MR. TIMERBAEV, HOW DID YOU VIEW THE EARLIEST EFFORTS OF THE US TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION? WHY WERE THEY NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION?

I understand this is the problem of connected with the Baruch Plan. I would imagine that this is something which you are discussing with me right now. One would not consider this at all a plan for non-proliferation. The Baruch Plan was not a non-proliferation plan. It was meant as such. It was a plan that was aimed at continuing United States monopoly in the atomic energy field, in the military atomic energy field. This was the idea of the so-called Baruch Plan. Because this plan did not provide for any prohibition and abolishment of nuclear weapons. It was aimed at continuing United States maintenance by the United States of the nuclear weapons. This plan was aimed at not letting anyone else to develop nuclear energy. And that is why this plan was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. This is in a nutshell our attitude towards this plan. That's why it failed.

HOW WAS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S "ATOMS FOR PEACE" SPEECH PERCEIVED BY THE SOVIET UNION? AND DID YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES WAS BEING OVERLY GENEROUS?

Our overall attitude towards this plan, which was introduced in 1953 was at first somewhat cautious, because we had some bad memories of the Baruch Plan of '46. So for some time we were studying it very carefully. And then somewhere in '54 that is next year we engaged in discussing the parameters, the contours, the ideas of this plan with the United States, and came little by little to a conclusion that this plan does deserve serious discussion and serious consideration. And this is how we gradually come to a common understanding of the importance of establishing some international mechanism, some... international framework, for a peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Uh, so in a gradual way, we come to an understanding of the importance of this effort. I would like to remind televiewers that about this time the Soviet Union started its own national program of Atoms for Peace. And in 1954, sometime in the summer of '54 the Soviet Union put into operation the first nuclear atomic power plant, a small one, but the first one. It was I think, June or July '54, and since then the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes started. So at that time we were able to combine the efforts of the two major nuclear powers in a common effort to create some framework for international cooperation in the field of atomic energy.

…THAT THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CRITICISM OF ATOMS FOR PEACE, THAT IT MAY HAVE HAD SOME POLITICAL OVERTONES. WAS THIS SOMETHING THAT THE SOVIET UNION FELT AT THE TIME?

Of course anything that happens in the world and has international aspects is viewed as to whether it has or not has political overtones. And of course as I said our attitude was somewhat cautious from the, from the start. But then little by little, everybody started to realize that atomic energy has a tremendous potentialities for progress and for the creation of a better life for mankind. And that is why little by little, we were able to come to a conclusion that it is important to combine efforts. Of course, this Atoms for Peace plan had another aspect, an aspect of trying to limit the use of nuclear energy and prohibit its expansion to military purposes. In other words, as we say it today, a non-proliferation aspect of this. Which is an important aspect. Because any proliferation of nuclear weapons does carry with itself the seeds for a sort of a chain reaction which would start over a general proliferation of nuclear weapons, which of course is very detrimental. So it had some political overtones, but in the, in the end we have all come to conclusions, of course, with the United States. We were able to to agree to certain suggestions on the Soviet part as to how to organize this cooperation. And then we were able to come to a decision, a common decision, to establish the Atomic Energy in Vienna, the International Atomic Energy in Vienna, which is now, as is known to everybody, a very important international organization.

I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE IAEA. I REALIZE YOU KNOW A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT ABOUT IT. SO IF I CAN ASK YOU TO BE AS BRIEF AS, A LITTLE MORE CONCISE. I REALIZE IT'S AN AREA YOU KNOW A LOT ABOUT. WHAT DID THE IAEA SET OUT TO ACHIEVE, AND HOW WAS THE SOVIET UNION INSTRUMENTAL IN ITS DEVELOPMENT?

Well the IAEA has two major directions. Number one, the promotion of international cooperation in the field. The IAEA has two major objectives. Number one, to promote the development of international cooperation in the field of atomic energy, in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Number two, the non-proliferation aspect, to establish international safeguards against any abuse of nuclear energy. These are the major objectives of the IAEA. And these objectives w-were embodied in the statute of this agency. And fortunate, very fortunately, through the efforts of the Soviet Union, the United States and a number of other states, this agency has been working very productively over the years. And it is now, I would say, a unique international organization which is I would take it as an example for a true international organization based on nondiscrimination, on equality, on the sovereign rights of states and which is developing its the international cooperation very successfully. So I could, I could add for instance, if you, if you care to do this right now, that this year, after Chernobyl, the IEA has shown a that it is really, it lived up to expectation. It was adequate.

