American power after World War II
The creation of two Germanys
U.S.-Soviet Competition
Escalating military and arms competition
The end of the United States nuclear monopoly

The Birth of the Cold War

Interviewer

Andrei Andreyevich, did Stalin understand the importance of Truman's announcement in Potsdam that the USA had invented a nuclear weapon - the atomic bomb?

Gromyko

I remember that episode well. It happened on the eighth day of the Potsdam conference. Straight after the end of the plenum session Truman got up from his seat and came up to Stalin. The interpreter for our delegation, Pavlov, who was sitting next to him, also got up from his seat intending to leave the conference room. I was close to them along with some other- people who had participated in the meeting. Truman addressed Pavlov: "Could you please translate?" Stalin stopped and turned towards Truman. I noticed that Churchill had also stopped a few yards away from Truman. "I would like to make a confidential statement", said Truman, "The United States has created a new weapon of great destructive power." That's how he said it. Stalin listened to the translation. He understood what kind of weapon Truman was talking about and he said: "Thanks for the information." Truman stood for a while probably anticipating some kind of response from Stalin. But there wasn't any, Stalin calmly left the hall. Truman's face showed a certain bewilderment. He turned and went off in the other direction - towards the doors which led to the American delegation's working area. That's the visual picture I still have in my memory, having witnessed this. But as it turned out later, a lot of things happened before and after this event which were clearly related to it. It has been proved that Truman deliberately asked for the Potsdam conference to be postponed so that the nuclear weapon tests would be completed and the USA would be about to speak at the three-power summit from a position of strength. Truman sailed from America to Europe on board the cruiser "Augusto". While the cruiser was crossing the Atlantic he received regular coded messages from New Mexico. It was there, in that state, in the utmost secrecy that the preparations for the nuclear tests had been made. The telegram that he had been waiting for most eagerly arrived on July 18th the day after the opening of the Potsdam conference. The message contained the results of the test of the new bomb. On that same day he consulted Churchill as to what would be the best way to tell Stalin. As you can see, they wasted no time. Truman's plan to put pressure on his Soviet ally in the anti-Hitler coalition was coming to fruition, Truman's views were shared by Churchill, Immediately seeing the situation in the same light, they considered how to create the maximum impact on Stalin when he was told about the new weapon. This was their main concern at that moment. The political situation in those days was not simple. The war with Japan was still going on. The Soviet Union had, earlier, at the Yalta conference, taken upon itself the obligation to enter the war against Japan not later than three months after the end of the war with Germany, thus performing its duty as an ally and helping to bring the Second World War to a swift conclusion, Here I should say that earlier, at the Teheran conference, our allies had tried in various ways to incite the Soviet Union to start military operations against Japan as soon as possible. Stalin had replied: "Yes, the Soviet Union will be prepared to start operations against Japan. But first Germany must be defeated." Various possibilities were discussed as to how the Soviet allies were to be informed about the tests, It was decided that Stalin should be informed about the new weapon casually, incidentally, in passing, At the same time it was decided that no details should be given in the conversation with Stalin. This should be done only when the detailed report on the tests had been received. That's what was agreed by Truman and Churchill. A detailed report on the nuclear tests arrived on July 21st - but the president of the United States waited patiently for three more days. This was all part of his calculation. From July 21st onwards he started to speak out more assertively, He argued more with Stalin and expressed objections on issues which before had seemed not to trouble him. This was quite noticeable. Some of our comrades, not being aware of what had actually happened or of what had caused his manner to change, half-jokingly interpreted this in the following way (I was one of them, actually): this is the first time he (i.e. Truman) has met Stalin. He was cautious at the beginning but now he is showing his mettle. But the truth came out on June 24th - the day pf the conversation between Truman and Stalin with which I began my account. Later on, when Truman and Churchill discussed that episode, they came to the conclusion that Stalin probably hadn't attached any particular importance to the news about the tests. That was the conclusion. In actual fact the reverse was the case. Stalin decided to have word with Kurchatov, who was a scientist of international reputation and authority, about speeding up our own work in this field. He spoke to him and Kurchatov took this enquiry as a call for action. Soon after this, the first Soviet nuclear weapon was tested. But our weapons have never been used against human beings. This is a well-known fact. It is recorded in history. So Stalin understood Truman's message at Potsdam perfectly well.

Interviewer

But Andrei Andreyevich, the Americans exploded their bomb over the people of Hiroshima. At that moment, did the Soviet leaders take it as a threat to themselves, or did they welcome the use of the bomb?

Gromyko

The Soviet leader and the Soviet people as a whole condemned the nuclear bombing of Japan. I must restate this categorically: After the Potsdam conference had ended I came back to Moscow together with the Soviet delegation. This was at the beginning of August, 1945. And then the news of the nuclear raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki came through. If anyone today assesses the events of those days differently then they are distorting the facts. The Soviet Union not only did not welcome those attacks but also regarded them as criminal acts. I repeat these words - regarded them as a crime. From a military point of view there was no need whatsoever to use this weapon. The Soviet Army had, by then, practically defeated the Quantung army. In this the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to victory over Japan. Militaristic Japan was very close to capitulation. It was very close. Some unbiased people in the United States shared the same view. So in those days, as regard the nuclear bomb, the Soviet Union had a clear conscience. Not yet possessing this weapon, the Soviet Union saw clearly that it should not be used in war. It is a very well-known fact that the Soviet Union still holds this view today. I would like to finish my answer to this question by quoting Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachov. In his speech at the UN on December 7th 1988 he very accurately pointed out that the emergence of nuclear weapons underlines in a tragic way the fundamental character of charges taking place in the World. He also said - incidentally, I like these powerful words - "As a material symbol, the embodiment of absolute military power; it has revealed at the same time the absolute limitations of this power," These are precise and cogent words - and should not be forgotten.

Interviewer

Yes, that's true. Today many western historians and political scientists look back at a number of plans and suggestions made in those days. In particular the so-called Baruch plan is often mentioned. What were the Soviet Union's objections to these plans? What kind of objections were there?

