IF YOU COULD HELP US GET A SENSE OF THE FEELING IN YOUR PART OF THE CIA IN THE SUMMER OF '62 WHICH LED TO THE ESTIMATE THAT WE SHOWED YOU,

Well, in the summer of 1962 -- of course this was after the Bay of Pigs — we were following carefully the activities in Cuba. I was involved in the activities from the standpoint of a guided missile and space intelligence division which was looking at Soviet missile activities. And since Soviets had missiles in Cuba, we were following very closely in the activities in Cuba in terms of both their defensive missiles and their offensive missiles. And one of the key questions that was developing during that summer was the Soviet activities in Cuba, the extent of the surface, to air missile deployment in Cuba and the rational and reason for that deployment as well as the key question: Will the Soviets put offensive missiles into Cuba or not?

AND YOUR FEELING IN SEPTEMBER WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT?

The feeling of most of the analysts uh...in the CIA at that time was that we could explain most of the surface to air missiles in the context of the repeating the Bay of Pigs. And those missiles would be quite effective against B-26s and the type of aircraft were used at that time. Uh... the question of offensive missiles from an analyst standpoint looked at what is the evidence do you have that the Soviets are actually putting in offensive missiles. And we could find no evidence in terms of firm information indicating that they were.

AND I GUESS IN TERMS OF LOOKING AT WHAT THEY'VE DONE IN THE PAST THERE WASN'T ANY FEELING THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER THIS?

Well, this was a unique uh...occasion. The Soviets had not moved offensive missiles out of the Soviet Union even to their satellites, much less to something that far away and overseas. So there was no precedence on which to build or to analyze Soviet activities.

SO YOU FELT THAT THE SAMS WERE PRIMARILY A DEFENSIVE AGAINST ANOTHER BAY OF PIGS?

One rationale for the SAMs and the extensive SAM deployment and obviously uh...with Soviet support, Soviet operations — their complex systems — was to assure that there'd be no other invasion of Cuba. And they were deployed quite extensively. But this was at the analysts level. There were 2 people in CIA who questioned this judgment, one of which was the director, Mr. McCone and the other was Dr. Wheelon -- Howard Wheelon, known as Bud Wheelon. They questioned this because of 2 reasons. One: Why would the Soviets put such an extensive defensive system in unless they were planning on defending some other activity. And they felt that there were so many Soviet troops in Cuba on the defensive that there must be some plans for other activities and therefore one could not exclude the possibility of putting offensive weapons into Cuba.

THERE WAS THE FAMOUS MCCONE HONEYMOON CABLE. DID YOU READ ANY OF THOSE?

No. No. I was a working level analyst. I met with McCone, but more often I met with Ray Cline and Bud Wheelon, my immediate bosses.

LET'S LOOK AT SOME OF THESE PHOTOS. WHAT DID YOU THINK WHEN YOU FIRST SAW THESE?

Well, there's a couple of words of background behind this. Uh...there was a question which was very thoroughly researched on this question — Would they or would they not put offensive missiles into Cuba -- And we were looking very hard at all the evidence. There were a lot of reports coming out of Cuba on visual observations of missiles and movement of missiles. Most of those reports could be equated to the surface to air missiles. In other words, they were moving those around extensively. But there's a significant difference in the size between a surface to air missile and an offensive missile such as the SS-4 and 5 which they eventually put into Cuba. But out of this voluminous number of reports, there were about 5 or 6 of these reports which appeared to be credible. They appeared to describe missiles that were much larger than those of surface to air missies. And these caused us concern. Those reports provided a basis for targeting the portion of Cuba to look at when the weather cleared up and we could actually fly a U-2. And it was on the basis of those reports that we were able to go to the right place and to find uh...these particular missiles. As you will recall there was a period of time when the weather was very bad and we couldn't fly over Cuba to get any information. These pictures were taken when the weather broke and were then sent back to the national photo interpretation center which Art Lundahl was involved with. I got a call from one of my branch chiefs who was down and looked at these in the evening and said, You had better come down. There's something important. So I went down and as quick as we looked at these uh...pictures it was clear that we had an offensive ballistic missile. There was no question because we knew enough about these missiles from their activities in the Soviet Union from the parades in Moscow. And particularly we had the Panofsky material which was very vital and useful in uh...doing the analysis on these. So there was no question of what we had at the time. And this was a combined analysis of the branch chief, the photo interpreters and myself and then we called our bosses right away and advised them. And then we went through the analysis that night of uh...reviewing which missile is it? What's the status? And so forth. And then we were told to appear in Mr. Cline's office, who was the deputy director for intelligence at that time, at 8 O'clock the next morning with the write-up, with the pictures. And then we decided where to go from there. Exactly who uh...Ray Cline and Bud Wheelon advised that night, I don't know. They were my immediate bosses.

