IN DECEMBER 1953, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER LAUNCHED HIS ATOMS OF PEACE SPEECH AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THIS PROGRAM?

It was the hopes that at last the secrecy policy would disappear; you see we were nearly isolated from one country to another by that secrecy. Even after the war there was no more contacts no more collaboration in between the British and the Americans, who had been partners, with the Canadians, during the war. And in France, where we'd started in 1946, we were completely cut off from the information from the most advanced country like Great Britain, United States, or even Russia, naturally, and also... it was the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries... United States, Canada, and England, had cornered all uranium available in the western world, so we were only able in France to start with what we had, which was, by luck we had been loaned uranium by the Belgians before the war, and this was hidden in Morocco during the war, and that's how we were able to start, and also because the Norwegians, before the fall of France, had sold us the world's stock of heavy water, and they had promised to sell us all their further production, so before even the end of the war, the Norwegian government in exile in London accepted to sell us five tons. So thanks to that, we were able to have a small zero-power reactor by 19, end of '48. But still we were isolated, and...it meant a tremendous turnaround that there was going to be, we were going to be able to speak, of, to our colleagues in various country; there was going to be, able to be seminars, conferences, and the first of these conferences was that big tremendous event in Geneva, in the summer of 1955.

IN ONE OF YOUR ARTICLES, YOU TALK ABOUT IT AS A PERIOD OF RENAISSANCE AFTER THE MIDDLE AGES.

You see, it, there, the Atoms for Peace was really a sort of discontinuity between what would one could have called... the Middle Age of the atomic energy... because nobody spoke to each other, a dark period, and then suddenly came the Renaissance, where we were going to be able to meet, compare methods, and suddenly we learned all the Russians had done, or a lot of what the Russian had done, and we met for the first time our Russian colleagues-- it was really the meeting of the east and the west, that happened at this big UN-sponsored Geneva Conference.

LET'S TRY IT ONE MORE TIME.

I wouldn't say it made a big difference immediately, because you know the Atoms for speech, Pe-, spe-, had to—

(INTERRUPTION)

Uh didn't make a big difference for France at the beginning, because, I don't know, it's difficult to realize today, but Eisenhower's speech in '53 was really a speech on disarmament. The idea was that the Russians, the Americans, and a little bit the British, had stocks of material for bombs, and they were going to, for the first time, divert some of the military material to put to use for peaceful purposes, under sufficient guarantee that these materials would be used for peaceful purposes. So, it was a, an idea, it was a plan... really what became important, it's when after that, and it's an American scientist, I think, who had the first idea, Dr. Hornby, to suggest to have a big international conference, where we would compare know-how, and exchange know-how, and this was accepted by the United Nations conference, where United Nations... General Assembly, and the secretary-general was empowered to organize the conference, and he was given an advisory committee of seven members, an American was with Dr. Hornby, an Englishman, a Canadian, an Indian, a Brazilian, a Russian, and myself for France, and we organized a conference, and, until the minute the Russians sent their communication we didn't know if it was going to be a success. But then when the Russians' communications arrived, we knew that everybody was going to start speaking, and that was a real revolution.

YOU PLAYED A VERY BIG ROLE IN THE FIRST CONFERENCE.

You see there was a rule... adopted in between the three Anglo-Saxon countries, the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, in a summit conference in Quebec in 1943, where it was said that... they wouldn't, neither of these countries would, was allowed to give information to a third party, without the agreement of the two others. And the Americans and the British -- it was mainly the Americans and the British-- would only give out information, they gave some out before the Geneva conference, in agreement, after having discussed it with each other. And before the Geneva conference, they also got together to decide what could be published, or what shouldn't be published, but we were not, in France, a member of that group, so we were quite free to publish what we want, and we did publish, at the Geneva Conference for the first time, the reprocessing method way of extracting plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel, and this we did, and I think the Americans and the British weren't very happy, because the method we, what we published, was more or less what they were doing, but we had less scruples because during the war I was in charge of the plutonium work for the Anglo-Canadian outfit in Montreal first and in...later, and, we were not helped in any way by the Americans in this field, so we were the first ones to start on solvent (?) extraction, so we had less scruples publishing it. Naturally, in those days, nobody worried about non-proliferation, which became a subject of worry only ten or 15 years later, and the best proof, that when...European collaboration started, and it started on two levels in the same time, the six countries of the European Coal and Steel Pool, and that was what became known as Euratom, and then there was the 17 countries of the European... Organization of Development and Cooperation, the OECD, and then there were 17 countries... as I was telling you, and I was, I was saying, and they decided to make the OECD the....

(INTERRUPTION)

Uh during the war, we had no collaboration in the field of plutonium, in between the Anglo-Canadian side... and, on the other hand, the Americans. The only collaboration was that I had been lucky enough to spend three months with Glenn Seaborg in Chicago during the summer of '42, during the golden days of the discovery; it was a time where Seaborg is-, and his team isolated the first quarter of milligram of plutonium, which was the first man-made element. And so, after that, the collaboration stopped during the whole year of '43 and when it started again, after the Quebec Conference, plutonium wasn't involved. So we were able, in Canada, to work out a new method; we did get... a little help from the States, because we got some uranium-containing slugs, ur-, uranium slugs containing a few milligrams of plutonium but, apart from that, we worked from scratch on a solvent-extraction method, only inspired by the fact that Seaborg had always thought that if he had more time, solvent extraction would be the best solution.

WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND WHAT WAS THE TENOR OF THOSE CONFERENCES?

My role was dual: first, I was an as-, one of the seven members advising Hammarskjöld how to run the conference, to make the program, to organize, to ask for the conferences, and then to, for the communications. But, the conference itself was what everybody was ready to say in the different fields of atomic energy, starting from the ore, going to the production of electricity, and the production of plutonium, and all the intermediate steps in chemistry, in physics, and even in geology when one speaks of the mines. So it was really... the whole field which was discussed among scientists of, all over the world, but there was only at that time about 20 or 25 concerned countries — all the other ones were listening--and this was a subject which for 15 years had been taboo, because it sometime, during the year 1940, everybody stopped publishing all over the world: in the States, in Germany, in France, or in Britain. So it was a field which had been practically, apart a few exceptions, a few reports which had been published after the bomb, which had been sort of out of bound, field for international collaboration, suddenly, it became a normal field where, except on a few spots, like the making of the bomb or the enrichment procedure which makes directly an explosive, all the rest was open and very fruitful.

TELL ME ABOUT THE OTHER SCIENTISTS, THE PEOPLE FROM INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

It was...great to see all these people together; one of the most brilliant men was the Indian scientist, who was the chairman of the conference. He was called Homi Bhabha; he was a physicist in tera-, tation (?), he was, he had...done all his work in Cambridge before the war, and could have quite easily got a Nobel Prize. And he, in 1944, before the secret was over, had the idea that atomic energy could revolutionize the world, and started very early a commission in India.

TELL ME ABOUT THE INDIAN SCIENTIST.

