LET'S START OFF WITH YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF NIELS BOHR WHEN YOU MET HIM IN WASHINGTON. WHAT WERE THE IDEAS HE WAS ESPOUSING FOR THE POSTWAR PERIOD?

Well Niels Bohr, I suppose was the greatest... certainly one of the greatest physicists of the age; he had been in... Scandinavia; he was brought out, and was immediately informed about the nuclear energy work which was going on; he was a man of wide vision and he was immediately struck by the importance of international control of this new force, which he... understood perfectly, and felt that every effort should be made to ensure that all those concerned, including... the Soviet Union, should be informed of the, what was happening and with a view to controlling the new force. He was concerned to speak to the leaders of the Allied countries, Roosevelt, Churchill, and all those concerned with the project... His ideas tended to be... a little imprecise. He did not express himself, very easily in English, and it was rather difficult to follow his process of thought. And this was an obstacle certainly, in his discussions in particular, with Sir Winston Churchill. They met, a meeting was arranged but it was not a success. Dr. Bohr didn't make himself, I think, sufficiently clear, and, Sir Winston felt that he was too anxious to inform the Russians in what was going on. And so, unfortunately the prime minister formed an unfavorable opinion of his activities. But he came to Washington in 1945, and came to see us, I spent several hours talking to him listening to his views but as I say, they were difficult to follow, and therefore he, his mission, because he certainly saw it as a mission did not succeed in the way that he had hoped. Now, is that all right?

YEAH, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO REPEAT PART OF THAT... COULD YOU TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED... WHEN BOHR CAME TO SEE CHURCHILL IN LONDON?

Well, I, of course I wasn't there. But he was he... Sir Winston Churchill was prevailed upon to meet him mainly by Professor Lindeman who was the prime minister's chief scientific adviser and so the meeting was finally arranged. And Dr. Bohr went to Number Ten; where... they had a meeting but that was... although there was a meeting of persons, I'm afraid there was no meeting of minds. Ah.... the prime minister felt that Dr. Bohr's campaign for wider information disclosure of possibilities of the new force, was not desirable in particular, it was not desirable that his proposal, that communications should be made to the Russians should be taken up; and em... I think the prime minister felt that his activities were not conducive to the of, to the aims of the alliance. And so he was, he was tended to discourage the certainly, I think he... eventually suggested to President Roosevelt that the ideas of Dr. Bohr should not be taken up indeed, that his activities should be contained as far as possible...

SO IN THE HYDE PARK AIDE MEMOIRE, THERE WAS ACTUALLY A CLAUSE THAT...

That, that in the Hyde Park agreement which was a three-paragraph agreement signed by the President and the prime minister at Hyde Park, the President's house, there was a clause saying that, to the effect, that a close watch should be kept on Dr. Bohr's activities. Since the that document was lost on the American side the effect of this was not, the effect of it was... negligible.

WHEN THE NEWS CAME THAT HIROSHIMA HAD BEEN BOMBED, WHAT WAS THE REACTION IN WASHINGTON? WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL REACTION? WHAT WERE YOU HEARING FROM OTHER PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY?

Well, there were only two other people in the... Embassy who'd, who'd, had information about it. And so it came to them, as a as a surprise and a shock as it did to the rest of the... world. But at that moment, the uppermost thought in everybody's mind, was would it bring the Japanese war to the end, to an end? And in the belief that it would do this, of course it, the news was greeted with relief, and well, with relief that it had, it had been a successful operation, the bomb had both bombs, both ones at Hiroshima, and at Nagasaki had worked and it was soon became clear that they had the effect of... making the emperor tell his generals to... stop fighting and... have an armistice. So the effect was wholly positive.

Too long? Am I talking, speaking too long?

PRETTY GOOD, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU AGAIN... YOU MENTIONED BEFORE THAT THE BOMBING OF HIROSHIMA WAS NOT THAT DIFFERENT FROM THE FIRE RAIDS IN TOKYO... CAN YOU DISCUSS THAT A BIT?