A LITTLE BIT LATER ON. AND IF I CAN JUST ASK YOU HOW THE SOVIET UNION WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT, THE EARLY STAGES OF THE IAEA...?

The IAEA was discussed at first between a number of major powers involved in the development of nuclear energy. The United States, the Soviet Union, UK, Canada, and a few others. And before a, an international conference was convened to approve the establishment of this organization, to approve the statute of this organization, this was well prepared in advance by a small group of states, including the Soviet Union. And all the major foundations of this organization were approved during these preliminary discussions. And this was a give-and-take situation. For instance, the Soviet Union position was that this is an important organization, having very close relation to the relation to the problems of peace and disarmament. That is why it was important that this organization should be in close contact, in close connection with the United Nations, as the universal organizations of peace and security. This was our major contribution to the statute of this organization, to emphasize that this is not only connected with the peaceful use, but is also necessary to prevent the abuse of nuclear energy.

IN WHAT WAY WAS IT A PROTOTYPE, FOR OTHER...?

For other organiza... It was a prototype, it still is a very good prototype for other international organizations because it is based on cooperation. In fact, nothing what is being done in IAEA today, as it was over the years. This organization will be 30 years old next year. Nothing no major activities is envisaged or implemented without the adequate cooperation between the major participants, major members of this organization. There is practically no vote in the governing bodies of this organization. I recall very few times, if any at all, when decisions were taken by a vote. Usually major decisions are taken by consensus. Everybody tries to concert their attitudes, their positions, and come to consensus conclusions. Of course there are some votes, there are some issues which do require votes. But on the major problems, the consensus is unique. You cannot cite another organization of that importance that has such a wide area, of consensus decisions.

IN THIS EARLY PERIOD, IN THE '50S, THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE NUCLEAR...CHINA. HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION HOPE TO BENEFIT FROM THESE AGREEMENTS?

In those years, the Soviet Union concluded a number of agreements, but after that we have concluded a great amount of agreements for nuclear cooperation with many countries. With countries of different political orientation. We are open to a very wide cooperation in the nuclear field. We are prepared to provide materials, equipment and so on. So this is, the cooperation with China is nothing, is nothing special, nothing exceptional. This is our constant and consistent policy of expanding nuclear cooperation with other countries. We have we have had agreements with the United States, too, in this field, as with a number of a great number of other countries.

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963 A NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURE, AND IN WHAT WAY DID IT PAVE THE WAY FOR NPT?

I believe that any limitation in the field of limiting the arms race, the nuclear arms race, is a step towards non-proliferation. So this treaty the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments, that is, in atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, did show to the to everybody that you can solve important nuclear matters. This was the first agreement on nuclear energy. You can solve important matters. A nuclear arms race can be limited. And so in this sense, in a general political sense it has created additional confidence in the possibility of limiting this nuclear arms race, and promoting non-proliferation.

WHAT WAS YOUR FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF YOUR FELLOW NEGOTIATORS AND THE INITIAL METHODS OF NEGOTIATION AT GENEVA? AND WHAT WAS THE POSITION YOU ASKED TO TAKE AT THE OUTSET?

We are still continuing to discuss the limited test...

I'M SORRY. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. AND WE WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT VERY MUCH AS YOU WERE THEN. TRY AND REMEMBER HOW YOU FELT AT THE TIME, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Well the whole idea started in '59, I believe, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the so-called Irish Resolution on Non-Proliferation. This was the first time that international community adopted a decision on non-proliferation. And soon after that, a few years after that first attempts were made to come to some agreement on non-proliferation. Unfortunately, the whole process was somewhat delayed by a few years.

LET ME JUST INTERRUPT FOR A SECOND, BECAUSE I'M COMING TO THAT POINT. BUT IF YOU CAN GIVE ME AN IDEA, YOU WERE THERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, RIGHT? GIVE ME AN IMPRESSION OF YOUR BEING THERE AND THE OTHER PEOPLE WHO WERE THERE, THE AMERICANS WHO WERE THERE—

Yes, you see the point is, I was not present when the first—

AT THE VERY BEGINNING.

At the very beginning I was not present. Because I was present when the real negotiations started in '66. Then I was present.