The chairman of the conference had been unanimously chosen as the Indian head of the Atomic Energy Conference. He was a man called Homi Bhabha, an extraordinary man, a sort of a mixture of an Oriental potentate and a very refined, distinguished intellectual person; he drew beautifully, he spoke beautifully, adored music, and by the way, if the International Atomic Energy Agency is sitting in Vienna, and not in Geneva, it's because Homi Bhabha loved so much music, and he put all the pressure he could to have the agency in Vienna. So he was a brilliant man, but unfortunately he got killed in a plane crash in 19-, early '66; the plane missed the top of the Mont-Blanc, you know, the highest the highest mountain in Europe, by a few meters, and they're all there still.

DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER RECOLLECTIONS OF THAT CONFERENCE? I UNDERSTAND THERE WAS A REACTOR.

There was a very lovely exhibition at the same time; everybody had shown what they could show as the best of the atomic work, either photographs, and the Americans had gone one step further: they'd built a non-exponential reactor... in the exhibition; I mean, there was a small reactor... the smallest reactor possible, and that was a great curiosity, naturally.

CAN YOU TALK SOME MORE ABOUT THE REPROCESSING TECHNIQUE...?

Um... I was very implemental in convincing...the French government to publish all our work on reprocessing, which means extracting plutonium from irrigated fuel. And we felt we could do it in France, because I had been the leader of the team in Canada, an Anglo-Canadian team, during the war, which found, independently of the Americans, a new method based on solvents. And, the method we published in Geneva was a little bit the daughter or the granddaughter of that initial Canadian method. And by the way, it is still the method used all over the world, today, and it had been discovered independently of us by the British and the Americans later, you see. So, when we published it we forced a little bit the opening of the secrecy in that field, which, I think if the French hadn't published it, would have been kept long a secret, and that perhaps would have had an influence on what we call today the non-proliferation.

GIVEN THIS, WERE YOU NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION AT THE TIME?

I would say that in the days of the Geneva Conference, the, what became later an obsession, and specially a national obsession in...the States, nobody was really worried about non-proliferation. One really wanted to disseminate... information. And...the following year, or two years, after the Geneva conference, in between 17 countries, of the OECD, 17 European countries, we launched a joint enterprise of reprocessing, in which the French industry which had built the French reprocessing plant, was the main leader. And therefore, at that time... we, France held the transmission to sev-, 16 other European... I said it wrongly... 17 countries, because there was only 13 countries, mixed up in there, but—

WHY DID, WASN'T—

December, 1953, EISENHOWER LAUNCHED HIS ATOMS FOR PEACE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THIS PROGRAM?

You see, you cannot make atomic energy without two main ingredients. One is uranium; the other is know-how. Now after the war, in 1945, in November, '45, the British, the Canadian, and the Americans decided to keep their knowledge secret, the know-how secret, and furthermore, to collect and buy all uranium available in the world, in the western world. Therefore the European countries, who had been the leaders in this field, before the war, were discovered fission, were reduced to what we could call nuclear impotence. Now suddenly in '53, the Americans announced that they would give information, and that they would give materials to allow countries to build by themselves, or with American help, reactors. So overnight, we passed from nuclear middle age, to a kind of nuclear renaissance, and there was really... a feeling of euphoria, all over the world. And then this was consolidated by the 1955 Geneva Conference, which was really... the raising of the curtain of secrecy, in practically all the field, from the mining of uranium, till the production of plutonium, and... the building of reactors. And France, in this domain, had an important role, because I was implemental in convincing my government to publish for the first time, the reprocessing method, the extraction of plutonium from irrigated fuel, which was a highly sensitive domain, because plutonium can be used as an explosive. But we felt we could do it, because personally I had led an Anglo-Canadian team during the war to find independently of the Americans the first method of that type of solvent extraction, which was...ever worked out in the world. And at that time, I would say, the problem of non-proliferation didn't exist. We knew that the Americans wouldn't be very happy that we published this, because we thought they wouldn't, but... we obliged them to publish, and the British also published, when they knew that we were going to publish in this field, they joined forces, so if you want... our main contribution to the Geneva conference was to force...our Anglo-Canadian friends to raise also the secrecy in that field, because we had...given the example. You can call it the bad example from the non-proliferation point of view, but in those days, nobody worried so much. It seemed so difficult to make bombs, and even France had... just played with the idea of having a weapon, but we hadn't really engaged in a... in a definite decision to make weapons.

WHAT DIFFERENCE DID THE ATOMS FOR PEACE SPEECH MAKE IN 1953?

Suddenly, the European countries, mainly the European countries, which had been reduced to nuclear impotence, because they couldn't get either uranium or know-how, the two main ingredients for atomic energy, suddenly it became available to those countries. It became available, because Americans announced that they would... sell some enriched uranium, or some uranium, to countries under guarantees of peaceful uses, and that they would publish a lot of the information, and this publication was really done in a special conference organized by the UN Secretary-General, in Geneva in August, 1955.

HOW DID YOU VIEW THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE IAEA, SET UP IN '57 AND AN OFFSHOOT OF THE ATOMS FOR PEACE?

The French reaction to the setting up of the international atomic energy agency, I would say was mixed, because we were not very favorable to the Safeguard system. We felt that the Safeguard system, in those days, was mainly directed against the French weapon program. We had tried to buy, French... tried to buy from Canada some uranium, and...we disliked the fact that Canadians told us that we could only have uranium with safeguards, only for peaceful purposes, and we felt we were discriminated, compared to Britain and United States, who were buying Canadian uranium, without safeguards. So if you want, this idea of safeguards, we didn't feel that it was the main thing. We felt that the agency should be a sort of follow up of the Geneva conference, to help countries who hadn't started in atomic energy to start, and to help them to exchange information, and exchange technicians. If you want, we were more interested in the...technical assistance point of view, and ourselves we were quite willing to buy enriched uranium from America under safeguards, but in the case of natural uranium, which we felt was available all over the wor-, the world, we felt very reluctant to buy it under safeguards from either Canada or United States.

I GET THE FEELING THAT THIS PERIOD WAS AN ERA OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IS THAT A FAIR ASSESSMENT?

After the Geneva Conference, one entered, really, a period of nuclear euphoria. Everybody believed that atomic electricity and very cheap was around the corner. The British were the first to launch a program which was going to give them...ten or 15 percent of their electricity... more cheaply than by any other way. And collaboration started in all directions. So it was a very fruitful period, and naturally everybody was very happy to be able to purchase enriched uranium from the United States, and you know, at that time, the... it should be known that at that time, the Americans were selling research reactors all over the world. The, there was a so-called collaboration agreement, which resulted in the fact, if I'm not wrong, about 40 reactors, research reactors were sold all over the world, and they were all, practically all of the American type. However, it must be mentioned that the first research reactor ever to be sold was, or given, was the Canadian re-, research reactor, heavy water, natural uranium, given by the Canadian government to the Indian government, and which was built in Trombay, in, near Bombay. And it is at the same time that we decided to do the same thing secretly, because of the difficulties with the Arab countries, we decided to build, for Israel, the same type of reactor that the Canadians were building in India, and this took place in '56, and in '56, international safeguards didn't yet exist. They were spoken of...they were... if you want, the first agreements with safeguards were just being negotiated by the Americans, but the at that time, really, safeguards didn't exist; that's why the two reactors, which later became... considered as proliferating reactors, were both sold, in those days, without safeguards.