Gromyko

This is, as we say, something that happened a long time ago. Baruch was an American multimillionaire who was a distinguished economist and statesman when Truman became president. Truman appointed this financier as US representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission. This Commission had been formed. Baruch was just the right man to implement the post-war policy of the American Administration. He and I met there at the Commission. By that time I was already the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations, I was also appointed as Soviet representative on this commission, There each of us defended the interests of his own country and we tried to find common ground. Admittedly, he was 77 and I was 37, But this didn't matter at all, At my age, a diplomat should be able to fight, to stand up for his nation, And, as a diplomat, Baruch was a bit of a hard nut - especially as his appointment to the Commission happened to be the last official post he ever held. He retired soon afterwards. He died at the age of 95. So - on June 14th, 1946 Bernard Baruch presented the UN Atomic Energy Commission with a plan which was immediately given his name. They just used to say "The Baruch Plan." As became clear later, Baruch certainly had a hand in the drawing up of this plan and gave his advice on it. But the whole plan was prepared by a special commission of the State Department under the leadership of Dean Acheson, the future secretary of state. By the way, this very commission headed by Acheson not only drew up the Baruch Plan but also the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as well as the materials which led to the subsequent formation of NATO. In other words the whole Package of American documents and initiatives which made possible the unfolding of the Cold War. The Baruch Plan, to describe it briefly, was designed to preserve the US monopoly in nuclear weapons. Many people in those days didn't fully comprehend the essence of this plan, but that was the fact of the matter. This was at that initial stage when nuclear weapons had just appeared, when the Soviet Union was not yet carrying out its own nuclear tests. But even at this early stage our country held the view that this weapon should never be used and should never be deployed. We demanded that it should be banned forever by strict international treaty, we were in favor of drawing up such a treaty. The US Administration emphasized that the USA also, allegedly, had noble intentions. Nuclear weapons should not be used, that's why they stressed the need to form a special international body which would exercise control over the use of nuclear energy. To the Soviet Union's query as to how the decisions of this organ would be reached came the following reply - that they would be determined by a majority vote of the member states of this body. It became clear that the whole idea was that decisions should be made so as to suit Washington because the USA then, in those days, had an automatic majority in the international organizations which had been formed - this has to be borne in mind - while the Soviet Union in these circumstances would have, been unable to protect its own interests.

Interviewer

Andrei Andreyevich, what was essentially different about the Soviet plan for this matter? We had a plan of our own.

Gromyko

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union demanded from the Commission a full ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons, In just the two years 1946 and 1947 we made several suggestions aimed at achieving a number of international agreements. I am not going to give you a list of them. There were many of these proposals. They were aimed at banning the production and use of nuclear weapons, at destroying the existing stocks and the weapons that were being produced. We wanted to create a system of strict control over all the installations which were extracting and producing nuclear materials and nuclear energy. So, even then the Soviet Union revealed the falsity of the allegation that it didn't want any effective control over the implementation of agreements supervising the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. But our state believed that the decisions should be arrived at by this organ in the same way as had been practiced in the security council of the U.N. - on the principle of unanimity of its five permanent members, Our proposals were categorically rejected. The United States was pursuing its policy of securing its own monopoly. Our lengthy meetings with Baruch and other American representatives where we tried to call their attention to the absurdity of the American stance on this matter didn't give any positive results, unfortunately, Baruch never avoided these discussions but always fell back on the fact that this wasn't his own position but the position of Washington. And he personally was not empowered to change it, this position of Washington, As if that made things easier for us. In December 1946 the United States, using this obedient voting system, managed to get through the main clauses of the Baruch Plan at the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. Thus they demonstrated that they were against a ban on nuclear weapons. I repeat - against a ban on nuclear weapons. The United States tried to impose the Baruch Plan on the Security Council and the General Assembly of the U.N. But in 1948 the plan was returned to the U.N. Atomic Energy commission for further consideration. It was returned to where it had been originally discussed. The plan could not have been imposed on us, The Soviet Union would have voted against it, And in 1949 on the insistence of the USA this Atomic Energy Commission ceased to function. That's how the fruitless Baruch Plan was buried.

Interviewer

Andrei Andreyevich, what do you think? Was there any opportunity to stop the arms race? Was any opportunity missed to stop the arms race before it started?

Gromyko

Yes, I think it was right then that an opportunity to stop the nuclear arms race was missed. It was missed before the arms race started. Probably it concerned not only nuclear weapons but conventional weapons too. It is clear from what I've said, who is responsible for the fact that this opportunity was missed. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Potsdam Conference was wound up by a speech from its chairman, then the President Truman, in which he expressed his hopes that the conference participants would meet again at the forthcoming peace conference. But, unfortunately, these were only words. Truman never again had a meeting with Stalin, neither he was going to take part in the peace conference. The policy of the United States changed. The nuclear weapon had created an illusion of strength, It made them believe that the Soviet Union was left far behind.In September 1945, in accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers took place in London. At this meeting, in the capacity of advisor to the secretary of state, was John Foster Dulles, whose name is well known. Even then there was an obvious hardening - a drastic hardening - of the Truman administration's foreign policy. Please note these events took place in September 1945. But on March the 5th 1946 Churchill made a speech at Fulton in which he called for the formation of an Anglo-American Military Alliance to fight against Eastern Communism, This speech was the open declaration of the Cold War which, as you can see had been building up for some time.

Interviewer

And yet there was the precedent of the cooperation of the great powers, the great nations. There was the idea of the big three. What was the reason, in your opinion, for the break-up of the big three that had come together during the war?

Gromyko

I would be careful with the term "broke up". It is true that a number of decisions taken by the three powers - for example the question of the Secretariat, still stand. And nobody has the power to abolish them. But it is also true, that the decisions taken by the big three at the Teheran Conference at... at Yalta and Potsdam were not fully implemented. The decisions of the three powers were broken by our allies, both during the war and in the post-war years. Of great importance was the breach of agreements on the German question and also on the questions of arms reductions, armed forces and disarmament. Of course, of all these the most important was the ban on nuclear weapons, as, I said before. As regards the German question, the policy of our Western allies first was aimed at breaking Germany, I would say, splitting up Germany into pieces. All the suggestions of the Soviet Union, that Germany should remain a single state, peaceful and democratic, first were declined under any possible pretext, and then were categorically rejected. The subject of the demilitarization of Germany was also swept aside. The policy of the Adenauer government is well known. This government established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union - but went no further than this. This government in fact performed the requiem of united Germany. I think that history will never forgive the position taken by the Adenauer Government, and the western countries which supported it. Though during the war these countries had fought alongside us against our common enemy, German fascism. A major factor in the disagreements among the three powers was the policy of our former allies of pushing on with the arms race and of maintaining numerous American bases on foreign soil - those bases a considerable number of which had been founded in the war years. In this connection, the Soviet Union presented a number of suggestions aimed at easing the tension in the world and liquidating these bases. Our initiatives were rejected, as a rule, out of hand - without serious discussion. This is a brief outline of what happened to the big three after the War.

Interviewer

And at the time when the Soviet Union was only planning - you know this better than anybody else - to create its own nuclear weapon, its first own atomic bomb, the United States was already creating its nuclear arsenal. How did we plan to respond to possible nuclear blackmail?