Well, it has to be... one should remember that there had been some devastating bombing raids on Tokyo — fire raids, in which tens of thousands of people had lost their lives in horrifying circumstances, because the effect of firebombing on Japanese cities, at that time, was horrific. So... the use of a new weapon calculated to... bring, force the Japanese into surrender was thought of as likely to have no more.... devastating effects than, for example, the fire raids. And in fact fewer people were killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki than in the fire raids on Tokyo, although that is now seldom talked about in the discussions of the use of nuclear weapons.

WAS THERE MUCH DISCUSSION THAT YOU WERE A PARTY TO, ABOUT HOW TO USE THE BOMB WHEN IT WAS READY, OTHER THAN TO USE IT AS A DEMONSTRATION?

There was a great deal of thought and discussion on the American side in the months before the bomb was ready to drop.

STOP FOR A SECOND.

Now. Do, do you want me to start that again? One must remember, that in the previous months, some very severe fire raids had been made on Tokyo and other Japanese cities with great loss of life, tens of thousands of people had died in horrifying circumstances, because the effect of fire on the Japanese cities in those days was particularly severe. So, when it came to the question of dropping a nuclear bomb, it was I think considered that the, as, the, they, that it, the effects would be little worse than the... previous raid. And in fact the casualties at Nagasaki and Hiroshima were less, fewer, than those which had ....which had taken place in the previous fire raids. Uh...

SO WHAT DID YOU HEAR IN WASHINGTON ABOUT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO USE THE BOMB MILITARILY OR JUST AS A DEMONSTRATION?

Well there were a great, there was a great deal of thought and discussion given, on the American side, in the months before the . the use of the bomb, on whether, and if so, in what circumstances, it should be used. And every alternative, such as giving a demonstration or giving information about the bomb.... and its likely effects was carefully examined on the American side. But it turned out that there were formidable objections to, all these alternatives, and therefore it was decided that to use the bomb without warning or rather, with only a very general warning... On the British side I think there was less discussion of these various alternatives; I think the Prime Minister, was quite satisfied, and indeed convinced, that if this weapon could be developed, it should be used in the belief that it would, . force the Japanese into surrender which in fact it did. But, to say, as... some people say, that it was a thoughtless act, I think, is really quite wrong, a great deal of thought was given to it.

HOW DID CHURCHILL THINK ABOUT THE BOMB? DID HE THINK OF IT AS SOMETHING TREMENDOUSLY NEW, OR JUST IN TERMS OF MORE FIREPOWER, OR WHAT?

Well, I don't think I can answer that, because I've never, I never discussed it with him, or never heard him discuss it, in fact. But I think it's I fair to say that he was, he was... looking for an end.... device, or weapon, which would... be likely to.... stop the... war..

EXCUSE ME A SECOND. COULD I ASK YOU TO START AGAIN AND USE HIS NAME...

Yep. The prime minister was looking for any solution by any device, or weapon, which would be likely to bring the war to the end. One must not forget that at the time that the bomb was dropped and the war stopped the British were poised to invade Malaysia and the Americans and.... the British and the Allies were poised... to invade Japan. And it was calculated, at that time, that the... on the, on the Americans...allied side alone, in the Japanese operation, there might be a million casualties. Not to mention the casualties on the Japanese side, or the casualties which the British would suffer in Malaysia. So, it's... in the light of that assessment which I.... had... I did not see at the time, nor do I see now, any reason to question it was in the light of that assessment that the decision to drop the bomb was taken, and it had the desired effect.

CHURCHILL'S CONSENT TO USE THE BOMB WAS REQUIRED BY THE QUEBEC AGREEMENT. COULD YOU JUST TELL US... I ASSUME HE HAD NO HESITATION WHATSOEVER?

Well, what happened was that we sought his instructions and we received a telegram approval.

I'M SORRY, COULD YOU SAY AGAIN...

Sorry. Ah.... We sought the Prime Minister's instructions and the Prime Minister sent a telegram approving the use of the bomb, and that, authorizing the British representatives in Washington, so to inform the American government. That agreement was subsequently recorded in the records of the combined policy committee.

COULD YOU JUST SAY WHAT YOUR TITLE WAS DURING THE WAR, AND THEN AFTERWARDS IN WASHINGTON?

