OK, WHAT WE THINK OF AS NIXON CALLING FOR DÉTENTE? HOW IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY SOVIETS, BY BREZHNEV?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, first of all, I think they were both, so to say, screaming at each other. The calls were from both sides. Well, in Moscow the attitude was, in principle, positive of course; it was received positively. Though, I have to admit, we didn't like Mr. Nixon too much, because, in general, we had a clear vision of his political physiognomy, we knew what he thought of us; nevertheless, business is business, so when the opportunity opened to start talks, we started them with pleasure. We didn't have a philosophical problem of any kind in that case. We've been mentally prepared for them. So, the negotiations with Nixon had started.

DID THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP DURING THE SIXTIES, CONTRIBUTED TO THE AMERICAN INTENTIONS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, generally that's correct, of course. The achievement of strategic parity was a prerequisite of détente. There was a period when we were well behind the Americans, remember the Cuban crisis, then we had far less rockets than America, Though, eventually, we began to catch up, thank God; strategic parity was achieved by the late '60s. Well, actually, you can call it a parity, of course, but the fact was that Americans were certainly superior. However, the parity was already not far away, and that hastened the negotiations, it pushed Nixon towards the beginning of negotiations and here, they started.

HOW DID THE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AT THAT TIME CONTRIBUTE TO THE NOTION OF DÉTENTE?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

That was a very complicated problem for us...

PLEASE, START AGAIN... YOU'RE MIXING SOUNDS.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

That was a very complicated problem for us. I would call it a very dramatic situation. If you recall, in May 1972 Nixon was preparing his first visit to Moscow. And, if I'm not mistaken, literally two weeks before his arrival in Moscow, Nixon gave orders to blockade the Vietnamese harbors, and, first of all, Hai-Phong, (he ordered) to bomb these ports. Our ships were there, and the Americans dropped bombs on them. So, Moscow had faced a problem: to receive Nixon, or not to receive... in such a circumstance. So, there were very serious discussions at the highest possible level. There were people saying that it was impossible to accept Nixon's visit in such circumstances. Though, eventually, both, first Brezhnev, as well as his colleagues came to the conclusion as follows: the issue of Vietnam was very important, of course, one of the most important ones of the time; but the issue of détente was yet more important a problem than Vietnam, because détente, if achieved, could also facilitate the solution of the Vietnam problem. So, weighing all of these factors, I'd say determined the situation: Nixon arrived in Moscow. That was, by the way, a sign of... a method of policymaking, inasmuch as dealing with politics, you have always a portfolio of problems, and always have to these are always not equally important. You cannot spread them over your desk evenly, because one would always be more important than another. So, this scale of priorities of the problems becomes essential to deal with real policymaking. When we brought our troops to Afghanistan, and the Americans (in response) suspended the ratification of the SALT II agreement, it was a typical example of a wrong decision. Of course, I understand that they didn't like the Afghanistan, didn't like the presence of our troops there, but SALT II was by all means more important than Afghanistan. Thus, the Americans chose the wrong policy... while we, in 1972 made the right choice. That's logical it seems to me... though, that was not easy to make, of course.

WHAT ABOUT... AGAIN, WITH THE CONTEXT OF THE OPENING STAGES OF DÉTENTE... HOW WAS THE BUDDING RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA VIEWED IN MOSCOW? ESPECIALLY BY SECRETARY BREZHNEV?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Friendly relations of the Americans with China? I see... I don't think there was such a link (between these two issues), because... That's what the Americans were saying sometimes: the fact of their convergence with China made the Russians begin their rapprochement with the Americans. There was no interdependence like that. To us, those were quite independent issues. We did want the normalization of the Soviet-American relationship, no matter what kind of relations either Americans or us would have with China. That was an independent and very important problem. Therefore, that interdependence mentioned by you didn't really exist in that case. We certainly considered... took into account many factors of our policy but, I repeat, in that particular case there was no connection like that.

OBVIOUSLY, FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THERE WERE CLASHES ON THE CHINESE BORDER... WERE THERE CONSIDERATIONS OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE UNITED STATES AT THE SAME TIME?...

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You know, my military rank is lieutenant (of reserve). So, I can probably think within the dimensions of, let say, platoon. The situation however, requires to be at least a general to discuss these problems. Nonetheless, I'd like to repeat, we always considered, and still do so today, Soviet-American relations as independent... as one of the most important independent problems. And therefore, certainly considering world events everywhere, be it Europe, Asia or Africa, we didn't see, I repeat, the immediate connection between the incidents on the Soviet-Chinese border or Kissinger's visit to Peking and normalization of the Soviet-Chinese relations... There was no immediate link. That's what I'd like to emphasize. Though, in the abstract, as much as everything in the world is interrelated, there were some links... but those didn't serve as the impulse that sped up, hastened the development of Soviet-American relations. That was quite independently important to us, regardless of anything else.

CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THE SALT MEETINGS? THE SALT I MEETINGS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FAILURE OF BOTH THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS AND THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS TO DEAL WITH THE MIRV ISSUE?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see, I didn't take part in these negotiations and therefore, understandably, can't say a lot about it. What I probably can do is to emphasize the difficulties of them. That was the first precedent when people sat at the table and began to discuss the security of their own nations. And it was, objectively, very, very difficult, no matter what their subjective intentions were. Objectively, it was very difficult to compare these (military-strategic) potentials. Quoting one Englishman, it was like comparing borsht and an apple-pie, because the structures were so different. That was very difficult. As for the MIRVs, that was, that was also a very important question and a very important issue. The Americans were ahead of us for approximately five years, And... had everything ready (in that area). We told them: "Let's both of us give up... the MIRVing of our rockets." "No," said Kissinger, because the superiority was on the American side. However, five years later we made our own MIRVs, and that did not help a lot to improve the national American security. I'd say, the opposite happened... By the way, the same thing happened again with the cruise missiles. Again, we appealed to the Americans: "Let's both of us give up the production of cruise missiles." "No," the Americans said, "we will produce cruise missiles," because again, they were ahead of us for about five years. Well, alright... Now we are producing our cruise missiles, again to nobody's profit. And now it's being repeated for the third time with SDI. Again we are saying to the Americans: "As far as we both don't have it, let's relinquish to produce it at all." "No," say the Americans, "we are going to produce it." Okay, so will we. And again, neither us, nor them will benefit from this. The same mistake is repeated the third time. And that's a pity. You see, sometimes we say that people learn from their mistakes. Alas, it is the third time that the same mistake is repeated. And this is very regretful... very regretful.

OK. CUT.

AS I DEAL MORE AND MORE WITH THIS ISSUE I SUSPECT THAT... HUMANITY IS MAYBE NOT EQUIPPED... IT'S TO BIG FOR US...

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see, there was one great German philosopher, Hegel, and he once said that the only useful lesson of history is that nobody ever learned any useful lessons from history.

THEY, COMING BACK TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS, CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE TACTIC OF THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM? IT WAS ALWAYS, THEY WERE RESPONDING TO PROPOSALS TO AMERICAN PROPOSALS, AND THEY WERE NEVER INITIATING PROPOSALS. WHERE DOES IT COME FROM?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You know, I have nothing to say on this subject, I simply know nothing. I would be glad to talk about it.

OK, I SHOULD...

I only know that we are very hard negotiators. Very hard negotiators. We... our positions are, always firm... and we give them up very slowly. This is a well-known trait of ours... Americans just the same.

WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF SALT I AND OF THE ABM TREATY?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

That was the very... You see, I think it was like losing virginity, only the other way around... I don't really know how to express it... It was proved for the first time that it was possible to achieve an accord. You see what I mean, that was the (core). Not that one hundred more, or one hundred less of particular missiles... What was important, was that for the first time it was proven that it was possible to agree.

THAT'S VERY GOOD. I UNDERSTAND IT.

As for the agreement on the anti-ballistic defense, it was also, of course, very... important because each country became hostage to another. And that is, of course, a dramatic situation. It is rather unpleasant to live under this threat. But in reality, it was the best solution of the situation.

IT WAS A RECOGNITION... TO SOME EXTENT... IT WAS THE FORMAL RECOGNITION OF MAD, MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Yes, yes, it seems to be mutually assured destruction... Yes... Yes... Yes! It was a formula of mutually...yes. Naturally, naturally... I'd like to say that… I can repeat that the significance of SALT I is that it showed it was possible to agree...that was the significance of SALT I. As for significance of the agreement on anti-ballistic defense, it was the fact that both sides recognized the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. And, of course, I want to note that it was rather unpleasant to live in this kind of world. But there was no other choice... no choice. Now Reagan names this immoral calling for the creation of a defense system. All those are just words, unfortunately, just words. In reality the fear exists, the balance of fear, but thank God, war hasn't erupted so far. By the way... here's a magazine arrived yesterday with an article by McNamara... very interesting one, and he just mentions here this very doctrine... here it is... it is very interesting...

