BY THE END OF 1978, BY GUADALUPE, THE AMERICANS WERE NO IN THE DRIVING SEAT, HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN RATHER RELUCTANT, BUT BEING THIS SORT OF CHANGED, IN THE COURSE OF 1978. CAN YOU QUICKLY GIVE US A SENSE OF HOW THAT CAME ABOUT?

Well, as I, I think I was saying a little earlier, the change in American attitude came about during the course of '78, when finally, uh, I think the White House, in particular, the National Security staff adviser, the deputy adviser and, uh, and staff, which included myself and a couple of others, said, uh, well, look, we just can't keep sweeping this issue under the table. It's, uh, it's going to just, it's going to kill us. And we're going to do damage to the Alliance, and we may also do damage to the, uh, to the SALT treaty. So we, we, some of us convinced the president to sign now what became known as "Presidential Review Memorandum #38". Where he asked the, uh, the government to review our entire policy in this area, in both the defense and the arms control realm. And that review brought out a whole debate, and that laid out what basically, I myself wrote the, the decision document, basically saying there were really two ways to think about the problem. One was that we did actually have a serious strategic problem here that needed to be addressed. And that was the gap in the escalation spectrum, the fact that the SS-20 had exacerbated that, and we needed to do some what would call the hardware solution. On the other hand were people who said, no, this is a political issue only, and has to do with the, uh, how nervous our allies are about how well we're taking care of their security, and we ought to be able to, by political means alone, do this. Because their had been an awful lot of reluctance to move in the hardware direction, basically because people felt that if we did that, we would unleash in Europe a new set of political forces. Uh, political forces saying, well, gee, you know, these things actually have to be here in our country? And, uh, what, you know, and that's going to lead to the poll problems and in fact we did see in the early 1980s. And this tension was resolved, I think as I was saying earlier, largely on the political grounds that we have to do something to make up for the catastrophe of the neutron bomb. We have to do something to ensure that the Europeans are happy with the SALT treaty, and, uh, that led to the change in American attitude. And basically opting for what was, what meant a decision that would include, had to include some hardware. It also had an arms control component. It said that in the SALT III, which of course never happened, there would be negotiations about these weapons. But that was the essence of the decision made by the administration. It was solidified in the period between, um, late summer of '78 and the Guadalupe summit. Uh, it was discussed, options began to be discussed in NATO groups about what we might deploy. Uh, options were put forward in what was known as the high level group. And, uh, in fact we had a process basically whenever a US paper was written for internal decision, it was quickly re-written, very little, and turned over to the high level group.

HOW DID THE ADMINISTRATION COME UP WITH THE PRECISE MIX OF CRUISE AND PERSHINGS THAT THEY ENDED UP WITH?

Well, um, by late '78 there were a number of potential options. Um, there in fact five, if I remember. Sea-launch cruise missiles, air launch cruise missiles, uh, a new intermediate range nuclear missile which would be built from scratch, the Pershing II, which was going to be a variation on an existing system, and the ground launch cruise missile. The new, you know, all of the first three were eliminated on various grounds, and that was left with two competitors, and you have found that two factors came in to play. One was that the, uh, the ground launch cruise missile and the Pershing II appeared to be available. Uh, secondly, well, actually three factors came into play. The second factor was that there was an old military approach that it's better to put your eggs into two different baskets than to put them all into one. So that the adversary's countermeasures have to be more, much more complex. And third, the ground launch cruise missile looked very cheap. So, and the Pershing looked very expensive. It only had the advantage of having an infrastructure existing for it in Germany, where the Pershing I was deployed, so we wouldn't have to build a whole bunch of new bases. But to build any more Pershings would have been more expensive, so the ground launch cruise missile was introduced basically on cost grounds.

NOW, WHAT I DON'T UNDERSTAND ABOUT THIS IS, YOU'VE SAID THE PERSHING HAPPENED TOBE AVAILABLE. WHY DID IT HAPPEN TO BE AVAILABLE?