THE MISSILES WE SEE THERE — THERE'S ONE OF A CONVOY ALONG A ROAD AND THERE'S ONE WHERE YOU CAN SEE SOME... WHAT DO YOU SEE WHEN YOU LOOK?

Well, what an analyst sees uh...is one set of information. Because an analyst has been used to looking at a lot of pictures. By an analyst --and when I say analyst now, I'm talking about an intelligence analyst — there are also photo interpreters who are experts at looking at these pictures, but more importantly, they have the negatives which you can look at. And you can look at them in stereo. And they can do a lot of mensuration data. So an analyst by himself is limited on what he can deduce from these pictures without the assistance of photo interpreters. And that is what Art Lundahl sho... So the analysis done here is done by people who are knowledgeable on missile systems; how missile systems operate, what they look like in the field. And a photo interpreter who can tell you, that's a shadow, that's part of the nose, that isn't. And if what you're looking at there is a canvas and the objects under it and we can't tell the exact dimensions. So you have to work as a team in order to be able to come up with an interpretation.

SO LUNDAHL WOULD SAY TO YOU, LOOK AT THIS...

Well, Lundahl and his photo interpreters — he had a lot of experts who had been working for some time on the uh...missile problem from other information — And those experts sat down, 3 or 4 of us at a desk, and they have the photos. They also have the negatives. And you say, What I want to know — I want to know the length. Well they say, I only know the length plus or minus two feet because there's canvas and I cannot uh...determine you know where that missile cuts off, where the canvas stops. So you have to know your uncertainties.

CAN YOU GO THROUGH THAT LAST PART AGAIN?

Well, the intelligence analyst working with me, my own views and those of the interpreters — When collectively that group met there was no question that we had offensive missiles in Cuba. And that's a combination of knowledge of Soviet missiles from parades, from other intelligence such as Penkovsky and the photo interpreter's telling us exactly what he sees there and the similarity with that activities and other material that they had been able to review. So there was no question when you get that group together that we had offensive missiles. The problem we had at the time, the first night, was whether or not this missile was what was known as the Soviet SS-3 or the Soviet SS-4. And the 4 is kind of a thousand nautical mile missile. And the 3 is a much shorter range missile. This becomes extremely important when you consider Cuba is 90 miles from Miami and the range of that missile as to how much of the United States could it cover. So we knew we had a problem. And the problem could not be resolved immediately because we did not know whether the nose cone was on the missile or not. Because these missiles had been shipped from the Soviet Union and the boosters were there and normally the nose cone, which carries the nuclear component, may or may not be mated at that point in time. And that makes a difference in dimensions of several feet. And until we could get through the canvas and see and determine, we would not know which missile. And the first day, when we reported to the President, we still had not resolved this particular issue. But subsequently, with more data, more pictures, we were able to clearly identify that the missiles we're looking at in these 2 pictures were SS-4s. Roughly a thousand miles range. And subsequently additional missiles of a different type, known as the SS-5 and about 1500 miles range, were also being deployed in Cuba in fixed pre — you know surveyed and pre-positioned launch pads.

HOW COULD LUNDAHL AND THE OTHERS TELL YOU THE LENGTH OF THOSE PIECES?

It's a mensuration technique that the photo interpreters are very excellent at because they uh...have some data on both the altitude, the size and so forth. And it's a complicated process which is done manually, but is now done mostly by computers. And they are very good at that.

SO HE WOULD TELL YOU FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THAT LITTLE PIECE OF WHITE IS HOW MANY FEET LONG?

He would tell me that this particular object here is a canvas covered missile and that object is X feet long. And he would also tell me, Our uncertainty is plus or minus one foot. It is so many inches in diameter plus or minus 3 inches. And they will tell you what the plus or minus because that's very important. And they can determine that not only from the object. Frequently shadows are as important as the object, because the shadow may be clearer and you can get a more precise measurement off the shadow. But you also have to know the length of the shadow, the angle of the sun, the time of day. It's not a simple problem and these fellows earn their pay.