...AMERICANS WHO TOOK PART IN THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS STATED THAT SOVIET CONCERNS OVER WEST GERMANY TOOK PRIORITY OVER THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT PROLIFERATION. DO YOU THINK THEIR CRITICISM IS WARRANTED?

I don't think this criticism is warranted, because our major concern was to put a definite end to proliferation. And that definite end to proliferation should cover not only West Germany but any other state. We wanted to prevent non-proliferation, period . That's what we wanted. And of course we were bothered by attempts to establish the so-called multinational nuclear forces, which would give a possibility not only to West Germany but to some other West European countries, to participate in the position of nuclear weapons.

IF YOU CAN JUST STATE REALLY CONCISELY WHAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS.

At the beginning of the talks, which I imagine started somewhere around '64 or '65, our position was that we should stop non-proliferation in such a comprehensive way so that the nuclear weapons or other nuclear weapon— nuclear explosive device, should not be transferred to anyone whatsoever, not only to individual states, but to international organizations as well. This was our position from the very start.

WHY WAS THE SOVIET UNION SO STRONGLY OPPOSED TO MLF, THE MULTI..., AND HOW DID IT BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS?

We opposed very much MLF, because we thought, as we think now, that this international organization, this international force would give a possibility to some other countries except— in addition to the United States, to have if not the possession, but to have the possibility to participate in the use of nuclear weapons. So that would be something which will be contrary to our concept of non-proliferation. That is why the problem of MLF delayed the conclusion of the treaty for two or three years.

IN 1963, PRESIDENT KENNEDY PREDICTED THAT BY THE '70S, UP TO 25 NATIONS MAY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DID THE SOVIET UNION SHARE HIS CONCERN, AND WHICH COUNTRIES WAS THE SOVIET UNION MOST CONCERNED ABOUT?

...we did not share these concerns of the President Kennedy. He mentioned 15 to 20 states that might have nuclear weapons after 20 years. This is by '83, '85. We did not share, because we thought that the international community is responsible enough to prevent this process of proliferation. We had some concerns, as we still have them today, about certain countries such as South Africa, Israel, Pakistan a few others who continue their efforts to set a, to create a potential for a nuclear possibility But we thought common efforts to put a stop to nonproliferation to proliferation, would in the long run give results and prevent from these nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. And we believe that overall, this effort was successful.

YET, ONLY WITHIN A YEAR THE CHINESE EXPLODED THEIR FIRST BOMB. WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION TO THAT EXPLOSION?

Well we have always been consistently against proliferation. This is in essence our reaction to that. To that because we wanted to put an end to proliferation.

DID YOU FEEL THAT SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN THE EARLY PERIOD HAD BEEN A GREAT HELP TO THE CHINESE PROGRAM, SPECIFICALLY CHINA?

Well we had a very expanded program of cooperation with China in nuclear field. And I would imagine that this program did give a chance to the Chinese to acquire knowledge and know-how in this field. So it helped them.

DO WHAT EXTENT DID THE SOVIET UNION REGRET THAT?

No I wouldn't say that we regret that. China is a great power. It has nuclear weapons. It has been acting responsibly in this field. Now China is very positive in its activities in disarmament. It made a number of important proposals on nuclear disarmament. It has accepted a, an overall non-proliferation policy. Though not a part to NPT, China has accepted the importance of non-proliferation. So it is a very responsible policy.

IN THE LATE '50S, KHRUSHCHEV TRIED TO PUT OFF THE CHINESE PROGRAM, TRIED TO, FOR EXAMPLE ...FAR-EASTERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ...IN '59. HE WAS TRYING TO HEAD OFF THE CHINESE, IT SEEMED.

In those years the relations between the two countries became very tense, for many reasons. And it is correct to say that at sometime there were attempts to prevent China from acquiring nuclear capability. But we are talking of today. And today China is a responsible member of international community, and it has a positive policy in this field.

WE'RE TRYING TO GIVE THE AUDIENCE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH YOU'RE PREPARED TO TELL ME ABOUT THAT, BUT THERE WAS THE INCIDENT WHERE THE SOVIETS ABROGATED THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT. I JUST WONDER IF YOU CAN GIVE ME...?