Well, the army had a program going back into the early '70s to replace the Pershing I missile, and this was called the Pershing II Program. And it was to replace it with a missile of the same range as the Pershing I, which was 400 nautical miles, or what, that's 150 kilometers or so. And, uh, that, um, the Army was having a terrible time getting this thing approved. They'd either have trouble inside the Pentagon, or if they finally got it approved they'd have trouble with the Congress. Uh, why did they really need this, and the like. And it was, it was really going nowhere. When the whole debate came up about the cruise missiles, the ground launch cruise missile in particular, some people got the bright idea of saying, hey, wait a minute. If we just put new engines on to this Pershing II, we could extend its range to about double. And, uh, maybe a little bit more. And then we'd have the competitor to the ground launch cruise missiles. And I got to tell you, the people who latched on to this one were the arms controllers in the administration. Because they were trying to do in the ground launch cruise missile, which they saw as a long-term threat to arms control. Cruise missiles being so difficult to verify and the like. And so the arms controllers began to push the Pershing II, became known as Pershing II-XR, extended range. And, uh, and that Pershing II Extended Range became the, uh, became the option for...

THAT'S RATHER IRONIC, ISN'T IT? BECAUSE AS IT'S TURNED OUT, THE PERSHING II WAS THE INGREDIENT IN THE MIX THAT THE SOVIETS WERE RATHER FRIGHTENED OF, AND WHICH MAY WELL HAVE TAKEN THEM BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. WAS THAT PREDICTED? DID THE PEOPLE APPRECIATE THAT AT THE TIME?

No, I don't think people appreciated that at the time. People thought that that would not be a problem.

SORRY, WHEN YOU SAY "THAT" YOU HAVE TO REFER TO WHAT "THAT" IS SPECIFICALLY.

People thought that the Pershing II with its extended range would not be a problem in this connection, because its range was not long enough to strike Moscow. And that therefore it would not have the capability for the the so-called "decapitating rapid strike" that the Soviets later began to get worried about. And I think we failed to predict Soviet worries in this area. My guess is that the Soviets never really believed that the weapon couldn't get to Moscow. They figured somehow or the other we had, we had cooked up a way to really get it there, and, uh, do them in with a decapitating first strike, which in fact, as I understand, understood then and still understand the capabilities of that missile, it simply could not do. But, uh, nevertheless, they believed it could.

BUT THAT ALSO BECAME A FACTOR, BECAUSE WHEN THE POLITICAL STORM BEGAN TO RAGE IN EUROPE IN THE EARLY 80S ABOUT ALL THIS, VARIOUS INGREDIENTS CAME TO BE BROUGHT TOGETHER. NOW SOME OF THEM WERE PURELY COINCIDENTAL. THE WAR-FIGHTING RHETORIC OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, FOR EXAMPLE. BUT, THERE WERE THOSE ON THE EUROPEAN LEFT WHO SAW THE PERSHING II AS FITTING INTO AN OVERALL CONTEXT, OF WHICH PD-59, WHICH WAS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, WAS ALSO A PART. AND THERE WERE THOSE IN THE EUROPEAN LEFT WHO STARTED SAYING, HANG ON, THIS IS THE AMERCANS TRYING TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WARS TO EUROPE. CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR REACTION TO THAT.

Well, this is the dual, the two-sided nature of the whole business of nuclear deterrents, and the whole business of NATO strategy and the strategy of escalation and its seeking to restore deterrents. Because in a sense that strategy says something about confining nuclear wars to Europe. Because it says if we can just get out of this thing without everybody blowing up everybody, uh, then that would be terrific. So, in a sense, you know, that, the European left was criticizing the strategy. That was indeed the strategy. The cruise missile and the Pershing together fit into the strategy that way. It wasn't just the Pershing. Now I think what happened was that because the Soviets were making such a ruckus about the Pershing, that that on the left became their focus, too. As opposed to the cruise missile. Uh, but, it is, it's the problem of nuclear, managing nuclear strategy in the modern age. How do we deter war, uh, and have a strategy that if war comes, can get us out of a war without blowing everybody up? And, uh, it requires an awful lot of seeming contradiction. That we're willing to use nuclear weapons. Well, that means we must be willing to fight a nuclear war. Well, yes we are. But, uh, we don't want to fight the ultimate catastrophic nuclear war. We'd like to avoid that, even if nuclear weapons are used. So it's a very difficult thing, you know. If somebody says, if you're in favor of the NATO strategy that means you're in favor of fighting a limited nuclear war. Well, I suppose it's true, uh, that you are in favor of that. If you want to put it, I don't want to favor any war. But if nuclear war were to occur, you're in favor of fighting a limited nuclear war as opposed to having a global conflagration. That's the way I would say it.