THESE PARADES THROUGH RED SQUARE MUST BE VERY USEFUL.

They were very useful in providing a basic information on the uh...missiles that uh...the Soviets were parading through. And when they paraded them, they were not canvas covered. So that gives you a real asset.

(REPEAT THE QUESTION)

Well there are 3 real important pieces of information which were available before the Cuban Missile.... That is basically the knowledge of the intelligence analyst on the Soviet exploitation of the German missile program, their own missile programs, what they were doing in different places, other sources of information, plus the Moscow parades. Which they paraded the missiles by in Moscow and there with attaché photographs and other, you got very clear pictures of the missile and very good uh...measurement data which you can compare with these data. We also at the time, had the Panofsky information which was also extremely useful in explaining how the Soviets would operate with these types of missile.

TELL ME A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE PENKOVSKY INFORMATION.

Well, there's been the Penkovsky book. Uh...I don't want to go into a lot of details. But basically, Penkovsky was able to describe how missile units of this type would operate in the Soviet Union. So we had to... The Penkovsky material, much of which has been published in his book and other activities, but basically in this context, Penkovsky's material had provided us a good insight as to how the Soviets would operate with these types of missiles in the Soviet Union. What Penkovsky of course didn't tell us, was how the missiles would be shipped overseas. And so therefore we had to figure out the problems the Soviets would encounter having shipped these missiles overseas: Mow much time did it take to unwrap them, to get them packaged up and to go into operation in a foreign land.

LET'S TALK A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THE PHOTOS. WHAT IS THIS PHOTOGRAPH?

Well, basically this photograph was taken by one of the low altitude flights that the air-force was flying uh... complementing the U-2 flights. Uh. . .and at this altitude, of course, you get much more detail. And from this, now, the PI is not going to have trouble in getting specifics because he knows the size of that truck. He can use the measurement from that truck to measure these canvas covered objects here and give you more precision as to the dimensions. And this is normally the way the Soviets would operate with these type of covered facilities where they can check out the missile without you seeing it. If I ever move to the Soviet Union, I'm going to go into the canvas business because they really uses that for uh...practically everything.

BUT JUST COVERING ONE OF THESE THINGS WITH CANVAS, OBVIOUSLY IT WASN'T FOOLING YOU VERY MUCH.

The Soviets are extremely security conscious. They are very conscious about covering items and the canvas covered object. If you saw that, that wouldn't mean anything to you to look at that. You know, it could be a sewage pipe. It could be uh...something covered for some food of that nature. But to an expert who has been working this subject, knows how it works and can identify unique vehicles, there is a signature. Photo interpreters work off of what is normally called a signature. Certain things — even crates have signatures. It's sometimes called Cratology. And when they move MIG-23s you can look at the crates and you can identify. Uh...so the...these could be changed, but the point is, it takes an effort to change it. The Soviets use canvas. There's kind of a unique signature to those activities. But those canvas covers do preclude you from getting the specificity that you would like. It's not like having that missile in a parade in Moscow in front of you.

WHAT WAS THIS PHOTOGRAPH?

Well, those are prefabricated concrete uh...uh... which you prefabricate ahead of time then you assemble them. And that's to be assembled into an igloo type of operation which can either be used for checking out the missile or for command and control.

I THINK THIS IS ONE OF THE PICTURES THAT YOU TOOK INTO THAT MEETING...IN TERMS OF RANGE AND THAT SORT OF THING BECAUSE THAT WAS OBVIOUSLY ONE OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS.

Not initially. Because this was a later time. See at this time when we took this picture or this -- It was actually a briefing board type exercise. When we took this in — This is after we had now identified that this really was an SS-4 and what we have on here is the range capabilities of an SS-4 which is 1,000 -- 1,100 nautical miles. And the range of the SS-5 which is — we also had identified with putting into Cuba. We did not know the SS-5 initially was there. So what this is showing the planner is that from these locations missiles.. This missile of 1,100 nautical miles can cover Washington and the SS-5 can cover essentially all of the United States except Seattle.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE FIRST EXCOMM MEETING THAT YOU ATTENDED. ... TELL US ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT THE BEGINNING OF THAT MEETING.

