TELL ME, JUST FOR THE RECORD, YOUR MILITARY AND POLITICAL HISTORY.

That's quite long, but I did participate in the war for independence, in many of the reprisal operations in the '50s. I had the honor to have the part to liberate Jerusalem in the '67 War. I was a military attaché in Washington. I was Chief of Staff during, or in the time of Entebbe Operation and Litani Operation, '74 to '78. Since then I am in politics.

THE CENTRAL ISSUE THAT I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE WITH YOU IS THE MILITARY IMPLICATION OF THE ISRAELI STRATEGY VERSUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE NOTION OF KEEPING THE ENTRANCE INTO A NUCLEAR AGE ON THE THRESHOLD. CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT?

Well, in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons, that might be quite a disaster. I did study nuclear philosophy in France in the military school there. So I could realize very closely what was the American and European thought about nuclear war. I can tell you that in the countries in the Middle East, countries that are concentrated around very small number of big cities, any talk of use of nuclear weapons could destroy the main centers of population and culture and government you don't need very much. If you count let's say three or four countries surrounding Israel, including Israel, you practically don't have, if we use the language that is being used by the war philosophy of nuclear strategy as we did in France, for example, you don't have in the Middle East more than ten to fifteen targets for nuclear weapons. Which of course makes the Middle East very vulnerable to that kind of weapon, and that's why we hope that it will never be introduced here.

THAT ALSO MAKES IT VERY APPROPRIATE FOR A MUTUAL DETERRENCE SITUATION?

That's a very good question, whether in such a situation the balance of terror that did prevent global wars in the world might be in effect also in such a small area in the Middle East. I say that because if we count let's say between 10-15 big cities that serve as the centers of government, of culture, of economy, of military strength, of all these in Israel you don't have more than two, maybe three. So the question is whether Israel can trust any balance of terror — that's a question that is very difficult to give an answer. Especially if you take all the thousands of books that have been written about nuclear weapons in the hands of crazy leaders. Now we don't lack crazy leaders among the Arab countries. If you take only in the present, Qaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq it would be quite difficult for Israelis to trust these people. So no doubt we should prefer that nobody will have them whatsoever. And balance of terror in the Middle East might be quite risky.

WHAT ABOUT THE NOTION OF ONLY ISRAEL HAVING THEM?

Israel is a small country and to be the first one to introduce these weapons in the Middle East might raise for Israel a lot of, lot of problems. And that's why it was the policy of the governments always, which is not very easy to keep, not to be the first one to introduce the weapons but never to be late even one minute in having them. Because then if some leaders in any Arab country might think that he has the power and he has the weapon, he might be tempted to use it. And then Israel is lost. So we are marching here in Israel on a very, very tight freedom of activity. But that's our policy. And if you remember the reaction among many Israelis including myself before the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq, we didn't want even that. We didn't want even to be considered as the first one to bomb a nuclear reactor, although we knew quite well the potential danger. Fortunately enough it worked well. But the fear that we had to be the first one in the Middle East is still in existence.

CAN YOU COME BACK TO THE NOTION OF PREVENTION, OR PREVENTION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. YOU INITIALLY HAD AN OBJECTION TO IT. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

Basically we believe that it will be good for the Middle East not to have any nuclear weapon here. But of course we can talk on ourselves, we cannot undertake any responsibility for what might happen in the Arab world. Especially since everybody's almost talking about civil use of nuclear reactors. Now we have made a lot of efforts in order to make sure that the nuclear reactor in Iraq will be able to serve only civil goals. Unfortunately there was no doubt that they were going to produce also atomic bombs. So the time limit whether we should have taken a military action against it or not, was very short. Still the discussion in Israel was very tough, not only because of the elections at that time but because we basically, I mean when I say "we" most people who were involved in any military thought in Israel concerning the whole Middle East, we thought that it was not good for us to be the first one to strike a nuclear reactor, but we realized that the time limit was short, because once it's becoming a hot reactor then the danger for all the surrounding is much bigger. Still I mention that because I want to give the proof, to feel to what extent we are worried in Israel about any kind of conflict concerning nuclear weapons in our area. Because we are aware of the huge dangers... huge dangers. So in that respect we did it because the government said that it was practically the last moment and that we had no choice. For the time being it worked well, as I said before, because it seems as if the world did understand what was the danger of introducing nuclear weapons to the Middle East.

DAYAN AT ONE TIME SUGGESTED AN INTERCHANGEABILITY BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS. AGAIN, USING MILITARY TOOLS OF ANALYSIS, CAN YOU TALK ON THAT?

Yeah. I believe it was a mistake in basic facts and of philosophy.

INCLUSIVE OF MY QUESTION. "DAYAN'S..."

Yes. What Dayan suggested at that time as a result of lack of resources for the security budget, he suggested maybe a certain mix of nuclear threat with conventional power--military strength. That was a big mistake. First of all, because any introduction of nuclear weapons change basically the whole situation. And that was a risk I don't think that Israel should have taken. But strictly militarily speaking, there is no proof whatsoever, and I personally don't believe in that, that the introduction of a certain nuclear umbrella prevents the conventional wars. As a matter of fact, under the nuclear affair and balance of terror between the two global powers, many wars did happen since the last world war. In the Middle East, even if there might come a day when there will be balance of terror, nuclear balance of terror, or a nuclear umbrella, it will not prevent the Arab countries to use their conventional strength against Israel, because the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is so complicated that they'll be able to achieve their goals before any thought of the use of nuclear weapons might take place. So I thought at that time that his philosophy was wrong and I believe today that this philosophy is wrong.