NOW, LET'S JUST TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW. YOU'VE HAD SOME DEALINGS WITH THE GERMANS RECENTLY. WHAT DO YOU THINK IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN? DO YOU THINK THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL STAY IN EUROPE? OR DO YOU THINK THAT WHEN IT IS NO LONGER POLITICALLY SO SENSITIVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE TAKEN OUT?

I don't know. I think we've got a very difficult political situation evolving now. Uh, now meaning post-INF treaty. Uh, the Germans have a feeling now that the only, they've created for themselves the perception that the only weapons left are those that can strike Germany. Is the, as they say, the shorter the ranger, the deader the Germans. And this is leading the Germans to say, we now have to have arms control on these shorter-range systems. Well, this leads in a certain direction, because if we eliminate those then maybe we will be eliminating some more, and some more, and some more. It's a, it's a direction. Uh, the British and the German, I mean, the French government, on the other hand, are saying, wait a minute. Or we should stop now. And go on to the conventional area. No more of negotiations on nuclear weapons. Obviously, their concerns are that these, any other further negotiations will lead into negotiations on their own independent deterrents. I think the American government is in a box. It doesn't know how it's going to satisfy both sets of allies simultaneously, And I think it doesn't know what to do. And uh, my guess is that it will not want to negotiate further on nuclear weapons. But how it will manage the political problems this will cause with the Germans, uh, I have no way to predict.

IT'S SLIGHTLY IRONIC, ISN'T IT, THAT THE SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN OUT FROM NATO'S POINT OF VIEW, THE SYSTEMS WHICH ACTUALLY MADE SENSE IN TERMS OF THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE...

Yes, that made the most sense, right. The ones that scared the Soviets the most, and scaring the Soviets are, to put it, I mean, the Soviets is what deterrence is about. And uh, yeah, we started at the wrong end of negotiations on nuclear weapons. We probably should have started with short-range forces.

LOOKING BACK OVER THIS WHOLE EPISODE, WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD DRAW FROM IT? DOES IT REINFORCE THE THEORY OF HISTORY, OR DOES IT SHOW THAT NATO HAS GONE THROUGH A PROCESS OF TOUGHENING, AND THERE'S NOW MUCH GREATER REALISM ABOUT WHAT IS INVOLVED?

Well, I think the jury is out on this, and will be for some time on this entire now episode that now spans ten years, more, more than ten years. And, uh, really will be coming to an end, in a sense, with the final implementation of the INF treaty. The alliance did well, you have to say. You know, there was, of course, a lot of fumbling and bumbling, as there always are when governments, any government is involved, and now you've got a number of governments which makes it even more difficult. But they did make a decision... on a very, very sensitive and difficult matter. And, uh, then they carried it out. In the middle of what was, you know, one has to say, a tremendous series of opposition. They carried it out. The American government stood firm as a leader of the alliance. The alliance, allied government stood firm with that kind of American leadership, and things were deployed. Now, somehow or the other we've trapped ourselves into a situation where having taken care of our problem, we in a sense began to recreate it again by, through arms control. And we're emerging now from the other end of that, uh, potentially slightly better off than we were when we entered, potentially slightly worse off. Because when we entered it we had no missiles and we did have strategic parity, and we're going to come out of it with no missiles and strategic parity. But we did get rid of the SS-20s, and a whole class of systems. And how that trade works out, you know, I think that will take some time to understand. But I think in general the NATO alliance did quite well through this. And, uh, it's a credit to them. To all the governments and leaders involved. [LONG PAUSE] Now whether or not this turns out to be o.k. really depends on how the alliance now manages the forces that have begun a march toward increasing number of zero nuclear weapons, which is something the alliance cannot afford. Uh, and if leadership is not strong enough to stand up against those forces, and continue to negotiate and bargain away entire classes of nuclear weapons, this can only, without having taken care of the conventional threat, this can only be a negative result. And so, that's why the jury is still out. So far, o.k., but let's see what happens next.