Well, as I mentioned to you earlier, we were to be in Dr. Cline's office with the photos, with statements so forth. Which we did and went over it. And after he was satisfied, then Art Lundahl and I were dispatched to the White House

WHAT HAPPENED AT THE EXCOMM MEETING?

Well, there's slight prelude to that. We were sent over to the White House around 9 O'clock in the morning to brief McGeorge Bundy who was his assistant. And then Bobby Kennedy came in and Dillon came in and we gave them a briefing which was essentially showing them the pre-prepared statement and also the briefing boards that were in the pictures that we had gotten the day before -- some of which you have seen here. Uh... they decided to call the EXCOMM meeting for around 11:30, 11:45 that morning. And Bobby Kennedy had gone up and briefed the President on the results. We did not see the President until the EXCOMM meeting. The EXCOMM meeting was convened. We were all in the uh...meeting room -- the NSC meeting room — and uh...we were waiting for the President. Uh...the door opened from the President's office. He came through and we rose, Good morning, Mr. President. He said, Good morning gentlemen. Get down to business. And he was just about to set down in his chair when the door through which he had come from his office burst open and Carolyn Kennedy came into the room. But someone was obviously holding on to her arms so she couldn't get completely in. And as I recall her words were essentially, Daddy, Daddy, They won't let my friend in. And the President smiled and said, Excuse me, gentlemen and got up, put his arm around Caroline Kennedy. Uh...took her out of the office. Was gone less than a minute. Came back in and he said that you should proceed with business. At which point uh...we turned to uh...General Carter who was the deputy director of CIA since Mr. McCone was on the coast — who read a prepared statement. And after the prepared statement said, Then we should look at the evidence. And then Mr. Lundahl laid the briefing book, which is a fold out book, in front of the President with Rusk on one side and McNamara on the other side. And then Mr. Lundahl proceeded to say, This is Cuba, this is Muriel and this is the pictures of the actual missiles.

INTERESTING THAT SOMEBODY ELSE WAS HAVING A CRISIS...

Well, I think the Kennedy's were very adept at handling crises in their family and this was an example of a president who really had things under control between personal problems and business problems. And I think all of us admired him in the manner in which he handled it.

WHAT WAS THE FIRST QUESTION THAT YOU GOT AFTER YOU MADE YOUR BRIEF?

Well, Mr. Lundahl, of course, gave the briefing – he being the head of the photo interpretation and said, What we have — this is Cuba, the locations and these are the missiles uh...Mr. President. And shortly after he had presented “These are the missiles...” the President's first question was essentially, How long before they can fire those missiles. And at which point Mr. Lundahl referred, Well, Mr. Graybeal is our missile man and which I stood up behind the President, Rusk and McNamara with the briefing board in front of them. And uh...attempted to provide answers to their questions based on our knowledge of how the Soviets operate. And one important lesson that people should learn in Washington, which was very clear then — What you know and what you don't know are equally important to the President and the NSC in making a decision. So it was very important to explain to him exactly what we knew, the basis for that, and what we did not know. The first question that uh...secretary McNamara had was, Where are the nuclear warheads for those missies. And we did not know and it was important that we let him know what we knew. We knew how they operated in the Soviet Union, but we didn't know how they would operate in a nation like Cuba. And of course the McNamara and the President's questions were aimed at a key point that they must answer specifically how much time do they have before these missiles are an actual and real threat to the US And uh.. though one of the questions they asked, "Could they fire these missiles now?", and my answer was no, on the basis of the information we had, those missiles were not ready to be fired. There was considerable activity that had to take place. But once they had everything there, they could set them up and then fire them in a matter of hours. Based on our knowledge from what they were doing in the Soviet Union.

HOW MUCH TIME DID YOU GIVE THE...

I don't know how long I was there. But I was I fired uh... several questions by the President, by Rusk and by McNamara, all of which seemed to be focused on the main point of your knowledge of what the missiles are, the status of readiness of those missies, and how long they can fire, and when may we know more about this activity. And I expect it was probably a matter of uh...10 to 15 minutes though it seemed a lot longer when you're having questions from that level uh... you want to be sure your answers are accurate. After we finished those questions, Mr. Lundahl and I were excused from the meeting. General Carter stayed and we sat outside in the anteroom while the rest of the discussion as to precisely what the US would or would not do — And that information you need to get either from people that were present or from the unclassified.