Gromyko

At the time when the United States began creating its nuclear arsenal the Soviet Union did everything it could to prevent the political use of nuclear blackmail. It proposed a number of suggestions with this in mind. The most effective means which would exclude that possibility was a permanent ban on nuclear weapons and the resolution of the question of the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union made this proposal and continuously insisted on its acceptance, as I have already said. But that proposal was turned down by our allies. And it was only due to this, only because of this, that the Soviet Union was forced to step up its efforts to produce its own nuclear weapons - which did in fact come into being. But not in 7 years, as American experts had asserted, but in 1949 - only four years after the appearance of the first nuclear bomb in the United States.

Interviewer

Now we had our own nuclear bomb and nuclear weapons. Did this fact have a considerable effect on our relations with the United States and its allies in those days?

Gromyko

The Soviet Union created its own nuclear weapons in response to the American challenge. After creating them our country continued to fight for nuclear disarmament, for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons for military purposes. Even before producing its own nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union had warned the United States and its allies that the American monopoly in nuclear weapons could not be sustained for long. And that is how it turned out. Of course, in that situation the first Soviet atomic bomb tests didn't promote a better relationship between the Soviet Union and western powers. That's obvious. But it would have been much worse if the Soviet Union hadn't had its own nuclear bomb. Above all, the Soviet Union would have been in a worse situation.

Interviewer

Nevertheless some confrontations took place. We are talking now whether there were any alternatives to them. For example, was there any alternative to the confrontation over Berlin, which would have allowed the Soviet Union to preserve its legitimate security interests in Europe at that time?

Gromyko

Yes, the Soviet Union made a number of alternative suggestions as regards the Berlin question. Had they been adopted our country would have been in a position to protect our legitimate security interests in Europe. Besides, it would have protected the interests of the Germans themselves as regards both the GDR and the FRG. In particular I am talking about giving Berlin the status of free city. Today this point is not very often mentioned, but such a suggestion was made. But our partners in the negotiations turned down this Soviet proposal, more exactly they rejected it. After lengthy and complex diplomatic contacts, exchanges of views, etc. it was only in 1971 that the four-power agreement on West Berlin was signed. Its participants, the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, drew up the agreement on the basis of agreements and decisions dating back to the war and post-war period. The four powers made a joint declaration to the effect that they would strive to ease tension and prevent any complications from arising over West Berlin. In this area, they emphasized, there should be no use of force or threat of force. As regards the legal status of the town, it was affirmed that West Berlin does not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany, and does not come under its jurisdiction. I especially emphasize these words: It is not a part or a dependency of the FRG. But this act, by which I mean the four-power agreement, the Soviet Union protected its legitimate security interests in Europe and the Berlin region. It fell to me to sign this important agreement which is in force at present.

Interviewer

You know, Andrei Andreyevich we recall such phrases as the Baruch Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the meaning of which today is only remembered in broad outline and there arises a question about directive number 68 of the National Security council of USA which marked a tremendous shift in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and in American attitudes to war. What was the reaction of the Soviet Union to this?

Gromyko

First of all I would like to clarify the question. We are talking about US National Security Council directive number 68. This clarification is essential. It was issued as a secret document and was circulated only within a very small circle of top officials in the government and the Pentagon. Two conclusions follow from this fact. First of all, the shift in the views on war - a shift could only occur in the case of those people who had had access to this directive, and not in the USA as a whole. The attitude of the general American public towards was is well known - it is an active non-acceptance, a rejection of war - an active nonacceptance, a rejection. A struggle to prevent war. And secondly, the Soviet Union could only have reacted to the document if it had been known to the Soviet Union. This US document was only made public 25 years later, in other words in 1975. So, the Soviet Union could only react to this document after 1975. But the fact that changes were taking place in the foreign policy of the USA - we felt that from 1951. You couldn't fail to notice the changes. So, what kind of a directive was it? It was an exposition of a doctrine of intimidation. It was a kind of guide to a new school of US military thought at a certain moment in history. The main idea of the doctrine, as presented by its authors, was to exert pressure on the Soviet Union - from all sides - to exert pressure on the Soviet Union from all sides. To force it to retreat on all fronts - political, ideological, economic and spiritual. It was essential also to influence the internal processes in the Soviet Union so as to cause the collapse of the Socialist system that was the aim. The directive pointed out that there was no need to avoid discussions with the Russians, otherwise the western countries wouldn't understand the Americans. So negotiations should be continued. But in such a way that nothing would come of them. Not to sign any agreements, not to take any joint decisions on the central issues. So here it is - their strategy and their tactics. Even without being aware of this directive one could guess that the strategic policy of the USA towards the Soviet Union had changed. And of course our country felt that. We were drawn into the Cold War. And we had to take reciprocal measures. I repeat, we were forced to take reciprocal measures. After the A-bomb, the H-bomb followed. Then they were followed by ever new types of missile. And when directive number 68 was published 25 years later, this was altogether a different era. Relations between the USA and the Soviet Union became more relaxed. During these years some important agreements were signed. Especially I would like to mention the agreement on the limitation of strategic arms - known as the SALT I agreement - and the agreement on anti-missile defense known as the ABM treaty. Lately much as been said and written about this and the discussion is still going on. Directive number 68 has already been studied by historians. An historian and a political scientist from the GDR - Greiner and Steinhaus - devoted a whole book to this document. The book naturally provides thorough analysis of all the doctrines of intimidation and of the directive itself, Soviet academics have also sharply criticized it - and this is a just evaluation.

Interviewer

At the time that you are talking about, at the end of the forties - a turning point in history - a war was fought not far from the border of the Soviet Union. A war flared up, there was a conflict on the Korean peninsula. Did the Korean conflict cause any shift in the Soviet attitude towards war?

Gromyko

The main lesson that we drew from the Korean war was the following: not only major wars but also lesser wars and even minor wars show that we must do all we can to make sure that any kind of disagreement in our times is resolved by means of negotiation - and not by the clash of arms. The Soviet Union at that time considered, and still considers, that the Korean people wishes to live in a single peaceful, democratic state. As for South Korea, it was turned into a nuclear base against the wishes of the people, without the consent of the people. Such a situation clearly does not accord with modern international law, or with the interests of peace especially in the Far East.

Interviewer

In the West they like to say that... Sorry

Gromyko

We consider that the policy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic was realistic. That's our view. I think that everything that happened subsequently confirms the correctness of this view.

Interviewer

I jumped in with that question because in the west people like to make much of occasions at that time and later, when Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev especially is supposed to have exaggerated the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. What do you think? Was it really the case? And if so, for what purpose did Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev exaggerate Soviet nuclear capability?