O.K., DR. THOMSON, I'D LIKE TO START WITH A COUPLE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SCHLESINGER PERIOD. IN, I THINK 1974, CONGRESS ASKED SECRETARY SCHLESINGER TO REPORT ON HOW MANY WAR HEADS THERE WERE IN EUROPE, AND WHAT THEY WERE FOR. HOW DID THAT HAPPEN, AND WHAT DID IT REVEAL?

Well, the initiative came from Senator Nunn, who had held a series of hearings on the nuclear posture in Europe, and potential dangers associated with it, which was the basic feeling at the time. And this set off a, um, review inside the pentagon of our nuclear posture in Europe, and an attempt, if you will, to rationalize both what it was and where it was going to go. And, uh, it did reveal a number of important points. That was, first, that the, the stockpile of shorter-range systems, what are now called, uh, SNF's, short-range nuclear forces, was aging, and had a number of technical problems that needed to be repaired. And indeed, one of those repairs became the neutron bomb, uh, which became such a political issue in the later '70s. Uh, we'll look at the, uh, at the posture of the tactical air forces and their ability to deliver nuclear weapons and the need to modernize the weapons associated with them. Uh, in general, the stress was on, uh, what role these play, you know, in the NATO strategy of flexible response? What's the problem of the stockpile? How ought it to be fixed? And, uh, it was very much in those days a, a political, but also largely technical discussion. Political in the sense that it was being discussed as part of the alliance, you know, what the role of the weapons were. But technical from the point of view of trying to put together a modernization program for the forces.

CAN YOU TELL US WHAT HAPPENED WHEN SECRETARY SCHLESINGER DID TRY AND RATIONALIZE THE STOCKPILE? WAS HE SUCCESSFUL?

Well, I think that process is still going on. I think, uh, in some ways he was successful in that a series of programs were either underway or initiated to modernize the forces. And in particular with respect to safety and security of the forces, with respect to their accuracy, lower collateral damage, uh, making them more effective. All of these are things that to some degree continue. These were, so that aspect of the, of the effort was, I would say, largely successful, although the neutron bomb debate derailed an important aspect of that that had to be put back on track, in a way, uh, that did not raise the problem of the neutron bomb to the degree that it had been raised in 1977. Uh, the interesting thing, of course, is that during this period of '74, 5, 6, uh, the issue of long range theater nuclear forces, or what we now call LRINF: long range intermediate range nuclear forces, was really not on the, on the front burner. It was really working with the stockpile as it existed at that time.

WHAT WAS THAT STOCKPILE FOR? WHAT AT THAT TIME WERE THOUGHT TO BE THE FUNCTION OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS? DID EVERYBODY AGREE WHAT IT WAS?

No, they didn't, because you have in, you have had in American nuclear thinking about these forces for many years really two schools of thought. One, that I would associate myself with, and which I think is generally the alliance policy, looks at nuclear weapons as a part of a strategy that is designed to deter, and in the event that war occurs, to restore deterrence. In other words, if the Soviets attacked us with conventional forces, the thinking would be, well, they must have made a mistake. They didn't understand that we were threatening them with nuclear weapons, so nuclear weapons would be used in an effort to cause the Soviet leadership to change its mind about the war, and to stop. That's the sort of theory of escalation. Um, the US army in particular, but other people, but in particular the US army has viewed these nuclear weapons, or had viewed these nuclear weapons quite differently. They thought of them more in traditional military terms. That nuclear weapons exist as a decisive element on the battlefield. To win a war decisively through the employment of nuclear weapons. So they thought of the result in terms of military outcome. Whereas the escalation theory thought of the result in terms of psychological outcome on the Soviet leadership. And those are not completely inconsistent. But they are intentioned as well.

WHAT ABOUT THE BRITISH? WHAT ABOUT PEOPLE LIKE MICHAEL QUINLIN? WHAT DID THEY THINK THAT THE FUNCTION WAS?