WE TALKED A LOT WITH MCNAMARA.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Yes, he is a very clever man, I value him very highly. Here... this is what McNamara writes: "...the Mutually Assured Destruction, then, isn't immoral, despite many who call it an immoral policy. The Mutually Assured Destruction, that is, vulnerability of each superpower is not a policy at all, it is just a merciless fact of our life.", and I think that this is very correct. It is not a concept, nor a policy, but a state of facts which we cannot disregard.

THERE IS A DISCUSSION WHETHER EITHER UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD ADOPT IT AS THEIR STRATEGY AND TRY TO STRENGTHEN IT RATHER THAN COME FROM UNDER IT.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

In my opinion there is no need to strengthen it, I think the idea... our idea is to maintain parity and to start to reduce it simultaneously. Because for the purpose of mutually assured destruction it is possible to have 1,000 missiles per each side, but, let's say, 100 missiles per each could also make it. Although, 100 missiles per each side is somehow better than 1,000. So, we propose to begin a gradual reduction of those levels towards zero. Speaking abstractly, even Reagan doesn't object to this. Though, in practice it's certainly not easy. Well, but to increase these levels (definitely) doesn't mean to increase security.

...is in that, that the SDI instead of strengthening the containment, is ruining it. That is the problem. The problem is that Reagan's idea is not strengthening the containment, but ruining it. By the way, McNamara writes about this very well.

I WANT TO COME BACK TO THE HISTORY. WHAT...HOW MUCH DOES HE KNOW ABOUT BREZHNEV'S OPINIONS OF PRESIDENT NIXON, HIS PERSONAL STYLE AND HIS IDEOLOGY?

Well, you see, politicians have very little room for personal relations. That's the core of the problem. The Soviet Union was behind Brezhnev, as well as America was behind Nixon. So they related to each other not as "Richard" and "Leonid" but as state to state. Therefore, I repeat, there was little room for a personal relationship. Well, you see... what was important to Brezhnev? He was a person who took part in the war, from its very beginning to the end. So for him, the problem of détente, of peace, was not purely cerebral. It was in his psyche; his heart was there, because a man who lived through the war couldn't approach such things in the abstract, but from the very depths of his personality. Therefore, I repeat, for Brezhnev these things were important from a very personal angle, as for a man who lived all these things through. Thus, he paid a lot of attention to this problem; that was a very complex approach. So...while Nixon had well, Nixon's approach was more logical than emotional. Anyway, in this particular case the result was in general, positive, regardless of the differences in approach. Generally speaking, it was possible to talk with Nixon. That's what was important to us. Certainly, we were aware of Nixon's anti-communism, of his entire ideology. We were well aware of that... but in that particular case, it was very good that both of us comprehended that a national interest was more important than differences in ideology; that we had to reach an accord...and decrease the danger of war... because if there were outbreaks, there would be no winning ideology.

CAN HE GIVE AN ESSENCE... TELL HIM HE'S A VERY GOOD SPOKESMAN FOR THE TV... CAN YOU GIVE AN ASSESSMENT OF KISSINGER...HIS STYLE OF DOING... FIRST OF ALL, DID YOU MEET HIM PERSONALLY? DID YOU HAVE A SENSE OF HIM AS A PERSON AND ABOUT HIS DIPLOMATIC STYLE?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Personally I never met him. I was present in the same room with him, let's say, during a reception... but I didn't talk to him. I value him very highly... I consider him one of the outstanding diplomats of the 20th Century. Being in disagreement with very many things that Kissinger... is saying today, I nevertheless, consider him as an outstanding political personality. And I think America was very lucky to have such a diplomat as Kissinger. He thought very clearly, very distinctly, and in general knew how to take risks. He knew how to take risks. He knew when to give up if necessary; to propose a compromise... well, and certainly did a lot to have this SALT I treaty happened. Therefore, I repeat, I think he is one of the outstanding diplomats of the 20th Century. Well, later, as it often happens, with people. Well, today he holds positions... which, I would say, are harder than ten years ago... Well, that's already a different problem.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

...MAN OF "REALPOLITIK", AND THE PEOPLE HE WAS DEALING WITH HERE WERE IDEOLOGISTS... HOW DID THIS KIND OF MEETING WORK?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see, that's not exactly correct. First, there are no people who are not influenced by some kind of ideology... and in that sense Kissinger was also an ideologist, inasmuch as his policy was also based on his general notions of history, of the world, of capitalism, of socialism... The thing is quite different, though, when you deal with some practical political issues. You have to focus on something... as I mentioned before, using that scale of priorities, you have to concentrate on something essential… and to put aside everything of secondary importance. Kissinger understood the essence: though we do have our contradictions and cannot reconcile our ideology with yours, there is no need to shoot each other for that reason. Ideological conflicts should not be solved by missiles, that is what Kissinger clearly comprehended,...and, by the way, we also understood it, so, there were no ideologists opposing Kissinger. His counterparts were politicians, as he himself was, and they comprehended equally clearly that, though we had differences in our ideologies, our arguments should be ideas, not missiles. Here you are: all of them were politicians, and all were ideologists.