WHAT WAS THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE THAT FRANCE COULD OFFER THESE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

Our main technical expertise was this natural uranium, heavy water graphite-moderated reactors, and the one which needed the least uranium was the heavy-water natural-uranium reactor...this is the reactor which we built... for Israel and Dimona; it was started in '56, and ended in the early '60s. We were also very keen to try to sell a nuclear power station. Our first power stations, producing not very much electricity--they wore both producing electricity and plutonium-- were achieved at the end of the '50s. And, in the early '60s, we were trying to sell a nuclear power plant. For instance, we competed with the Americans for a power plant in India, and Bhabha, this famous Indian scientist who had presided over the Geneva conference, came to Paris to discuss with us, and I remember a lunch given by our minister--I was present, the minister was called Pierre Guillaumat, was Minister for Atomic Energy--and he tried all the time, during the whole lunch, to convince Baba to purchase a French type of reactor. And one of the two advantages we considered...if he purchased from us, was one, that we were willing to sell the reactor without safeguards, and two, that it was a natural uranium reactor, and it was quite obvious that India, on this large territory, would find some natural uranium, and therefore it would be a reactor that the Indians could fuel by themselves. Now the o-, the competition came from General Electric in the States, which was selling an enriched-uranium reactor, with safeguard, because that was the American law. And therefore...Guillaumat was telling Bhabha, that if you buy the American reactor, first you'll be totally dependent of the United States for your fuel, and furthermore you'll have inspectors to see what you're doing with your reactor. At the end of the lunch the minister, French minister, asked Bhabha, "Now, Dr. Bhabha, which do you prefer, either the American safeguarded reactor or the French reactor with natural uranium, which will be much freer to run?" and Bhabha answered, "The reactor we pre-, the type of reactor we prefer is the one we don't pay for," and two months later, he signed a contract with General Electric, because it was sold with an... 40 years, a loan of 40 years, payable... starting to pay back after 10 years, with only, I think, .4 percent interest, which was really a gift, in these inflation days.

THIS WAS THE TARAPUR REACTOR.

That's the Tarapur reactor.

DIDN'T FRANCE COME IN FOR A LOT OF CRITICISM, BECAUSE THEY WEREN'T CONCERNED ABOUT SAFEGUARDS?

When the agency was negotiated, there was a big conference which took place at the UN, in October, '56. It was a conference where the statute was d-, decided. And I gave a speech, which fortunately had been okayed by the Foreign Office, and I said the motto of the agency should be, "Once client, always client," and not "Once safeguarded, always safeguarded." It was to show our reluctance against the safeguards. And our ambassador was called by the Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy, and got a scolding. And I was obliged by my government, the next, which was a weekend, the next Monday, to mumble that I, what I'd said wasn't exactly what I meant, but it was... just eating a little bit my hat, but it was going back a little bit on what I'd meant to say. But that we were, if you want... in those...it should be said that in those days, France, India, and also the eastern countries, were rather reluctant to safeguards, and we were with a bunch of countries which were...really reluctant... against this international system of safeguards. Then everything turned 'round, after the Cuban incident in '62, and there was this rapprochement in between the States and Soviet Union, on all... nuclear problems. One of them was a partial test-ban treaty, signed in Moscow in '63, and the other one was the exception of the international safeguard by the Russians. Emelyanov, who was the Russian governor in the Vienna agency, and also the head of the Atomic Energy Commission, used to say, and still in '62 he said it, that the... international safeguard of the agency was a kind of spiderweb, with which the Americans were trying to strangle the whole nuclear science in the world. The same Emelyanov in June '63 said there's nothing more important for the agency than the international safeguard system. So overnight, the Russians became fanatically for safeguards, and the whole problem of non-proliferation was being blocked at that time, because they were ready to discuss with the Americans and to go towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Before that, it was out of the question.

IT'S AS IF THE FRENCH RESENTED THE AMERICANS IN SOME WAY. CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN WHY THE SAFEGUARDS THING WAS A PROBLEM? WAS IT A REMINDER OF THEIR POLICY OF DENIAL?

We… didn't like the, if you want, the...I'll start over again. The best example of the reason why there was ill feelings in between the French and the Americans in this field was given in '58. In the year '57, after the Sputnik, President Eisenhower offered all the NATO countries to have the technology, American technology of the submarine, or any interested country. Two countries said they were interested: the British and the French. The British got easily the American license of the submarine. When we came to negotiate, it was first agreed that we would also be treated like the British. Then when the agreement went to the joint committee of the Congress, Joint Committee for Atomic Energy of the Congress, the Congress...encouraged by Admiral Rickover, decided not to give us the technology. And, this was one of the reasons why de Gaulle started re- taking away the French fleet in the NATO Mediterranean organization. And that was the beginning of the departure of France from the military side the joint command in NATO. So you see, this was a very important...case. And, by the way, it was a blessing in disguise. Of course, the Americans... decided that they would give no know-how to France; they were afraid, Rickover had spoken that the know-how would go to Russia, though the only spying cases has always, had been with Britain, and there's never been any... proof of a spying case in France; and...they decided, the Joint Committee accepted, to give us the highly enriched uranium, which we needed to build a land-based prototype engine for a submarine. And therefore we had, from scratch, by our own know-how, but thanks to the American enriched uranium, we were able in five years to build a land-based subma-, submarine engine. And then later we built our own submarine engines, but the blessing in disguise was that we learned at that time the technology of what is called the pressurized-water reactors. And, today, we are the country the most advanced in the production of electricity by this type of pressurized water reactors. While Britain is still discussing, since 20 years, should they buy or not the British the American license on PWR's, and have lost an enormous fraction of their advance.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR POWER AND THE TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED TO BUILD A BOMB?

Fortunately, they're very mixed up. When you make a reactor producing energy, you produce in the same time plutonium, which can be used for a bomb. And some types of reactor are made with enriched uranium, and the method used to produce enriched uranium, if you push it a little further, more concentrated, you produce the other type of explosive. So that's why the two things are quite mixed up.

TRY ONE MORE TIME.

I can't say there's a difference. It's the same technology that you push towards one end or the other. There's two explosives; there's two roots to the bomb. One is the... en- highly enriched uranium, and this root is the one you start upon to make enriched uranium fuel for production of electricity. Now, the second root is the production of plutonium. And in reactors, producing electricity, either from natural uranium, or from slightly enriched uranium, you produce plutonium, and if you extract this plutonium, and if you don't cook it too long in the reactor, it is usable for a bomb.

ONE MORE TIME.

There's two roots to the bomb. Two explosive( ), one is plutonium, and plutonium is produced in reactors producing electricity, either from natural uranium, or from slightly enriched uranium.

WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE IN THE TECHNOLOGY?

I would say there's no difference in the technology. It's the same technology used for different purposes. If you build a reactor to produce electricity, inside the tummy of this reactor you produce plutonium, and if you put your, you decide to... recover this plutonium, you can make one of the two explosives. Now, in many of the reactors-- I would say, practically all the reactors --are fueled with slightly enriched uranium, and the enrichment procedure, if you push it, instead of pushing it 'til three-percent enrichment, if you go to 93 percent enrichment, then you have made the second exploded, explosive, which is called uranium-245. So if you want, the routes going to civilian energy are...practically the same road that you have to pursue further, the bifurcation to civilian and to military arrives rather late in the whole procedure.

(QUESTION REPEATED)?