HOW MUCH TIME DID YOU GIVE THE PRESIDENT?

Well, we...first we pointed out that...how these missiles would operate in the Soviet Union based on information of Penkovsky. We pointed out the problem of shipping these missiles overseas and the uncertainties as to how the missiles would be set up there. How much unpacking would be necessary. The gyros — how you spin the gyros up, how much time this will take. Most importantly, Where is the nuclear warhead? Where is the nose cone? That might be moved with the unit, but when you're moving the missiles overseas by ship do you move the...nuclear warhead with that? Or would you fly the warheads over, the nose cone? So there were so many unknowns there that it was not possible to give a precise uh...figure on that first day.

SO THEY WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE BEFORE THESE THINGS WERE READY TO FIRE. HOW DID YOU RESPOND?

Basically, I responded with both what we knew and what we didn't know. What we knew was basically how these units would operate in the Soviet Union, based in large part on the Penkovsky material. However, these missiles had been shipped from the Soviet Union to Cuba by boat. The problem was How were they wrapped? How were they stored? How long does it take to get them out? How long is it to be sure to get the components back together? But most importantly of all, was where are the nuclear warheads that go with these missiles? Had they been on the ships that were sent over? Would they be flown over? And in this first day, we had no evidence on which to base any judgments as to whether or not those nuclear warheads were or were not there. So you could only provide an answer in terms of how these units would operate. They clearly are not in a position to fire now. But for the time it will take them is directly dependent upon where those particular components are located and how long it takes them to set this unit up: namely, unwrapping it after it's been shipped uh...on the deck of a boat in salt water overseas. I mean, you've got lots of problems.

BUT I GET THE SENSE FROM READING HISTORIES THAT THEY FIGURED THEY HAD SOME TIME...

From the nature of the questions that were asked and the answers that we provided them, we did not give them any clear basis for a time at that first meeting. Now, subsequent, every--the process was very important because after that first meeting we were flying missions during the day. The pictures come in 5 to 6 at night. The analysts in PI sat down at night from whatever time it took up to midnight or 2 or 3 AM preparing a report which was then taken to each of these subsequent EXCOMM meetings and as we got more information we could be more definitive and not only by uh...general but by specific units. We were now following each unit and we had a status report on each one. And some of them would be closer to be in operational ready than others. But on this first day, there was no basis for telling other than they cannot fire those missiles now. In other words, that answer I could give. But how long it would take them — There were too many unknowns to give them a figure which they used which could be wrong. It was you know — It's important that they know what you don't know. And I had no basis on which to make any judgment as to how long it would take without more information.

IT WAS MCNAMARA WHO ASKED YOU ABOUT THE NOSE CONES?

Uh...the President wanted to know how long before they could fire these missies. Mr. McNamara's first question as I recall was Where are the nuclear warheads that go with these? Are they there or not.

DID THIS FRUSTRATE THEM THAT YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO GET THEM AN ANSWER?

No. I think they were is... was a very positive constructive meeting. They were trying to get as much information as they could on which to base their decision process as to where to go. There was never any uh...friction or any Why don't you know more or Why can't you give us a better answer. They ask you a question. They listen to the answer. They ask the next question. You were not challenged on your... on your answers as much as you were asked as to how did you know...

I GUESS THE REST OF THE TIME WAS GETTING THE NEW INFORMATION EACH DAY AND STUDYING IT...

Well, the EXCOMM met everyday. I was not present at any subsequent meetings. These were attended by uh...Bud Wheelon or Ray Cline on each of those days. My job was to work with the photo interpreters and the other missile analysts. We were now getting the community all involved. And as I say, we worked each night on going over all the evidence and preparing a report for the EXCOMM the next day which was in a format that I won't go into, but essentially was designed to tell them the status of every missile in Cuba in terms of where did...how long it would be before that missile could be operational. And that was all designed to provide them a basis for how much time do they have to act.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT WAS HAPPENING TOWARDS THE END OF THAT FIRST WEEK? THAT SURPRISED YOU THAT THEY WERE GETTING THESE THINGS READY SO QUICKLY?

