US nuclear protection

Interviewer

I'd like to continue that thought we were having earlier...the discussion. In a sense it's always seemed to me that when people like General Galwell or General Richardson actually take a very hard line against flexible response. They have the kernel of a very good argument there in a sense surely what flexible response does try to do is try to have both options open....both a conventional response and a nuclear response. And the argument is that you can't have that 'cause you just get confused...it doesn't work in the end. How would you really answer those criticisms to that?

Goodpaster

I don't think that you have to made a hard and fast choice between, uh, flexible response on the one hand and uh, eh, an immediate and certain use of nuclear weapons on the other...And I think it...uh, you are foreclosing options and foreclose a part of the deterrent if you do that. And I believe the price that you pay, uh, is too high. And what I mean by that is that when you think about the deterrent you want to be sure that, uh, uh, you don't offer to, uh, an analyst on the other side or a decision maker on the other side a notion even though it's a mistaken notion that he can somehow crowd you into a decision between all or nothing. Uh, in other words, that uh, unless you're prepared to bring on the holocaust there's nothing you can do about it. I think that having, uh, a lesser option is a very useful contribution. Now I don't say there's no weight to the argument, and uh, my friends', uh, uh, Galwell and Richardson have explained this to me and I've discussed it with them. They incidentally participated with me in that study group that I mentioned, uh, was operated in the early, uh, period, uh, of, uh, SHAPE. And I respect their views but I do believe that, uh, the idea of immediate and automatic reliance on the nuclear weapon, uh, with the idea that that, uh, uh, somehow gives added validity to the nuclear deterrent. Uh, uh, I believe that, uh, you, you pay too high a price. You lose part of your option in presenting to the other side, um, a clear idea that, uh, uh, he would, uh, not be able to, uh, take action by threat or by limited military action that would, uh, uh, through keeping you, um, uh, forcing you to the choice of all or nothing and, and finding you reluctant to resort to all.

Interviewer

If you look at some of the...if you talk to some of the people involved in planning for the royal air force in the British forces very early on...by 1954 it became quite...there was already the feeling that it would be no longer possible to rely on the umbrella the safety of the United States nuclear umbrella. And this was one of the justifications for continuing with an independent atomic force for the British. how much were those increasing concerns about the US reliability in Europe on Eisenhower's mind, and do you think that he addressed himself to those problems?

Goodpaster

Eisenhower really had no doubt that if there were to be an aggression from the East, the United States would have no choice but to be fully involved. And his view that this would automatically be full scale...large scale, uh, conflict. And that meant that you would, uh, put into use everything that you had. Uh, those were his views and as a result I don't think he had any, uh, notion that, uh, uh, the United States, uh, could stand aside or that its weapons, uh, uh, could be, uh, uh, withheld. So, uh, that was, uh, not, uh, significantly on his mind. I would say that that became...you began to hear that from theoreticians and uh, and analysts, uh, uh, in, uh, Europe and from people who, uh, try to look at every worse case and see that, uh, they were not likely to be abandoned in a moment of threat. But insofar as Eisenhower was concerned that was a non issue.

Dwight Eisenhower and relations with Britain

Interviewer

You mentioned a little bit about how Eisenhower felt about General de Gaulle. But could you tell us how he dealt with Macmillan? What was his views of...how ....can you remember any anecdotes about their relationship?

Goodpaster

There was always a very warm feeling on Eisenhower's part toward Macmillan, and I think on Macmillan's part toward Eisenhower. And I recall, for example, when Eisenhower went out to, uh, Checkers that was some time after the Suez affair and uh, he and Macmillan and Lloyd, as I recall, each took a golf club and a golf ball and played themselves kind of an impromptu game of golf down the lane that leads into Checkers. And each of them would hit a ball and then go look for it and then work their way on down the, uh, on down the lane and back. He enjoyed that tremendously...remembered with warm regard...affectionate regard he would often say, his service with Macmillan in Algiers during the War...And that was a very difficult period for Eisenhower, and he was very appreciative of the advice, the insight, the uh, the uh, the experience and ability, and the assistance that he got from, uh, uh, Macmillan, uh, during that period. When, uh, it became apparent that the Suez thing had failed, and when it became apparent that Eden would not be able to stay in office, I think Eisenhower was very happy, uh, with the British choice of Macmillan because uh, he knew there could be a, a very full communication and, and an effort to work out the difficulties. So he welcomed that.