Yes, I see. There have been ups and down in Soviet-Chinese relations over the years. But those ups and downs in our relations do not prevent us from developing very actively and very intensively our relations over the recent years. So while the history is full of zig-zags full of ups and downs and from today's perspective I believe that both of us have learned to live as good neighbors. And we intend to improve our good neighborly relations with China. It may not be a complete—

THERE'S JUST ONE OTHER INCIDENT THAT COMES TO MIND, WHICH IS THE ...CRISIS. I'M JUST THINKING, WELL, AT THAT TIME THE SOVIET UNION WAS RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED IN ...TO HELP THE CHINESE IN... AGAIN, I'M THINKING, WELL, WHAT WAS THE SOVIET POSITION, WHY DIDN'T THEY STEP IN TO HELP THE CHINESE AT THAT POINT?

Well I'm, I was not very much involved in this...

OK, LET'S GET BACK TO THE PROLIFERATION TREATY. IN THE COURSE OF THE NPT DEBATE, THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES DESCRIBE — SOME OF THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES DESCRIBE THE TREATY AS DISCRIMINATING. DID YOU AGREE WITH THEIR CRITICISM?

No, I do not agree with it. I do not consider this treat discriminatory. This treaty is based on the realities of today. There are a number of nuclear weapons states and there are a number of non-nuclear weapons states. And this treaty fixes the position, the situation that we have today. It is not a completely equal situation, but it is a situation which is more conducive to a peaceful nuclear situation than if we had more nuclear weapons states. So that just is a -- it registers what we have today.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY OF THE INDIAN SPEECHES? I'M TRYING TO GET SOME ANECDOTAL MATERIAL, THE FLAVOR OF THE NEGOTIATING. AMBASSADOR... DO ANY SPEECHES COME TO MIND? ANY INCIDENTS?

Not on the spur of the moment that I can think of something. India has a, has always taken a special position vis-à-vis non-proliferation. Well, India is a great power. And we respect Indian, India's position. I cannot say that I appreciate Indian arguments all the time. I have some reservations with certain of the arguments against Non-Proliferation Treaty. I believe Non-Proliferation Treaty is a good treaty and it should be joined by all international community. And so I hope that one day India will join it.

TO WHAT EXTENT WERE US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES AT NPT AND DIFFERENCES IN GENERAL — NOT JUST WITH THE US, BUT WITH THE...PEOPLE AS WELL— TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THEY RESOLVED AWAY FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE? WE'VE HAD STORIES — GEORGE BUNN TOLD ME A STORY ABOUT HOW YOU WERE HIKING IN THE WOODS, AND ON YOUR WAY DOWN THE MOUNTAIN DISCUSS...?

Well of course, at that time the Soviet Union had some apprehension about a number of countries that in our view might... like to keep a nuclear option, and create a capability for producing nuclear weapons. So we were mindful of the fact that some of such countries were very suspicious of any attempts to reach agreement on non-proliferation. So that would give you a feeling of the situation that we had at time in Geneva, in '66, '67, early '68, when the treaty was under active consideration. Sometimes the depositories, the present depositories of the treaty had to find ways to discuss in privacy, different aspects of the treaty. Especially that concerned the question of safeguards, of verification of the treaty compliance. Article 3 of the treaty, which provides for the safeguards by the IAEA, that is, International Atomic Energy Agency. In the non-nuclear weapon states it was a very important, and it is a very important, part of the treaty. And of course the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were interested to work out a just, a fair, system of safeguards And we wanted to have a possibility to do this privately before we took the agreed principles to other states for general discussion.

SO HOW DID YOU DO IT PRIVATELY?

Well, we sometimes we took a yacht and were yachting on the, in Geneva. Sometimes we went to the, for hiking somewhere near Geneva to give us a chance to discuss and to work out, it was a creative effort. It was a creative effort to work out details of the system. At the time I remember well, there was an attempt on the part of some West European states to have a special system of safeguards for Western Europe, the so-called safeguards of... And we thought that it would be discriminatory to other parties of the treaties if a number of a limited number of states had safeguards of their own. We called it a self-inspection, self-verification. We wanted international overall, nondiscriminatory verification, which we thought would be best provided for by the International Atomic Energy Agency. And we were able to reach such a, an agreement. Hopefully.

LET ME ASK YOU ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT NPT. HOW USEFUL WAS NPT IN ESTABLISHING BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US? JUST BRIEFLY.

