Dropping the Atomic Bomb on Japan
Informal Diplomacy with Nikita Khrushchev
Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy
Nikita Khrushchev, the man
Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Dropping the Atomic Bomb on Japan

Interviewer

Do you recall the day the bomb dropped and your reactions?

Cousins

I don't suppose that anyone who was alive on August the 6th, 1945 and old enough to look at a newspaper and read a headline will ever forget that day. Yes, I have a very vivid recollection of that day. I...I was living in Connecticut at the time, but I stayed late and so I stayed over at the home of my physician Dr. Hissig in New York City. And he had the <>Times</> delivered every morning. And I picked up the copy of the <>Times</> and there spread large was the headline about the atomic bomb being dropped on Hiroshima. Uh...I had been... at the time... at the time I was editing the magazine <>USA</> put out by the United States government for distribution overseas in a number of languages. And uh... we would receive government reports so we were following the development of new weapons technology very closely, but nothing had been said about an atomic bomb. And so I... I was completely taken by surprise. As I read the story the big question that occurred to me, inevitably was, How is it that we didn't have a demonstration of the power of the bomb before dropping it on human beings. That I didn't understand. Uh, the fact that we used this vast new power on human being uh, without issuing an ultimatum to Japan, which would then have the responsibility for making that decision, that... that fact was, to me, a devastating one. And I wondered about it at the time. And uh, it stayed with it... it stayed with me, especially when the president came on to make an announcement that he dropped the bomb because he wanted to avoid an invasion that would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives. And uh, I didn't see how this particular need uh, would not have been maintained or how ah, how this affected a test bombing because he still could have had a demonstration of the power of the bomb. And uh, if the power was as great on the test target, as it was on... on Hiroshima then uh, that would have said the same thing to the Japanese uh, with respect to an invasion. So I still didn't see how the argument about an invasion applied to a demonstration about the power of the bomb.

Interviewer

Do you recall the first day how you heard the first news and what your immediate gut reaction was?