They would fall very much... People like Michael Quinlan, and I think the whole British, uh, military defense, civil service, thought very much in this first school of thought. And indeed, in my view, were probably the most, um, articulate and leading thinkers in this area. And the role of nuclear weapons in escalation, to restore deterrence, and that was their purpose. And that was very much the way they came at it.

DOES THIS MEAN THAT THERE WAS A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT CALLING FOR WHAT WERE THEN CALLED TNF, EVEN BEFORE THE SS-20S APPEARED?

Um, I suppose there had always been some people calling for TNF missiles, uh, even all the way back, as you know, to General Norstadt, who had, uh, had wanted and indeed had for a time these longer range missiles. Um, but those were supplanted by the evolution of the American strategic nuclear deterrent, and saw, seemed to be unnecessary. And the issue of that capability had essentially receded. Uh, the SS-20appearance brought that back to the fore, as did the SALT negotiations. And as did some people's thinking about the evolution of the strategic balance, which had by that point American superiority had been wiped out. Parity had been achieved. Uh, but the, the talk about new missiles was stimulated in fact by the appearance of the SS-20, and the SALT treaty. But I have to say, that the theory of escalation, and including especially that articulated as you were just discussing, by the British civil service, obviously called for the weapons. It required a, sort of a spectrum of capability, from the lower level, shorter-range battlefield, all the way up to the strategic forces. And what was obviously missing in that spectrum for a long time was the capability to attack Soviet territory from European soil.

RIGHT. LET'S NOW MOVE ON TO THE 1977 SPEECH THAT HELMUT SCHMIDT GAVE. I'VE SEEN THE SPEECH, AND ON THE FACE OF IT IT DOESN'T SEEM SO WORLD SHATTERING. WHY DID IT CAUSE THE REACTION IT DID CAUSE INSIDE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION? CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO US THE CONTEXT?

I think the context is quite important. Uh, beginning in, in, beginning with a couple of things. The appearance of the SS-20, which I think frightened people. A new weapon that they didn't understand why the Soviets had deployed it, threatening Western Europe. Coupled with the debate over the SALT treaty, especially the Vladivostok accord of late 1974. And in part, as part of that was a discussion about limitations on cruise missiles. In particular, what was being discussed were bans on the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers launched from the ground or the sea. This led a lot of people to say, hey, wait a minute. If we're giving up these cruise missile capabilities, uh, maybe we ought to think before we give it up why, why we would have them. If we wanted them. And this got a debate going, mainly inside the pentagon, uh, about, uh, about the role, potential role of cruise missiles. This coupled into the theory of nuclear deterrents, as articulated—, as I just articulated it and I say articulate. And also the fact that maybe we needed a political counter to the SS-20. Europe picked up this debate. And indeed, European governments, in particular the German and the British government began to say, wait a minute. What are you guys going to do, if you give away these ground and sea launch cruise missiles. Are you going to give up a potential element of Western we ma-, a potential element that we may need in the Western deterrence posture. When the Carter administration arrived, this was going on before the Carter administration. When the Carter administration arrived, it began to behave in ways that suggested it was quite willing to give away these capabilities in order to get a SALT agreement. This led to tremendous amount of pressure from Europe. Questions, what are they—, we want to know more about cruise missiles. Why are you giving these things away? And so forth. And, uh, it was in that context that the Schmidt speech arrived. And Schmidt said, in essence, first, the American nuclear deterrent, strategic nuclear deterrent, has been neutralized by, over the past several the years. The SS-20 has arrived, something has to be done about this. So this was read by officials like myself, and others in the administration is saying, Schmidt is saying to us he wants to deploy cruise missiles in Europe to counter the SS-20 and to to fill a gap in the escalation spectrum.

I SEE. BUT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DIDN'T AT FIRST RESPOND. IT DIDN'T AT FIRST DO MUCH ABOUT THIS, RIGHT?

