DESCRIBE THE CONTEXT OR THE COLLECTION OF FORCES THAT BROUGHT ABOUT DÉTENTE.

Well I think that the question of which brought about détente is actually very important. And it is very important not only from the viewpoint of the past, but also from the viewpoint of the present process, and of the process directed to the future. And I think that one of the main reasons which give a rise to détente was the understanding by political leader of the Soviet Union and United States, that in a very tense, very difficult periods to which we were facing at the end of the sixties, there is only one way to settle the dispute through political means. There was an understanding that military means of solution of political difference could not bring any advantage to any of this, of the contest. And the importance of political solution of the matters has helped to start the détente. But this is the process which in the mind of the people -- what is more important of course, the material process. And from this point of view, it was a very important that the human mind has understood that the shortest and the most effective route toward the solution of the existing problems, toward the starting the process of détente or whatever you call it. The process of cooperation between countries in the practical, effective measures in the field of, as you call it, arms control, or we call it arms limitation on disarmament. And the process of détente has started with SALT I. And SALT I has proved that effective agreements in the fields of arms control are possible. And I would say that the importance of this SALT I agreement was more than the area of arms control. Of course in the area of arms control, it provided a basis for the further solution. And what is more important for the solution of the questions which are really delicate by their nature. The questions which concern the heart of the national might of each country. And nevertheless, even in such delicate questions, the countries has been able to find the balance of interest. And it served, I would say, as a signal for the movement in other direction. SALT I provided the opportunity for starting the process of restructuring the Soviet-American relations at that period in different areas. And it played a kind of a guiding lines. Guiding lines in a sense showing that the balance of interest is possible to achieve. And the number of agreements which has been achieved after this SALT I is how to say, graphic evidence to this.

COULD YOU TICK OFF THE IMPORTANCE IN THE OPENING PHASE OF SUCH THINGS AS THE VIETNAM WAR, THE SOVIET MOVEMENT OF THE MILITARY PARTY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USSR, CHINA AND US, TO WHAT EXTENT THOSE ELEMENTS PLAYED ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF THIS GESTALT?

International context for the starting of the process of détente at the beginning of seventies was not an easy one. And from the Soviet perspective, at that moment, it was not very favorable conditions. Your country was involved in aggression against one of our allies and it was a difficult decision for us to start the process for détente. However, from the viewpoint of our political thinking, it was more important to be guided by long range aids, by long range considerations. Considerations which took into account the necessity to change the Soviet-American relations for the better in order to change the whole situation of the — in the world. And that's why our government has taken the decision to start the process of détente, to start negotiation. Though, I will tell you, from as far as I remember, there were certain attempts on the part of probably military people in the United States to make some kind of provocation against the forthcoming visits at that time, and particularly during the period when our prime minister was in Hanoi. There was a bombardment of Vietnam at this time. That was very difficult decisions. However, we understood that there is a chance to start the process and we considered that any consideration of the present day, of the present moment should be weighted against much more broader historical background. And that's why this decision has been taken at this particular point.

DIDN'T YOU FIND SO THAT YOUR COUNTERPART ON THE OTHER SIDE, PRESIDENT NIXON, CAMPAIGNED AS AND WAS A STAUNCH IDEOLOGICALLY ANTI-COMMUNIST.

You know, when you take decisions with regard to the foreign policy you should not be guided by the fact what kind of ideology is demonstrated how to say this?

STATED?

Is stated by this or that particular person. We understand that we live in the world of different ideologies. And to be the realist, we should deal with those people who are elected by their respective countries to be the leaders of these countries. We should live in the world of different ideologies. So, we took into account the fact that there was certain signals on the American side that there is an interest to start this serious negotiation. And whenever there is a signal to start this serious negotiations, serious talks which would bring the practical results, we are ready to take these signals. This is matter of priority and we consider actually this is the political realism in the behavior of the States.

IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, THE STYLE OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS MUCH MORE DIFFERENT THAN THE AMERICANS IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS ALWAYS SORT OF RESPONDING TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS RATHER THAN INITIATING THEM. IT'S ALSO DIFFERENT FROM THE STYLE TODAY. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

You know, I wouldn't agree with these things, so the style of our diplomacy and as far as I remember the negotiations which were developing in this time was rather active in the sense that our country put forward a number of proposals but putting forward our proposals, we never take a position. Either take it or leave negotiations. We were always open also to consider the realistic proposals on the other side. They reacted on this side. In other words, that was a process which took into account the proposals on the both sides with the aim of finding some common kind of balancing interest of both parties in these negotiations.

WHAT KIND OF COUNTERPART WAS KISSINGER CONSIDERED TO BE?

Well, Kissinger was of course not an easy counterpart. But this is good, I think for any diplomat when you have a counter partner who is not an easy one, but who is really wanting to do something to make something constructive. It's a good change. Professionally I would say, humanly, it's a good sharing and it was of course, personally very interested to have a discussion, negotiations with him and to find some kind of agreements. So if you have an easy partner, it's not an interesting negotiation.

THE AGREEMENT ITSELF--BESIDE THE ABM TREATY, WOULD YOU SORT OF EVALUATE THE AGREEMENT. WHAT IS IT'S PRINCIPAL VALUE, LET'S SAY, IN MAYBE, FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW THEN AND MAYBE IN RETROSPECT?

You know, it depends of course from which angle to look at this agreement. If to look at this agreement from the period of the beginning of the seventies, it was very important. Because it was a kind we call it "tzyelina". A kind of...

VIRGIN LAND.

Virgin land. A kind of a virgin land at this particular moment. And not only virgin land, but virgin land which concerned very delicate products, I would say. Such products as strategic weapons which were never a subject of negotiations. And which were considered a top secret, very confidential and so on. And the fact, that only negotiations, the agreement has been achieved on this kind of the weapons which is the heart of the national might of the state was very important. If we look at this agreement from the present date, of course we will see that was a starting point, but very important starting point which provided the opportunity to reach the agreement by 1979, about SALT II, which was unfortunately disrupted by the United States now. It was a logical development, but that was the starting point. And if American side would follow this line, I'm sure that we would have now, not only SALT II, we would have a SALT III, and we would have established a model of behavior in a very delicate and at the same time very important area from the viewpoint of arms control and arms negotiations.

...SOVIET POINT OF VIEW THAT YOU NEGOTIATE WITH NATIONS AND NOT WITH PEOPLE, BUT NEVERTHELESS ONE DOES NEGOTIATE WITH PEOPLE. AND TO WHAT EXTENT IS IT A PROBLEM FOR PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELF? THE CONTINUOUS CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION AND THEREFORE OF PERSONALITY AND THEREFORE OF STYLE OF POINT OF VIEW AND SO ON. HOW DO YOU ADAPT TO THIS SORT OF THING, THE NATIONAL PERSONALITIES PERIODICALLY WHO HAVE TO CONTINUE TO LEARN TO ADJUST AND SO ON?

Yeah. So I would say that first of all, of course this is the problem for you to make this adaptation so--

CAN YOU MAKE IT A FULL SENTENCE?

Yes. I will tell you, first of all, this is the problem for the American people to meet this adaptation to the changes. But you know in our speaking seriously, in our approach to negotiations with Vienna and United States, they always conceded that we are dealing not with particular people with Mr. X and Mr. Y. We are dealing with the country and not only with the country, with the great country to which we have a highest respect, to the United States. And we expect that the great countries like United States should be consistent in its dealing like any other country. And that's why it is very strange for us sometimes you know, to hear that, you know, the Congress take this thing, or President that. For us, this is the United States. And their dealings with you are with the United States but not with any particular governmental branch or with any particular administration. It doesn't matter. And they think, I would say, the normal way of behavior in international relations demands that the obligation taken by certain people should be necessary to follow by other administration. At least, I would say that, this is the European logic. The logic of those countries through which have came through Renaissance civilization and so it is. But they think that also the common sense approach which was actually highly developed. Unfortunately only at the early stages of American revolution – when Tom Paine wrote his famous tract. This is common sense approach it seems to me.

DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR FEELINGS? I THINK AT THAT TIME YOU WERE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHEN SALT I WAS SIGNED. CAN YOU TELL US YOUR PERSONAL FEELINGS ABOUT IT...?

Yes, at that time I was in the American department of our foreign policy planning stuff and I remember we took it with great enthusiasm. We were really much satisfied that the agreement has been reached and we never considered this is, how to say, the closed question, everything is settled. We considered it was a good start. It added energy. And the energy to make new agreements, to move along the path to restructure the Soviet-American relations. And especially for the people who were dealing with the Soviet-American relations. It was a clear manifestation that we can make Soviet-American relations advantageous, not only to both of our countries, but advantageous to the whole structure of international relations. And I remember the consequence with a number of documents has appeared and by the way, there was a very important document which has been worked out with participation in, of Kissinger to... fundamentals of Soviet-American relations. I considered it from the viewpoint of political philosophy. These documents establish, if I may call it, a code of behavior between our two countries. There is much talk now what kind of behavior should be — how to behave. But everything is formulated. The question is to follow this document and I think this document has become possible to the — a large extent due to the success which has been done with regard to negotiating on SALT I.

YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT THE DOCUMENTS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL--

This document has been adopted in 1972, if I'm right. And this document was really –

(INTERRUPTS)

Was very important.

START AGAIN.

This document's fundamentals of relations between the Soviet Union and United States has been adopted to on the highest political level in 1972. And for the first time in the history of Soviet-American relations, it acknowledge the principle of peaceful co-existence. Uh, the basic principal in the relations between our two countries. And it said also a number of principles which should be the guidelines for behavior of our countries with regard to arms control, with regard to conflict and crisis situation and it's oriented all the countries toward developing the cooperation between our two countries without diminishing all these differences. From this point of view, as I said, I consider it was a kind of a code of behavior. And if we would be able to resort, or to address more often to this documents in trying to implement, it would be very helpful from practical point of view.

IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, I THINK THE ISSUES THAT CAME TO THE FOREFRONT IN THE SENSE THAT SOME OF PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS OF THE PRESIDENT -- I'M THINKING ABOUT VANCE AND BRZEZINSKI HAD AN ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION... THE PERSON THAT VIEWS SOVIET UNION AS ESSENTIALLY IDEOLOGICAL POWER, A WHOLE SET OF OPINION ABOUT NUCLEAR FORCES -- PEOPLE THAT SEE IT AS A NATIONAL POWER, A FULL SET OF OPINION ABOUT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION. CAN YOU ADDRESS THIS...?

Well, so you want my reaction to this Carter period?

AND TO THE POINT OF VIEW AS REPRESENTED BY PERSONS SUCH AS BRZEZINSKI ON ONE HAND AND VANCE ON THE OTHER.

So I think you know that this kind of the thinking about the Soviet Union — it is still also present in the United States. And it seems to me all this kind of ideas with regard to the Soviet Union, they do not actually correspond to our real thinking with regard to the foreign policy. And in particular they do not correspond to our understanding of the state of affairs of the world. And what kind of behavior should be conducted in this state of affairs of the world with regard to the present date moment. We're now in the process of a change. And not only change. We call it in the process of revolutionary change in our political thinking, in practical deeds, both at home and international affairs. What is the sense of this revolution? We accept it now as a main criterion for our behavior in international affairs. The system of the human values. In other words, we made it quite clearly that in the conditions of the nuclear age, which is on the one hand is characterized by the danger of the nuclear cataclysm. On the other hand, it is characterized by the shortness, interdependence of the world that is only one way for survival. It is common security. So on from this position of common security, we're approach to the solution of all kinds of the problem, not only military and political but also humanitarian, and economic problem. And we consider that this kind of orientation toward the system of human values provide the chance to broaden the cooperation among all other countries. We have just spoken about the session of the general assembly and from this point of view, of course it was still very small but still manifestation of a new of a thinking, which is developing in the world community. And to understand the deepness of the change in our political thinking, you should take, for example, into account that as a main aim of comprehensive security, we provide now the principle of the peaceful coexistence. You can say that it was always stated by us that the principle of peaceful coexistence is a guiding principle of the Soviet foreign policy. It is right, but for the first time, we said that the principle of the peaceful coexistence had the highest value, much more higher than the consideration of the national ideological or class considerations. In other words, the peace is a, how to say, important goal. Of course, peace is not everything, but everything without peace is nothing let's say. And this is the kind of the philosophical approach which is now taken as a guiding line in our foreign policy. And from this point of view, I think, it is very important to look at the process which are taking place in practical actions.