Cousins

Well, my first awareness came in picking up a copy of the <>New York Times</>, and I stared at the headline. I must have read the headline four or five times before I went on to the news story. Uh, it uh, it was a tremendous shock. I don't think I felt elation. Uh, the big question that occurred to me was uh, how is it that we didn't demonstrate the power of the bomb before using it on human beings? That was my uh, dumb impression. That afternoon I spoke at the Waldorf Astoria before a group of businessmen -- found them all in a state of great elation over this. And I raised that question. I...I remember saying to them, yes uh, the war is drawing to an end, but I'm not sure that it was necessary to kill 100,000 or more human beings in order to bring this about. Uh, and then in the uh, months and years after the bomb, the bits and pieces began to come in about the decision to drop the bomb. Things that had not been told to the American people. One thing for example that had not been shared with the American people was that the United States was racing against a deadline with respect to ending the war. And that uh, a test demonstration would have used up valuable time. Well, what do we mean when we say, valuable time and what is the deadline? Uh, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed that the Soviet Union would come into the war on August the 15th, 1945. Uh, this had been agreed at Yalta where the date that had been set at that time was August 8th, 1945. But uh, at the time that date was set, which was at Yalta, Germany had not been defeated. Roosevelt was still alive. Uh, then when President Truman went to Potsdam in Germany to meet with uh, Premier Stalin the firm date uh, was fixed as August the 15th, 1945. But once we discovered -- and this was on July the 16th while, from the period of July the 16th through the 25th while Truman was at Potsdam at the approximate period at the end of the last 2 weeks in July. When Truman got word that the United States had successfully tested an atomic bomb at Alamogordo, suddenly things changed. Because now, we recognized that it would be possible to finish off Japan without the assistance of the Soviet Union. Now this may... the decision may have been justified. My point is that the American people were not told exactly what the situation was. We were given the impression that the bomb was necessary in order for it to avoid an invasion. We were not told that the reason for dropping the bomb was that we, having persuaded the Soviet Union to come into the war, we now discovered a way of ending a war without the help of the Soviet Union. Uh, I uh, I have been looking at the actual documents and there's some very interesting uh, there's some very -- we got some very interesting material here which demonstrates that the bomb was not necessary to win the war. Uh, for example, Truman's own journal which uh, was lost uh, as a matter of fact for a number of years because Charles Ross, the presidential secretary had borrowed uh, the papers and hadn't returned them. And so, they were missing. But they finally turned up. And in these papers we read from Truman's journal that... we read that Truman kept pressing Stalin for his specific plans on entering the war. But then uh, and in fact the moment that he had this unequivocal assurance, he wrote in his diary uh, on July the 17th. He said, Most of the big points are settled. -- reporting his conversation with Stalin. He'll be in the Jap war on August the 15th. Japan is finished when that comes about. Then the next day he wrote in his diary that he believed that Japan would fold just when it learned... at the point when it learned that the Soviet Union would come into the war. So there's no question about the fact that Truman believed that the war was going to end very soon. And that just the fact that the Soviet Union was coming into the war would be enough to get Japan to pull out. But now we... we find some other entries here. Uh, incidentally we find that in his entry of July 18th, 1945, the president gave additional evidence that Japan was ready to quit the war because he said that he'd received from Stalin a copy of a document uh, in which the attempt of the Soviet... the attempt of Japan to seek peace terms was revealed. Since the Soviet Union was not then at war with Japan, Japan wanted Moscow to use its good offices with Washington to ask for peace terms. Stalin gave Truman at Potsdam the cablegram -- the actual cablegram -- in which on the authority of the Emperor the Soviet Union was asked to inquire about peace terms. So it is not true to say, and this is the impression that President Truman gave the American people, that Japan was resolute on keeping... on continuing the war. And that only an invasion could have brought about Japan's defeat. Well, we have some additional information here. First that on hearing the news that the United States had an atomic bomb, President Truman wrote in his diary that the United States had an obligation to issue a warning about the existence of the bomb. His actual words were: Even if the Japs are savage, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, he wrote, We as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop the terrible bomb on the old capital anew. And then he wrote that he had issued uh, an order for a warning to Japan about the bomb asking them to surrender and save lives. Well, this was not done. Why was this not done? It was not done uh, because of the fact as I said that they wanted to get the war over with before the Soviet Union came in. A warning would have used up time. A test demonstration would have used up time. Now here we have James F. Byrnes, his testimony. Burn was secretary of state under Truman. He accompanied Truman to Potsdam. In an interview he gave on August the 15th uh, to <>US News and World Report</>, he answered a question. The question was: Did we want to drop the bomb as soon as possible in order to finish the war before Russia came in? Byrnes replied, Of course we were anxious to get the war over as soon as possible. But this was a rather equivocal answer and so the interviewer persisted. Was there a feeling of urgency to end the war in the Pacific before the Russians became too involved? Now at this point, Byrnes was unambiguous. Quote: We wanted to get through the Japanese phase of the war before the Russians came in., close quote. Now this was amplified in the diaries of James Forrestal uh, in which... who was then the secretary of the navy. In his uh, diaries he wrote, I talked with Byrnes now at Potsdam. Byrnes said he was most eager to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians came in. Close quote. Now we come to Leo Szilard the uh, famous physicist who was one of the prime sci... scientific figures in the development of the bomb. He had some conversations with Secretary Byrnes. And he repeated the same points that Byrnse had told <>US News and World Report,/i>. And then he added that he, Szilard, was told by Secretary Byrnes that he and President Truman, Byrnes and Truman believed the use of the bomb on a live target before the war was over was necessary to make an impression on the Russians and to make them more manageable in a post-war world. Now what about this question concerning Japan's military situation at that time. Was it true that uh, uh, Japan was going to fight to the bitter end making an invasion necessary. Let's look at the testimony of Admiral William D. Leahy who uh, was the military aid to the president and the uh, and who wrote uh, his memoirs under the title, <>I Was There</>. In these memoirs uh, Admiral Leahy wrote that all the evidence available to him indicated that Japan was on the verge of surrender even before the bomb was dropped. He, Leahy, said that he was opposed to the use of the bomb on human being both on military and moral grounds. I now quote from...from Leahy's memoirs. It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated, said Leahy, and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons. My own feeling is that in being the first to use the atomic bomb we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the dark ages, close quote. General Eisenhower. Eisenhower wrote that he shared Leahy's moral repugnance over the use of the bomb on a live target. Uh, in Eisenhower's book, <>Mandate the Change</>, we find his reaction on learning from Secretary of War Stimson about the fact that the bomb that we intended to use it. Quote. We now quote Eisenhower Due to Stimson's recitation of the relevant fact, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression. And so I voice... voiced to Stimson my grave misgivings. First on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary. Secondly, because I thought our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory to save American lives. George C. Marshall who was chief of staff. Marshall told the president he thought that we ought to have a demonstration bombing perhaps against a naval installation distant from a population settlement. Finally, what about the chiefs of staff themselves. In 1946, there was a publication published by the department the department of... War Department in what was called uh, Japan's Struggle to End the War issued by the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Even if the bomb, atomic bomb had not been dropped, the survey found -- I now quote -- ...air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need of an invasion certainly prior to the end, to the 31st of December, 1945. And in all probability prior to the first of November, 1945. We have other quotations here from uh, other military figures, but I think that... that the evidence is clear that we've tried to re-write history.

Interviewer

Can you start that again...

Cousins

The evidence is clear from other military sources that Japan was on the verge of surrender and that we have now been attempting to rewrite history in a way that makes it appear that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were absolutely necessary to win the war. I have been living very uneasily with this fact. For some years. I've been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I've carried out medical projects uh, in those cities. We have brought uh, people who have been maimed or injured by the bomb to the United States for plastic reconstructive surgery. We've also trained uh, Japanese doctors in uh, plastic reconstructive surgery. And I must say that when I visit the city as I did again recently and looked at the survivors, this weighs very heavily on me. Uh, in warfare we... we have to do terrible things. But as Admiral Leahy said, even in warfare you always have to ask yourself the question: are you taking life unnecessarily? Are you making responsible decisions? In this decision it was clear was more for the purpose... more for political purpose in making the Soviet Union more manageable in the post-war world than it was for the purpose of ending the war which the American people were told.