HOW WAS THIS PERIOD OF DÉTENTE IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN TERMS OF IT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE, ESPECIALLY WITH GERMANY AND WESTERN EUROPE?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see, in the abstract you can extract the Soviet-American direction or the European direction of our politics, but in reality these are very closely related areas. It was very important to us to find...say, some solution to the German problem, to stabilize the situation in Central Europe; and we did it by signing our treaty with FRG. Later, the FRG-GDR treaty followed, as well as treaties between FRG and Poland and Czechoslovakia... Yet later, there was the Helsinki Conference, and all that was one of the most important components of détente. Actually, there were two of them: the Soviet-American relationship and Europe. Those were the two most important directions of détente at that time. Sometimes we've been told: "You want to sour the relationship between Western Europe and America, to split them apart." Well, I usually answer by asking: "Do you really think we're such fools? We clearly understand that the things uniting America and Western Europe are far stronger than all kinds of contradictions and disagreements that exist among them. We are realists. We understand that we cannot split Western Europe and America. So, why should we set such unrealistic tasks for ourselves? We don't have them all. It would be advantageous to us to have a good relationship with both Western Europe AND America, and also, if America had a wonderful relationship with Western Europe. So, we never had any problem here." The problem starts when the relationship between America and Europe adopts an anti-Soviet tendency. Then we do have a problem,...but that's already... but that very problem can be solved by détente. Speaking of presence, there are some talks today, well,; that during the '70s the Soviet Union paid too much attention to America and not enough to other directions of it's international policy. That's probably right... probably right...because, mind you, we understood that the main problem, the problem of war or peace didn't lie in the sphere of our relations with Europe, or even with China. This problem, THIS problem could be solved only within the framework of Soviet-American relations. So, quite naturally, we paid great attention to them. Well, inasmuch as the conclusion of one (SALT) agreement was followed by another, some level of stability was achieved which, in turn, allowed us to expand our movement in the direction of both Europe and Asia. That was natural, because our interests are as global, as those of the United States of America. Today we are trying to follow several directions.

WHAT HAPPENED TO DÉTENTE, WHY DID IT GO AWAY?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, actually, I prefer to ask the Americans this question...of what happened to détente. Well, what should I say?...I would formulate the problem as follows; Our American friends couldn't withstand the challenge of détente. Détente as a policy is much more complex than the cold war. To deal with détente requires more brains, more subtlety, more diplomacy. Everything is simple with a cold war: here is the enemy, here is the power, and that's it. Hold your position. That's what the cold war is about. As for détente, it requires far more intellectual efforts, psychological efforts, and, I'm afraid, our American friends failed to muster these efforts. Here is a simple example: America got used to always being the first. The most powerful, the wealthiest...

I'm listening. Yes. Hi buddy. Fedor, right now they're putting me on film... the Americans. Where are you now? I call you right back, what is your number? 205... I call you right back. How much longer will this take? How much?

HALF AN HOUR, AN HOUR...

Yes, all right, half an hour. OK, I call you right away... OK. OK. All right. That was Fedor Burlatsky.

OH, I TALKED TO HIM...

Well, what was that?... Oh, yes... Yes, détente. So, that's a very complex policy that requires major intellectual efforts. Unfortunately, the Americans proved to be unable to muster these efforts. One more psychologically important aspect: the Americans got used to always being the first; the wealthiest, the most powerful, the most... the most... the most.... by will of God himself. That's it. As if Reagan has a telephone on his desk through which he daily reports to God. That's the impression of mine. So, détente in general means: say goodbye to first place. That means, as they say in sports, to share the first and the second place with the Soviet Union; but to the Americans, in psychological terms, not to be the first always means to be the second. So, this notion of sharing of the first and the second place (psychologically) doesn't exist (for them.)... And, subconsciously, the Americans are trying all the time to return to this state of superiority. The Americans are for détente, but only when they are much stronger than we are. The same could be said about MIRV. What is MIRV? It's an effort to thrust ahead. What are cruise missiles? It's an effort to thrust ahead. What is SDI? It's an effort to thrust ahead. By no means can the Americans accept the fact that they are not the first anymore and will never be. Never. But if you psychologically did not accept this fact, it would be very difficult for you to go on with détente. Very difficult. Hence, Reagan got a desire... I compare sometimes Reagan with Khomeini. Khomeini is trying to escape from our time to somewhere in the seventh century, to the times of, let's say, early Islam, while Reagan is trying to escape from twentieth century to the nineteenth century, when there was no socialism, when there were no social laws. Somehow he feels more comfortable there... And that's what we call a policy of social revenge. He wanted to play it back, just to go back... here, Weinberger noted very clearly: "When we complete SDI, we will return to the situation when we had the atomic bomb and the Russians didn't," Here you are, that's what precisely said.