Yes. I think that NPT was and remains one of the areas of the Soviet-American relations in which we have a common interest, and which does in our view help us to develop better relations in other areas. Because in this area there has been a common understanding all the way through. There were some nuances, some little problems. Maybe some medium-size problems but overall it was a very successful, and we hope that it will it will be it's it becomes a good model for our relations in other areas, too.

IN 1974 INDIA EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE. WHAT WAS THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THIS?

Well, at that time we made a statement that this was a device as explained by the Indian government designed for peaceful purposes. We didn't have any doubt as to the explanation given by the Indian authorities.

AND IN THAT WAY IT DIDN'T CONTRADICT THE NPT IN ANY WAY?

India was not a party to NPT. So we couldn't say that India's action contradicted NPT and was any violation of the international commitments by India. India was not and still isn't a party to NPT. Of course, we would like India to become NPT member. And we hope it will become one day.

IN WHAT WAY WAS THE SOVIET UNION INSTRUMENTAL IN ASSURING THE SUCCESS OF THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP OF WHICH YOU WERE A PARTICIPANT. JUST BRIEFLY AGAIN.

Again. Well, the whole idea originated in '74. By a idea originated by the United States and the Soviet Union because at that time there were efforts by a number of nuclear exporters to expand nuclear trade and to provide certain non-nuclear weapon states with sensitive nuclear installations, nuclear facilities. That is why the United States and the Soviet Union decided that we need to create a special set of principles, set of rules, set of guidelines in order to limit any possibility of expanding a nuclear trade which would lead to proliferation. That was the idea behind the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

HOW DID YOU VIEW THE VARIOUS COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR DEALS WHICH WERE GOING ON AT THIS TIME? AT THIS TIME OF THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO, THERE WERE THE DEALS, THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN DEAL, AND THE FRENCH-PAKISTAN...?

We viewed it with great apprehension and great concern. This, these deals of 1975-76 did prompt the idea of the Nuclear Supplies Group. And we made our position very clear. And we are very glad that due to the efforts of the Nuclear Supplies Group, some, at least some of these agreements, were put to an end.

BUT WHAT WAS IT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID? I MEAN, THEY JUST INSISTED THAT THE ...SHOULD APPLY ...TO THE IAEA THAT PEOPLE SHOULD ABIDE BY THOSE? WHAT WAS IT THAT WAS SO SPECIAL ABOUT THE SOVIET... I THINK THEY HAD MORE OF A ROLE THAN THE US...SUPPLIES.

Because our opposition in the London Suppliers Group was that any transfer of nuclear materials or nuclear technology or equipment should entail the so-called full-scope safeguards. That not only a, an individual transfer should be safeguarded, but all nuclear activities in a country, in a recipient country, should be put under safeguards. This was our position then, and this is our position now. And we were not able to reach agreement because of opp, of opposition of some Western countries such as France and Japan in the first instance. And we unfortunately felt that the United States was not consistent in their position to persuade their friends and allies to adopt a more strict rules in nuclear export controls.

IF YOU CAN JUST REPEAT THE POINT YOU WERE MAKING ABOUT THE AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ASPECT.

When we started to work out on the general guidelines for nuclear experts the Soviet Union proposed, together with the United Kingdom, that any transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology should entail safeguards on all nuclear activities of the recipient state. That was objected to by a number of countries, especially by France and Japan. And the United States at that moment was not consistent in its insistence on these s— full scope safeguards, that is, the safeguards on all nuclear activities of a recipient state. And that didn't give us a chance, it didn't, didn't give us a possibility to conclude a, an agreement on nuclear guidelines that would cover full scope safeguards.

WHY WAS THE UNITED STATES...?

I believe that it was for political and commercial reasons that perhaps the United States did not want to press hard their friends in Japan and in France, or maybe s-some other reasons. I don't want to go into any attempts to ...

PRESIDENT CARTER, WHEN HE CAME INTO OFFICE, HE WENT ON TO INTRODUCE THE NON-NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ACT. NOW, WHAT DID YOU FEEL THAT ACHIEVED, IF ANYTHING?

Well generally we see it as a positive development. It was an important piece of United States national legislation which created a certain additional constraints on proliferation of nuclear weapons, and other nuclear explosive devices. However that legislation does have some loopholes. Because under certain conditions the United States could provide materials, equipment, and technology to certain countries by a special decision of the president, as I understand, if the President considered that for reasons of United States security interest it was necessary to provide such equipment to any state. So that law has some loophole. But overall, it was a step forward in the general non-proliferation efforts.