During the war I was a member of, . British diplomatic service; I served in London as head of a, of one of the European departments, from 1931 — ...from 1939 to 1942; in 1942 I... served as a political adviser, first in West Africa and then in Allied force headquarters in the Mediterranean; I then went to Washington in 1944 where I became one of the many ministers at the British embassy. My title was Economic Minister, and my main function was to act as a link between the ambassador and the embassy and the many missions — joint missions — in Washington. But my principal activity was to deal with the politics of the atomic weapon, then being prepared for tests in the Alamogordo, desert. In that capacity, I was a, I was of course undercover, in the sense that it was a very secret matter, and only one or two people in, on our side in the embassy, knew about it.

WHEN DID YOU BECOME LORD SHERFIELD?

At the at the end of my official career, my last post was chairman of the British Atomic Energy Authority; by that time I'd left the foreign service. I was I was created Lord Sherfield in 1964, which was the date of my retirement from the British Public Service.

OKAY, I THINK WE HAVE THAT STRAIGHT. RIGHT AFTER THE WAR ENDED, IN THE FALL OF 1945, HOW DID THE UNITED KINGDOM LOOK AT UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING ATOMIC ENERGY?

Well... there were two aspects of that. First is that Mr. Attlee had become the British Prime Minister and he immediately took up, with President Truman, the question of the international control of this new force, nuclear energy. The President was responsive to that and they m- they Mr. Attlee, President Truman, and the Canadian prime minister, Mr. MacKenzie King, who was party to the atomic energy arrangements, which had been set up at the Quebec conference, met in Washington to discuss the question of international control, and they reached a, an agreement that, it should be... commissioned in the United Na-, under the United Nations, should be set up and that should be the forum in which the whole question of controlling this new force should take place. The Prime Minister was also concerned with the bilateral arrangements for the exchange of information on atomic energy, which had been built up during the war, and there was a strong desire on the British side for that collaboration to continue into peacetime. And so the second objective of his visit was to set in train arrangements for reviving or... establishing the conditions of collaboration which should prevail after the war. I'll stop there.

WHAT WERE THE CONDITIONS OF COLLABORATION THAT WERE IN EFFECT RIGHT AFTER THE WAR? WERE THERE ANY?

There at the end of the war there the there were a very large number, all, practically all the available and scientists and engineers, who were... working on the project, or were concerned with the project in England, had been transferred to the United States, and were spread through the American establishment, stealing the dealing with the development of the bomb. So that the position... was that all our effort, in terms of people, was concentrated in the United States. And, they there was a... under the, under strict security conditions, there was a pretty free exchange of... information, and British scientists made a very substantial contribution to the... success of the project. The British would like, were... wanted not necessarily that precisely that... organization, which was a wartime one, but they wanted arrangements which would provide for the free exchange of information on the physics and on the... engineering, and on the scientific as-... and technological aspects of the problem. Now the, there was a... there was no such desire on the part of the... United States because mainly because the, there, it was, there was a feeling in the Congress that this new force had been developed solely by the United States, that it involved a secret, which could be kept a monopoly, which should be preserved, and therefore that no information, of any kind, should be given in relation to this project, to any other country, including the... United Kingdom. Well, this...

YOU JUST GAVE A REAL GOOD DESCRIPTION OF THE UNITED STATES' POINT OF VIEW ABOUT NOT WANTING TO SHARE. WHAT WAS THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POINT OF VIEW?

Their their, the United, the United Kingdom point of view was that it there were doc-, documents which showed United States agreement to this collaboration continuing in some form after the war. And in, indeed, the Prime Minister, President Truman, and Mac-, Mr. Mackenzie King had signed a document in November, 1945, to that effect, and had asked the combined policy committee to work out proposals for that purpose. Well, the combined par-, the subcommittee of the combined polic... did just that, and did... come forward with some proposals which would enable... collaboration to continue, and the exchange of information to continue. But the when it came for discussion to the combined policy committee, the American representatives threw the proposals out and said they could not agree to them. By that time, of course, the Congress had made its views perfectly clear, and the McMahon Act was going through the Congress at that time.

YOU SAY THE UNITED STATES JUST THREW THE PROPOSALS OUT. WHY? WHAT WAS THEIR... HOW COULD THEY THROW THE PROPOSALS OUT?

Because they were... by refusing to agree to them. By, they, the American representatives said they were sorry, they couldn't agree to these proposals; it was not in accordance with their policy, to have collaboration in this form. And the, that was also the view of the Congress, and so expressed in the... McMahon Act.