Informal Diplomacy with Nikita Khrushchev

Cousins

I suppose the question is, why bring this all up now? It's forty years later. What difference does it make? Well, I... I believe it does make a great deal of difference. I think it makes a great deal of difference in a democratic society when a government demonstrates that it does not use power responsibly. I think it creates bad habits in government. In any case, I don't think there's ever, ever any warrant for government lying to the American people. At least the basic theory under which this government was established was that the people could take the truth. But whether or not they could take it, they had the obligation to receive it. There's something else, and this has to do with how power's used. We live at a time when vast power is at the disposal of nations. If faulty decision making is involved we could touch off a series of hideous explosions. The same thing is true of the Russians. So I believe that it's precisely because the test of our time is not whether we can make power, but whether we can control power that it becomes necessary to face up to everything in our history. Even something 40 years ago that may have a bearing on our situation today.

Interviewer

What is the legacy of the bomb, the decision, for the people of the United States today?

Cousins

The decision to drop the bomb had an effect, I believe, not just on events at the time. Not just on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but did have an effect on the course of the post-war world. The scientists who made the bomb implored the president not to use it because they felt that once the bomb was used, our ability to set up world controls would be jeopardized. They felt too that our use of the bomb would set... would almost start an atomic armaments race. And so that decision to drop the bomb has significance, it seems to me, on almost everything that has happened since. But more than anything else it does have a bearing on the responsible use of power. Lord Acton said that power tends to corrupt. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. The big test in a democratic society is whether power placed in the hands -- great power placed in the hands of government can be responsibly used in the national interest.

Interviewer

1962, December. There were two meetings you had with Khrushchev...

Cousins

Did you see a book I wrote called the <>Improbable Triumvirate</>?

Interviewer

Yes. If you can combine those two meetings in this interview. And I'd like to ask you first of all what you think the impact of the missile crisis was on Khrushchev?

Cousins

In 1959 President Eisenhower asked me to go to the Soviet Union as a private citizen for the purpose of seeing whether it might be possible to create dialogues between well-informed citizens of both countries. The president felt that the diplomatic process needed to be strengthened between the two countries. He also felt that diplomats tended to dig in at a very early stage in negotiations uh, fearful that the slightest conciliatory attitude or statement might be regarded as weakness by the other side. But he felt that individual citizens could discuss important questions without penalty to either government. And then if they perceived that there might be daylight at the end of some tunnel, they could report back to the diplomats who then might start from an advanced position. And this was the beginning of what is now known as the Dartmouth Conference Series. It got its name because the first meeting was held at Dartmouth College in Hanover. But it's been held alternately in uh, both countries. And we've now been through 26 years of Dartmouth Conferences. Well they have had... they've been of some use to both governments. Uh, in 1962, October, uh, the Russians arrived to start a meeting with the Americans in Andover, in Massachusetts. And when we all arrived on uh,that Sunday night we tuned in and looked at President Kennedy on TV announcing that the United States was going to have a blockade of Soviet shipping uh, and the reason was because the presence of missiles on Cuban soil. Russian missiles. Uh, the gravity of the crisis was not lost on anyone as we started that meeting. As a matter of face the uh... we had to take a vote at the start to ask the Russians if they wanted to continue or whether they thought it'd be safer for them to go home. We'd put them on the next plane. But they said they would go on with the meeting if we would. And of course we were very eager to go on with the meeting. And uh, this uh... The meeting at Andover became something of a uh, minor uh, clearing house between both sides. For example, we got a message from Khrushchev uh, which we transmitted to the United States. Pope John XXIII uh, got in touch with us asking us to put questions to both sides as to whether they would welcome a statement by the Pope proposing that the United... that the Russians withdraw the uh, shipping and the United States withdraw the blockade. And this was communicated to both sides. Uh, Khrushchev said, Yes, he would remove the shipping. President Kennedy said that the uh... told us to relay Pope John XXIII his response which was that he was grateful for the intervention of the... of the Pope because he took very seriously the implications of the crisis at that time. And he felt that uh, all the help that was available should be brought to bear. But the issue, the president asked us to tell the Pope was not the shipping or the blockade. The issue was the missiles on Cuban soil. And the president said that if they don't come down by Saturday at 6 o'clock, we're going to have to knock them down. Well, all that week we met with the Russians trying to talk this out. We talked about many other things too. Uh, and then we all drove down from Andover in a bus. All together. We arrived at my home in Connecticut Uh, en route to New York at about 5:30 I guess it was uh, very close to the deadline. And then just as we walked in the house, there was the report over the radio that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle the missiles. And I need not tell you uh, of the mood of celebration that we were all in. But there... there was some aftermath of that which is that uh, the Pope was very eager to have his good friend, Bishop Cardinal Josyf Slipij, released from house arrest in the Ukraine. He had been interned ever since the end of the war. And uh, I was asked to go to the Kremlin for the purpose of putting the request to Khrushchev. Uh the... the reason that I was asked to it was because of the access that we had as a result of the Dartmouth Conference Series and also the fact that we had uh, been this liaison for the Pope during the week of the missile crisis. And so I went to uh, the Vatican first and uh, had a talk with the Pope. He was then I think 79. Was ill. Had cancer. But he was determined to use whatever days he might have on earth in order to create a situation of increased safety for all... all the human beings on earth. Uh, and uh he wanted... asked if I would communicate this to Khrushchev. And he also asked if we could get the distribution of bibles, holy bible, old testament and new in the Soviet Union. And then the request about Archbishop Slipij. I went to Moscow. Had a meeting in the Kremlin with the Mr. Khrushchev. We talked this out. He was not very enthusiastic about releasing Cardinal Slipij. He said that he knew about Cardinal Slipij since he, Khrushchev, was Ukrainian. And he said that uh... that the Archbishop had collaborated with Nazis in that period just before the end of the war. And I could point out to him that uh, what was described by collaboration by some was an attempt to save as many people as possible. But in any event, all that was now behind us. That it was 19 years earlier. And it would be uh, a very humane thing to release the cardinal. And then uh, Mr. Khrushchev turned to me and he said...he said...he said, I still don't know why should I do this? And so I just with uh, simplistic as it might sound, I said, Why, I think it's the... it'd be a decent thing to do. And he said, Oh. See once we lifted this out of the... out of the political... out of its political frame, and once we just put it on a moral level, he saw the point. And when I got back to the United States, I received a telephone call from uh, Ambassador Dobrynin uh, saying that he'd received a message from Khrushchev and that the archbishop was released and uh, asking about the methods of release. Where... where would they like the uh, Cardinal Slipij to be delivered. To Vienna or Rome or whatever. And uh, I got in touch with the Vatican which was very pleased of course. And the arrangements were made.