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SOVIET UNION HELPED OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WITH THEIR CIVILIAN ENERGY PROGRAM SINCE THE NPT, AND UNDER WHAT TERMS? I'M THINKING AN OBVIOUS ONE IS LIBYA.

Well our policy is a very strict one. And I think we have a very good record in non-proliferation. We have our own national legislation which goes beyond the London guidelines. It has more strict provisions than London guidelines. And we believe that we have been acting very responsibly, and we have a good record. Uh, there was some criticism, say, of our relations with Libya. But I must first of all emphasize that Libya is a party to Non-Proliferation Treaty. That all Libyan nuclear activity is safeguarded. The Soviet Union built a nuclear research facility in Libya, and it is safeguarded by the IAEA. There is no problem. And there was no complaint on the part of IAEA of any activity which would be contrary to the existing system of safeguards. So there is no problem there. And we are prepared to help other countries in the same way.

I'M JUST GOING TO PICK OUT A FEW NEWS EVENTS NOW JUST FOR A REACTION. ONE IS THE ISRAELI BOMBING OF THE OSIRAK REACTOR, THE IRAQ REACTOR. WHAT WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S REACTION?

We condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor because it was something against any against international law, against any principles of international behavior. Um, I would like first of all to emphasize the fact that it was a very well safeguarded reactor. There was nothing wrong with the activity of this reactor. But even if this reactor was producing some materials, which would be contrary to the principles of non-proliferation then Israel should have addressed the United Nations, the IAEA, the United Nations Security Council with complaint. And they never complained. And any international organization against the Iraqi activities.

IF YOU COULD JUST REPEAT IT. I THINK YOU SAID INDIA INSTEAD OF ISRAEL. JUST TO BE SAFE, LET'S SAY ISRAEL NEVER COMPLAINED.

Yes, of course. If Israel had some grievances against Iraq, with regard to the reactor we are talking about it should have complained to United Nations to IAEA. There was no such complaint. All of a sudden, from the blue of the sky, India, Israel, sorry, again, Israel attacked the Iraqi reactor. And it was condemned by all international community.

DO YOU MIND SAYING, "OUT OF THE BLUE..." ?

Hm-mm. And all of a sudden, out of the blue Israel attacked the Iraqi reactor, and provoked indignation and condemnation from all international communities. United Nations, the IAEA condemned Israel. And it has been a terrible blow to the IAEA and to the IAEA safeguard system.

THE RECENT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE ISRAELI REACTOR AND TALKING ABOUT 200 NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TEN TIMES AS MANY AS WAS BELIEVED BEFORE. HOW MUCH CREDENCE DO YOU GIVE TO THESE REPORTS?

Well, we look with great concern. Of course we cannot corroborate or deny or corroborate the figures given in these reports. We don't know about these. But we look with great concern at the Israeli efforts to develop their nuclear potential. It's a great concern. And we said so on many occasions. We said this in the United Nations and we tell our American colleagues about that. We believe that it is a great danger. It may start a chain reaction.

IN WHAT WAY?

In what way? It may give a good pretext to others to do the same thing. So we look at this with great concern.

ON JUNE 21ST THIS YEAR, THE SOVIET UNION CONDEMNED PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HOW DOES THE SOVIET UNION VIEW A NUCLEAR-CAPABLE PAKISTAN?

We are we have also great concerns about Pakistan, because according to information we receive, Pakistanis are developing their nuclear capabilities, and developing quite fast. Approaching the stage when they will be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon. And we in the United Nations, in our bilateral relations with Pakistan, with our contacts with other countries we draw their attention to the necessity of the international community to prevent Pakistan from creating nuclear explosive capabilities.

AND LAST QUESTION. BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT, WHOM I'M SURE YOU KNOW, HAS SAID, "IF YOU WANTED TO BE SOMEBODY IN THIS WORLD, YOU HAD TO HAVE A BOMB." WOULD YOU AGREE WITH HIM?