LET'S COME BACK TO THE QUESTION OF THE THRESHOLD. HOW CLOSE FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW DOES ISRAEL NEED TO BE IN ORDER, NOT TO BE THE FIRST, BUT TO BE SECOND?

Well, I believe that all philosophic thoughts about production, about realization of what weapons should be cleared, and Israel mastered the basic research and technological knowledge. Because once we have these things, and thanks to our development in the last thirty years, we have these. We have the knowledge. We have a lot of very good people. We have a very good technological infrastructure. So I believe that once we get enough information about any development or substantial development, among the Arabs in any Arab country, we shall be able not to be too late.

WHAT ABOUT THE THRESHOLD OF PREVENTING ARAB COUNTRIES FROM HAVING THE WEAPON? AND DO YOU SEE THAT ATTACKING THE REACTOR IN IRAQ CREATES SORT OF A FORMULA FOR DEALING... WHEN DOES ONE ATTACK? AT WHAT STAGE OF THE GAME IT BECOMES AN ACT OF WAR?

If we talk strictly military, of course any attack must be executed before the reactor become hot. Now this everybody knows. It's not a military secret. It's not a technological secret. I don't believe that there is any definite answer or complete answer to your question. On one hand, we don't wish to stop any technological development in the Arab countries. And if they feel that they need nuclear reactors for civil goals, I don't believe we have the right to interfere. Whether the lesson of Iraq will serve the Arab countries not to go too far in preparing the infrastructure for developing the bomb, then I believe a certain coexistence can be found. I believe that modus operandi of that kind based on the mutual understanding that civil development is a necessity while nobody should ever cross the line of calculated risk. Then I believe that we can continue in developing our countries without endangering any use of nuclear power.

AND WOULD THE ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH A CONDITION END BY A TREATY?

I believe that understanding is enough. You know, when we had our previous peace understandings with Arab countries once we had used the term during the negotiations that if both countries wanted, you don't need anything in writing. If one of the countries doesn't want, no written contract will serve. So I believe that here we are talking about tendencies, about philosophies of co-existence. And not to cross a certain limit that makes the other side too nervous about it. Just as long as you have leaders with logic, with responsibility, with understanding of the risks, and good hopes, it can be kept. And let's hope that that will happen in the Middle East.

ONE IS--SUSPECTS AT LEAST--THAT ON THE OTHER SIDE IT'S PRESENTED AS A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY THAT THESE CRITERIA THAT YOU JUST DESCRIBED HAVE BEEN CROSSED BY ISRAEL.

In what way?

IN THE SENSE THAT ISRAEL IS EITHER THERE, OR IS SO CLOSE THERE, THAT THE NOTION OF MUTUAL NON-NUCLEAR STATES IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THEM.

I believe that the best proof to contradict this view can be found by the fact that Arabs we're talking about this even before the Six Days War, which did not prevent them from threatening Israel and its mere existence. And the repetition of that same kind of threat to our existence in the Yom Kippur War. And when they claim that they knew that we supposedly had nuclear weapons, how could they take the risk to initiate such a war? Which means that they know quite well that in the Middle East for the time being we are talking about conventional wars. Some of the Arab leaders today, fortunately enough, are not speaking any more about wars of extermination but political war. I mean a war that aims to change a political surrounding or atmosphere. As long as people think in that respect, it's fine. But I mention this just in order to show you that if they really thought we had something close to nuclear weapons, they would have never taken the risks to initiate a war of that kind. So a talk is one thing and having a bomb is another thing. I can say only that in all our military considerations until now we're talking about the conventional war. When we are talking about shortcomings in our military budget, we are talking about conventional war. And let's hope we won't talk about war at all. But until now, no basic military thought of the use of nuclear weapons has been developed whatsoever.

THERE IS AT LEAST ONE THEORY, THAT THE LIMITED ROLE THAT BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SYRIANS HAD IN THE '73 WAR WERE PART OF NUCLEAR THINKING...IT'S A MORBID...NOT ENOUGH DAMAGE WAS DONE TO...

As you well put it, it's one of the theories and when they failed to continue the conventional war, that was a very good excuse to explain why they did not go further. They did not go further, first of all, because they were stopped; secondly, because, unfortunately for them, they didn't find the way how to do it. Looking in their papers mainly of the Syrians, they shouldn't have any doubt about the fact that if they could they would've gone much further with no connection whatsoever, with no reference whatsoever to any nuclear power. That's just a big nonsense, changing the past.

LET'S CUT FOR A SECOND...

No. I don't feel that the precedent of our bombing the nuclear reactor in Iraq should serve as a rule in the future. Not at all. I believe that it will be much better if our neighbors, as well as we, will learn the mutual co-existence. And if they have nuclear reactors for civil goals they will not cross the line of being able to produce the nuclear bomb. I believe that this can be kept and once both sides will keep it, I believe that the danger of explosion, a nuclear explosion in the Middle East will be close to none. And I believe that will be the best logic policy of both sides in the Middle East.

AS A MILITARY MAN YOU WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN REASSURED BY A STRICT ADHERENCE TO NPT, AND INSPECTIONS OF BOTH SIDES' REACTORS?

Maybe for those countries who are not under danger of extermination, all kind of international arrangements can be well accepted and enough. I don't believe that it can work in the Middle East as long as we don't have the proof that countries and leaders in the Middle East would behave in a logic way. And unfortunately for us, if you take what happens today between Iran and Iraq, I don't see any Israeli leader who can trust any kind of international supervision to stop threats like that. What could the world do now when both sides use missiles against civil population? And with chemical weapons. Unfortunately we deal here with a very specific situation with leaders that not always realize what should be the red line not to be crossed. And as long as that continues, I don't believe Israel can undertake any risk that goes beyond what we consider as a calculated risk for our existence.