We would like to ask you what the 1966 search and destroy operation and our counter attack were like. And what were the impacts of the 1966 search and destroy operation on Cu Chi?

On January 8, 1966 [sic] the Americans started to land in Cu Chi. For several days before their arrival in Cu Chi the Americans used all war making means such as B-52s, fighter bombers and artillery to bomb and shell the liberated areas of Cu Chi almost continuously. The operation officially started on January 8.

During this operation the tanks rolled in first, followed by the infantry. In the air the fighter bombers coordinated with the helicopters to pour in troops. On our side, at that time I was a member of a reconnaissance company of the Saigon Gia Dinh Military Command. My job was to cling to the enemy in order to help the Regional Military Command in its deployment of the various regular units in the fighting.

At the same time, I participated with the guerrilla fighters of Hien Duc village to fight against the mop up operations on the front line, which was only a field away from the paratrooper headquarters. On this side of the field were Nhuan Duc, Bo Cap, Bo Chua villages which led successively to Cu Chi. Therefore many forms of combat. First of all, there was combat on the ground along trenches. Secondly, there was combat from under the tunnels.

Thirdly, we employed explosives to defend ourselves against the tanks and infantry. As far as the Americans were concerned, every time a battle took place they used all the bombs and shells they had in their arsenal in order to destroy the area of the battle until not a tree or a blade of grass was still left standing on the ground. After the battle, we would have to move to another area. The Americans then came after us in that new area.

And again, we had to fight them. During this search and destroy operation, in the battle in Bo cap alone we were able to destroy over thirty tanks and kill about 100 American troops by coordinating the fighting from under the tunnels with the fighting on the ground. The 100 Americans killed were still left on the spot. But there were other dead and wounded which they were able to take away.

During that 1966 [sic] search and destroy operation they removed the population of Cu Chi, especially from the areas of Nhuan Duc, Phu Minh Hung, An Nhon Tay and other liberated areas of Cu Chi, to the urban areas. From 1966 on, this liberated area of Cu Chi became very desolated.

This was because the destruction by bombs and shells was just really terrible. During daytime, there were at least 18 attacks by bombers. And they did not just drop bombs on particular areas. For example, when we arrived in the An Phu and Xom Chua area, the Americans went after us and bombed one end to the area to the other, flattening the entire area. They also used bulldozers to scrape the whole place clean.

So during the day we stayed in the tunnels and in the late afternoon, after 5:30 or 6 p.m., we would climb out of our tunnels and follow, them to find out where they were stationing their troops. Then we would organize our forces in order to attack them at night. During the day we had to fight from the tunnels. But at night we attacked them directly at encampments.

Please describe to us what the fighting was like during the Cedar Falls Operation.

When the Cedar Falls Operation started, I was in Ben Cat. But I was then called down here to the Cu Chi area, living in Phu Hoa Dong which was an area in between the enemy and us. So we had to organize a force which would enable us to fight the enemy from the inside. This is to say, to fight in the Saigon Gia Dinh area in order to force them to bring back the troops which they were using in the search and destroy operation out here.

And so we put together a force which mounted an attack directly on the Tan Son Nhut Airbase. At the same time, out here we clung on to the area by living in the tunnels. During the day we entered the tunnels and continued to fight from the foxholes. During the night, we came out of the tunnels and attacked their command headquarters by lobbing B-42 and B-44 mortar shells and grenades in there. This went on day after day until the end of the Cedar Falls Operation.

We wrestled very fiercely with the enemy in this area. During the Cedar Falls Operation, from here to the village of Phu Hoa Dong the Americans troops thickly encamped along both sides of the river. Sometimes, our fighters could not make it through the enemy's line and were forced to eat banana roots and leaves in order to survive. It was the largest and most ferocious search and destroy operation during the war.

It was also during this Cedar Falls Operation that the Americans bulldozed all the houses in the town of Ben Suc to the ground. And then they took all the inhabitants there to other places. Ben Suc was literally wiped out from the map. As far as the shelling was concerned, they fired an average of over 300 shells per minute into a very small area in which I was on guard that night. And the troops were everywhere in Cu Chi.

After the Cedar Falls Operation, in your opinion, did our forces become stronger and did we get more weapons? At that time Westmoreland sent a report back to the United States saying that the situation had been much improved for them. But what was the real situation like?

After the Cedar Falls Operations, our troops were reinforced and we were able to achieve many victories. This was because we had obtained a lot of experiences from the search and destroy operation of January 8, 1966 [sic]. Through this operation we were able to gain certain experiences in fighting the Americans. We had held a conference after that operation to pull together the over all experiences in fighting the Americans. Therefore we were able to apply the experiences gained from all the previous search and destroy operations to the Cedar Falls Battle.

After that, by the end of 1967, in your opinion did the revolutionary forces grow in strength and in term of weapons?

By the end of 1967, our forces had developed significantly. For example, before this time in the Cu Chi area we only had a company of regional forces. But by that time we already had a battalion. And by 1968, we had a company in every village. Therefore, our strength was developed every day. After that, during the preparation for the 1968 Offensive, I was no longer with the reconnaissance unit. I had been transferred to the special force unit which was responsible for attacking all the nerve centers of the enemy in the city.

By November of 1967 we received order from above to prepare and to train for an attack on the city. My unit, which was composed of thirteen comrades, was responsible for attacking the radio station. We also had a comrade who served as our driver and who was living only 200 meters from the radio station itself.

Please describe to us the battle for the city.

On the 26th of the 12th lunar month I, who was at the time the head of the squad which was going to be assigned to attack the radio station, was called by the Regional Military Command to this very place to give me instruction. This was, I was told, a once in a lifetime assignment. We were to occupied the radio station in not more than two hours and to turn it over to the regular armed forces. Therefore, the instruction was that we should celebrate Tet on the 28th.