YOU WORKED ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE.

I was a member of a subcommittee... which worked through the winter...

COULD YOU START BY SAYING THAT YOU WERE A MEMBER...

I was, I was a... Sorry.

YOU JUST HAVE TO PAUSE A SECOND AFTER I STOP TALKING

I'm sorry. Now. Em... I was a member of the subcommittee which of the... combined policy committee which worked out these proposals. The other members were General Groves, who was the chairman of the Manhattan Project and the other, third member was Mr. Lester Pearson, who was then Canadian Ambassador in Washington, and subsequently Prime Minister of Canada. We worked through the winter; we worked out these proposals, there were some, many difficulties about working out a bilateral agreement at that time? but we did.... put forward some proposals to the combined policy committee, which, as I... say were rejected by the American representatives.

WHEN YOU WERE WORKING IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE, WAS THERE MUCH DIFFICULTY IN COMING UP WITH A PROPOSAL WITH GROVES?

The, there was, there was no difficulty in the sense that General Groves and Mr. Pearson and myself knew each other extremely well and were fully aware of each other's problems. There were difficulties about it about com- making a bilateral agreement at that time. One of them was that the three governments had agreed to present the proposals for international control to... the United Nations and therefore a bilateral agreement might have looked . a departure from that policy; there...also we were thinking of a, of a since... most of the information was of high security value, we were thinking of a of an agreement which would be an unpublished agreement, and... that would have run counter to the article a hundred and two, I think it is, of the Charter of the, of the United Nations. So there were some formidable problems, but nevertheless we were able to come up with some proposals, which as I say were not... were not accepted.

SO WHEN THESE PROPOSALS WERE NOT ACCEPTED, WAS THAT THE POINT AT WHICH ATTLEE WROTE TO TRUMAN...

Well, when the, when the, we got this turn-down — the British got the turn-down from the American side, the Mr. Attlee then wrote an important memorandum, a state paper, reviewing the whole course of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom on atom, atomic energy. And he sent this to the President, but he never got a reply. Which is a curious result of... of saying that the British and the United States were still close allies. Shall I go on?

(BACKGROUND COMMENT)

The... the consequence of that breakdown of the relationship in this field was that the United Kingdom then saw that there was no alternative but to... embark on a full-scale program of atomic energy development.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT COLLABORATION WOULD CONTINUE AFTER THE WAR?

I would say that it was decisive. There was a... particularly in the Senate.

CAN I ASK YOU TO START AGAIN? COULD YOU START BY SAYING, THE OPINION OF CONGRESS...

Yes yes. I would say that the attitude, of the Congress, particularly the Senate was decisive in this matter they there were a number of senators who were quite convinced that they had, the United States had, a monopoly in this field they were that it was an American secret, which could be kept. This was not the view on the British side; we were quite aware that the Russians would... develop a bomb possibly in five or six years. The, that was a —

LET'S STOP.

I would say that the attitude of the Congress was decisive in the breakdown of the relationship, in the atomic energy field, between the British and American governments. Particularly in the Senate there was a number of senators who felt strongly that the atomic energy — the bomb, shall we say — was an American secret, an American monopoly, which should, and could, be kept, as an American monopoly. That was not the view on the British side. Our scientists were — sure that the Russian, scientists were capable of developing an atomic weapon, but — and that probably they would do this in— a time scale of six or seven years. In fact they were quite correct, but the Russians achieved it in a shorter period than had been anticipated.

DID YOU FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SLIGHTING THE BRITISH IN ADOPTING THIS POLICY?

Well, we, clearly we were very disappointed. After all we were close allies, and we were, and working... very closely together in... other fields of defense and in a whole range of policies and of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Europe and throughout the world. And it seemed strange to us that in this one field the door was slammed in our face.

DID IT SEEM LIKE THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF THE WAR WAS ALMOST TOO BIG FOR ITS BRITCHES?