Interviewer

Let's move to the missile crisis business.

Cousins

The conversation with... with Premier Khrushchev about the missile crisis was fascinating. Uh Khrushchev was very somber as he spoke about it. He said that I get nightmares when I think how close we came. And suddenly he said, I had this terrible responsibility. Was I going to try to, out of pride, just to determine... just to demonstrate to the world that the Soviet Union could stand up to the United States? Was that decision going to result in the destruction of my country and your country? He said it was insanity. And uh, when the United States assured me that it had no intention to invade Cuba, there was no reason he said, for me to continue the blockade. And so he said, I was very happy to write to the president or send the message to the president that we were withdrawing the shipping. We would take down the missiles. Uh, the criticism of Khrushchev inside the Communist world for that decision uh was wide spread and very severe. When I returned to the Soviet Union the next spring for the purpose of uh, seeking the release from prison of another cardinal at the request of the Pope uh, Khrushchev invited me to accompany him to the uh, uh, meeting -- the congress meeting of... with representatives of the party from all over the country. And uh at that meeting it became clear that uh, Khrushchev was under attack because it cl... the claim by Albania and China was that the... he had knuckled under and that uh... he uh was afraid of a paper tiger. Had surrendered in effect to a paper tiger. He uh met that criticism by saying be... before the congress: Yes, he said, people will say this about me. But I'm not interested in uh taunts. I am interested in... in seeing this country go on. I'm interested in, if we can do it, to prevent a war. And that's what I think we ought to concentrate on and not try to make decisions just out of false pride. Uh at that uh... the second meeting with Khrushchev took place in uh Gagra on the Black Sea. He felt that uh, we would have a better opportunity to have sustained conversations at his retreat. At this meeting or the second meeting, President Kennedy had asked me to try to...

Interviewer

Can you start that again...

Cousins

Yes. The second meeting took place...

Interviewer

Start again, I'm sorry.

Cousins

The second meeting took place at Khrushchev's uh, retreat on the Black Sea. Uh he felt that uh, there was a better chance for uninterrupted conversation. My purpose in going on this trip was two fold. First to seek the uh, release again in behalf of the Pope of another cardinal who had been imprisoned behind the iron curtain, Cardinal Beran of Czechoslovakia. And the second purpose was to attempt in behalf of President Kennedy to clarify the situation with respect to the test ban. The uh... the negotiations were stalled because of uh, what the president said were misunderstandings about the American position on inspection. Khrushchev had claimed that uh, the United States had gone back on its word concerning the number of inspections that it wanted uh, but the main point that President Kennedy asked me to try to register with Khrushchev was that he, President Kennedy, was genuinely interested in reducing the tensions between both countries. And in uh, laying the basis for genuinely and work genuinely workable uh peaceful relationship between the two societies. Uh, when we met I thanked Khrushchev for the release of uh, Slipij. He uh, asked about the Pope. About the Pope's health. Uh, he conveyed his good wishes. And there's a rather interesting episode there. Uh, I'm going to have to move back chronologically now, because after I returned from the first visit to the Kremlin to seek the release of Cardinal Slipij and I reported to the Pope, he felt that uh, the situation looked promising. And so he gave me his personal medallion by way of thanking me. I said, No thanks necessary besides, I am not the one who's going to release uh, Cardinal Slipij, Khrushchev is. If you're going to give it to anyone, give it to Khrushchev. And he said, well, I've got two medallions. One I will give you and this is the one you will keep. Now he said, I will also give you another. And with this I will confer on you the power to award this to anyone in the world you think is deserving. You see, he said, the... the uh... holy father does not bestow awards on heads of state. But you have that authority now. And so through the diplomatic pouch I sent uh, uh Khrushchev his medallion. And now, when I saw him several months later at his retreat in the Black Sea he held it up and he said, You know, this has been very useful because when party functionaries come to see me I uh, play with it very ostentatiously hoping they will say, Nikita Sergeevich, what is that? And they if they don't ask me I contrive to let it fall and sometimes if I'm lucky it will fall on their toes. And then they will say, as I pick it up, what is this? And I will say, Oh nothing, just a medal from the Pope. He had a good sense of humor, but in any event uh, we did discuss the problem of the test ban. Uh...

Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy

Cousins

The reason that the negotiations over a nuclear test ban treaty had been stalled had to do with the matter of inspection. Uh, Khrushchev said that he was told that the United States wanted just three inspections. He felt that the United States didn't need any inspections as all; that it would be possible to monitor any explosions inside the Soviet Union from the borders of the Soviet Union. And therefore he was told by his advisors, he said, that the only purpose of American inspections was to get information which they couldn't get otherwise. But he said, it was important to have a test ban treaty. It was also more important to have general agreements with the United States which he believed in. He wanted to end the uh, Cold War. And so he persuaded the Central Committee of the Communist Party that uh... give them their inspections, he said. What are they going to find out. That uh, he said, so far as we're concerned the important thing is to get on with the treaty. So he said, we agreed with the three, but no sooner did we agree with the three than the United States asked for six. Well, I tried to point out to them that this had been a misunderstanding. And we kept going around and around on this. And he said, You know, he said, you sound like a broken record. You keep bringing up the fact that... the President Kennedy is acting in good faith. He said, I'm acting in good faith too. But the fact of the matter is that... that the United States has no desire really to do this and wants inspections for the purpose of military espionage. And uh, I uh at that point -- we were now well into the second day, I guess-- I packed my briefcase. Put all the papers in my briefcase and got up. And he said, What are you doing. I said, I'm going home. He said, Why are you doing that. I said, Well it's clear that I've failed and I am going home and I'm going to have to confess my failure to the president. I... I had hoped to be able to convince you that he was acting in good faith. And that the question is not whether it's three or six inspections. The question is whether we should start all over again. You and the president. And uh, without trying to find out what went wrong before. But apparently I failed in that and I'm going to have to go home and confess failure not just to the president, but to my wife and my daughters. He said, Please sit down. He said, You haven't failed. You know again that... that uh... that human touch. And uh, he'll say, We'll start all over again. All right. So I came back and told the president that uh, Khrushchev was willing to make a fresh go at this. And I also told the president about the sequence of events with respect to the six inspections and the three. And the president just held his head and he said, Gosh. I can understand exactly how he feels and how uh... and what that situation, situation is, but we'll make a fresh start. And they did and they won.

Interviewer

How did Khrushchev feel he stood with respect to the Central Committee at this point? Did you get the feeling from him that as a result of the missile crisis he was under some pressure?

Cousins

I have no direct information about Khrushchev's...

Interviewer

Could you start again?

Cousins

I have no direct information about Khrushchev's position with the party leadership. But he had moved so far and so fast in the direction of reforms and the direction of trying to open up the Soviet Union. And also in contesting the authority of the party that uh, his position became, I think, increasingly precarious. I also understand that at uh, some meetings of the Central Committee, he would chide uh, some of the older party members for uh, uh being old fashioned and dogmatic. And I don't think this sat well with them. But uh, what part this played in uh, his ouster I have no way of knowing.

Interviewer

Kennedy said to you at one point that his political position in the United States was in some ways similar to Khrushchev's political position.

Cousins

Khrushchev uh, would refer to the fact that his generals would come to him and say, We're responsible for the security of the Soviet Union and we have information that the United States is ahead of us in these particular weapon's development. And unless you give us more money, unless you enable us to proceed uh, the uh security of this country will be impaired. And the generals, as Khrushchev said, always come to us with their horror stories. When I reported this to President Kennedy, he said that's exactly what the generals tell me.

Interviewer

Were there other ways in which the two men were alike?

Cousins

I don't think that there was that... President Kennedy and Khrushchev had very much in common. I thought that uh, Khrushchev and Pope John on the other hand uh, had much more in common. As Khrushchev himself said, We both come of... of poor parents. He said, I come of peasant stock. And he said, I think the same thing is true of the Pope. Uh he said, we're fairly philosophical and I think we've got pretty good senses of humor. So I understand the Pope, he said, And I think the Pope understands me. But Kennedy, you see, came of this aristocratic background. Uh, very well educated. Very sophisticated. And I think that uh, Khrushchev uh tended to feel that uh he was a little out of place in... in a... or a little awkward in talking to Kennedy. But Kennedy, understanding this, went out of his way to uh, seem very accessible.

Interviewer

During that time you had conversations with both men, their feelings about nuclear weapons, nuclear war.

Cousins

Uh... both of them had.

Interviewer

Can you refer to their...

Cousins

Yes. However there was one thing that President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev did share. And this was a blazing awareness of the implications of nuclear warfare. And as uh, Khrushchev said, He didn't come to office for the purpose of uh, paraphrasing Churchill at one point -- for the purpose of presiding over the destruction of the Soviet Union. Uh President Kennedy uh, said these weapons represent a mandate to us; a mandate to find some other way to maintain our security, maintain our freedom. And we're going to do everything we possibly can to explore those other possibilities.

Interviewer

How much do you feel in your conversations with the two men the missile crisis experience pushed them towards the partial test ban.

Cousins

The... the impact of the missile crisis on President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev was much the same. But the experience of the missile crisis was somewhat different. Uh Khrushchev, I think, and some of the things he said made me feel that this was so -- Khrushchev followed his own council. Yes, he would speak to the military and to party leaders, but in the end uh, that decision was his. President Kennedy had constant uh, dialogue with the key members of administration and with the... his aids in the White House. Uh and uh, he was prepared to go all the way in nuclear war if the Soviet Union didn't take down those missiles. Khrushchev, I think, never really intended that the crisis would get that far. I think he was testing the United States. Uh, we had missiles in Turkey and it's a fair guess that he felt that he could use the Cuban missiles as the basis for a trade with the Soviet Union under which we would take the missiles down in Cuba and he would take the missiles down in Turkey. But uh, I think Khrushchev was uh, being rather strategic in playing this game, but to Kennedy it was not a political game at all. He was facing the ultimate and he knew it.