ARE YOU SAYING THAT'S AT PRESENT? THE EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE ARE PRIMARY, AND THE EFFORTS FOR OR SUPPORT FOR WARS OF LIBERATION--OF CLASS STRUGGLE--OF WHICH SOVIET UNION IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE CHAMPION, IS SECONDARY?

You know, I will tell you in this matter that the principle of peaceful coexistence is considered by us now as a highest principle. We Communists have to speak about ideology demands a very responsible approach to the questions of peace or war. But we expect also that the other side, the people who adhere to different, let's say, Western kinds of ideology should be responsible also to the questions of peace and war. And it will provide the opportunity to avoid the violence in international relations. But of course, when they got to the violence, the same principle is active which is in existence you in the physics. Reactions gives rise to counter reactions. But we consider that if the same kind of responsible attitude as it is taken now by the Communist Party will be taken by the parties which are in the power in the Western countries. We would be able to avoid all kinds of the war.

...I WANT TO COME BACK TO CARTER. I THINK THAT HE CAME IN WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND SO ON, BUT IT ALSO PUSHED THE WESTERN NOTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE WAS VERY CRITICAL OF SOVIET SUPPORT OR SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA. DID THAT PRESENT A PROBLEM IN TERMS OF SALT II?

You know, I will tell you from the viewpoint of our approach to the SALT II we were always very strongly against making any kind of the linkages, of SALT II with any other events. Because we considered that the negotiations with regard to the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons are of particular importance in itself. And they should be dealt without involvement the questions which are not related to this matter. You're right in a sense that your side in this matter tried to introduce in these negotiations the questions which are not related to this matter. Of course, these questions are in existence. It is a part of reality and we do not close the eyes on the fact that the problem of human rights is in existence. And more than that, we also consider that this question should be dealt not only on national arena, but also in international arena too. But the question is how to deal with it. Therefore the very serious negotiations, for the detailed approach to this matter, but unfortunately, as far as I remember, during this Carter administration, the very serious question of human rights has been used for purely propaganda purposes. And I'm sorry not only for those human beings who have become the victims of this cheap propagandistic approach to the human race, but also for the state of affairs of arms control. Of course, it inflicted a certain blow to these negotiations.

COULD YOU ADDRESS THE AFRICAN ISSUES?

The African issues were also, how to say, involved in this SALT II negotiations by the American side. And here too, I would say, there was a question of African developments. The questions which demanded the political solution. But there is a special machinery for this matter, both multilateral and bilateral machine. And again, if there was a serious concern of these matters, they could be dealt separately through political machinery. But you know, this involvement, both of human rights and as you call it, African questions, they were intentionally made to prevent the process of SALT II from achieving the practical results. And of course, it was not helpful. Of course, I'm not saying that the SALT process is developing in the vacuum. It's a part of the whole international scene. But it should be concentrated on its particular issue. These issues itself are very-difficult, very much complicated.

LET ME MOVE JUST BRIEFLY TO PRESENT TENSE. THERE WAS A CRITICISM, ON THE PART OF KISSINGER PRINCIPALLY, THAT THE REYKJAVIK WAS MORE PREPARED, THAT BOTH THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION WERE SHOOTING FROM THE HIP, THAT THERE WAS PROFESSIONAL ENVY OF SOME PARTIES NOT INVOLVED. THAT THEY WENT TO DEAL WITH EUROPE AND CAME BACK WITH GLOBAL SOLUTIONS WHICH COULDN'T HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AT THIS KIND OF THING.