Interviewer

How would you sum up Eisenhower's attitude towards the development of the British atomic forces. Would you say that he was in balance in favor of seeing them develop?

Goodpaster

I think it was very clear that Eisenhower welcomed the development of the, uh, British atomic forces. He wanted to support that, uh, long before the change in the McMahon Act came about. He thought that Britain, in effect, uh, in Eisenhower's terms should shoulder part of the responsibility. And to shoulder that part of the responsibility implied and required that Britain also, uh, move into the era of, uh, uh, nuclear arms and nuclear capability. So, uh, uh, he thought it was inherent in the operations of the alliance and, in fact, wanted to extend the cooperation beyond Britain. But if he couldn't do it with others, uh, he was very intent on doing it with Britain. He thought we had an obligation to Britain going back to British participation in the nuclear development during the war.

Interviewer

Do you remember any debates in...it may be out of...you may not have been around at the time....certainly there was a visit from Sir John Schlesser and various other air vice marshals who brought what they had formulated... something called the global strategy paper. And they visited the people in strategic air command. Were you aware of that visit at all?

Goodpaster

I recall some visits, uh, by Sir John Schlesser and others. I think he came up with the idea of the so called broken back war. And that was talked about that you would have a nuclear exchange and then whatever the situation, uh, was after that time, uh, military operations would be continued to some kind of, uh, conclusion. Uh, I think there was a lot of discussion at the military level on those ideas. Eisenhower himself thought that this was so far beyond the experience of mankind and it, it, was so far beyond anything that could have a net value to either side, uh, that it was almost, uh, uh, it was a distraction... .it was uh, uh, almost a flight of imagination, uh, to think of the sensible conduct, uh, of war if I can use that term in involving exchanges of thermo-nuclear weapons. And that we should instead focus our attention on seeing that this war, uh, did not happen, strengthening the deterrent, strengthening the means of, uh, avoiding surprise or the fear of surprise on both sides.

Interviewer

One final question. You may have already answered it but let's see if you can answer it differently. When the German [Federal Republic] eventually was formed and Germany became part of the military operations within NATO, do you remember if that caused any serious problems in NATO's organization over targeting and over the Germany's desire to see increased emphasis on a forwards different strategy?

Goodpaster

We knew always that, uh, for the German's to come in and participate in NATO a new meaning would have to be given to the term "forward strategy". In some of the initial planning uh, we thought that the most forward that we could see ourselves defending would be the Rhine. But we knew that that would simply not be satisfactory to the Germans', and along with the German, uh, uh, capability, uh, the uh, introduction of the German forces came the possibility then of establishing a defense a good deal further, uh, uh, forward. Now parallel to this and course many things were going on at the, the same time, as the, as the years went along more and more the NATO, uh, headquarters....military headquarters were engaged in the nuclear planning. And that gave the German, uh, that made possible German participation and German understanding of just what was involved. I can tell you that not all problems have been resolved even today but we're a long way down the road of resolving common ideas, uh, and agreeing on preparations and what the capability should be that we present to any, uh, would be aggressor. And in that a very large measure of agreement has been reached. And that's one of the great achievements of the alliance, in my, in my view, that you could bring separate nations together to do something like this where they each get reassurance and confidence from the participation of the others and from their own role in working out the agreed arrangements. I think that's one of the great achievements of the alliance -- its tremendous value on the part of the alliance.