I would say the same technology used for different purposes, in the production of electricity, inside the nuclear power plant, some uranium is transformed in plutonium, which is one of the explosives. And...practically all the power plants are fueled by enriched uranium, and the procedure to enrich uranium, if you push it at higher concentrations, you get the second explosive, which is called uranium-235.

SO REALLY WHAT IT COMES DOWN TO IS AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES…?

Absolutely. And, there's two things: there's availability of resources, and there is the political will, because this is the thing which counts. Do you want to use money? Do you want to use people, to make an explosive or not? Or are you only interested in production of electricity?

AT WHAT POINT WAS THAT REALIZED, THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE SAME TECHNOLOGY?

It was realized from the start. The only thing is that the technologies were discovered for the production of the bomb. The two main routes were discovered during the war by the Manhattan Project. And it's only after the war, and even, nearly ten years after the war, that one built the first nuclear power plants.

FRANCE WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH ASSISTED INDIA IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THEIR ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THIS ASSISTANCE?

India is really an extraordinary mixture of underdevelopment and rather advanced technology. You have very good scientists; you have plants building jet...

(INTERRUPTION).

Everybody felt that atomic energy would be very important for developing countries, and this, in this people were rather wrong; it hasn't been for developing countries as important as we believed in those days. And India was obviously the country that first to, go to, because they had some very good scientists, and because they were in the same time such a dev-, underdeveloped such a developing countries, as one says today. And so, we, for instance, in the case of France, because in the early days we had a top scientist, who was Communist, nobody dared speak to us, and the first country with whom we made an... agreement, was India, because India didn't mind... India being a neutral country, didn't mind coming to an agreement with France, and we—

(INTERRUPTION).

Uh... during the first four years of the French Atomic Energy Commission, the top, the chief scientist, was Frederic Joliot-Curie, the son-in-law of the discoverer of radium and Nobel Prize winner, who was, who had become during the war, in the underground, who had become a Communist. Because of that, no European countries... dared to... collaborate with us, and the first country who came to us and said, "Could we work together?" was India, and that was as early as 1951. And that's where I met Homi Bhabha, who was the first chairman of the first Geneva conference.

HOW DID FRANCE ASSIST INDIA IN HER EARLY PROGRAM?

We trained a lot of their people. We opened, we showed them what we were doing. I think that's the main thing. They learned a lot from us, for how to purify radium, and even, a little bit, how to reprocess enriched irrigated uranium and to extract plutonium. But in that domain, I think they learned more from the British, who trained a lot of Indians. You see, after the war, the British were prevented collaborating with the Dominions by the secrecy rule. But then after the Geneva conference they were able to take trainees, and they took a lot of Indian trainees, so honestly, one can say that practically all the advanced...countries of the west helped India. The Americans formed a lot of Indian, and built them their first electricity production reactor, the Tarapur reactor; the Canadians helped them for the Trombay react-, research reactor, which was able to give the plutonium for the bomb; we helped them by forming a lot of people; and the British too.

WHAT I'VE READ ABOUT IS THE SPEECHES BY BHABHA AND NEHRU...

Yes, only I don't remember anything special. I mean, it was a time for India to be the first developing country to have a research reactor. I think that was really... and they would, they had started this large research center, and obviously, they were going to develop it by themselves. That was really the... thing. By the way, it is interesting that in the mid-'50s, Bhabha went to Nehru, Prime Minister, and said, "Prime Minister, shouldn't we decide never to make bombs, and to announce it publicly?" And Nehru told Bhabha — and this is, I got from Bhabha himself — "Are you ready? Could you make a bomb today?" And Nehru said, "No, not before ten years probably." Nehru said, "But when you are ready, when you have everything, and you are ready to make a bomb, come and see me again, and we'll discuss the matter then." So, I think from the minute go, the Indians had always left the door open to produce a weapon if necessary.

DID IT OCCUR TO YOU AT THE TIME THAT THE INDIANS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC FOR THIS MILITARY OPTION?

I don't think that in those days... it was very clear. You see, you, it has to be realized that even in France, in the mid-'50s, we didn't know how difficult it would be to make a bomb, and therefore, we were ourself fighting the problem, and not obsessed by the fact that in giving someone information to a country which was many years... behind us, we would help them to make a bomb. It's the same, it's valid for Israel, it's valid for India. We hadn't made the bomb ourselves, so we still felt that it would be more difficult for those other countries, who were far...who had started... before us, who were less who had less means; we were not at all... obsessed by that fact. However, I must say that the last years before Bhabha died in that airplane crash, that... means in the... early '60s, it became clear from the conversation I had with him that he felt that India at least should be able to show the world it's the second world, country in size of inhabitants and probably... by the year 2020 will have caught up China, that he felt that India should at least show the world that they could have a bomb if they wanted. That was quite clear in the... mind of Homi Bhabha.

DO YOU RECALL ANY PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH DR. BHABHA ABOUT HIS INTERESTS IN AN INDIAN WEAPONS PROGRAM?

I recall...two facts, the fact that he went to see Nehru, to ask him if they should announce that they would never have a bomb, and Nehru said, "The time isn't right; come and see me when you're ready to have a bomb. We'll discuss it again," and then, that, Bhabha must have told me that, around the mid-'50s or the late '50s, but in the early '60s, let's say '63, '64, I fell back (?), the way he would discuss matters with me, that he had put his mind, that India should show the world, as soon as it could, that it was capable of making an atomic explosion.

A MORE SENSITIVE ISSUE: THE ISRAELI PART IN THE COOPERATION. WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE IN THAT?

My main role was because there was, I was in charge of international relations, and any relation with a foreign country, I knew about it, and we were quite proud to build a reactor for a foreign country. Israel was... in those days, it was a kind of l'etre de noblesse, if you understand what I mean, in French, it was a kind of, it showed that you were ma- mature country in atomic energy, if you were able to sell either a research reactor, or, better still, a nuclear power plant, to foreign country. And so we were quite pleased when Israel asked us to help them to build a research reactor; by the way, the same time as the Canadians were building in India; but, at that time, the Ind-, the Israelis said that to prevent any trouble with the Arab countries, it preferred that the matter be kept secret, and as our industrialists didn't want to be blacklisted with the Arab countries, they were not pe-, pleased that the thing would be kept secret as long as possible. And you know this thing was kept secret for quite a few years; it's only in the early '60s that it became public, and then when de Gaulle learned about it, and realized that...France could be accused of helping Israel to make a bomb, because our difficult relation with the Arab countries, he decided to stop the collaboration: Ben-Gurion was called to Paris, was told by the General that we would finish the reactor, and that would be the final... part of the co- it would be the end of the collaboration, and this is, by the way, the time that, when de Gaulle accompanied Ben-Gurion on the steps of the Elysee Palace where... the French president lives, he told in front of the journalists, speaking to Ben-Gurion, he said, the famous sentence which has been repeated quite often, "Israel, my ally, my friend," and he just had been given... a scolding to Ben-Gurion, by this.

DID YOU THINK THE DIMONA REACTOR, WHICH BEN-GURION CALLED HIS TEXTILE FACTORY, MIGHT BE USED FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN PEACEFUL PURPOSES?