No. Uh...we were following this on a day by day basis. We did find the SS-5s and these do require construction of a...a hard pad from launching from. And we saw that construction. And of course that gave us then a better handle on the timing of those than on the timing of the SS-4s which are in field units which can be fired from any solid surface with a flame deflector launcher of...Uh.-.when you say surge, I think uh...of what we saw was that the Soviets were moving rapidly to get these missiles ready. And uh...I don't call that any great surge. They were moving them in and you know...I don't know that there's anything that struck me as being any spectacular or extra effort to get them in firing condition by any certain time.

THEIR CONCERN BEGAN TO INCREASE TOWARDS THE END OF THE WEEK... AND THEY COULD SEE THAT THE MISSILES WERE ALMOST OPERATIONAL.

The concern is that on the first day, the pictures we've just looked at and discussed — these missile clearly were not operational. As I indicated, those of us doing the analysis were reading every night and providing a status report. More and more data were becoming available. It was clear that these units were getting better organized. Better in shape. The fuel tanks were there. The Harvey uh...transporter was there. You begin to see the whole unit and you also begin to see them in practicing. So now you come to the conclusion that that unit appears to nearing operational readiness. Or that unit is operational. This one's still a few days away. This one may be a week away. But towards that end of the week we were beginning to see that maybe some of these units were moving into operational readiness. Which essentially meant that now, under duress, the Soviets could actually fire X number of these missiles. And that's where I think the concern was. Not necessarily a surge in activity. The Soviets were moving these in and they were moving at a steady pace to prepare them.

(REPEAT THE QUESTION)

Well, I don't think it's appropriate to go into the details specifically of each of these reports or the format, but clearly, what you were seeing is that a series of units — and that we were identifying more units than just what we had seen — that each of these units was beginning to get nearer to an operational readiness. And you saw this both in terms of the fuel tanks and the warhead transporters. And other things start showing up and you see them getting into position. So what you do in your assessment is that that unit is at operational or nearing operational status. And that was what we would report. And that would be what would cause the EXCOMM uh...to surge or to be concerned. Because at this point — first day they couldn't fire them, towards the end of the week, units were now becoming operational. Not all of them. Just a few. So that in ten...in case there became a crisis that blew out of proportions, certain of these missiles, by our assessment, could be fired. And that's why the concern came up. And I don't call it a surge in Soviet activity. I call it a Soviet progression towards reaching operation readiness with missiles. And that clearly could happen with the SS-4 units in field long before the uh...SS-5 units which required construction.

ONE OF THE GREAT CONCERNS THAT MCNAMARA SPOKE ABOUT WHEN WE INTERVIEWED HIM WAS NOW THAT A FEW OF THESE THINGS WERE OPERATIONAL THAT SOME SOVIET GENERAL ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OR… SOMEONE MIGHT LAUNCH THIS MISSILE? WHAT'S YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL AT THAT TIME AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISSILE BEING LAUNCHED FROM CUBA?

Well, at the time, we were focusing as a missile intelligence analyst on the operational capabilities of which command and control was a part of that. We knew how the command and control system worked to a pretty good degree in the Soviet Union. You make assumptions...command and control work here and there is always the possibility that uh...one of these units could get out of control and that a Soviet colonel or somebody could get mad or something could happen and he could let one of them fire. There can always be an accident. I think the Soviets are very conscious about uh... accidents and they've been very careful and this has been reflected in subsequent agreements like their concern resulting in the Accidents Measures Agreement to be sure an accident doesn't get out of control. But that was a distinct possibility. And I think at the time, from McNamara's standpoint, from a missile analyst's standpoint, it would be an exception rather than, you know, something that normally wouldn't happen in the Soviet Union. There's pretty tight discipline.

BASED ON YOUR KNOWLEDGE AS A SOVIET ANALYST, WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF THESE BEING LAUNCHED INDEPENDENTLY?

Well, that was not a specific question that we were focusing on directly. I mean, McNamara had this concern that was reflected to EXCOMM. And it reflected by -- uh...at that level...And there were people also in the...EXCOMM that were top notch missile experts too, namely Bud Wheelon who had been in the US missile program...who was vey knowledgeable on intelligence And he may have given some answers that I'm unaware of in this uh...in this area. But from our standpoint, the Soviets are very conscious of the likelihood of accidents and they'd like to preclude those. We don't know the details of their command and control system, but basically they have strict discipline among their troops and it would be an exception if uh… some colonel or somebody took it on his own to fire a missile, And the consequences of that, I think they're pretty well aware of.