No, no, I don't think so at all. I think that it was a, it was a, it was a... strongly held conviction, by the legislature that the, that this was something which I which should be kept an American.... monopoly as a matter of policy. And the one of the things which I think disappointed us was that the wartime agreements were never disclosed to the Congress at the time that the McMahon Act was going through the legislative process. And it has been said by one or two of those who were involved, that had they known about it, the McMahon Act would have taken a different form. Personally, I don't believe that. I think that the feeling in the Congress and in other... some of the American scientists as well, for example, Dr. Vannevar Bush, was certainly not in favor of continuing collaboration with the British, under the circumstances. So ma, my own view is that is that the, although it was a significant fact that probably nothing would have changed the attitude of the Congress at that particular period.

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, VIS-A-VIS A BILATERAL AGREEMENT?

The... On the British side, there was a great desire to continue the collaboration which had de- existed in the atomic energy field at the end of the war. For several reasons: First of all, the British felt that they had done the preliminary work which convinced the American... side that a nuclear bomb was practicable. They had also given as mu-, all that information to the United States, who had then, of course, the development had to take place in the United States, because it would have been... to... risk this sort of activity to Chairman Bonning, and so on. So that it was, it was agreed that everything should be done in the United States. So.... the, on our, on the British side, they felt that they would need, and they were entitled, in fact, as a part of their contribution, to continue to receive the.... scientific and technological information which would enable them to develop their own project. On the American side, the feeling was... that this was the en-, the Americans had done all the development work; they would, well, tended to forget the input, the British input at the beginning of the program, that they had done all the development work; that therefore they should... obtain the benefits both in the defense and the industrial field that it was a, information which could be kept secret, could be kept as an American monopoly and which therefore should not be divulged to any, other country, and that in any case as far as the British was concerned, the agreements which had been made were basically for war purposes, there was no obligation to continue the collaboration and, I think possibly, in some American minds, there was not too great anxiety to see another atomic program developed in another country. Is that it?

WHAT ABOUT THE FEAR OF ESPIONAGE? DID THAT PLAY A PART IN THE UNITED STATES' THINKING?

The... Americans... side, government officials, were very concerned about security. At this particular time, we're talking about 1945, '46 there, of course, were leakages of information both from the United States and from Canada. And these, they were agents, Russian agents, and they certainly communicated valuable technical information to the Russians. But the two countries worked closely together and but when the negotiations were resumed for.... collaboration, between the United States and the United Kingdom, the, those who were on the American side were not anxious for such collaboration to be resumed, had a good, a valid reason by.... saying that the British security was not... good. And, unfortunately, a number of instances--Dr. Fuchs, Mr. Pontecorvo, Mr. Donald McLean defected at various times during this period of discussion. And each defection either put, brought the discussions to a close, or prevented them coming come, coming being successful. So you may say that the that the security, or the lack of it, on the British side was an was a significant factor in holding up and delaying the resumption of collaboration in the atomic field between the two countries.

CAN I ASK YOU TO JUST SAY THAT LAST SENTENCE? YOU HAD A NICE SUMMARY SENTENCE, WHERE YOU SAID, "THE LACK OF SECURITY..."

Yup. The so you, one could say that the lack of security of security lapses, perhaps, on the British side, were a significant factor, in a holding up the discussions between the two countries for the resumption of collaboration in the atomic field.

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

You want me to say it again?

SURE. SORRY, IT WAS MY FAULT, REALLY.

I see. One could say that the bad security, or security lapses, on the British side in the atomic energy field were a significant factor in the negotiations between the two governments for the resumption of collaboration. The

THAT'S FINE. TELL US ABOUT THE BARUCH PLAN. YOU WERE IN WASHINGTON DURING THAT TIME. WHAT WAS THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ABOUT THAT, IF THERE WAS ONE. WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION?

Well, the British government, Mr. Attlee's government, were extremely concerned to achieve a system of international control of atomic energy, that was shared, I think it was certainly shared by the United States government they, a commission was set up in the United Nations to deal with this matter the United States worked out a proposal for international collaboration and a committee which was which was which Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Lilienthal, were members Mr. Baruch was then appointed by President Truman to lead the American delegation at this commission and Mr. Baruch had some... ideas of his own, which tended to stiffen up the attitude, the American attitude, and therefore made, perhaps, the negotiations more difficult. But I think my view at the time was that it would be extremely difficult to get the Russians to agree to any system of international control, because it would involve supervision, essentially at that time, by British and Americans; and the, they were very unlikely to very reluctant to accept the control measures which would be nee, necessary in order to make the system work. So but and so it turned out the commission did produce some proposals which were vetoed, or turned down, by the Soviet Union in 1947 or 1948. So but one could also say that, however... unlikely it was that negotiations would have succeeded that, the proposals for international control of atomic energy were a casualty of the cold war.