It's difficult to say... one can say that... a country can always have the idea of a bomb behind its mind, or used to, before the Non-Proliferation Treaty, no country had taken any commitment not to make bombs. When we negotiated the Euratom Treaty, which is the treaty which, in which we are, have, are common, have common links... with the six initial countries of the Common Market...Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Italy. When we negotiated this treaty, it was suggested that Euratom should be purely peaceful, and that the six countries... should renounce... the bomb. The Germans had been obliged to renounce, being a vanquished country, of the last war—

(INTERRUPTION)

It can be said, Do you feel that Israel was, had the idea of making a bomb. I think that Israel was... very interested to show that they could make a bomb if they wanted. And, as an example of the spirit of those days, when, in a completely different part of the world, in between the six European countries, the time of the Common Market negotiation, there was a negotiation in the Joint Atomic Energy... Commission, which was called Euratom, was suggested that the six countries would renounce the bomb (by the way, the Germans had to do it, to join NATO), at that time Luxembourg, a much smaller country than Israel, and Belgium, said they didn't see why they should renounce-- they had never renounced to anything, and why should they renounce to have a bomb, when many other countries like the States or Russia, England, and perhaps France, had them or were going to have them? So you see, in those... so, it can be said that in those days... no countries wanted to renounce to anything. The non-proliferation philosophy came only in the late '60s.

DID YOU THINK THAT THE DIMONA REACTOR, WHICH BEN-GURION CALLED HIS TEXTILE FACTORY, MIGHT BE USED FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN PEACEFUL PURPOSES?

In principle, it was going to be used for peaceful purposes, but we knew quite well that this type of reactor could also be used to make plutonium for weapons. But in those days, the only countries which had officially renounced to make bombs were the countries which had been beaten, who had lost the last war: Japan, in its constitution, Italy, Finland, Bulgary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, in their peace treaty in '47, and Germany, when it joined NATO, all these countries renounced to ever have, produce, or study, atomic weapons. But no other countries. Therefore Israel was quite openly free to make a weapon, like France was, or like India was.

WASN'T FRANCE WORRIED THAT ISRAEL MIGHT SET ON THAT COURSE?

Not the French government, but... it must be remembered that in '56, when this help was given to Israel, France and Israel were close allied in the Suez affair.

WHAT WAS BENEFICIAL TO FRANCE ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT?

It was the days of... atoms for peace, and atoms for peace, when a country could show that it was selling a reactor to another country, and we knew that sooner or later, in the day that the reactor would be built it would be public, we would be, it was, it was a good note for our nuclear industry that another country had come to us, to purchase a reactor.

WHAT WAS THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI PROGRAM?

Israeli scientists are first class, and...

BUT AT THIS TIME...

Before the Geneva conference, you needed nuclear know-how, atomic know-how, and uranium, but the moment a country with a very high technological level, like Israel, was given the necessary plans, plus the uranium, that they were going to initially, that they initially purchased from France, plus the heavy water that they purchased from France and Norway, at that time, the fact that they had high-quality scientists was perfectly sufficient, because building a reactor is an engineering job. So, a country like Israel was quite capable, once it was given the plans, to build themselves a very... good working reactor. Do you want me to answer for the bomb?

YES.

I would say even more, and I have no proof of that, but I believe that the quality of the physicists, the theoreticians, the engineers in Israel is such that probably Israelis one of the... countries, advanced countries technologically in this world, which could, like Germany... make w-, make atomic weapons and not need to test them, and being 99, or 95 percent sure that they will work. And I will say, this is not the case of India. And today, India has made, up to now, one single explosion since 19—

LET'S COME TO THAT. GIVEN THAT THEY HAD TOP SCIENTISTS, WASN'T THAT A WORRY AT THE TIME?

I don't want to answer.

WHY DID PRESIDENT DE GAULLE DECIDE TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT, IN 1960?

I think it can be said that by that time, the French government started worrying that Israel could make a bomb out of the help that we had given them, and, at that time, de Gaulle insisted on international safeguards, and Israel wasn't ready to accept it; they weren't ready to accept international inspectors, which would have had inspectors coming from enemy countries like... Arab countries, and that's how the whole thing stopped.

IT WAS A TURNAROUND IN FRANCE AS WELL, IN TERMS OF SAFEGUARDS.

I would say in a certain way... it was.

IN 1963, FRANCE DECLINED TO SIGN THE PARTIAL TEST-BAN TREATY. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS IT DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS A NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURE?

Let's say that France had, very like every country, a very selfish, nationalistic policy. France was building a nuclear deterrent. France had not yet reached the stage of the hydrogen bomb. In those days it was unthinkable to test the hydrogen bomb in an underground explosion. Today we can do it. In those days we couldn't. And therefore we had to be free to test our hydrogen bomb, which by the way was only ready in '68; we were obliged to test it in the air, and if we had signed the non-, the partial test-ban treaty, we would have handicapped our military program. That's why we couldn't sign it. It was not a ques-, it was, in a way, because it prevent your testing, it was a kind of non-proliferation treaty. But we didn't want this non-proliferation to apply to us. And therefore we didn't sign it. China did the same thing.

WAS IT YOU WHO SAID, "EVERY COUNTRY MAKES A MISTAKE?"JOSEPH NYE TALKS ABOUT EVERY COUNTRY HAVING MADE A MISTAKE...IN THE CASE OF THE US, IT'S INDIA...IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, ISRAEL. WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

One speaks of sin, perhaps the biggest sin we committed towards the non-proliferation philosophy and treaty... is helping Israel.

IN 1963, PRESIDENT KENNEDY PREDICTED THAT BY THE SEVENTIES, UP TO 25 NATIONS MAY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AT THE TIME DID YOU SHARE HIS CONCERN?

I didn't share the concern...of Kennedy, because, you see... I'll start again. I didn't share the concern of Kennedy, because it can be seen that what is needed is the political will. And really, the countries about which one worries today are the countries which on—

BUT IN 1963--

But...the 25 nations that President Kennedy thought... one must look at it in two ways. There's no doubt that from one point of view he is right, that 10 years or 15 years after his prediction, there are 25 countries, which if they had the political will, they could have the weapon. But it is the political will that counts, and very few countries have this political will, because it's expensive, and also because these countries are either protected by the Russian nuclear brella or protected by the...American nuclear brella. And really the countries about which one has worried, and one will continue worrying, are those which are protected neither by one or the other brella.

IN 1964, THE CHINESE EXPLODED THEIR FIRST ATOMIC BOMB. WHAT WAS THE REACTION IN FRANCE?

It was a surprise, until the Russians told us that they had given them everything. There is symmetry in history, in between the case of the British and the Americans. There was about 20 British scientists working in Los Alamos, on the making of the bomb, and that's how Britain got so easily a bomb in '52. Now when the Russians embarked on a program to make a weapon and catch up the Americans, they took all the best scientists available to them, and among those there were some very good Chinese physicists who had been trained in the States and who were taken in the most secret Russian, part of the work. And the day when Russia and China parted, those Chinese men were available. Furthermore... sometimes in the end of the... '50s, the Americans decided to build an enrichment plant in the part of the world...further away from any possible American bombing, and this was--

(INTERRUPTION).