No, I wouldn't. I think that the, that the trend in international community is that the bomb is not an asset but a disadvantage. Now, now I think the general trend is towards a non-nuclear world. The bomb doesn't give you any advantage. That was a a thinking of the past. Now the new political thinking is more towards the non-nuclear world. And now, with the efforts of the Soviet Union, and hopefully the United States will join this, to abolish nuclear weapons completely. Such statements that a nuclear bomb is an asset just do not receive great support.

THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES SAY THAT, HOW DO YOU EXPECT US, YOU KNOW, WHEN YOU HAVEN'T DONE THIS ABOUT VERTICAL PROLIFERATION, WHY SHOULD WE...

Yes, of course there are such voices that you cannot have a horizontal, so-called horizontal proliferation...

OK. THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAVE VOICED THEIR CONCERN THAT WHY SHOULD THEY DEAL WITH HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IF WE DON'T DEAL WITH VERTICAL PROLIFERATION?

Well, such voices are not that loud now. And the Third Review Conference of the Third Review Conference in '85, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has shown that the vast majority of non-nuclear weapons states do not share this view. They do not want to have their own weapons. And they are prepared to live without them. So this argument that if the nuclear weapons states continue to possess their weapons, others should do the same thing, this argument is not very popular now. Now the trend is towards a non-nuclear world. So I don't think this argument has a great popularity in today's world.

TO WHAT EXTENT WERE US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES AT NPT RESOLVED AWAY FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE? YOU MENTIONED BEFORE THE PERSONAL, PRIVATE WAYS IT WAS DONE. CAN YOU TELL ME A BIT MORE? WE'VE HEARD FROM GEORGE ABOUT THIS.

Hm-mm. Our NPT negotiations were very creative. Because some ideas for NPT were developed during the actual process of contacts between the two delegations. I think that on certain issues there were no instructions. And we tried to find out how to approach — we didn't know how to approach certain aspects, like the safeguards, for instance. So at the suggestion of either Soviet or American delegations, we made a lot of personal contacts. Like I mentioned yachting or we went to the mountains or we just walked around the lake in Geneva. And during these discussions, we were trying to find out, how to approach my counterpart, George Bunn suggested one thing, I suggested another thing. Then in the process of mingling and mixing ideas we found solutions. And then those solutions were approved by our respective authorities. And this is how this particular piece of legislation of international law was worked out.

LET'S JUST DO IT ONE MORE TIME, BECAUSE YOU SAID,"I MENTIONED BEFORE…" AND IF YOU CAN JUST START BY SAYING, "WELL WE HAD A LOT OF CREATIVE WAYS OF DOING IT."

Can you cut it, can you cut it out? No, you can't. I'm sorry about that. So I shall repeat without mentioning before. So I think that Non-Proliferation Treaty, the negotiations of that treaty, was a very important experiment in a creative approach to establishing international law. Because on certain specific issues of this treat neither delegation, neither US or Soviet delegation, had any specific instructions. And the parts of agreement were discussed, I would say created, in the in the personal discussions and contacts in the, in the personal spirit of creativity. And in order to come to such a spirit of creativity from time to time delegations went yachting or went hiking in the mountains, or do some other things like having parties together, in hotels or in restaurants. And in human discussions discuss business, parts of business, then thought about them, met again, and created provisions of the treaty. And then those provisions were approved by respective authorities. And this is, I think, the way to approach treaty elaboration.

OK, REALLY BRIEFLY NOW, HOW DID WEST GERMANY FIGURE IN THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE ...PERIOD. IF YOU CAN JUST PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL, WHAT THE SOVIET...

We were very suspicious of West Germany, and it's...

CAN YOU JUST START AGAIN, I'M SORRY.

We were very suspicious of West Germany's attempts to proliferate. So our one of the major objectives of the Soviet Union during the non-proliferation discussions was to prevent everybody, including West Germany first of all, from becoming nuclear. This is why all our efforts were aimed at this, at this, at this goal. And we knew that West Germany was also suspicious as to how we are going to limit the, their nuclear capabilities. I think looking behind from today and to those times, that they thought that we wanted to limit their peaceful nuclear industry. We didn't want to do that. So there was maybe some misunderstanding on both parts. On the parts of the nuclear weapons states, and the parts of some non-nuclear weapons states. But in the long run, in the end we came to a correct decision.

AGAIN, REAL QUICK. THE CHINESE BOMB EXPLOSION, DID IT HAVE ANY EFFECT AT ALL ON THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS?

No, I don't think it affected I don't think so.