Interviewer

In terms of what the missile crisis meant for the men afterwards, do you think it moved them towards the test ban?

Cousins

The specific result of that week in October was to provide momentum that would carry the united States and the Soviet Union into ser... a series of agreements not just with respect to a test ban, but with respect to some resolution of the Berlin crisis and other sources of tensions between the two so.... societies. Uh... once Kennedy was able to get the missile crisis behind him he was determined never to let anything like that happen again. And so he uh... as he said to me, You tell Mr. Khrushchev that there's no one in either party who is more eager than I am to address all the problems confronting our two nations in the hope that this will never happen again.

Interviewer

You speak about the missile crisis as a kind of a watershed in both of their thinkings...

Cousins

It was a... the Cuban Missile Crisis was a watershed not just in the thinking of President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. Not just a watershed in their personal lives as well, which it was. But a historical watershed. But I'm very much afraid that today the meaning of that crisis and the blistering reality of it have been somewhat dimmed and uh, once again I think we are witnessing a uh... a test of nerve on both sides rather than a fundamental and common realization that... that uh both these countries are on the same lifeboat. And uh, we're not really meeting the threat represented by the Soviet Union by saying to them, We can drill a larger hole in our end of the lifeboat than you can drill a hole in yours. This sense that uh, of a common destiny I think is yet to become fundamental in the foreign policies of the government. Both governments.

Interviewer

Do you feel that the partial test ban was a great lost opportunity?

Cousins

The partial test ban, I think, was as far as was possible for the United States to go at that time considering the temper of Congress and considering the fact too that for a long time most of the mail of the Congress was against a test ban treaty. The partial test ban treaty enable the president to get the support of Senator Dodd who had been the principal opponent, a powerful one, against a treaty. And it had been the president's hope that we could follow up on the success of that partial test ban with a comprehensive test ban which would uh, extend to all forms of testing: on the ground, on the sea, or in the air.

Interviewer

In speaking to some of the others who were involved, they feel very sad now that that moment was lost. They both feel that there was a possibility, an opportunity there...

Cousins

Well, consid... considering the fact that we just squeaked through the Senate with that partial test ban treaty I don't think that one can say confidently that we missed an opportunity at that particular time. I do think, however, that we missed an opportunity in the months following the test ban treaty to come back with a wider uh ban, a complete ban. And certainly after the death of President Kennedy one might have been able to uh say that we will finish the job and as a tribute and a memorial to President Kennedy, we would propose the kind of treaty that he wanted very much and felt was in the American interest and the human interest. That was the opportunity that was missed at that time. I believe that President Johnson was in a position to do that which Wiesner and the others said might have been done earlier.

Interviewer

The American University speech -- obviously a very critical time. I know you had some role in that. We're interviewing Sorenson about that, Sorenson, so I don't really want you to deal with the speech itself. Did you get any sense of Khrushchev's reaction to or feeling about it.

Cousins

I did not uh, speak to him after the speech so I have no direct information about his attitude of the speech. We do how... however have some indication in the fact that the Soviet Union at the time was engaged in uh, rather serious negotiations with the Peoples Republic of China. Khrushchev's aim, his whole strategy, had been based on strengthening the Soviet Union in its relationship with the united States in order to free the Soviet Union for dealing with China. The problem with China was a very serious one from Khrushchev's point of view because China was demanding the return of vast territories seized from China during this... the period of the Czars. Uh, Khrushchev had no... Khrushchev had no intention to return those territories. Another problem was that China was seeking leadership of the Communist world. Uh, therefore these countries the two great Communist countries were on a collision course. Khrushchev's whole aim had been to effect a reconciliation with the West and in particular with the United States. And uh, that was why the resolution of the missile crisis was so important to him.

Interviewer

Kennedy made the American University speech at the same time, I understand, Khrushchev got a letter from the Chinese. You refer to this as a critical moment in history where the Soviet Union decided which way to go.

Cousins

Therefore, Khrushchev had this balancing act uh... If, in fact, it was not possible to have good relations with the United States, a modus operandi and perhaps modus vivendi uh, then he had to turn to China and swallow some bitter pills. Uh, and that was why a great deal was in the balance. President Kennedy realizing this, very dramatically made a breath taking peace offer, not just to the Soviet Union, but to the Soviet people and talked about uh, the long term aspirations of both peoples. And tried to restore some sense of... of sanity to the total picture. Now, for three days, President Kennedy's dramatic... dramatically outstretched hand was not reported to the Soviet people. Uh, Khrushchev was considering this letter from China which was conciliatory. And uh, one wondered which way he would turn. And then we got the indication of what his decision was because suddenly, after three days, the president's speech was not only broadcast uh, but rebroadcast, printed. And so the Soviet pe... people had uh, dramatic access to the president's offer. It did serve Khrushchev's purpose because that enabled him to uh... confirm that he was right in deciding that he would rather go with the United States. President Kennedy's dramatic, as I say, June 10, 19 uh, uh 63 speech did have that essential purpose. Serve that purpose.