WERE YOU CONVINCED THESE MISSILES WERE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL, NOT CUBAN CONTROL?

Uh...in our view, they were definitely under Soviet control.

(REPEAT THE QUESTION)

These missiles, the SS-4s and SS-5s that we saw in Cuba were clearly under Soviet control.

HOW WERE YOU CONVINCED OF THAT?

By a series of uh...pieces of information as to how the Soviets operate uh...which would be different and how the Cubans operate and I don't want to go into the details of. Plus just the basic. The Soviets aren't about to turn these missiles over to the Cubans and they're not going to turn over any missile to the Cubans that has a nuclear warhead on the front end of it. And ah— particularly the Cubans would ah--would be hard pressed to have the technology to operate even if they did.

YOU NEVER SAW A NUCLEAR WARHEAD, DID YOU?

You don't see a nuclear warhead. What you see is the nose cone of the missile. The warhead is inside the nose cone. And the nose cone has made it to the missile. And the nose cones are handled by ah--vehicles and transporters and we saw the vehicles that are used to carry the nose cones around. But as you notice in...of these shots, the missile is covered by canvas, so whether or not the nose cone has made it or not, you don't know and the mating takes place under one of these pictures you showed me, which is a, kind of a large shed where they put the missile in there and do their mating,

DID YOU EVER SEE THE NOSE CONES? AND WHAT WAS YOUR EDUCATED OPINION ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE THERE?

Well, we didn't actually see nose cones and you don't normally see nose cones. From a missile analyst standpoint, these units operate with all the equipment that is necessary and when you do see the vans that are normally used for handling the nose cones present, you don't have to see the nose cone to make the assumption that the unit does have it's warhead and could in fact operate. And that was the conclusion that I reached, though that's not a universally accepted view.

DO PEOPLE THINK THE NOSE CONES NEVER WERE THERE?

Some people are not sure that the nose cones were there for a variety of reasons. That they didn't detect what they expected to detect if the nuclear warheads were on ships or not.

IT'S TWENTY FOUR YEARS AGO NOW SINCE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. WHAT DO YOU THINK HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM THAT WHOLE EXPERIENCE, OR WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEARNED THAT HASN'T BEEN LEARNED?

Well, that's a very broad question and you really need people that are a lot more closer to policy activities than I am. I'm—as an analyst and looking at the situation, I think there are a couple of lessons you learn. One, is that it's clear the Soviets were willing to take a major risk in order to essentially hold the US hostage while they were waiting to get their ICBM force up to—up to a threat to the US And this is not unusual because essentially they held Europe hostage with their MR and IRMB's until they got ah--the US as a hostage. So, moving missiles into essentially, these missiles become ICBMs when they're in Cuba because they can hit most of the United States, so they don't need a Soviet ICBM. So, it shows the Soviets were willing to take a major risk in terms to I think bring the US under a crisis of threat. The other part is I think that the Soviets clearly do not want a nuclear war anymore than the US wants a nuclear war and I think the manner in which this crisis was handled by the administration, the President, among others, clearly shows that we were able to convince the Soviets that you are...moving to the brink and you had better back down, and we are not. And I think the Soviets recognize the hazards of a nuclear war and were willing to pull their missiles out of Cuba.

DO YOU GET ANY SENSE, IN STUDYING HOW THE SOVIETS OPERATE, THAT THIS WAS AN INDIVIDUAL'S DECISION, OR THAT IT WAS A...

I have no knowledge on that.

WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION?

Well, basically that's where you need an expert Sovietologist, and there are only a few of those in the US but there are, you know, ten thousand who have met a Soviet who think they are. They are the dangerous ones. You have to get to the real experts and that's the kind of question you need, I think the focus of a real Sovietologist. I can't see these missiles being moved in Cuba from what I know without ah—the approval of the top leadership. You would just not move missiles out of the Soviet Union without Khrushchev personally being involved in the decision.

HE DIDN'T LAST MUCH LONGER. DID YOU GET ANY SENSE THAT THE MISSILE CRISIS HAD ANY ROLE IN HIS...