I'LL COME TO YOU AGAIN... IN A FEW MONTHS TO TALK ABOUT REAGAN... AND SO ON... BUT I WANT TO CONTINUE WITH THIS...

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Uh, okay...

ASK HIM WHETHER HE'S TIRED.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

No, no, I'm not tired, just... we just talked too much.

I'm afraid it's not, but no matter...

WHAT ABOUT SUCH THINGS THAT DETRACT FROM DÉTENTE, AS WATERGATE, THE OCTOBER WAR...

No, you see, one can name ten more (obstacles), say, Afghanistan, October war, and what not. But all those are just particularities, while I was trying to outline the general picture. Of course Watergate disturbed it, because it undermined Nixon's position. Of course the October war disturbed it to some extent, as well as Afghanistan later on... which obviously didn't improve the international situation, as well as the events in Africa. All those issues certainly complicated, each in its own way, the general situation. But, you see, détente is not some ideally pure condition. That was the very problem, that, despite all of these obstacles the state (of détente) should be maintained. There is such a notion of... that, as they say, peace is indivisible. That's not correct, it is divisible because, for instance, we are not at war now, while somebody else could be. So peace could be divided (into fighting and non-fighting nations). Though, from the American point of view... They sometimes use expressions like the indivisibility of détente. If something is bad somewhere (they say,) let it be bad everywhere. If, say, Russians entered Afghanistan, let's ruin the entire détente. We cannot accept this. We think that it is always necessary to carefully weigh different political values,...and despite all the obstacles, be them brought by Watergate, by the October War, or by any other events, we thought that despite all these events, we had to preserve what was already achieved and not to give it up. Alas... Carter was such a nervous person. He was nervous, too much.

I WANT TO ASK HIM ABOUT... WHAT KIND OF EXPECTATION DID SECRETARY BREZHNEV HAVE... AND FROM CARTER MEN HE WAS RUNNING FOR PRESIDENCY?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Well, you know, of course he was not a bad man, Carter... not a bad man. Not bad enough to be President. That's how I'd put it. Perhaps, his attitudes were much too naive. As well as his understanding of what's good and bad...

CARTER... AS YOU KNOW... I THINK, THERE WERE GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL. WHAT HAPPENED?

Well, at the beginning some hopes were related to him, indeed. The thing is, that he, so to say... The situation required forward movement, I'd say, not too quickly, but evenly. As for him, he immediately felt like leaping forward. And those leanings were definitely... a bit out of place. We thought we should continue along the way started by SALT I and to proceed in that direction gradually but evenly. Carter immediately jumped forward and, in general, disturbed the whole business by that, to some extent. Later, he stepped back, so to say, to the starting point, and despite everything we concluded SALT II, but the time was lost... a few years were lost because of all this stuff. On the other hand, in principle... we certainly tried. Of course, everyone says that no arms are needed at all. Zero for you and zero for us. But, unfortunately the reality is a bit different. So, I am a supporter of a more prudent policy in this case, of more cautious steps.

CAN YOU GIVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT WAS PREVALENT HERE ABOUT SUCH PEOPLE THAT CARTER WORKED WITH AS BRZEZINSKI AND VANCE?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see, speaking of Brzezinski, he was much more an ideologist than..., much more an ideologist than, I don't know...than Brezhnev, than Gorbachev. He was the ideologist. He thought not by categories of politics, but by categories of ideology...even when sitting at the negotiation table and making policy. And that was a real obstacle... a real obstacle. And, as it seems to me, the advice he gave to Carter was often motivated not by considerations of political realities, but merely by his... by some of his ideological... his philosophical sympathies and antipathies. As for Vance, in that sense he is a much more realistically thinking person, more restrained, I'd say. As far, as I understand, with him it could be possible to negotiate far more effectively and productively than, let's say, with Brzezinski. Vance, by the way, is one of those few people who resigned if you remember, because of that incident when Carter sent planes to rescue hostages in Iran. As far as I recall, he is the second State Secretary in the entire history of America, who... who resigned for good. Well, that also says something about his moral virtues, which is also important. I personally like him. I, speaking of my purely personal sympathies, I dislike for some reason Brzezinski, but as for Vance, I have feelings of sympathy to him, as a person, as a politician. Naturally, I don't share many of his beliefs, that's another matter, but... he is a person I would like to talk with, that's how I'd put it.