But you know, here I cannot agree with my friend Henry Kissinger on this matter because I think he's absolutely wrong in this matter. The American side was well informed about our proposals and there is nothing unexpected. More than that, I would say, publicly it was made known in the statement of our Secretary General Comrade Gorbachev in his statement of January 15 and they knew our plan of the stage-by-stage liquidation of the nuclear weapons by the end of this century. But more than that, the diplomatic negotiations in which Garthoff and Kampelman participated, they were also considering these proposals in much more detail. That's why there was nothing new and nothing unexpected was for American delegation. And it was clear from the very beginning that it was not a summit itself, it was a pre-summit which was supposed to establish the framework for further summits, basing on the agreement on Geneva. And the agreement of Geneva gave a very clear guideline for negotiating in this matter. That's why I think Dr. Kissinger is wrong in such interpretation.

WHEN WE START IN THERE THAT THE FEELING WAS THAT THERE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOME USEFUL WORK ABOUT EUROPE. AND THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN. AND NOW IT WAS NO USEFUL –

Again, you know about Europe, what I'll tell you, with Europe there was always contacts between with European capitals. There was always contacts. Europeans also, well know. Take the part of the Soviet package which has been proposed on the Reykjavik relating to Europe. There is nothing unexpected. It was a zero solution. Exactly the same zero solution which was proposed by the American side. But you know, unfortunately, nowadays, it very often happens, as soon as the other side see the Soviet Union approaches the American proposal the other side immediately rejects it. This is the phenomenon which has developed lately. And happily, it did not take place in the seventies. Otherwise, we would not be able to reach neither SALT II nor SALT I. That was more serious approach in these matters. But you know, whenever you are not interested in negotiations, you're finding a lot of pretexts you know, like a artificial, how to say, involvement of the questions which are not related to negotiations or trying to speak about this matter. This is, I would say, rather pretexts to justify the absence of desire to reach the agreements at this particular moment. And now it has become quite clear, because what we're facing now is a complete deviation of Reykjavik agreement.

WHEN WE TALK ABOUT THE SIGNING OF SALT I, THE IMPRESSION ONE GETS IS THAT MOST OF PEOPLE I THINK, ALMOST EVERYBODY, THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE SALT TALK ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS EVENTUALLY FIRED. THAT MOST OF THE PEOPLE THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE SOVIET SIDE, THEY HAD MADE ADVANCES AND TOOK THEIR PLACE IN THE SOVIET POLICY. ARE YOU AWARE OF THAT?

Well, so as for your side then, or that a lot of people of course has left the diplomatic service, has left it. As for our people they went ahead and we considered that it was a good school for diplomats. A very good school on negotiating. Anyhow, what is expected for the diplomats? To be the masters of negotiation. And SALT I, from the viewpoint of our profession was a very good example of the diplomatic art. It was actually diplomatic art to reach this agreement in rather short period. And on a very delicate subject. That's why the people who are there now take the leading position in our diplomatic service.

THE SIGNING OF SALT II, WHAT DID YOU SEE AS THE ACHIEVEMENT IN THE SIGNING? OBVIOUSLY IT WASN'T RATIFIED, BUT WHAT WAS THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF SALT II?

Well the main achievement of SALT II that it moved further. It broadened the scope of the subject of agreement. In other words, the volume was much more, it reach, much more broadened in comparison with this matter. And it provided for much more radical, much more deep reductions. What was also very important, it has moved forward with regard to verification and it has shown that whenever there is a serious intention to deal with the matters of arms control and strategic arms verifications could not be a problem. And but what is more important I think, SALT II has showed that the main reason for the success, the political will of the leaders to reach the agreements. Negotiations, you know, were continued for several years, but when it was become clear that the summit meeting is planned in Vienna, and when the delegations has received a strong impulses from the upper echelon they were able to overcome the difficulties within the night time to reach the agreement. So it shows that actually what is needed to reach the agreement is strong political will. And then all the diplomatic difficulties can be settled. It showed that the talks about technicalities, technical difficulties, of course, they are in existence, but they're not the major part. And by the way, it showed me, it reminds me of another part, at that moment when this SALT II was in the process, I was involved in negotiating and it was my part of this duty of the Helsinki final act, where we worked out actually a basically new agreement for European countries. And it was not only two countries — Soviet Union and the United States were involved - it was involved about 35 countries actually were involved. We wrote the document by 35, how to say, pencils. And nevertheless again, when there a strong political will, strong impulses, we have been able to work out the Helsinki agreement. And I will tell you all the technicalities - there was a number of technicalities — were settled within the last two weeks before the end of Geneva preparatory meeting.

...WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE ESSENCE OF IT?

The essence of it, it has established the European process. In other the words, the process which should be permanent in the way of deepening cooperation between these countries, it give the start what is called the all-European process. And we're witnessing now that this process is developing despite many difficulties, despite ups and downs in relations on the European continent, in relations between certain European countries and United States and so on. This process is developing. But the main essence was, that it worked out a number of practical agreements. Both principal of relations between European countries and then substantive material has been provided for all four "baskets" of this European conference. Both for political and military affairs, for economic affairs, for cultural affairs and for the follow up of European basket. I am speaking about the four baskets because I personally feel very much affronted. Everybody speaks about three baskets, forgetting about the fourth basket. I was a representative in the fourth basket. Fourth basket was dealing with the follow up. And this is actually what is taking place now. This is follow up. In other words, the number of meetings. And you know how this process is developing. The methods of confidence building measures has become now a larger part of European reality so. Several years ago it's considered unbelievable to reach. Now, it's a part of reality. And there is an opportunity now to start the Stockholm too, which would deal with the question of reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. In other words, this is the process which bring the material, tangible results in the fields of arms control.

OTHER TANGIBLE RESULTS THAT WERE IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET UNION CAME OUT OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. WHAT WERE THOSE?

If we will speak about the recent period, the recent period which has been characterized by the balance in the development of international relations. I think in the recent period here on the European scale there were two important significant developments. One was of course this Stockholm Agreement which adopted a number of confidence building measures and which opened the road for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. We consider it as really important results. Secondly, we consider it was a very important result in humanitarian field, in the human rights matter. I had already the chance to tell it, that our approach to the human rights is a completely new approach. We have studied great changes within our society, and the reflection of these changes toward the democratization, toward the opening is our approach to the human rights problems and we're very much enthusiastic about this Bern Agreement which was worked out by all countries and only the United States did not give its consent to Bern Agreement so we consider that Bern Agreement should be materialized and practical measures. And thirdly, I would tell you, it is a very important that in here in Europe we have been able to work out within the framework of international atomic energy to the most important conventions which laid down the groundwork for the regime of safe development of nuclear energy. I would call it, you know, this is the first signs of the new political thinking. This thinking which puts, how to say, the human system of values, rather than the nationalistic system of values.

...OR COMPROMISING ATTITUDE FROM THE SIDE OF THE UNITED STATES AS CONCERNING SDI AND... WHAT KIND OF...DO YOU HAVE IN YOUR HANDS FOR THE FUTURE?

You know, as for SDI, I have the impression that, I'm sorry to say probably it sounds a little bit rude, but I have the impression that the American side and actually the President that they're just obsessed with SDI. Obsessed. They do not want to see. They behave like how to say? A child. You know Albert Camus once wrote that there are certain nations, though they're big ones, they behave like infants. "Nations enfants," the famous phrase of Albert Camus. And they have the impression that United States with regard to SDI behave like a nation enfants. They say, "We want SDI," ...and "we do not want to take anything." We proposed you know, for them the decisions. We are not going to kill SDI. We would prefer it, but we are the realist. We are saying, of course, you're obsessed, what could be done? We propose now not to withdraw for example from this treaty for another ten years. To agree what should be the libertarian research with regard to this method. We proposed these compromises, so and if again this common sense will be displayed, which is unfortunately in deficit now, then the way could be found. I could advise only for you to refer to Thomas Paine's tract "Common Sense." It was the greatest work. All other countries took, how to say, the advices of Thomas Paine except the your administration.