Nikita Khrushchev, the man

Interviewer

What are your own thoughts about what was the greatest block to a comprehensive test ban? Some people say it was Khrushchev. Some people say it was Kennedy...

Cousins

We're talking about the situation as it existed in uh, June 1963...

Interviewer

Give us a sense of the mood of the United States.

Cousins

In the summer of 1963, the test ban debate was very much alive. And uh, the opponents of a test ban treaty, notably Edward Teller uh, the key figure in the development of the hydrogen bomb, was opposed to any test ban or to any limitation on our ability to explode these weapons or test these weapons. President Kennedy on the other hand felt that the security of the United States depended more on the control of force than on the pursuit of force. He was well aware of the... of the menace to this country represented by the arms race and the accidents that could trigger an explosion. He felt no particular obligation to those who were manufacturing the bombs or the scientists who wanted to make sure that... that their work could continue untrammeled. But Teller's trip across the country and his appearances on television had had their effect as did uh, many speeches and statements by Senator Dodd and others who uh, didn't want to cut into uh testing. But President Kennedy's appeal to the American people uh, began to take hold and the mail to Congress shifted. Where at one time uh, the mail to Congress had been 15 to 1 against the test ban treaty, now it turned uh, so that it was almost even. And at that point, the president felt justified proposing a treaty.

Interviewer

Can you give us a little more of a sense of what Khrushchev was like in these meetings with you. There are all sorts of myths and false impressions of the man.

Cousins

I had the... Before meeting Khrushchev I expected that I'd feel... I would uh, find someone who was dogmatic, bombastic uh, rather arrogant uh, short tempered. Instead I found someone who was incredibly polite. And uh, observed all the amenities far beyond, I thought, those that were necessary. For example, when I visited him at his uh, retreat in Gagra on the Black Sea, I found him standing in the uh col... cool weather -- very cool as a matter of fact -- uh waiting at the sentry gate outside to greet us, then discovered that he'd been waiting there 40 minutes. Our plane had been late, but uh, he didn't get that word. Uh then in talking to him if he would say something that... that uh I disagreed with, I would start to speak but not wanting to interrupt him, but he would interrupt himself. And he would say, [Podjalsta] please. And uh, he was extremely deferential. Uh, he was also rather formally dressed I thought for... for his retreat on the Black Sea. I was wearing a sweater and a uh, sports jacket at times and he had on the uh, his diplomatic clothing, gold cufflinks uh, and under his uh cuffs, I could see his winter underwear, long winter underwear. But his tie was immaculate. Uh beautifully knotted. Uh, he uh was very precise, very cordial as I say, almost deferential. Not what I expected. He was also very playful. And uh, I had been told that strategically if I brought my daughters with me that that would create a more responsive mood in the man. And it was right. He uh, was enchanted by uh, my daughters, then in their early teens. And uh, so it was more like a... a family talk between fathers even though I was a lot younger then than I.... than I am now. He invited me to play badminton with him. I uh was a little reluctant to do this because he was then 69 uh, and I was then uh, uh in my late 30s I guess. No I was a little older than that, I was in my 40s, early 40s. But we played badminton. I was amazed at his agility. And he really slammed the ball. Later when I uh, or the shot with the little bird. Later when I told President Kennedy about this he looked at me very sternly and he said, he said, I hope you let the old man win. I said, I... that I did. And it wasn't too much strain to do that either.

Interviewer

You took some great photographs. But can you just tell me about the circumstance of taking these pictures?

Cousins

Well, since I had my daughters with me, he decided to entertain them by uh, getting his great bear coat and then doing his magic act of disappearing inside the... the uh... the coat and then suddenly having his head pop out of it saying, Boo. This is the sort of thing I suppose that would have made an even stronger impression on my daughters had they been a lot younger. But even at that age it was rather delightful.

Interviewer

This is not the myth. This is not the image of Khrushchev as the highly emotional, banging his shoe on the table...

Cousins

Yes. The popular image of Khrushchev is of a -- in that uh, famous scene at the United Nations where he took off his shoe and pound.... pound the table. Uh, I'm not uh, sure that that wasn't done for effect. I'm not sure that that wasn't calculated. Uh, and it may be that uh, sometimes with... within the party itself he uh, would uh become bombastic. But there's also another side to him which is reserved uh, very polite uh, and also uh, in which he uses humor to great effect. When uh, he poured some vodka for me, I'd been told that that even though I don't... don't drink vodka that you've got to get it down because it's considered an insult. And so I very deftly uh, contrived to fill another vodka glass with water and uh, in the toast I poured that down. And he looked at me and uh, he said, This old dog knows all the tricks. And... and he said there was one other American who wouldn't drink vodka with me and that was Walter Reuther, the head of the Automobile Workers Union. And I said to him, Don't you drink, And Walter Reuther said, Mr. Chairman, come the revolution in the United States, I want to be the only labor leader who's sober. No I... I didn't drink the vodka and uh, I made my peace with Khrushchev uh, because of that fact.

Interviewer

There's a story you tell in your book which I'd like you to tell briefly if you could. About the feeling that in the United States at that time there was the feeling that Khrushchev is some sort of a dictator. And in fact he didn't have as much power in his party as many of us thought. And I think he said something to you to that effect.