IN 1976, IN THE 25th PARTY CONFERENCE BREZHNEV MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT... THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTRIES... DO NOT CHANGE THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE. IN THE STATES IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AS SUPPORT FOR ALL KINDS OF MOVEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD WHICH WAS CONTRADICTORY TO DÉTENTE. HOW...DO YOU THINK BREZHNEV UNDERSTOOD IT?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see... You see, the thing is that…For Instance, Negroes in South America... (I mean) Africa are struggling for their independence against apartheid. Does it contradict the interests of America, or not? Seems like it does. Inasmuch as the Americans are concerned, they don't want it. Well, there are people struggling in Salvador... Well, in Chile... people struggle against Pinochet - does it contradict the interests of America, or not? You get a strange picture: as it turns out, wherever people overthrow some dictators, some tyrants, some despots, small or big, they always turn out to be friends of America. This is the paradox. So... yes, we support those who are against Pinochet. You support Pinochet. Seems like there is a symmetry here, but there is NO symmetry here, because there IS a difference between Pinochet and his adversaries. True, we support the people, the groups, the political movements, which we consider are struggling for freedom, for independence, for progress, for social development; and we really help them. The Americans, mind you, also help their friends. So, I want to emphasize again, formally it seems like we help our friends, while you help your friends. Thus, it turns out, you sort of right, and we are too or: you're wrong and we are wrong, but...this symmetry is only imaginary. Just look at who is supported by America, and who is supported by us. You like history. Chang Kai-shek, who's friend was he, ours of America's? Yi Seung-man in Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. All those Portuguese colonies, Angola, Mozambique whom did the Americans support? The guerillas? No, they supported Salazar. They supported Franco. They supported "black colonels" of Greece. They supported Marcos of Philippines. That's what, speaking of history, (turns out:) all the dictators who emerged after the World War II were always best friends of America. Therefore, as it quite naturally turned out, people who stood against these dictators because they simply could no longer live under them, were considered as struggling against America. Inasmuch as I fight Marcos, I fight the interests of America; if I fight Chang Kai-shek, I fight the interests of America; If I fight Pinochet, I fight the interests of America. That's how it turns out. If you had some other interests... You know what, let's... OK, you Americans are great democrats. You are great liberals. You like freedom. Why, then, don't we help together the Negroes of South Africa to overthrow the apartheid regime? Let's do it! Why, you stand for freedom, we too, so, let's try together, let's agree and dismiss Botha! Though, I'm afraid, you won't go for it... I'm afraid, the Americans won't... But why? You are for liberty? So? You are for equality, aren't you? So, let's do it, let's commit a very practical good deed, let's get rid of the last racist regime in the world. But I'm afraid, my American friends would say no, we shouldn't...

TELL HIM, I'M ONLY AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST, I DON'T REPRESENT ANY POLICY.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

I understand, I understand, I just mean that... I hope I'll be listened to not only by journalists, but also by those who...

BUT...BUT...THERE WAS... THE FEELING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WHEN UNITED STATES HELPS A COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA... THERE WAS A STATEMENT HERE, THERE WERE STATEMENTS THAT IT MIGHT HURT SALT.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

I don't see any connection here... I don't see that relation... I recall now, once I lectured in Washington. There is an Asia Society (there). So they invited me to give a lecture on China. This is what I said: "Gentlemen, today you are glad of the fact that you have good relations with China, while we have bad ones. You glad of this fact, and I understand your joy. Though, you seem to forget something: you forget that China is a Socialist country; and because you keep forgetting this fact, your tactical gains will turn into a major strategic loss in a few years. And I'm sure, that's what's going to happen. It will happen. You keep forgetting that China is a Socialist country.