Gromyko

I don't quite see what you mean - which of Khrushchev's statements you have in mind. I was present at the session of the UN General Assembly in New York when Khrushchev said that now nuclear missiles had been brought to such an awesome degree of accuracy that with them we could shoot down flies high above the Earth. It is clear that thus was simply an imaginative way of expressing an idea. It is quite possible that such a comparison seemed frivolous to some. That's what I think it was - frivolous. Let's not argue. His message was clear to everyone at that time. It is clear now, too. I personally don't know of any statements or remarks made by Khushchev which exaggerated Soviet nuclear capability. And if he ever let slip any such remarks which could be seen in that light, they were only said in the heat of the moment - only to parry the arguments of certain western politicians. An actual speech may differ from the edited version which is published. Well, this is a well-known fact. Krushchev was an emotional person. He understood very well that in the heat of discussion even a leading politician can sometimes get carried away. That's why he called for realistic and sober judgments, especially in those cases where nuclear weapons were being discussed.

Interviewer

Now, Andrei Andreyevich, you have suggested how we should view discussions of what Khrushchev is alleged to have said about our expansion of nuclear might. But in the 1950s, nevertheless, there was a real and rapid build-up of American tactical nuclear weaponry in Europe. How did the Soviet Union evaluate this?

Gromyko

I would like to keep my answer to this question brief. As it turned out later, the United States was thereby implementing directive number 68 of the US National Security Council, of which we have already spoken, where the doctrine of containment. The rapid multiplication of missiles with nuclear warheads, those which are called tactical nuclear weapons, was viewed extremely negatively by the Soviet Union. This was one of the manifestations of the arms race.

Interviewer

That's right, it is just over a quarter of a century since the so-called Nuclear Crisis, or the Caribbean Crisis - there are various names for it. People in the west often ask nowadays why the Soviet Union at that moment decided to deploy its missiles in Cuba. Was it done with a specific purpose of which you know? Or was the possible reaction of the United States misjudged?

Gromyko

The Soviet Union has given explanations of its position - more than once. I can only repeat them. It was 1962. A year before that the Cubans had defeated the bands of American mercenaries who had landed at the Bay of Pigs. The United States had tried to prevent the establishment of a socialist system in Cuba and to undermine Soviet-Cuban cooperation. Their aims are documented for all to read. The defeat of these interventionists did not stop certain circles in America and the threat to Cuba was growing. In these circumstances sensing the danger of an attack on the island of freedom the Cuban government, in the summer of 1962, turned to the Soviet Union for help. That was the moment when the two countries agreed on a number of measures aimed at strengthening Cuba's defensive capability, including the deployment of missiles - exclusively for defensive purposes. What was the United States' reaction to this? What was it? It is well known. It was accompanied by the threat of an assault on Cuba by the American army. At the beginning of September 1962 the Soviet Union called upon the US government to see reason, not to lose self-control and to make a sober evaluation the possible consequences of its actions, if it resorted to the use of force. Our country acted responsibly, fully aware of the responsibilities which bind the superpowers as regards the existing situation and the possible consequences of any hasty action. The American government, however, ignored the Soviet appeal and continued to build up the tension. I must say that that American reaction did not come as a surprise to the Soviet Union. The main facts are well known. It is hardly necessary to go through them again.

Interviewer

Andre Andreyevich, on October 18th 1962 you met the then president of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Could you tell us something about that meeting?

Gromyko

I am not surprised that you have asked me this question. On that day in October acting on the instructions of the Soviet leadership, I spoke to President Kennedy in the White House. Naturally, we discussed Cuba. I raised the question of Cuba on my own initiative and explained the Soviet position to the President. "I would draw your attention," I said, "to the dangerous developments caused by the American attitude towards Cuba." The President listened attentively. "For a long time," I continued, "America has been conducting an unrestrained campaign against Cuba. It is attempting to cut off Cuba's trade with other countries. It threatens Cuba with aggression. Such a policy could lead to grave consequences, which we believe, no nation - including America - wants." Kennedy replied that the present regime in Cuba did not suit the United States. If there were a different government there, the United States' attitude would be different. I noticed that this was said sharply. "But," I said "on what basis does the American leadership assume that the Cubans ought to order their internal affairs, not according to their own judgment, but as Washington thinks fit? Cuba belongs to the Cuban people. Neither the USA nor any other power has any right to interfere in its internal affairs. Statements that we hear from the president and other spokesmen to the effect that Cuba allegedly, threatens the security of the USA, are unfounded. It is enough just to compare the size and resources 0f the two countries - a giant and a midget - for the groundlessness of the accusations against Cuba to become obvious." Then I emphasized the fact that the Cuban leadership, and Fidel Castro personally, had on many occasions announced to the whole world that Cuba had no intention of imposing its system on anyone else, that they are firmly against any interference by states in each other's internal affairs.

The American Presidents

Gromyko

It seeks to resolve all points of contention with the United States by means of negotiation. Those declarations, as is known, are reinforced by deeds. Those who call for aggression against Cuba claim that they do not find the Cuban government's statement sufficient. But this may be said of everything, this way every aggression may be justified. Any aggressive action, against any country. It is enough but to say, "we do not agree to this." When the United States takes hostile action against Cuba, and at the same time also against the states which maintain good relations with it, respect its independence and assist it in its hour of need, the Soviet Union will not assume the role of a bystander. This was said. Yes. Kennedy asserted that the US administration had no plans to attack Cuba, and that the Soviet Union could assume that no threat to Cuba existed on the part of the United States. At this time, he made an important admission: the Bay of Pigs action was a mistake. He, as president, stated that he was restraining those circles that supported an invasion. That he was restraining those circles. While he himself seeks not to allow actions that might lead to war. The Cuban question became really serious. Nevertheless, Kennedy further interpreted events as if the situation was aggravated by the actions of the Soviet Union, which supplied Cuba with offensive weapons. Then the president read out an official statement - he just held it up and read it out - on the Cuban question, justifying the US decision to impose a blockade around Cuba. I had to say again, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet Union was calling on the US Government, and the president personally, not to allow any steps incompatible with the interests of peace, with the principles of the UN Charter. In the course of our discussions Kennedy, despite allegations which circulated in the west, never raised the question of presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba; I repeat, he never mentioned it, thus, I didn't have to give a direct reply as to whether there were such weapons in Cuba or not. At the same time, I explained to the president that Soviet help was aimed exclusively at strengthening its defense capability and the development of a peaceful economy in this country. The training of Cubans in the use of arms intended for defense by Soviet specialists could not be evaluated as a threat to anybody. The Soviet Union responded to Cuba's request for help because the request was aimed at eliminating the danger hanging over the country. At the conclusion of our meeting I said: "Mr. President, allow me to express the hope that the United States is now fully aware of the position of the Soviet Union as regards Cuba and of our evaluation of US actions towards this country." The discussion with Kennedy of the Cuban question was full - how can I put it more exactly - full of sharp turns, zigzags, if I may say so. He was clearly nervous, though outwardly he tried not to betray it. He made contradictory statements. Threats towards Cuba were followed by assertions that Washington didn't have any plans for an assault on Cuba. This last statement, that Washington didn't have any invasion plans, this last statement is certainly significant, and was assessed as such then by me and by the Soviet leadership after my report. Common sense prevailed with the head of the White House. It shows that behind the appearance of a man who slightly lost his balance was a statesman of outstanding intellect. I would like to say this explicitly. He was a man of outstanding intellect and character. Our discussion was a long one, I only render the gist of what was said by each side on the most critical question, that of Cuba. Otherwise I would go on too long. This was probably the most difficult meeting that I ever experienced in all my 48 years of meeting presidents of the United States in various circumstances. Maybe not such a long period of time!