Um, in the late '50s, the Soviet decided to build an enrichment plant, which could produce highly enriched uranium, which is an explosive, in the part of the world the most distant of any possible American bombing. And this was the desert of the Sinkiang, in China. When in '59 there was a split in between China and Russia, the Russians take away overnight their scientists, they had to leave the plant, which was unfinished, and which the Chinese finished, and it's from that plant that they made the U-235, the uranium-235, which was used for their first bomb. And by the way, it's the first country whose first bomb was built of the Hiroshima type and not of the plutonium Nagasaki type.

HOW DO YOU KNOW THIS?

This was...gossip with the Russians.

DO YOU RECALL ANY OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS?

The one who told us was a man called Akimovich, who was a great specialist of fusion in Russia, and I think he even used the word, "The pigs -- we gave them everything!"

LET'S JUST START AGAIN.

Yes. I think in the 1964 Geneva Conference, if I am not wrong, they told us that they had helped considerably the Chinese, because they had employed Chinese scientists in the ef-, in their own project, and that they had given them...the Chinese had got all their information from the Russians.

(QUESTION REPEATED)

From what I understood is that they had employed, at all levels of the work, and even in the most secret part, the making of the bomb, they had employed Chinese scientists, and these Chinese scientists were capable of helping the Chinese to make the bomb the day... there had been a... complete split in between the two countries.

CAN YOU SAY THAT AND INCLUDE IN IT THAT YOU HEARD IT FIRSTHAND?

I don't think I did.

WHAT DO YOU REMEMBER THE SOVIETS TELLING YOU?

I remember quite clearly Akimovich, who was one of the great specialists in So-, Soviet Union of the fusion, telling us that all the know-how the Chinese had come from Russia.

(DISCUSSION)

The best proof, I would say, is that... the Chinese... China is the country who passed the quickest in between the... classical A-bomb to the much more difficult and sophisticated H-bomb, hydrogen bomb. They did it in three years. In France we took eight years. In Britain they took... five years. And... when de Gaulle learned that the Chinese had exploded a hydrogen bomb before us, though they had exploded a classical A-bomb four years after us, he did, he gave a terrible scolding to the Minister... in charge of atomic energy in France. He said... "Alors, men! Even the Chinese are capable of doing what we haven't yet done."

TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THEIR RAPID PACE?

I... attribute the rapid... space, pace, of the Chinese... the development of the weapon, Chinese weapon program, to the fact that the best Chinese scientists were employed in Russia on the most secret part of the Russian program, exactly as during the war, the British scientists, 20 of them, were employed under Los, and, at Los Alamos under Oppenheimer, on the making of the American bombs.

DO YOU RECALL HOMI BHABHA'S REACTION TO THE INDIAN NEWS? HE GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE IN LONDON. DO YOU RECALL THAT?

No.

DID YOU HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE PAKISTAN SCIENTISTS BEFORE '64?

No, the Pakistanis were building very slowly a Canadian type of where...you see…

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS IT KNOWN AT THE TIME THATTHE SUCCESS OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS DUE TO EARLY SOVIET ASSISTANCE?

It's only after the Chinese explosion, that the Russians told us that they had, the Chinese had been helped considerably by the know-how they had gathered by participating to the most secret...phases of the Russian program.

TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THE FAST PACE OF THEIR WEAPONS PROGRAM?

I attribute the fast pace to the, of the, of the Chinese program to the fact that Chinese top scientists, physicists, theoreticians, were employed by the Russians in the most secret part, the weapon-making part, probably both A-bomb and H-bomb phase of the Russian project.

DURING THIS POINT IN TIME, '64, '65, THE SUPERPOWERS WERE MOVING CLOSER TOGETHER, YOU WERE GETTING MORE OF A COOPERATIVE EFFORT IN TERMS OF NON-PROLIFERATION. HOW DID THE FRENCH REGARD THIS?

I think this joint cooperative effort was regarded as a good sign, because détente, in between America and Soviet Russia, was very important for the peace of the world, and therefore even though the... partial test-ban treaty was a treaty we couldn't join, we couldn't not rejoice in a way by the fact that there was a sort of slowing down of the hostility in between the east and the west. But in the same time, we were a little bit reluctant, or definitely reluctant, to see the world run by a American-Soviet co-dominion.

WHY DID FRANCE CHOOSE NOT TO SIGN NPT?

When France didn't sign the partial test-ban treaty in 1963, it clearly stated that the main reason... the... main unselfish reason was that it was not a disarmament treaty, but a treaty to disarm those which were not armed. And this argument was absolutely valid, for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so it was difficult for the French government to say, "We will sign the NPT, because it doesn't slow down our military program. We refuse to sign the partial test-ban treaty because it does slow down our weapon program." And so, we said we would behave like if we had signed it, but we didn't want to sign it. And by the way, it seemed clear that if we sign one, we couldn't not sign the other, and therefore not wanting to sign the first one, the partial test-ban treaty, we decided not to sign the second one. And then there was always the fact that France wanted to take some advantage of the fact that she didn't belong to the... co-dominion, if you want, American-Soviet co-dominion, to which England, Britain was a sort of... junior partner, and we felt that towards the developing world... we would be in a better position if we didn't sign that treaty, which was forcing them to renounce something we hadn't renounced ourselves.

LET'S DO IT AGAIN BUT JUST A LITTLE BRIEFER...

France view NPT, what it is. It is a treaty where people, the parents tell the children, Do what we tell you to do, and don't do what we are doing. Therefore, we felt that if we signed NPT, we had to sign the Moscow treaty also, and that we didn't want to...

LET'S DO THE ANALOGY AGAIN. WHAT WAS THE FRENCH VIEW OF NPT?

In a way, France has tried to be absent from these treaties, which prevent countries, less advanced countries, doing what the most advanced countries have done. If you want, we feel that the NPT treaty, or even the partial test ban treaty, is a count-, is a treaty where the parents tell the children, "Do what you're told to do by us, but don't do what we do."

ONE MORE TIME.

The French view of NPT was that it is not a disarmament treaty -- it's a treaty to prevent the countries which are not armed, to arm themselves. And in a way, it's an unfair treaty --I'm sorry for the word "unfair" -- because it's a treaty where the parents tell their children, "Do what you're told to do, but don't do what we're doing."

TO WHAT EXTENT DID FRANCE'S OWN EXPERIENCE AS AN UNWANTED MEMBER OF THE NUCLEAR CLUB AFFECT HER PROLIFERATION POLICY?

It must be seen that among the nuclear powers -- and I'm speaking of the western nuclear powers -- France is the only one which was for a long time prevented to become nuclear, by the other nuclear-power countries. We were not given material; we were not given know-how. And therefore, France... feels, understands better the position of the countries which have to renounce. If you want, in a childish way, we've been thieves before becoming cops, and we understand better the mentality of the countries which don't like being told what they cannot do.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION, THE REACTION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, TO THE INDIAN TEST OF 1974?

There's two reactions. The scientists were quite proud, pleased, to see the Indian scientists succeed. We liked them, we were friends of them since 20 more years, and even it is said that the congratulation telegram was sent from the French atomic energy commission to the Indian atomic energy commission. But in the same time, the French government, foreign minister, who is by that time becoming very conscious of the problem of proliferation, they were not too happy about it.

WAS THE TELEGRAM SENT OR NOT? WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION AND THE REACTION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT?