Well I'm sure it didn't help. In spite of what he wrote in his book.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE LESSONS OF THE CRISIS ARE STILL VALID TODAY OR STILL USEFUL TODAY? ARE THERE THINGS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND PEOPLE RUNNING THINGS ON BOTH SIDES, BOTH SUPERPOWERS, THEY MAY HAVE FORGOTTEN SOME OF THE LESSONS OF THE MISSILE CRISIS?

Oh I don't think so. I think that the missile crisis was such a ah—major confrontation between the Soviets and the US and the concerns were so great and the publication of that activity and it's, you know, continually being brought up over the years, such as your program here, keeps it into the forefront and reminds people of actually what the Cuban Missile Crisis consisted of and the effect it had on the two sides. So I think the lessons are there and people are still very much aware of it.

YOU GOT VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN ARMS CONTROL LATER ON. DO YOU THINK THIS CRISIS LED AT ALL TO THE ATMOSPHERE—TEST BAN IN '63?

Oh I think these things eventually stayed ah--basically separate and the test ban in '63 was clearly in our mutual interest and that's the only way you'll get any arms control agreement if it's in the mutual interest. And here we were able to ah--ban testing in the atmosphere, under water and ah—so therefore you were removing the fall out problem and both sides continue underground testing which is what they needed for their military programs.

LOOKING BACK AT THESE THIRTEEN DAYS, HOW DOES IT FIT INTO YOUR WHOLE CAREER?

No, it's an experience which I am very glad to have been a part of and I'm very pleased at being able to make a contribution and I figure this is what I was trained and paid for and it was important to be able to provide as much factual information, as I said, what you know and what you don't know, to assist the leadership to make the most intelligent decision. And that's fundamentally what intelligence is about. Intelligence is a tool for the leadership to use to decide on US policy, both military, political and economic. And here was a case where a missile analyst and his people had a great opportunity to provide a service to their country and I've been very fortunate career and this was one of the many highlights in the career and one that I feel very proud to be involved in and I think ah—the analyst involved, both the missile analyst working with me and the photo interpreters did an excellent job in providing the leadership with the type of information they needed on a timely basis.

A LOT OF PEOPLE GOT VERY SCARED DURING THAT CRISIS. PEOPLE WERE MOVING AND DRIVING NORTH AND GETTING CONCERNED ABOUT PROSPECTIVE NUCLEAR WAR. WERE YOU FRIGHTENED? DID YOU THINK WE WERE ON THE EDGE OF NUCLEAR WAR?

No I was never--felt that we were near the brink of nuclear war at any time during the crisis for a variety of reasons. Basically the number and the status of these missiles, the status of activities in the Soviet Union, and I don't think the Soviets wanted to go to nuclear war and I think that's one part of the Cuban Missile Crisis which was overplayed at the time and has been overplayed since then, that we were on the brink and about to have a clash between the main superpowers. And I was never worried about there being a nuclear confrontation over the ah--missiles as much other people are. And that may be because maybe I'm not smart enough to know that I should have been scared, but I wasn't.

THANKS VERY MUCH.

This is the general area of the operating base. These are the missiles in this location here and these are supporting equipment and vehicles that you see scattered around.

ONCE MORE.

This is the general operating area. These are the missiles that you see here. These are supporting equipment and you see some of them even under trees that are not visible.

THE OTHER ONE IS A CONVOY, ON THE ROAD?

Yes, it appears to be a convoy on the road, though it is not as distinct and identifiable as those missiles. But basically, if you blew this up as a photo interpreter can, and looked at these... What you see here is basically a convoy on the road, but to identify the details of the vehicles, one needs to blow this photograph up and look at in detail under a microscope. The convoy is running along this road here. It's hard to see from this photograph, but once you blow this photograph up and look at it under a microscope, you can identify similar vehicles that we saw in the previous picture. Basically, what you see in this picture is a low altitude photograph which provides great detail of the missiles which are under their canvas covers and a check-out tent area, where the missile would be brought in there and then mated and checked out. This is a photograph of a briefing board that was used at one of the EXCOMM meetings to show the range of the two missiles that were identified as being installed into Cuba. The inner circle is a range of 11,000 nautical mile missile, which shows that it could reach and cover Washington. The other is a range of the SS-5 at 2200 nautical mile missiles, which shows that essentially it could encompass all of the United States, a portion of Canada, with the exception of Seattle,