Interviewer

It is a period long enough for you to know this topic thoroughly. But you knew what was happening in Washington, their moods etc. And what was the mood in Moscow as the Caribbean crisis developed?

Gromyko

Mood? This is not exactly a suitable word. Sometimes it suits and sometimes it doesn't when you want to describe the attitude of the leaders of the country and of the people as a whole in that situation towards the Cuban question. No doubt the situation was highly tense. I must admit this. It was. People watched with great interest and listened attentively to what was taking place. All rumors and news concerning the Caribbean crisis were weighed on invisible scales. Of course, the leaders of the country had much more solid information. Everybody wished the situation were more relaxed as regards this question. It was widely known that both in Washington and in Moscow serious consideration was being given to the question of how to get out of this situation, Both capitals, no doubt knew what it meant to resort to extreme measures over Cuba. Though there were hotheads in the United States and emotions prevailed over common sense in the case of some politicians. But as a whole, the American public was aware of the consequences that would follow if extreme measures were taken, i.e. if nuclear weapons were used, I must say that that was true of the general public. When President Kennedy announced that the United States was not going to invade Cuba, as I've already mentioned, the possibility of an agreement opened up. And it became even more definite when the United States let it be known that it intended to lift its blockade from Cuba, and besides that, that it was prepared to remove its own missiles from the territory of Turkey When people talk about the Caribbean Sea and about the Cuban question of those days this point about Turkey is sometimes forgotten. But in the agreement that was reached, this undertaking was included, The United States committed itself to the removal of its missiles from the territory of Turkey. On many occasions the Soviet representatives in those days and in following years have been asked by politicians of various countries whether at that moment there was a threat of nuclear war. Today I would say this - the situation contained a certain degree of risk, but there was no real threat of the unleashing of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States, I have solid grounds for this statement. President Kennedy and his administration kept their promise not to invade Cuba. The development of Cuba took its own course - the course of an independent, sovereign state, where people decide for themselves what regime should rule their country. This is a peaceful state, friendship with which we value highly. And not only our country but many other states in the world.

Interviewer

Andrei Andreyevich, with all your experience to look back on, what do you think? Which lessons can we learn today from the Cuban crisis?

Gromyko

We should learn one lesson. Nobody, no state, should impose on any country, regardless of its size and population, a regime which is not acceptable to its people. In other words there should be no interference in any country's internal affairs. The Soviet Union in its policy towards other countries is strictly guided by the Leninist principle. Both sides at that moment did the right thing, they exercised restraint. The whole confrontation between the USA and the USSR over the Cuban question, in my opinion, even today demonstrates to the great powers the necessity to seek for mutually acceptable peaceful solutions in all situations, however complicated and critical these situations may seem. I would like to point out with some satisfaction that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev has referred to this principle many times when he has had meetings with the US president and leaders of other states. This constitutes a new principle in international affairs.

Interviewer

Andrei Andreyevich, while pressing forward with our peaceful policy you have met many of the leaders who have shaped the foreign policy of the United States. One of them, Henry Kissinger, believed and still believes that arms control should be linked to other aspects of foreign policy. What is the view of the Soviet Union on this matter?

Gromyko

It is true that the problem of arms control and the problem of disarmament are connected with other areas of foreign policy. We can't deny this. But how can we understand this connection? It can be understood in the following way: that the problem of arms control and the problem of disarmament have to be solved independently, with no attempt to link them with negotiations on other questions of foreign policy. It also could be interpreted in this way - that you can't make progress on disarmament without at the same time, resolving other foreign policy problems. The latter view is contrived. More than once Henry Kissinger in the course of our meetings asserted that it is difficult and even impossible to pursue any consistent line in foreign policy if there is no agreement on other important issues. He referred to the policy of Metternich as a good model for the conduct of foreign affairs, he went as far as that, to the Foreign Minister, later the Chancellor, of the Austrian Empire. However, Kissinger, although a man of great abilities - I have already had occasion to comment on this - lost sight of an essential fact - Metternich, by his policy rather assisted the collapse of the bloated Austrian Empire than its consolidation. In our opinion this fact can't be disputed. This is an objective historical fact. It can't be denied.

Interviewer

You know, there have been many negotiations, many aspects of these negotiations, there is one, well, particular case - why did the Soviet Union, as many people now write in the west, object to the ban on missiles with multiple warheads which was proposed at the SALT I talks?

Gromyko

The Soviet Union objected to this for one simple reason. The USA already had these missiles but we didn't have them. The United States was trying to consolidate its monopoly and they proposed banning the production of these missiles. While still having the existing missiles in their possession. The situation in connection with this problem turned out to be similar to that when the United States tried in actual fact to retain its monopoly in nuclear weapons, I've already talked about this.

Interviewer

Here is one more of those questions often asked in the west. To what extent did the visit of President Nixon to China influence the Soviet Union to sign the SALT treaty?

Gromyko

AS far as I know Nixon's visit to China didn't have any immediate effect on the signing of the USSR-USA treaty on the limitation of strategic arms. I can't say anything else on this matter.

Interviewer

These are questions which tend to be taken over-seriously and are often asked in the west. Among them there is another one; to what extent did the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the port of Haiphong affect or threaten the SALT treaty?

Gromyko

Of course, the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the port of Haiphong, which were carried out by the armed forces of the USA, to a certain degree created difficulties in the process of signing the agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. These American actions complicated the drafting of the SALT treaty. But nevertheless, in the course of the Soviet-American Summit meetings in May 1972 the SALT I treaty was signed.