CAN I ASK YOU TO TELL ME THAT THOUGHT AGAIN, ABOUT BEING A CASUALTY OF THE COLD WAR?

Well. There were... The, the negotiations in the United Nations were clearly difficult ones because the, any system of control would have meant, at that time, supervision mainly by the British and Americans. And the Russians were very unlikely to accept that degree of control as indeed, subsequent events have confirmed, over and over again. However, I think one could... say that, whatever the prospects, good or bad, these, the these negotiations were they... became, in fact, a casualty of the cold war.

(DISCUSSION)

Want me to do it again?

YEAH, LET'S DO IT AGAIN, TO BE SAFE. IF YOU COULD JUST PICK UP THE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A CASUALTY OF THE COLD WAR...DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FAILURE OF THE BARUCH PLAN WAS REALLY A TURNING POINT, AN OPPORTUNITY THAT WAS TRAGICALLY MISSED?

I don't think that in the circumstances of the time... Sorry. Right. I don't think that in the circumstances of the time, and having regard to the United States' attitude and the Russians' reluctance to accept measures of con-, international control, a reluctance which has been abundantly proved, in subsequent years I don't think that the prospects of a, of a negotiation, were... for a... system of international control, were very likely to succeed. The... but . in any case, the onset of the cold war made such agreement really impossible. In other words, the negotiations were a casualty of the cold war. In those circumstances, I think it's wrong to say that . misleading to say that a... great opportunity was missed. An effort was made to bring about a system of international control, but the political... and circumstances were such that in fact it wasn't a feasible possibility at that time. An effort was made, it did not succeed, for reasons which are quite evident, I think.

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

Well, I was in London in 1939... from 1939 to 1942, and of course there were, there was a considerable amount of... bombing, at that time, but.... at the early part of the war the bombs were relative-, the firebombs were relatively small, and the, and they could be fairly easily extinguished. I was living in a house in London, I had a housekeeper, and another servant, and we had a, what was called a stirrup pump, which was used for putting out fires and two or three, one of the, one of these incendiaries lodged in the ceiling of my... living room. And so we got the stirrup pump, and my housekeeper worked the pump, and I put out the fire. And this happened on more than one occasion. And walking home one night, and drove down my street, and there I saw a house, a friend of mine's house on fire so I went and got my stirrup pump, and had the great satisfaction of putting out the fire in his grand piano. But these were... small incidents which were widespread throughout the country. Of course, later on in the war, the incendiaries became much more powerful, bombs became more powerful.... and therefore the prospect of the ordinary citizen putting out his own fires became rather restricted. Is that all right?

HOW DID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT LEADERS, ESPECIALLY THE PRIME MINISTERS, CHURCHILL AND ATTLEE, HOW DID THEY VIEW THE GROWING RELIANCE ON ATOMIC WEAPONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY, IN THE LATE '40S, EARLY '50S?

Well, there was a, I think... both governments were... in.... let me start again. Now. Both governments regarded the development of atomic weapons as essential

COULD YOU POSITION THE MICROPHONE

Oh. All right...

(INTERVIEWER INTERRUPTS)

Want me to start again?

YES.

Both governments regarded the development of atomic weapons by the United States and indeed by the, by the... Great Britain, as essential to the security of the western world. As a, as a means of as a policy of deterrence was... accepted by both and there was no question on the British side at that time that the American strategic bombing force should operate from this country.... Mr. Attlee . agreed to the stationing of American bombers in this country; there was no dispute about it was regarded as a as a... natural development of the alliance. So the, that, there was no difference of view on this between the two governments, or.... for that matter, after all, this was a period in which NATO had been, was negotiated and came into force and I think on the official side, of course, there were people in the United Kingdom who opposed this policy and thought it was mistaken, misguided, but the official policy was quite clear, and there was no... disagreement between the British and American governments in, on these, on this, these major questions.

SOME HAVE BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT AFTER THE WAR, AS THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM WERE DEMOBILIZING IN EUROPE, THE ONLY THING THAT THE SOVIETS NEEDED TO GET TO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN WERE BOOTS.