Yeah, I think there was a tendency to hope this would go away. You know, just maybe we could ignore this and get on with our business. And, uh, in fact there were, uh, attempts made to try to downgrade, to try to explain to Europe well, these cruise missiles really weren't all that important anyway, you know, and, uh, efforts to try to say on the one hand they might be good, and on the other hand they might be bad. And, uh, the Europeans all heard the on the other hand part. And, uh, and said, look, the Americans are throwing cold water on the whole idea of cruise missiles, and this only increased the pressure on the United States to do something about this.

THEN IN 1978, THINGS CHANGED COMPLETELY, OR QUITE CONSIDERABLY. WHY WAS THAT?

Well, first we have continually always been the background of all this strategic situation, which was the strategic parity achieved by the Soviet Union, the buildup of Soviet nuclear forces, and the fact that the Soviets seemed to be countering our, our deterrent doctrine. But these sorts of expert discussions would not by themselves have had enough weight—, as valid as they might be, and I agree that they are, would not by themselves have had enough weight to push this issue forward as fast as it did get pushed in 1978. And two things happened in 1978. One was the neutron bomb debacle, where the President looked as though he could not manage the nuclear affairs of the alliance, as leader of the alliance. A rather serious problem. Secondly, the emerging SALT treaty, and concern on the part I would say, of the political side of the administration, that if we didn't do something about the Europeans, and their continued complaints about potential restrictions on cruise missiles, uh, we potentially could have a European opposition to the SALT treaty. So this, I think, turned the tide. There was always an on-going debate in the administration between those who said we've really got to move forward here, those were the people who thought about the theory and the need to fill the gap in the escalation spectrum. And the political side. And suddenly those things came together. And they pushed a decision out the door of the administration, in late 1978.

CAN I JUST GO BACK FOR A SECOND TO THIS NEUTRON QUESTION. WHY DID THE BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENT CARTER GET SO OUT OF STEP WITH EACH OTHER ON THAT?

Well, um, hmm. I think what happened, I personally don't know exactly, I have to say that. And I think you have to ask President Carter and his senior advisers, actually, to get the clear answer. But I have a theory. And that is that the President had approved, finally, in late 1977, a policy toward the neutron bomb. And that policy was basically I call a three part policy. And that was, the United States will agree to produce the neutron bomb. The European governments will agree to deploy it, and there'll be an arms control proposal made to the Soviet Union to trade away the neutron bomb, who which of course at this point would be under production and deployment, for... something. And this became the SS-20, and in my view a mistake, but, uh, as the linkage, but that's what it was. In the course of then carrying out this decision, uh, through diplomatic channels, the, uh, the last two elements kind of got reversed. And you seemed to have a decision emerging that said, uh, Americans are going to produce, they'll make an arms control offer, and if it fails, the Europeans will agree to deploy. Which is quite a different situation, because it makes the deployment decision of the Europeans contingent. And, uh, I think a lot of people inside said, well, you know, so what. We'll, we, you know, we got, we got what we needed, which was a consensus on, on deployment. When the president got a look at that he said, not "so what". I want the Europeans to be in this decision fully with me. And if they're not going to be there I'm not going to do it. And that in my view was the fundamental downfall of the neutron bomb.

LET'S NOW TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE SS-20S. WHAT DID YOU AND THOSE AROUND YOU IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION MAKE OF THE SS-20. WHAT DID YOU THINK THE SOVIETS WERE UP TO, WHAT DID IT SIGNIFY?

Well, my views on this changed over time. When I was in the pentagon, I took the view at first that the SS-20 was more of the same. That, uh, they were simply modernizing the SS-4, and the SS-5 force, and, uh, looked upon in that light, so what? They could destroy the same targets they could destroy before. But over time I think, uh, some of us began to see this in slightly different context. That the SS-20 had to be seen as part of a broader effort of the Soviet Union to change the overall strategic balance. By which, I mean they had built up their strategic forces to a point of parity with the United States in an effort to neutralize that element of deterrent. They had also had underway a modernization program of their nuclear forces in the theater. Modern weapons for the shorter range, modern air delivered capabilities, uh, and the SS-20. All of these provided much more credible options for them to escalate. And it almost looked as though they were seeking to undo our own doctrine of escalation, by having a counterveiling capability at every potential level of nuclear war. And moreover, now, with the SS-20, they had a cou-, they had a capability that wasn't even counterveiling. We had no capability at all. So then the SS-20 seemed to loom somewhat larger than it did when we first heard about its development, It began, we began to think, well, we've got a much more serious problem here for our whole structure of deterrence, than simply the replacement of old missiles with new missiles.