There was two reactions: the French scientists, who had been friendly with the Indian scientists, knew that the Indian scientists would be very proud of their technical success, and the French commission even sent a telegram to the Indian commission congratulating them. But the second reaction was the reaction of the French government, and the foreign, French foreign office, which by then was becoming very conscious of the problem of proliferation, and they were not happy about it.

IS IT TRUE ABOUT THE FACT THAT FRANCE THEN OFFERED TO HELP WITH THE FAST BREEDER REACTOR FOLLOWING THAT?

It is not true. No...the help that we gave...that the French government gave India, in two fields: the field of heavy-water production plants, and the field...of fast breeder reactors, came three years before the Indian tests, it was, it was negotiated in '71, when we decided to help them to make, to build the most elementary breeder research reactor, and French industry built them two heavy-water plants.

DID YOU SHARE THE SKEPTICISM OF MOST OF THE WORLD THAT THIS WAS NOT A PEACEFUL REACTION?

There is no peaceful nuclear devices. There is an explosion, which is neither...it's like if you say is a baby homosexual or heterosexual? When it's born, it's a baby. An explosion is an explosion --it's neither peaceful or military -- it's, it's the way it will be used at a certain time, it will become either military or peaceful. But when you test it has no sex.

DID YOU VIEW IT VERY SERIOUSLY?

The first test in a country is never a bomb. One wants to know if putting together two pieces of plutonium if it... if a bang takes place. And, in between... a first test and a bomb that you can give to your army or air force and tell them, you have 95 or 99 chances out of a hundred that it will work in case of war, there's an enormous step, and this step you can only...overcome...in doing testing. And I could say that my personal belief that...uh, Indians have no nuclear deterrent because they have no, not tested; I don't believe that today the Indians have real bombs that they could give the army, and the army'd be sure that they would work.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE US WAS GETTING MORE CONCERNED ABOUT PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, AND THIS WAS SPURRED ON BY THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF THAT IN FRANCE?

It was very serious, because we were terribly dependent of

START AGAIN. (QUESTION REPEATED)

The effect of... the effect a Arab oil embargo had on France was... a very worrying effect, because we needed more dollars, and at that time, one of the possible sources of dollars to buy Arab oil was to sell them reactors. And that's how we got... started in negotiation, to sell a research reactor to Iran... I'm sorry, to sell—

ISN'T IT TRUE THAT YOU HAD A LIMITED AMOUNT OF ENERGY RESOURCES…?

France has no oil... practically no oil, no gas, and very bad coal, on its metropolitan territory. Therefore, France was terribly dependent on Arab oil, and the reaction of the embargo, the first oil crisis, was... that our government launch an enormous... nuclear program, which puts us today in the forefront of electric-, nuclear electricity producing countries; the electricity which is, that you are using... that is used to see me, actually, is 70 percent, about, nuclear, and we are by far the world record country in that proportion.

YOU SAID AT THE TIME THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY IS THE ONLY SOLUTION AGAINST THE STRANGLING OF THE WESTERN WORLD BY ARAB COUNTRIES. DO YOU STILL STAND BY THAT?

The oil crisis was predicted beautifully, in a very striking terms, in the mid-'50s by the three wise men report, a German, a Frenchman, and an Italian, on the future sources of energy in the world, and they stated quite clearly that the only way for Europe to be independent of, or more, less dependent of the Arab...of the Middle-East oil, was to launch large nuclear programs. We still believe that today.

IN THE PERIOD '73-74, FRANCE NEGOTIATED A NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS. THEY BECAME A TARGET OF MUCH CRITICISM. HOW DO YOU JUSTIFY THEM IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENTLY NEGOTIATED NPT?

The NPT...evolved, or let's say the American policy evolved, from '74 and after the Indian test. The Americans, the American government, believed that the NPT was insufficient. By that time, France was applying the NPT and nothing more. Our sales to Iran and Iraq, a power reactor, twin power reactor, to Iran, and a very sophisticated research reactor to Iraq, were both under agency safeguards. In a way, we were applying exactly the rules of NPT. But by that time, the American government was unhappy about NPT, and was starting to consider that certain countries shouldn't get any help, even under safeguards.

WHY DID IRAQ NEED A REACTOR?

Because... every rich country, and they were very wealthy, felt that it was a question--

(INTERRUPTION)

Quite clearly, in those days, and probably still is, for a country which has the means, either financial or industrial, to form... a strong team in atomic energy, it is a question of... I'm sorry.

WHAT'S YOUR RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN CRITICISM THAT FRANCE EXPLOITED THE LOOPHOLES OF NPT?

The Americans felt that France was taking commercial advantage of not really applying, as strictly as they were, the rules of the NPT, rules that we hadn't signed. We had said at the United Nations, in '68, that we would behave as if we had signed NPT, and President Ford met Giscard, President Giscard d'Estaing, in the end of '74, at Martinique (?), and they discussed... the...Indian test. And France agreed, from there on, not only to behave in the spirit of the treaty, but to behave in the letter of the treaty. And that's where we organized the main meetings of the main suppliers, in London, in... the year '75, and agreed all the main nuclear suppliers to obey certain rules which we called the London guidelines.

CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE, WHICH FRANCE BOYCOTTED?

Yes.

WHY DID FRANCE BOYCOTT IT?

Because the Zangger Committee... the Zangger Committee was created to elaborate on a given clause of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which case one would insist on safeguards, and in which case one shouldn't. If one says, some concrete for a nuclear reactor, one doesn't ask safeguards. If one says uranium, enriched uranium, one applies safeguards. And as we didn't belong to the treaty, we had no reason to participate in the making of the list. But later, when we joined... the bandwagon in London, and agreed on the guidelines, in the guidelines there's a list which is even a little more strict than the Zangger list, so... by '75 we had joined the Zangger list.

WHAT ACCOUNTED FOR THAT TURNAROUND?

The turnaround is due that...I think the President of the Republic, and the foreign of-, Giscard d'Estaing, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and the foreign ministry, got quite convinced that France had to behave, had to prevent... by its own means, proliferation as well as the other countries who were trying to do it. And by the way, by that time, nobody discussed anymore the fact that we were a nuclear power. In the '60s, when we had exploded a bomb, we were still not considered as a nuclear power. For instance... the Americans were... refusing to sell us high very sophisticated computers, because it would help us in our program. All that was finished. We were admitted in the club without any discrimination.

IN THE MID-SEVENTIES, YOU WERE INVOLVED WITH SOME VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS, AND AMERICA WAS VERY CRITICAL OF FRANCE FOR EXPLOITING THESE LOOPHOLES. HOW DID YOU PERSONALLY FEEL ABOUT THAT?

Personally...I never felt...very guilty, because I have all that past. On the first day in Canada, when overnight the Americans ceased to collaborate with the British, this was already in '43, a move on non-collaboration. And... I signed, the first of January, 1946, a contract to stay one year more in Canada, asked by the British and the Canadian government. And the 18th of January, I was out of Canada, because the Americans had insisted that no Frenchman would be allowed to continue working in the field, so I have seen so much of this... kind of discrimination -- at one time it was against France — that I've always been less worried about discrimination, or less keen to discriminate towards other countries. And I can tell you that today --I'm out of everything, so I can tell it... more easily.