Interviewer

In the west there is a vast number of published memoirs and articles on the details of international negotiations, in particular you hear quite often that in Moscow on the eve of the signing of the treaty you were engaged in negotiations with Henry Kissinger until midnight. What were these problems which turned out to be so difficult to solve?

Gromyko

It is not nice to be engaged in negotiations at night, you should get some rest at night - not at some other time. The question contains a hint that there must have been some unresolved problems as regards the agreement itself, and that they had to be resolved on the very last day, even in the very, last hours. No, that was not the case. The treaty had been finalized and was presented for signing. I myself, and the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Leonid Vasilievich Smirnov, were engaged in talks with Kissinger and his advisers about the interpretation of certain clauses of the treaty. I emphasize that - about the interpretation of certain clauses of the treaty. I repeat, there was no disagreement on the main issues then. We reached mutual understanding as regards the interpretation of the articles of the treaty. And the loose ends were tied up... And the next day it was signed.

Interviewer

As you can see, Andrei Andreyevich, a lot of this derives from the existing memoirs of statesmen and certain interpretations of well-known situations. Henry Kissinger, in particular, claims that both of you drew up identical directives for your delegations in Helsinki. Could you also tell us about that?

Gromyko

I gather that you are referring to the directives to the delegations in connection with the completion of the General European Conference on Security and Collaboration in Europe and the signing of its main document - the declaration -which took place in Helsinki. We then were working on our own directives and the United States of America, Kissinger, its own. The main objectives of both countries were similar at that stage. It was necessary to make the maximum effort so as to complete the Helsinki meeting and to sign the documents. But it doesn't mean that our positions coincided completely on all matters. Differences of opinion on some questions remained. In particular, this was the case over human rights. But in principle our directives were similar. The final Helsinki document was then and is today of great importance. One can say without exaggeration that this document is one of the major pages in the post-war history of Europe. It was designed to confirm the outcome of the second world War - first of all with regard to the political map of Europe, I would like to underline this point.

Interviewer

In any case, there is an opinion in the west that, concessions made by one side are, as a rule, requests for concessions from the other side. And that's why nowadays many people in the west ask whether the Soviet Union was taken by surprise when the Carter administration didn't use the cancellation of the well-publicized B-1 bomber as a bargaining counter in the arms reduction talks that were held at that time. This is the Carter Administration, so we are talking about a time which is nearer to us.

Gromyko

Nearer to us. No. The Soviet Union wasn't at all surprised by this. Though we knew that production of the B-1 bomber in the United States had been halted. And why should the Carter administration use its own unilateral decision as a bargaining point in international negotiations?

Interviewer

So, sometimes we recognize decency in others - quite rightly. But what we are talking about here is the fact that people quite often assess our reactions without consulting us. We were talking here about Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and nuclear weapons. Nowadays in the West you can hear quite often that Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was not really committed to the Vladivostok agreements. Is it really the case?

Gromyko

You are talking, as I understand, about the Vladivostok agreements which were the result of the Summit meeting of 23rd-24th November 1974. The way to them turned out to be complicated. The negotiations before the meeting in Vladivostok went on for several years at various levels, in various capitals and on various continents. I myself took part in the negotiations on dozens of occasions. Many questions were discussed. But I would like to emphasize the importance of one question the agreement on which actually led to agreements on many other questions. The main obstacle in the process of our meeting was the US demand that we should get rid of our heavy intercontinental missiles or cut their numbers drastically. Drastically, the Soviet side firmly announced that it couldn't comply with this demand in view of the fact that the United States had the so-called "forward bases" in other words bases with nuclear weaponry scattered all around the world including Europe, and in the first instance along the borders of the USSR. This was a well-known fact - in Moscow, in Washington and in other capitals of the world.After heated discussion, we at last came to a compromise. Both sides gave up their demands, which I have referred to, and thereby reached agreement. The essence of the Vladivostok accord was that agreement had been reached on the need to complete the drafting of a new treaty to limit strategic offensive weapons. The result of the discussions - there were several of them - was an agreed ceiling for the total number of strategic delivery vehicles on each side and certain qualitative restrictions, such as the limits on the strength of strategic offensive systems equipped with multiple, independently targettable warheads. As you can see the progress towards agreement in Vladivostok looked impressive. Naturally Brezhnev, who was the head of the Soviet leaders and in whose term these agreements were achieved did his best to confirm them with official American-Soviet documents. But it must be said - the proves of getting them confirmed in a written agreement took five years. At that time President Carter arrived in the White House. He announced that he approved the concept of detente and expressed his wish to broaden Soviet-American accords. In particular, he wanted in a short period of time to complete the preparation of the SALT II treaty. Only on June 18th 1979 did it become possible for the SALT II treaty to be signed. It took place in the capital of Austria, in Vienna. It was signed by Mr. Brezhnev for the USSR and by Mr. Carter for the USA. So Brezhnev had reason to be anxious. For the conclusion of this agreement was prolonged for a very long time. And the way to it was mainly opened up by the Vladivostok accord.

Interviewer

The thing is that every new administration which has been formed by every new president - you had the opportunity to work with many presidents, and it used to happen that a new president perceived his country's policy in a slightly different way or sometimes in a very different way from his predecessor. What happened in the case of Carter? His approach to arms control? Was it very different from those of his predecessors? What difficulties did the Soviet Union face in the connection with the change of the American administration?

Gromyko

I wouldn't say that Carter's approach to this question was essentially different from those of his predecessors. The thing is that there were no essential differences. Each of the American administrations, starting from the time of Truman, based its policy on the assumption that the United States must have military superiority. I underline this - it must have military superiority over the Soviet Union. In this respect, the American administration didn't differ much, as if they had all conspired. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union couldn't accept this U.S. position. Whatever administration was the USSR always tried to achieve a reduction in levels of nuclear arms and the prevention of the superiority of one country over the other. At the same time I would like to emphasize that we were always one step behind the USA. This is very important - this is a very significant point. We have always followed the USA as regards armaments and have never been ahead of them. Never.

Interviewer

You have made an extremely important point - that we have followed the United States. Nevertheless, nowadays it has become a commonplace of American propaganda, - for example they constantly discuss the question of the Soviet Union's continued production of huge strategic missiles even after military and strategic parity with the United States had been reached. Was this the case? And if so, why was it?

Gromyko

Strictly speaking, there was no military-strategic parity, Speaking of this, when we spoke about parity we have always added the word "virtual". We used the phrase "virtual parity." This addendum has no lexical meaning. Politicians know this very well. It has a certain specific meaning. Tell me, what could the Soviet Union do, when the United States was arming itself to the teeth? Lay down our arms? The situation was such that the interests of our state didn't allow us to do this. Our aim was to get both sides to do this. But we were not listened to. Even when missiles were first introduced we pressed for cuts of nuclear weapons of all kinds. Taking into account the fact that concrete agreements would eventually be reached on parameters and types of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union couldn't afford and didn't wish to be left behind as regards to nuclear armament. This was dictated by our security and in the interests of our security. Of course nowadays we are in a better position to be able to see everything that took place and in a better position to give a more objective evaluation of the positive aspects and of the whole situation in which we were then.