Were boots, yeah.

DID THE ATOMIC WEAPON PLAY A PART AT THAT TIME, IN CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION?

In... I... it depends what period you're talking about. If, if you're talking about 1945, '46 the I think that the... consciousness of the atomic weapon was probably not decisive. After all the relationship between, with the, with the, with the Russians, we were still... talking to them, and all through that postwar period 1940 taken up to the time of the almost up to the time of the Berlin airlift the discussions between the four-power discussions were continuing. Now, admittedly, they were going from, they were not going well, and... the prospect of agreement receded, the... attitude of the American government changed to the idea of the possibility of an American-Russian understanding diminished but nevertheless the circumstances, I mean the dreaded .... I think misguided to talk about Russian boots walking through Europe at that time; this, that was not the atmosphere of the day. Uh.... it's important to try and... put oneself back to the circumstances; it's very difficult, but the idea of, I mean, perhaps what was at risk was the spread of Communism, and... cut through the communist parties of the European countries but the idea of a, of a, of some military operation, was really quite no, in nobody's...minds. So I would say that the the doctrine of deterrence, the feeling that perhaps atomic weapons were the one thing which could stop a war, or prevent a war breaking out developed in the, in the late '40s, and from then on.

OKAY. HOW ABOUT KLAUS FUCHS? DO YOU HAVE SPECIFIC RECOLLECTIONS ABOUT THE DEALINGS WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST?

Well, at the time of the, of the Fuchs arrest we were in close discussion with the United States about renewing collaboration arrangements on various bases. We, by that point on the British side, we had laid the foundations of our of our atomic program, particularly of course on, both on the military and on the civil side and but we were... reluctant to go in for the for the for weapon development, and, the building of... the expensive plants before we had explored the possibility of...partnership arrangements in the development of atomic weapons, particularly, and so we were doing that, and, I can't say that there were obvious difficulties in the way of reaching agreement on this matter, and I can't say that the that the negotiations would have succeeded. What I can say is that the Fuchs affair put a stop to the negotiations. And they were not resumed for another couple of years, and then on a different basis.

COULD YOU BRIEFLY SAY AGAIN WHAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE, AND THAT THE FUCHS AFFAIR PUT A STOP TO THEM?

We were in negotiation with the United States from 1947 on exploring various ways in which the collaboration in the atomic energy field and the exchange of information could be resumed. At the time of Fuchs' arrest we were in close discussion with the United States for the renewal of the partnership, particularly in the field of atomic weapons. On the British side we had reached a stage in our program at which further decisions were needed, building of expensive plants, if we'd.... continue the development of the weapon on our own. So it was... sensible, to find out if we could not reach an agreement with the United States, which would enable us to share the burden. I can't say there were difficulties in these negotiations, I do not know whether they would have succeeded if they had continued; what I can say is that the Fuchs affair put a stop to them.

OKAY. WE'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED THE... KOREA...

Oh yes, I was, I was with Attlee on that occasion.

(DISCUSSION)

I was present at all those discussions.

OKAY, TELL ME ABOUT THAT. HOW DID ATTLEE REACT WHEN TRUMAN IMPLIED THAT ATOMIC WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED IN KOREA?

What happened was that at, it was at a crucial moment in the, in the Korean War when the Allied forces were in retreat, the Chinese having crossed the Yellow River in force and... the President gave a press conference which in which his answers could have been construed as foreshadowing the use of the atomic weapon in certain circumstances in the Korean War. The news of this press conference reached the House of Commons when they were in the middle of a debate on foreign policy, and caused consternation in among the members of Parliament of all parties. Mr. Attlee acted very quickly; he sent a message to Mr. Truman, saying could he come over and talk to him about this and some other matters and the Truman and the President replied in the affirmative, and the Attlee was able to announce this at the end of the debate in the House of Commons, and calmed the atmosphere. He then went to the United States with a group of people, and we had I was with him at that time we met for four days in the White House and on the Presidential yacht; we covered a whole area of, out of... a big agenda; but as I'm but on the principal... reason for which Mr. Attlee had gone, there was no discussion at the conference, until the very end when the communiqué was being drafted when, the President and the Prime Minister went....to., went to the President's study, and had a 20 minutes private conversation. And when the they came back the President said "Well, we've reached an agreement that we won't use this weapon without consulting each other." Well, this was, well, actually counter to what he told the Congress and was would, it would, if it had been put in the communiqué, have created a, quite a difficult situation on the Hill. So so there was some discussion, and the communiqué was altered in such a way that the President said that he would of course let us know if he was thinking of using it, and we said that we would.... I forget the exact words of the communiqué; anyway, it was enough to enable Mr. Attlee to come back and tell the House of Commons that he was completely satisfied with the President's attitude, and it was enough for Mr. Truman to well to satisfy the Senate that he hadn't given too much away to the British. So, that was the end of the crisis.