THAT SAME YEAR, '74, THE PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL, PRESIDENT KATZIR ANNOUNCED ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION? DID IT SURPRISE YOU?

It didn't mean anything, because we knew perfectly well that since 10 years, the Israelis had a reactor which... was capable of producing enough plutonium for a bomb or two or three a year, so that didn't, it wasn't a surprise for us. We knew more in France about the Israeli program than many other countries.

WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE CHASHMA REPROCESSING CONTRACT?

It's a long history, because the Pakistanis came to us in the middle '60s, after the time the Indians had finished their reprocessing plant, and asked us to build one, and we were not specially keen, and so we insisted — and it's the first countries where we asked international agency safeguards — and the Pakistanis said it's unfair, you haven't asked them when you helped India. Then, they asked us we asked them, they asked us to finance the plant, and we were not ready to spend a lot of money on that plant. And then, they couldn't decide the size of the plant, and the whole thing dragged on for about ten years, and then suddenly in '74, they were ready to accept agency safeguards; they had find, found some financing, I think Libyan or Arab, whatever it was --we never were told — and furthermore, they had decided the size of the plant. So we were more or less committed to agree to go ead with the agreement. Then later, it made so many difficulties that we went back on the agreement we had signed, and asked them extra conditions. It was the days where the Americans were very against export, transfer of reprocessing technology; so we became stricter, and the, finally... the whole agreement ceased being applied — by the way, I don't think it was ever cancelled; it was just, it died out. By that time they had received a lot of plans of the plant, but practically no equipment.

IN 1974, WHEN THE PAKISTANIS FIRST APPROACHED FRANCE, WHAT WAS IT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN?

It, the Pakistanis approached France in 1964.

IF YOU CAN SUMMARIZE THAT REALLY BRIEFLY...

They approached France in '64, because at that time, they were playing with the idea of having a very large nuclear civilian nuclear-power program, and a... reprocessing plant was reasonable. Now, by the time they, we were committed to go ead with them, everything hadn't be, having been solved by '74, '75, by that time, their program hadn't gone ead. It was very limited, and therefore they were going to have a plant which was too large, practically, for their program.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE PLANT?

The Pakistanis could have built...the makeshift plant, in '74, using the know-how which was available. Exactly like the Indians did. But, they preferred paying the refined plant where they were sure no workman would have accidents of radiation, having the up-to-date technology that we were capable of selling them, and we were interested in selling our technology.

THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT HAVE INFERRED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT KNEW OF PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS TO USE THE REPROCESSING PLANT TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

You see, it's again the same story, of the... discussing the sex of the baby before it was born, and before this new method, which allow us to know the sex of the baby. Before the plant existed, you couldn't know what kind of government would be present in Pakistan, when the plant would be finished. Naturally there was a very military-minded government, they could use it for military purposes. But one mustn't forget that this plant was under agency safeguards, and therefore they could only use it for military purposes either in cheating or in breaking agreement and forbidding the inspectors of the agency to come and inspect the plant.

WHY AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DID FRANCE DECIDE TO WITHDRAW ASSISTANCE FROM PAKISTAN?

Because by then we were much more conscious of this problem of non-proliferation, we didn't want to be accused, to help... we didn't want to help Pakistan to make bombs, we didn't want to be accused to help them; and we felt that each time we asked added guarantees from Pakistan, they were refusing them. So therefore, we decided to stop.

HOW MUCH PRESSURE DID THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US EXERT ON THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THERE?

To my knowledge, the Soviet Union didn't exert any pressure, and to my knowledge, Kissinger came and saw our minister even one summer in Deauville, of all places, which was, which is a summer resort.

YOU DON'T REMEMBER BREZHNEV APPEALING TO D'ESTAING?...LET'S GO ON TO THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP AGAIN. WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION AT THESE MEETINGS?

At those meetings, there was two different positions. There was the American Carter policy, who wanted to refuse to any country the right to produce either plutonium, in their reprocessing plant, or to enrich uranium, even though enriched uranium is the fuel needed for a power reactor. Even under safeguards, and that we felt went too far. And...we accepted that in the case of this sensitive technology, one should be as careful to take great care, great caution, which meant, but it's not stated in the London guidelines, means that you are ready to discriminate, that if you want to sell Belgium something, and you have no worry that Belgium has no intention to make a bomb, you can be more lenient with Belgium than with Libya.

CAN YOU PUT THAT A BIT BRIEFER?

The Carter policy was that the two technologies, which can lead to... the producing explosives, the reprocessing plant, the plutonium, or the enrichment plant, for U-235, should not be sold even under safeguards, and that we felt unfair, because these are plants which are elements in the civilian technology. A reprocessing plant can be used if you make breeders, is necessary, or an enrichment plant can be used if you want to make your own fuel. And therefore we accepted that in the case of these two sensitive technologies, we should act with caution, naturally under safeguards.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE WEST GERMANS HAD JUST SIGNED A DEAL WITH BRAZIL. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT, AND CARTER'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION?

The fact that they were selling those technologies to Brazil, under proper safeguards, didn't worry us. But we did feel, and this is a completely different side of the picture, that the Brazilians were embarking, were pushed by the Germans to embark on a gigantic program, which was completely out of proportion for their means, and as you know, not much more than 10 percent of this program has been...executed, and that Brazil completely broke its public obliged to stop (?).

HOW DID YOU VIEW PRESIDENT CARTER'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978?

I viewed it as exaggerated. You see as I... as I've told... reprocessing, and The idea of President Carter was really to outlaw plutonium, and to outlaw reprocessing. That is not reasonable; you can't... you can't... and after that we had this INFCE conference where everybody ganged up to show the Americans that proposal were unreasonable.

AM I NOT RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THIS WAS A TIME WHEN EUROPE WAS TAKING OFF IN THIS TECHNOLOGY AND WHEN AMERICA WAS FALLING BY THE WAYSIDE?

I think you must realize that... one must realize... that, it is a time where Europe continued, and not took off. And where America made a kind of self-castration. I mean the decision of President Carter to stop the breeder reactor was a kind of partial suicide in the field. And... for that, from that moment on, the Americans started losing the advance compared to the rest of the world.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL FUEL-CYCLE EVALUATION GROUP? WHAT DID IT ACCOMPLISH?

It was an enormous happening, it cost millions of dollars, if you add all the hours lost in transport of the 500-odd scientists who worked, and it showed Americans quite clearly, which was obvious before the start, that nobody was ready to accept their policy, their exaggerated self-immolation policy.

IF YOU COULD JUST ENCAPSULATE THE CARTER APPROACH TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND WHAT YOU FELT ABOUT IT AT THE TIME?

The Carter policy had something different. With the past policies of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because this time, the Carter policy wanted to prevent the rest of the world, to make plutonium. But in the same time, decided that America, to show it was a good boy, would also stop making plutonium. The result was that nobody agreed stopping, and the Americans punished themselves.

DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS A REMINDER OF THE EARLY DAYS, THE POLICY OF DENIAL?

No...it wasn't the policy of denial, because they were deny-, the Americans were starting to...deny to themselves, which was so unreasonable.

BUT THEY WERE STOPPING EXPORTS OF TECHNOLOGY.IN THAT SENSE IT WAS DENIAL.

Yes. It was also a policy of denial.