The Other Side of the Table

Gromyko

Round about the end of Khrushchev's term and in the initial stages when Brezhnev came to power, nuclear armaments had reached such levels - all this is very important - that even the country which had fewer weapons also was capable of striking a devastating blow, the country which had fewer weapons could have struck a devastating blow. To use some other words came to be used by politicians and in military circles - it was possible to "inflict unacceptable damage" on the enemy. And here the question arises as to why, then, a country which has a smaller nuclear arsenal should build it up even more? A man can't be killed twice. The conclusion which naturally follows from this is that it would have been possible to stop. Even the country which was left behind in the stockpiling of a nuclear arsenal could have stopped. In other words that country could have cut its expenditure on nuclear arms. I am not alone in thinking so. The politicians of those days would have been justified in reaching such a conclusion. But this was not done. I would also add that in that situation no one even dared to mention the necessity of cutting down expenditure on nuclear armaments. The situation in which both parties in the Soviet - American relationship found themselves did not help them to assess the situation more objectively. None of the people involved - neither politicians, nor military specialists, nor scientists, nor the specialists carrying out research on nuclear weapons - nobody spoke up in favor of a cut in their own production of nuclear weapons. It would have been possible, if this conclusion had been drawn, it would have been possible, at least, to direct a few billion rubles towards the peaceful needs of the country. Today we have the right to act more intelligently and more boldly. So, we, the Soviet Union, have now set an example in the field of disarmament. Any unilateral action of ours in this direction influences public opinion, influences whole nations. If one country takes this line then it is bound to be noticed by others, if these other countries conduct a serious and fully responsible policy. In this matter we follow the principle of rational sufficiency. In his speech at the UN General Assembly on December 7th 1988 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev announced that a decision had been taken in the Soviet Union to make substantial reductions in our conventional weapons. This is an important, I would say, an epoch-making, decision. This reduction means first of all that the Soviet Union has not only continually proposed disarmament, not only talks about disarmament, but actually carries it out. At the same time, the security of the country is safeguarded.

Strategic Decisions

Gromyko

Our country's aim is to take effective steps towards the abolition of nuclear arms from the surface of our planet and to make sure that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes.

Interviewer

You know, when I was in New York, I was amazed at your capacity for work. And today...

Gromyko

What do you suggest?

Interviewer

There is a tiny bit left.

Gromyko

A young organism, not yet grown to its full strength.

Interviewer

Well, I need a special reinforced diet, vitamins... I'll manage... Detente was a tremendous joy for everybody. Detente was an enormous victory not only for us, though in the Soviet Union we felt it, each of us, as a personal happiness. Nevertheless, towards the end of the Carter Administration, that is basically how it is perceived in the West and probably there are grounds for this, detente turned out to be defunct. Don't you think that we also contributed to this? What are the reasons for that, in your opinion?

Gromyko

No, I don't see it that way, that we are partly to blame. The Soviet Union couldn't have assisted in the undermining, so to speak, of the policy of detente. Simply because it was constantly pressing hard for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional armaments. It made efforts to achieve general and full disarmament. We have always based our policy on the known Leninist formula; "Disarmament is the ideal of Socialism." No, I repeat. It wasn't the Soviet Union, or its policy that caused the collapse of detente at the beginning of the 80s. During detente quite a lot was achieved. All the good that was done in those days has left its mark. No one can wipe it out. Actually the concept of detente should not be analyzed in isolation from its own time and place like some kind of abstraction. And today, are we not witnessing the beginning of a detente? Hasn't it taken place? Admit it. You probably will agree that there is no precision instrument with the scale and figures which could be used to measure the degree of detente. And at the same time especially since the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium and short-range weapons has come into force, we can confidently say that this detente is a fact and that the role in detente of the present Soviet foreign policy is well known. The whole process taking place in today's international affairs is seldom called detente. The words you'll hear more often used for this process are: the process of deepening mutual understanding and trust, based on the contemporary philosophy of peace, the cornerstone of which is the belief that general humanitarian values are of the utmost importance and take first priority. This is a profound idea, This is a kind of yardstick the assessment of any state's foreign policy. The task of any Government, any leader is to assist in the broadening of this process, whatever name is given to it, detente or any other term, the essential meaning is the same, the movement towards a stable peace on our Earth.

Interviewer

You have just given an answer concerning one of the most important and crucial strategic questions, and now I have a question of a more specific nature. You probably remember the decision to deploy the SS-20 missiles, as they were called in the West. Did the Soviet leader at that moment, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, understand what the reaction of the Western European leaders to that decision might be? What do you think?

Gromyko

I don't undertake to answer this precise question, as to whether he understood or not the reaction to the deployment of the Soviet Missiles. I don't think he did fully understand this. I don't think he understood it completely. I have grounds for my statement.

Interviewer

You see, there are several more questions related to this question. In particular there is one: Was NATO's decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe a threat to the Soviet Union? What do you think on that?

Gromyko

Yes of course, it was a threat. It was a threat.

Interviewer

And in 1983 did the Soviet Union think that the deployment of the missiles in of the missiles in Western Europe could be halted?

Gromyko

Stop! The machine's run too far. We need to go back.

Interviewer

Let's repeat it again.

Gromyko

I thought you had swallowed ...

Interview

Let's repeat the question again.

Gromyko

Please, do.

Interviewer

I'll repeat the question now... If you can, please do it straight off. In 1983 did the Soviet Union consider that the deployment of the missiles in Western Europe could have been halted?

Gromyko

Probably they could have been halted, if there had been an agreement between the USA and the USSR on the conditions for non-deployment.

Interviewer

In the final analysis, the situation as regards the so-called SS-20 missiles became clear. Why did the Soviet Union in the end agree to dismantle these SS-20s?

Gromyko

The Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the SS-20 missiles on certain conditions, which were written into the agreement. This decision was the result of a sober assessment of all the considerations for and against. And the Soviet leadership unanimously came to the conclusion about the necessity of reaching the agreement on certain conditions. The significance of the treaty is enormous. This was clearly explained by Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev both to the Soviet people and to the whole world. There is hardly any need to expand on that.

Interviewer

In the west people like to talk about who wins in the process of disarmament. And those who are against the process of cutting strategic arms in the United States think that the process is not equitable, that it benefits the Soviet Union. What could you say to counter such assertions?