CAN I ASK YOU JUST TO SUMMARIZE, FROM THE POINT WHERE MR. ATTLEE WENT TO THE UNITED STATES TO MEET WITH TRUMAN, AND BRIEFLY WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF THAT MEETING?

Well, the Mr. Attlee went with a large party of.... advisers to the United States and met with Mr. Truman, and... Mr. Dean Acheson and others for... three or four days at the end of the of the discussions the question of the use of the atomic weapon was discussed between the two, President and the Prime Minister, in private. The President then came out and said that they'd agreed to not to use the weapon without consulting each other; this was something which would have run had it been published, would have run counter to what the President had been saying in public so it was modified, a form of words was put into the communiqué sufficient to enable Mr. Attlee to go back into the House of Commons and satisfy them that he'd got assurances from Mr. Truman which he found completely acceptable, and which enabled Mr. Truman to satisfy the Congress that he hadn't given the.... any.... anything, the essential.... freedom to use the, whatever weapon was necessary for American defense without consulting anybody. Is that better?

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

You want me to try again?

NO, I THINK WE'RE OKAY THERE...I'VE GOT ONE MORE QUESTION: AS OPPOSED TO A FISSION BOMB-

I don't know what Church... I, when...the first hydrogen bomb, or the first bomb?

THE FIRST HYDROGEN BOMB. COMPARING IT TO THE FIRST... FISSION BOMB...

I can't really answer that question.

WE'RE GOING TO SKIP AHEAD NOW TO 1962, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WHEN YOU WERE IN MOSCOW. AND BEFORE YOU ANSWER THAT, WHAT WAS YOUR TITLE THEN?

I was a chairman of the British... of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. That's the equivalent of the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States. At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, I happened to be in Moscow leading a delegation from the British Atomic Energy Authority to, for discussions with the... Russian atomic energy commission. And I was in fact staying, at that point, in the embassy ; the I would not have known that there was a Cuban missile crisis had I not been in touch with the British ambassador. As far as the Russians I was dealing with, it made no... difference to the program or to the arrangements, which were for my, for my tour. It's also, so happened that at the height of this crisis, I was I, went to the to a performance of Boris Godunov

COULD YOU START AGAIN?

I went, I went to a performance at the Bolshoi, of Boris Godunov. At which the part of Boris was being taken by an American bass. In the, on the Russian side, the, Praesidium was entertaining the Romanian premier, and...

(INTERVIEWER INTERRUPTS)

Oh. Well, I'll start off again. Is that all right? Shall I is this what you want?

YEAH. COULD YOU START IN BY SAYING, AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS, I WENT TO...

Again. All right.

(INTERVIEWER STILL TALKING)

At the height of the crisis, I went to a performance at the Bolshoi, of Boris Godunov. It so happened that the part of Boris was being taken by an American bass. In the Bolshoi were Khrushchev and Kosygin, and the other members of the Praesidium, entertaining their Romanian counterparts... that was a Romanian official visit. Khrushchev and his colleagues remained in the box for the entire performance and after the performance, Khrushchev went behind the scenes and had a long conversation with the American bass. The ambassador and I wondered at the time how the business of the Soviet Union at the height of this crisis was being conducted! Because there was Khrushchev and his colleagues appeared to be absolutely unconcerned. All the time in the world to listen and enjoy the opera, and to go behind the scenes afterward. Of course, it's possible, I suppose, that they had already decided on their course of action, to withdraw, turn the ships back from Cuba, and so had taken their decision. Nevertheless, it was....