AGAIN, IN '78... BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AMERICA... IN AFRICA...IT MIGHT HURT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. DID IT CHANGE ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT, DID IT CHANGE ANYTHING IN SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFRICA?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

I don't think so... I don't think so. Why? Here we are, we are coming back to ...the main question: what is permitted to the Americans is for some mysterious reason forbidden to us, that is the problem. The thing permitted to America... Take an example, here, the Americans are going to build an airfield on Easter Island, a reserve airfield for the Shuttle landings. Sounds normal, it's routine. Now, just imagine what would have happened if we started building an airfield on Easter Island. Can you imagine what fuss would have been raised? So, this is a question of a double standard. When the American ships are visiting some Italian...well, any port, it's all normal. When a Soviet ship enters a Vietnamese port of Cam Ranh, a big noise is raised: "Oh, my God! what's happening! The Russians are coming!" But why, may I ask? Let's live equally. There is a wonderful joke... Please Jane, interpret it simultaneously... A drunk man is coming home. He approaches his door, rings the bell. Some strange man opens the door. The drunk asks: "Excuse me, do I live here?" very politely. "No," he's answered, "Excuse me, comrade, but you don't live here." "Oh, I'm so sorry..." and goes away. He walks through the streets, and again, returns back to the same door. He rings up, the same man (opens), and he asks again: "Excuse me, do I live here?" "No, comrade, you do not live here!" "Oh, for God's sake, please, forgive me..." When the same thing happened to him the third time, (the drunk stops and says:) "This is remarkable, he lives everywhere, and I don't live anywhere!" So... sometimes it looks like the Americans live everywhere, while we don't live anywhere. However, we have our own interests, why... it's only natural. It seems natural to America to have its own interests in Africa. That's natural. What seems unnatural to them for some reason, is when we have some interests in Africa. Why? I ask you why: it is a very, I'd say, important question. Yes, we were interested in the victory of people who opposed Portuguese colonies in Africa. That was our interest, any kind of ideological, political... We helped these guerillas. So...the Americans didn't welcome that...

Yes, come in. Oh, Seriozha, hello! B'ahramdzess,... b'ahramdzess, my dear!

So, one better use a single standard. Yes, we also have interests in Africa, we do have interests in the Middle East, we have interests in Asia... and that's natural: we are a great power. So, let's consider it as such without being nervous. There's no need to nervous, as the Americans are — a real nervous breakdown is going on in Washington... They are stomping on the floors, breaking the dishes... What is all that for...?

WHAT WAS -- I'M MOVING ON TO SALT II. THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, OF SALT II, IN WHAT WAY WAS IT IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIETS?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You see, if you take SALT I, it confirmed the existence of basic conditions for such agreements. As for SALT II, it was the first agreement that actually required the reduction of armaments. Imagine, if the Americans ratified SALT II, we would have to dismantle, I think, 250 rockets, against approximately 50 to be dismantled by the Americans. But at least, the numbers would be reduced; for the first time in the entire history we could have made a modest, but first step back. That's what was important. It was, I repeat, the first agreement that contained an embryo of the actual reduction of the nuclear arms means of delivery. No matter how modest, it set a precedent, and that was important. Of course, like any agreement it had its flaws...as well as advantages; this was arguable. It's normal, it's understandable. I can also ask why, according to this agreement the Americans remained with the number of strategic bombers four times as big as us. Four times more than we had. But that's a different issue, it is always discussable; these are just particularities, while I am talking of essence: that was an agreement that, despite everything, limited the arms race, and that was very important. Yes, later we increased the number of warheads, as well as the Americans did, but all that was, so to say... that was permitted by the agreement. There were some moves, banned by the agreement, though, and now, by relinquishing this agreement, the Americans actually removed the last, I'd say, obstacle from the course of the arms race...

YES, IT'S BETTER IN THE CARIBBEAN...

Uh-huh. Yes... So, I repeat, that was the first agreement that started reducing the quantity of weapons... and it is a pity that the Americans ruined it.

Well, you see, we...does it work? Yes? You see, that was primarily an American concern, the ratification. Of course, we've been watching, what can I say...Carter then was occupied not even with policymaking, but just with the devil knows what. Do you remember this lapse with a brigade in Cuba? If you do, you remember of course what a clamor was raised: Oh, the Soviet brigade is in Cuba! They started beating on the big drum, blowing their trumpets...After that no brigade was found, but the clamor was already raised; and many other things happened that way in the same manner. Instead of beginning to work and insisting on ratification of the agreement, Carter was among those who began burying it. Later, (the) Afghanistan (issue was raised)...I clearly understand that the Americans were not happy by the fact that we entered Afghanistan, I understand it alright... But...let's put it this way: there are issues more important than Afghanistan, and the significance of SALT II, in terms of the international politics and the Soviet-American relations, was more important than Afghanistan. Though, to Carter there were no considerations of this kind; as I said before, he simply spread, like butter on a sandwich, these problems through his desk. That's it. Regretful as it is, the agreement remained un-ratified.