DR. THOMSON, THIS IS FASCINATING, BUT A LAYMAN MIGHT SAY, HANG ON. YOU'RE ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIETS THINK IN THE SAME EXTREMELY INTELLECTUALLY COMPLICATED WAY THAT WE DO. YOU'RE ASSUMING THAT THEY DO APPROACH THESE MATTERS WITH EXACTLY THE SAME SET OF DOCTRINES THAT WE DO, WERE YOU NOT?

Uh, to a degree, yes. I'm assuming that the Soviets had read our doctrine, had understood it, and that they capabilities that they had developed it were undermining it. But I don't re—, I don't really need to think whether or not the Soviets had that as their plan. They built the capabilities that had that effect, and there out allies were saying to us, this development of these capabilities is very worrisome to us. And nuclear weapons perform two functions. One is they deter the Soviet Union. And the secondly, they deter-, reassure our allies that we are, are trying to deter uh, war in Europe with our whole panoply of capabilities.

I JUST WANT YOU TO TELL US A LITTLE BIT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE EARLY '70s. NOW THIS WAS A TIME WHEN THERE WASN'T MUCH PUBLIC DEBATE GOING ON, NOTHING THAT'S PARTICULAR CONTENTIOUS IN PUBLIC. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE HAD BEEN AGREED IN 1967. WHAT WERE THE PEOPLE INSIDE THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE, DEBATING IN TERMS OF HOW YOU SHOULD IMPLEMENT FLEXIBLE, IN TERMS OF WHAT IT WOULD MEAN. PARTICULARLY PEOPLE LIKE QUINLAN?

Well, I have to say, I wasn't a participant in those days, and I also didn't know, uh, didn't know Quinlan at that point, and only came to know him later. Um, there were, there were two things basically happened. One was, soon after flexible response, somebody said we've got to think a little bit more about how we're going to employ nuclear weapons. And there was an effort in the, uh, alliance to put together what became known as "provisional political guidelines for first use". And, uh, the British government played a rather important role, and, uh, as did the German and the American governments, as you might expect. And those finally were, were completed in, I think, '69 or '70, I can't recall for sure. Uh, and then came some studies and I can't, their connector they were connected to the Schlesinger Initiatives. The ones that came out of the Nunn…called the "Military Implications of Technology" and "The Political Implications of New Technology And in the NATO environment, the environment of the nuclear planning group. And those studies, uh, I think helped lay an awful lot of technical—, provided Europeans with an awful lot of technical understanding of what all these weapons were about, how they worked, and what was on the horizon for new technology. But again, those were being—, as I say those were happening in the early, to middle '70s, so they weren't about what became the focus of the debate. They were about how to modernize the battlefield nuclear stockpile, the artillery tubes, the air-delivered weapons for the tactical air forces. Uh, the Lance was coming on then to replace the older Honest Johns and Sargents. And so they were a sharing of information about, on a military basis and on a political basis about these things. They were laying the groundwork. But I can't say exactly what I think, uh, Quinlan and so forth, thought about, talked about. In fact, as I've told you, the best source on this is Michael Legg's report at RAND.

O.K., LET'S MOVE ON A LITTLE BIT, AND TALK ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN 1978. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE... I ALWAYS GET CONFUSED WHETHER IT WAS THE NUCLEAR POWER GROUP OR THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP. BUT WHAT WERE THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, SAYING THEN? THERE WAS A POINT WHEN IT WAS EUROPEAN DRIVEN. WHAT WERE THEY SAYING THEN?