Cousins

Khrushchev had to carry many of the liabilities of Stalin in terms of uh, the general impression of uh, the style of a... the head of the Soviet Union. But uh, his ambition, he said, was to be able to leave office in a natural way. Which meant uh, without uh, being shot. And uh, he did, but I... I doubt that the changes that he wanted to bring about were regarded highly by leaders of the Communist party at the time or the Central Committee. I think they felt that he was moving too fast. I think too that they felt that uh, Khrushchev had disadvantaged uh, the Soviet Union side of the uh, Communist world, Khrushchev on the other hand, felt that only as the Soviet Union freed itself from the fear that Stalin created would it be possible for the Soviet Union to become productive. And he felt that unless it could be productive uh, in terms of its agriculture and in terms of its industry it uh, would become... it would be in fact weak. The uh... to him, Khrushchev, Soviet strength was measured by productivity and not by the size of its army. And I don't think the army was too happy about this and I think that his personal style didn't sit too well with the party leaders and uh, uh when he was deposed uh, it was done with very little ceremony. And as you know, at the time of his death uh, uh there was a... the funeral service were nominal and uh, he has been backburnered ever since.

Interviewer

What did he say to you about his power and about the amount of control that he had in the Soviet Union?

Citizen Diplomacy

Cousins

He was concerned about the fact that the Soviet Union had not met its quotas in agriculture or in industry. And as he pondered this he realized that the reason for it was that there was so much fear among the people that uh, the country was paralyzed. And that was why he said he went before the uh, congress to try to get the... get Stalin expunged and to lift the fear of Stalin. And he said that he spent hours talking about the tyranny of Stalin and also about the fact that uh, uh many soldiers had died because of capricious decisions made by Stalin. He went into this in great detail. And he expected, he re... really expected that being able to tell the truth about that tyranny would somehow liberate the Russian people. Four months later he said, I was amazed that uh, there'd been very little change. And so he decided to go once again before the... before the party and the country. And this time he spoke for 4 1/2 hours I believe and went to great detail about uh, Stalin's uh insanity about the murder of the Kulaks, about the irresponsible decisions made during the war. Uh and then he hoped as a result of this speech that finally the Soviet people would be able to come out of that uh feeling of blind obedience and fear. Uh it was the kind of fear that... that made it impossible even for workers to put suggestions in suggestion boxes. Uh and... but the second speech before the party and the world apparently made not too much difference because he said, Despite those two talks, I now meet people who seriously think that Stalin was sane. So I think that he uh, was deeply disappointed. When I asked him I said, Well don't you think that it is in the na... nature of a dictatorship that... that people will be paralyzed and that just trying to... to... to expunge Stalin from their memories is not enough? Don't you think you have to move along the path of reforming institutions themselves. And he said something about, Interesting. He said, We can learn. We can even learn from you.

Interviewer

What. We're just going to wait for this plane...

Cousins

There's one other thing I'd like to say about...

Interviewer

Yeah.

Cousins

Uh, when we spoke about relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, I said, Mr. Chairman, You have to understand that so long as you say to the American people or the American country that we will bury you uh, you're not going to find that the... the people are going to be well disposed are you? And so he said, I run into that all the time. He said, I'm surprised that you should say that. He said, In the United States, when two friends have an argument, one may get a little angry and say Drop dead. That's not because he wants the other man to drop dead. Here in the Soviet Union we have a similar expression meaning that if two friends and one says that I... he was going to be proved right -- he said, I will bury you meaning that he will outlive the other man. He will live long enough to be proved right. He says, This is what I believe. I believe that the strength of our institutions and our ideas uh, is such that we will outlive you. But this doesn't mean that we're going to... to seize you and kill you and bury you. That's ridiculous. You've got a great society. And uh, uh your greatest days are still ahead of you.

Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer

Looking back on that time know do you feel has been learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis today in terms of the nuclear relationship?

Cousins

What the Cuban Missile Crisis taught just not the leaders of the countries but the peoples of both countries was that both had an ultimate responsibility not just to themselves, but to the world's peoples. And that whether they realized it or not, whether they liked it or not, they had the obligation to try and try and try again until the weapons were brought under control and until they... a workable basis was established to keeping the peace. Because ultimately it's not just the abolition of weapons that is important, but the abolition of war itself. This feeling, I think, was very much alive in the early 1960's. A new generation has come of age. And once again you hear the taunts on both sides. Once again you have bo... both sides talking about their readiness to march to the brink. Uh, I still entertain the hope that the United States will declare to be the fundamental objective or its foreign policy to eliminate the basic causes of war. And to try to create a rule of law among nations. Because so long as we live in the present condition of anarchy, all sorts of things can happen far beyond our calculations. Accidents with computers that could trigger a war. We don't seem quite to accept the reality of that particular danger. And so we've lost a great deal of that primitive feeling of urgency that we had in the... in the early 1960's on both sides to try to eliminate the anarchy in the relations between the societies. And to work out a method of living so that we would not feel that we were threatened and they would not feel that they were threatened. General MacArthur, I think, perhaps put it best when he said that both the United States and the Soviet Union have to learn that their greatest aim must not be to destroy each other. Their greatest aim must... must be to eliminate the frictions between both societies that can become the fuse... the fuse of a war that can destroy them both. I think that General MacArthur's speech before the American Legion in 1953, I believe it was, uh may be... may well be something that ought to be resurrected at this time.