IF BREZHNEV KNEW THAT MOVING INTO AFGHANISTAN WOULD PREVENT RATIFICATION, WOULD THE SOVIETS STAY OUT?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You know what, I really don't like these questions of the "what if" or "would it" kind. Here you are: the decision was made for our troops to enter Afghanistan. That was certainly an extraordinary decision, made in extraordinary circumstances. That was, I'd say, not a rule, but an exception. So, all the possible consequences of this decision were, I'd say, taken into account, and our leadership had quite clear ideas about the possible American reaction. It seems to me though, that,... perhaps considering our own position concerning Nixon in 1972, I don't think, nonetheless, that... Nonetheless, I don't think we expected the Americans to go as far as throwing the SALT II agreement away. We hoped, this agreement would remain, so to say, alive as an entity independent of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, I repeat, the Americans proved to be too nervous.

DOES HE REMEMBER THE AMERICAN...OK, THREE MORE QUESTIONS... DOES HE REMEMBER THE DISCUSSION DURING THE RATIFICATION PROCESS OF THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY, AND DOES HE HAVE A RESPONSE TO IT?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

Yes, I remember it... No, you see, that's ridiculous to mention. Take the report of the Scowcroft Committee which was charged exclusively with this issue... and there is written there, excuse me, in good English that there was no such thing as "window of vulnerability," because, apart from land-based missiles, the Americans had on board their submarines enough missiles to destroy the Soviet Union, mind you. Therefore, pardon me, but this talk is good for the nursery school, for the individuals ignorant of the situation. It would be better to talk to them about "windows of vulnerability." As for the serious Americans... the serious ones, they understand clearly that there is no such "window of vulnerability." That is all about this deal... I repeat again, read the Scowcroft report.

DOES HE REMEMBER THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE, WHICH CAME OUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THAT SALT II NEGOTIATIONS? HOW WAS IT UNDERSTOOD HERE?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You know, there were bunches of doctrines there... Was it a doctrine of counter-power, or what?...I don't remember already what it was about...

CORRECT.

Yes...Well, you see...the essence of all these things is, after all, a possibility of a limited nuclear war. That's what it is, stripped of particularities. We disagree with this very principle. We think, if a nuclear war were fought by computers, one could talk (something like that:) "Did I strike you so, now you strike me too... I will wait. Here, I just dropped a bomb on Chicago, you also did somewhere else; now, let's make an agreement." But the war will be fought by people. Their nerves will not stand it, and right after the first atomic explosion the escalation will start immediately. That is what we presume. Therefore, all those Schlesinger's doctrines are in our opinion very dangerous things. What if somebody really believes that it would be possible to fight a limited war? And starts this war? So, everything will be ruined and everyone will die. Thus, we presume that it will be either a full-scale war, or none... No war at all...

ONE LAST QUESTION...

The last question...

BUT WHAT I HOPE FOR, IS ESSENTIALLY AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE...

Why, I'm always speaking emotionally...

...ABOUT THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST SALT TREATY? AND DOES HE REMEMBER HIS FEELING ABOUT SIGNING THE SECOND ONE AND, MAYBE, THE NON-RATIFICATION OF THE SECOND ONE. I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERSTAND THE EMOTIONS OF THOSE TWO OCCASIONS.

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

You know, I usually try to save my emotions for ladies, and somehow less to express them on the occasions of political acts. Swear by God, I couldn't recall what were my emotions, regarding the conclusion of the SALT I agreement. I just don't remember. Well, I was probably glad...but I didn't jump with joy, nor did I run in circles... I preserve my emotions for some other situations in my life.

WHAT WAS THE HEADLINE OF "IZVESTIA" ON...ON THE SIGNING OF BOTH OF THESE...?

[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]

I don't remember. I do not remember. I simply do not remember. I was never interested in that. I, for example, never look at the headline; I look to see who signed (the article.) For see mysterious reason journalists always think that headlines are very important. As for me, I'm indifferent, I usually look for the names of those who wrote an article, and read it, depending upon the author, not the headline, I don't remember what the headlines were that day. So, here, I cannot help you anyway.

DID HE THINK OF WHAT WERE THE SYMBOLS THERE, OR WHETHER THERE WAS SOMETHING SYMBOLIC ABOUT A MEETING WITH BREZHNEV AND NIXON? WAS THERE SOMETHING SYMBOLIC OF THE MEETING WITH CARTER...AND BREZHNEV... AND...

...Ford and Brezhnev...

FORD AND BREZHNEV...?

So, what is it (about them?) you know, really, this question is not for a person like me. I'm a plain person, I don't deal with symbols. Everything is sym... even the fact that you are sitting here and talking to me is also a symbol of something.

This is it. That's all, folks, enough. I'm fed up.

OK. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Thank you very much, indeed!

INDEED! INDEEED!