Well, the British were, were, along with the Germans...You have to, can't separate them to some degree, were pushing the position that became known as the need for an evolutionary upward adjustment in NATO's nuclear, toward the long-range end of NATO's nuclear deterrent. That was the code word that they, uh, that they were using. And they, in fact, pushed this, uh, this line, and it was adopted by what is, the high level group. They were the leaders, at that point. They, the Americans were very reluctant. In fact there was an episode where, where uh, to show the American reluctance where, where the, uh, American team, to a meeting, which at that point was mainly pentagon officials, returned with this evolutionary upward adjustment conclusion that had been pushed on to them, in my view, and, uh, uh, although some of them wanted to agree with it too. They were pentagon officials, and they also shared these views. Uh, and they, we had a look at this over at the White House and said, I read that, I read cruise missiles. And this, we said, we can't have this. We haven't, uh, we haven't got an American position on this, as a government And this led to a tremendous amount of pulling and hauling where we sought to change the conclusion of the high level group, to expunge this particular piece of language, and, uh, uh, that was an unsuccessful effort because it was, uh, the, you know, the, uh, horse was out of the barn already at that point, and it didn't, it didn't work. But we did make clear, I think, it was already quite clear to the British and the Germans and all of our allies that the American government did not stand behind this expert group conclusion. At that point.

BUT IT DID LATER.

It did later.

FINAL QUESTION: SCHMIDT, IN THOSE BITS OF HIS MEMOIRS WHICH I'VE MANAGED TO TRANSLATE, CONTINUALLY GOES ON ABOUT THE NEED FOR WHAT I THINK HE CALLS "STATICHKEIT", WHICH I UNDERSTAND TO MEAN STABILITY, CONTINUITY.[GERMAN WORD]; calculability. HIS MAIN BEEF AGAINST THE AMERICANS IS THAT THEY WERE INCONSISTENT. IS THAT FAIR?

Well, yeah, to a degree, but the reason they were inconsistent on this particular issue was that the Europeans wanted them to be inconsistent. They had, in other words, one position, and the Europeans said they didn't like it. So they got another position. And, uh, the position, so the position of the American government did change. Absolutely. But his, I think the inconsistency, uh, was more broadly, of more broad complaint of Schmidt that went well beyond the nuclear realm, and it went into a whole series of non-proliferation, you know, Korea, all kinds of behavior of the early Carter administration. And let's face it, it's the nature of American politics to introduce a certain amount of inconsistency, because we change our leaders, and our leaders are going to have different views, and that's going to lead to some change in policy. Which some might view is inconsistent It happens.

CAN I JUST ASK YOU TO EXPLAIN TO US HOW THE DYNAMICS OF THESE DECISIONS IN NATO WORK. IN OTHER WORDS, THE AMERICANS HAVE THE EXPERTISE AND THE KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEAPONS, THE EUROPEANS HAVE THE SOIL ON WHICH THE WAR'S GOING TO BE FOUGHT. THEY HAVE VIEWS, BUT THE AMERICANS ULTIMATELY HAVE TO MAKE DECISIONS. NOW HOW DO THE EUROPEANS EXPECT THIS PROCESS TO WORK?

Well.. this is a very difficult problem, because for—, it's one that American leaders have to, uh, to wrestle with. Now, it seems to me that what ultimately, you know, if the Americans push, and take these matters entirely on themselves, the Europeans are going to rightly claim that this is a, that Americans are forcing things down their throat. But when the Americans instead say to the Europeans, well, we don't know what to do, what do you think? Uh, the Europeans will react with horror of that. They say, well, we don't, we need to know what you think. We can't take a decision until you tell us what your views are. And it's a difficult process to manage. What, uh, what the Carter administration did during the, uh, the decision on nuclear forces in the late 1970s was probably the best way it could be done. And that was a process where cabinet level officials would meet over a paper. They would reach conclusions, or tentative conclusions. This paper, including the skewing in it from the tentative conclusions, would then be introduced into a NATO forum, and would be discussed. And our allies would say, well, we don't like it, and it would be an expert paper, of course, with a lot of technical detail and the like. And out allies would introduce their own political views from their angle. And this could then be factored into the American paper, and then re-discussed at a cabinet level meeting here in Washington. And then back into the alliance. And so you had a process where the Americans led it, but the Europeans were never really cut out of it. And I think it's, it's tedious. Takes an awful lot of flying back and forth across the Atlantic, uh, by American officials and by European officials. But it did seem to work.