Gromyko

These critics are not objective. Their conclusions are not serious. This process is equitable. Both countries, the Soviet Union and the United States, benefit in the same way from this process of strategic arms reduction. How could this process possibly be inequitable? Because in this process each side has the opportunity to demonstrate the validity of its own position, to weigh all the pros and cons of each proposal made by its opponent, of each clause of this or that agreement, of any agreement which they have already entered into and which is already in force. Each side has the opportunity at every step to stand up for its legitimate interests. And if necessary it can clarify practical points in the implementation of the agreement. This being so, can we actually say that the process is unfair? Certainly not! The results of a particular phase of the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are taken into account when the next agreement is being signed. Isn't this shown by this very treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range weapons? It was thoroughly discussed by both sides, not only before it was signed but also in the process of its ratification by the Senate and Congress of the United States and by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I don't see in this matter any room for unfair advantage. The benefit is mutual.

Interviewer

Andrei Andreyevich, you are one of the world's most experienced and respected politicians. On the basis of your enormous experience what are the issues, in your opinion, that are decisive at the moment, in these times which we call the age of nuclear diplomacy?

Gromyko

All the nuclear powers, and other countries, all the nations, all the statesmen and each person on earth must understand that nuclear weapons must be abolished. The security of the world cannot be guaranteed - guaranteed - if they continue to exist. The Soviet Union is fighting for their abolition, as are other socialist states, our friends and allies. We shall never give up that struggle. And at the same time we shall try to convince other countries that nuclear energy should only be used for the benefit of mankind. We try to convince everybody - though nowadays all politicians are perfectly aware of this - of the fact that if control over nuclear weapons is lost due to some political misjudgment - intentional or unintentional - and they are used, then this will be a cataclysm for the whole world. Here I would like to recall the words which were said to me personally by that famous scientist, at the mention of whom any reasonable man takes his hat off even today, his name was Albert Einstein. He said: "I told President Roosevelt that we could expect the atomic bomb to bring suffering. My opinion today is well known." He made it public. The contents of his letter to the president were published by the American press.

Arguments against Nuclear Weapons

Gromyko

"The local lads" - that's how he referred to them, as "lads" - the locals lads probably haven't got a very clear idea of the fate that awaits the round vessel on which we are all, including the Americans, are sailing. The great scientist meant by "lads" the American politicians of those days, of course, who had to decide the future of nuclear weapons. And by the "round vessel" he of course meant our earth. He also remarked, that "if everything had depended upon the scientists then in my opinion the overwhelming majority of American scientists would support a ban on this terrifying weapon." I can hear these words even now. Though he uttered them in the course of our discussion in his usual manner, quietly and calmly. By the way, I would like to say something about another scientist, also outstanding, and well known not only in the United States, but in the world as a whole, about Oppenheimer. He was a man whose fate was, so to speak, tragic and dramatic. It is well known fact that he was the principle scientific adviser during the creation of the first A-bomb in the United States. Under him and thanks to his efforts, the bomb came into being. He, when it was achieved, was the adviser - the senior, principal adviser of Baruch, the American representative at the Atomic Energy Commission. And I must say that his position was then different from that which he had taken before. He took a different stance, He came to a certain honest conclusion about the situation, the conclusion that ways should be found to eliminate nuclear weapons. Otherwise they could cause a catastrophe for the world. So, on one side, he was senior scientist, an advisor to a politician, the American representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, and thus had to give him support. On the other hand, he took the view that atomic, or as we say nowadays, nuclear weapons should be destroyed. This was the most correct and honest position to adopt. And he never betrayed his views. He remained the same scientist, the same Oppenheimer as he had become then in the second stage, when the A-bomb had appeared. It wasn't easy for him. He was surrounded by an atmosphere of, if I may put it like this, of ostracism in the political sense. And it was created by nobody else but the American administration. I met him again after that only once, I think this fact would probably be of some interest, under rather strange circumstances. I arrived from Geneva together with my colleagues, colleagues from the three powers: England, France, USA. We arrived from Geneva, where we had been at a conference, to attend the funeral of Dulles, John Foster Dulles. On the way from the cathedral to the Arlington Cemetery in Washington, I saw a car which drew level with ours. I noticed somebody was vigorously waving his hand. There were two men in the car - one of them was Oppenheimer. He recognized me and I recognized him, so we exchanged friendly gestures. We waved to each other. After that I never saw him again, I don't think he was going to the cemetery. He was going in another direction on business of his own, otherwise I would have seen him at the cemetery. But I didn't see him there. Credit is due to the American scientist Oppenheimer for the views of his later years. I can't help mentioning another scientist, Joliot-Curie, the Frenchman, who was a spectacular personality in the scientific world. He was a scientific adviser on scientific question of the French political representative at the UN Atomic Commission, [Mr. Paradis], He also held views that were based on and directed towards a full ban on nuclear weapons, so that atomic, nuclear energy should be used only for the benefit of mankind. So I just would like to take my hat off in front of these three outstanding representatives of the scientific world who have left such a deep mark on history.

Interviewer

This is very interesting. You've met great scientists, who had invented... with politicians, etc, - so today, what do you think about the way towards further arms reductions? What are the obstacles in the way of the Soviet leadership, in the way of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, which have to be overcome before the aim of ridding the world of all nuclear weapons can be attained?

Gromyko

I have already spoken about what needs to be done as regards arms reductions. The first and ultimate aim of which is the elimination of nuclear weapons. Their total abolition. To accomplish this we must press on with our negotiations. We must show we have the determination and the will on both sides - or rather, on all sides - well, you can actually say, realistically speaking, that there are always two sides at any meeting. This is the only way we achieve the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and bring about a nuclear-free world. Of course, for this Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev and indeed all the Soviet leaders and all the people have to overcome enormous obstacles. And parallel to this, we must carry out the process of conventional arms reductions also. The programme of action for a nuclear-free world which is not being proposed to the world by the Soviet Union was brilliantly presented by Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, in particular at the UN General Assembly. He was speaking on behalf of the whole Soviet people.

Interviewer

And now another question to which you can give a more precise answer than anybody else. With all your experience and all your knowledge, what do you think? Is it at all possible to create a world free from nuclear weapons?

Gromyko

My answer is - yes, it is possible. It depends on people, on politicians, on their awareness of the responsibility which they have. The earth should be free of nuclear weapons. The seas should be free of nuclear weapons. The air should be free of nuclear weapons. There shouldn't be any deceit like that of Ulysses in politics. People who know the works of Homer are familiar with the name of the inventor of the Trojan horse. Politics should be honest - this is the guarantee of the security of all states and all nations.