After the celebration, on the 29th we were instructed to attack, occupy and maintain the radio station for two hours and not to destroy it. After two hours, my unit was going to get other assignments. On the first of Tet, I moved my men into the area. During the 1963-1964 period, a section of the Regional Military Command had built a house for one of our infrastructures which was only 200 meters in distance from the radio station.

Besides the house, a car was purchased for this man. There was also a hidden cellar in the house where weapons were stored. On the first of Tet 1968, at exactly 8 a.m., I and a comrade who was the political cadre of this special force squad and who also came from Cu Chi rode a Honda to that house to get the weapons.

As soon as we got the weapons we sent a courtier to the Regional Military Command, reporting that we had the house and the cellar of weapons turned over to us. The instruction from up here at that time was that I should gather all my men to that house, which was 200 meters from the radio station, by 4 p.m. on the 1st of Tet.

Please continue.

After I received the cellar of weapons, I sent a courier up here to report to the Regional Military Command. But most of the weapons had been eaten by termites. Only the steel parts were left. But we rolled rags around the weapons so that we could hold them and fight with them. By 5 p.m., I and a girl who served as the courier for my squad went out to take another good look at our target area. The Saigon radio station, as you know, was the voice for the whole country.

So, as I observed, the enemy had one platoon of soldiers placed inside the station. Across the road was the headquarters of a security force unit. And the Naval Command Headquarters was only about one kilometer away. The Ba Son factory (an old arsenal) was only a couple of meters nearby. Therefore, in my opinion, it would be easy to attack and occupy it. But it would be very difficult to maintain the occupation

It was because during the previous coup attempts which I observed at first hand, the most ferocious and drawn out battles between Diem troops and the coup participants occurred in the area of the radio station. Therefore, my conclusion was that it would be easy to attack and occupy the place. But it would be much more difficult to hold it. In actual fighting, we were also able to prove this. We drove a car from Pham Dang Hung Street to Phan Dinh Phung Street and opened fire, killing all the guards at the pillboxes on the end of the bridge.

Then we used large explosives which we rigged in the car to blow up the gate so that we would rush in and fought and occupied the building complex where the radio station was housed. Therefore, in a matter of only 10 minutes we occupied the entire radio station building complex. Then we continued to fight until 10 am the next day. At first we suffered only one dead, one critically wounded, and one superficially injured. But throughout a whole night of fighting until 8 a.m. the next day, we depleted our ammunition supply.

At that time, the command committee unanimously assigned me to get away from the area in order to report the situation to our superiors and to find out whether we should continue to hold the place or to destroy it since we did not have very many bullets left. When I left the radio station I had a comrade in there who had captured an enemy's machine gun and fought with it throughout the night until a little after 9 a.m. when he had only twenty bullets left.

He was also injured, his leg had been shattered. Therefore, he told me to go and ask whether we should continue to hold the place or to blow it up. By around 10 a.m., we had 8 men left in there with a very large explosive. The men detonated the explosive, destroying the entire radio station complex and sacrificing themselves as a result.

When was the first time you fought with the Americans? Was it difficult or easy fighting with the Americans. What were your feelings about them?

The first time I fought with the Americans was on January 8, 1966 [sic] in the Nhuan Duc area. At first, when the Americans came and attacked several areas in the central region, I heard the Americans were quite modern in their warfare. Therefore, I felt kind of nervous at first. But in actuality, on January 8, we were only a cell and yet we fought with the Americans about a dozen times.We found out that the Americans were quite clumsy and naive. This was because they were not familiar with the geography and the land. Therefore, through actual combat, we realized that it was easier to fight the Americans than the puppet troops.

Besides, being quite naive and clumsy, the Americans were well disciplined. They would not open fire until receiving orders. Sometimes they would run into us and would not open fire because they had not received order to do so yet. Therefore, after our conference on the lessons of fighting with the Americans, we concluded that it was quite easy to fight them. Many people preferred to fight the Americans. The puppet troops were also Vietnamese and, therefore, they were quite devious in many ways. The Americans, in general, were quite naive. It was easy to fight them.

Please tell us about that time when you engaged in hand to hand combat with the Americans and your feeling of that situation.

It was during the same search and destroy operation when we got so tired after many days of combat that we got down into a bomb shelter belonging to the villagers and took a nap. When the Americans came, we did not detect their arrival until they reached the opening of the shelter. The three of us jumped out of the shelter and fought in close combat with the Americans. Finally, only one of us got injured while about a dozen Americans were killed.

This was at the Bau Trang area of Nhuan Duc village. The second time was when we clambered out of a tunnel. It was pitch dark and so we did not see them. Hence we fell into their ambush. They jumped us and tried to wrestle us into the ground to capture us alive. But we used special tricks which we had learned through our training as commandos by hitting them at danger points. They were forced to let go of us and then we fled.

What were your feelings about hand to hand combat with the Americans?

When engaging in close combat with the Americans, we had a slogan here which stated that to fight the Americans you have to cling to their belts. This is to say that if we fought them at a distance, we would suffer a lot of casualties. As far as the Americans were concerned, if you were about 100 meters from them there would be a lot of bombs, shells and bullets. Therefore, if we clung to them as close as thirty to fifty meters then we would be exposed to very few bombs and shells.

When we were that close to the Americans, they did not dare to bomb and shell and even strafe us with their helicopter gunships. Hence, most of the time when we fought with the Americans we fought them in hand to hand combat. We clung very close to them even when at rest. Because if you were any distance away from them, you would suffer a lot of casualties. If you were 100 meters or farther from the American positions, they would use a great amount of bombs and artillery shells. We stayed close to them and hence were able to avoid the full thrust of their military power.