SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. WHEN YOU FIRST JOINED THE ADMINISTRATION, YOU HEADED UP A STUDY THAT WAS LOOKING AT US STRATEGIC POSTURE AT THAT TIME, WHAT WERE THE MOST CRUCIAL FINDINGS THAT CAME TO LIGHT THEN?

Well we were basically interested in trying to get as an objective evaluation as we could of the relative capability of the United States strategic forces versus the Soviet strategic forces. And this is a complex issue because the forces are not matched one for one, they built on certain things. The large land-based missile, for example. We've depended for other things on our strengths. So we wanted to understand the problem as, as well as we could. We were concerned at that time with the ABM issue and there was also a considerable interest in arms control negotiations from the very beginning of the Nixon administration when I joined it.

DID THAT STUDY THEN RESULT IN THE IDEA OF ABANDONING THE SUPERIORITY AND JUST GOING FOR SUFFICIENCY ON OUR SIDE?

Well, I think it was, it was quite clear from that study and actually from the work that had been done before that the question of what constitutes superiority in a nuclear world is a very difficult question. And they got down to the word sufficiency and I held at that time that even sufficiency was a difficult word to define. I remember commenting it's a good expression to use in a speech but I don't really know what it means. But it was, there was a great deal of concern about how we could get the better balance and hopefully reduce the threat of the nuclear arsenal on both sides.

SO WHEN YOU CAME IN AND STARTED LOOKING AT THIS, DID YOU CONCLUDE THAT MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION HAD TO BE EMBRACED AND WE SHOULD NOT TRY FOR ANY KIND OF DAMAGE LIMITATION.

Well, there was a good deal of talk about possible other basic approaches to the problem. The mutually assured destruction theory was was one which on which we primarily based our deterrence. There were some who thought the war fighting capability of the forces would be an important element. And I don't know that anyone at the time at that time came to any final conclusions about that because there were still some efforts to look at the war fighting capability. My own view was that that we ought to limit the forces. I felt, for example, that the use of nuclear forces in the NATO theatre was a mistake. And that we should do everything we could to avoid those things which would build up into an escalation which might result in an all out nuclear war.

SO BASICALLY WAS THE CONSENSUS PRETTY MUCH TO LIVE WITH MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION?

Well, as I recall the situation and I don't think it has changed very significantly since, and at that time there really was not other viable alternative. We looked at the ABM during that time and when I, before I joined the administration, the ABM of that period had been adopted by the previous administration and work was underway. It was quite clear that the ABM technology of that time could not provide protection for the entire United States and we concluded the only thing that the ABM technology of that period could possibly do would be to defend some of our key military installations, specifically our land-based missiles. And that was really to enable you to maintain some second strike capability which was a very important element of, of the whole deterrent theory.

SO AT THAT TIME YOU WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR ICBMS. WHAT CAUSED THAT CONCERN AT THAT TIME?

Well, we, we looked very carefully at the trend of the Soviet development in this area and they were clearly working on larger missiles, larger warheads, and improved accuracy. All of which would not be necessary unless they were designed to hit military targets with specifically our land-based missile installation. Not everyone agreed that that was their aim and no one could be sure about it, but everything they were doing indicated to me that that was what they had in mind that at least that was the direction of their efforts.

SO IN THAT INSTANCE THEN, WHAT IS THE THINKING THAT SAYS WE HAVE TO PROTECT OUR LAND BASE FORCES AND THAT WE CAN'T JUST RELY ON THE OTHER LEGS OF THE TRIAD IF THEY SHOULD GO FOR A STRIKE ON OUR...

Well the concern was not only the land based missiles, it was also our bomber capability. Both of those were potentially threatened by the build-up of the large Soviet nuclear capability by their build-up of their own naval based missiles which then provided a much shorter warning time for our land based aircraft and that potentially left us with only one leg of the triad which I think most of us felt was a little too risky.

I'M JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS FELT THAT JUST HAVING SURVIVABLE SUBMARINES WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DETER ANY KIND OF PREEMPTED STRIKE.

Well, there were, there were some potential problems with submarines. One of them was that they were difficult to communicate with and one of the advantages of, of the bomber capability is that you could have an airborne alert, you could communicate, you could stop the attack if you wanted to before it reached the, the base. Now one of the weaknesses of the submarine lost force is you might not be able to get a signal to them and we spent a good deal of time looking at the communication problem. The other concern was that the, the Soviets might be able to locate our submarine capabil-, our submarine forces. The Navy took the position that um, they could easily find the Soviet nuclear submarine but they couldn't find ours and that never seemed to me to be a very credible position. And though we had some doubts about the third leg.

DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF ALL THREE?

Well, I think um, on a very simple proposition that you have these forces that all provide the nuclear capability and you certainly wanted to keep that capability to the extent you could... just some plain, ordinary, everyday logic.

COULD YOU TELL ME THE THEORY, THE THINKING THAT PROMPTED YOU TO WANT TO CHANGE FROM THE THIN CITY MCNAMARA SENTINEL SYSTEM TO THE HARD SILO DEFENSE?

Well the main, the main reason for that is that after looking at the system, it was quite clear that there was no possibility of protecting the entire United States. Just, just couldn't do it. And so then the question of well, is, is the ABM good for anything? And I came to the conclusion that the preservation of our land based missiles was an important element in maintaining our deterrent capability and that the ABM technology of that time could assist in that important roll.

SO WAS IT A CASE OF SOME HARDWARE WITHOUT A JOB OR WAS THERE A WELL-DEFINED JOB FIRST?

Well, actually, you didn't even have the hardware completely developed at, at, at that time. No I felt that this, this provided a real capability in protecting the land-based missiles. Bu it was quite clear that the Soviet development that I've already alluded to larger missiles, larger warheads and more accuracy-, accuracy indicated you could probably not protect your land-based missile forces by simply hardening, further hardening of the, of the silos and, and that kind of a defense and so I concluded that you were going to have to some kind of an active defense if you wanted to improve that survivability. Now there's the other, there's the other option I've considered since that time of mobility we did not consider mobility in our at that time it was discussed but not actively considered.

DID YOU CONSIDER HAVING A DECLARATORY POLICY OF LAUNCH ON WARNING AS BEING SOMETHING TO BE RELIED ON?

I think everyone that looked at the question had some trouble about a launch on warning. You wanted to- you you'd have to be absolutely sure that the warning was realistic and that was a matter that was, that was discussed and considered thoughtfully, I think and I think everyone recognized that you had to be very careful in, in any policy that involved launch on warning and very cautious to be sure that the warning was real. And you'd like to, you'd like to avoid that but if you avoided that then you had the question of whether you would have the capability of retaliating. And of course that's why a second strike capability was extremely important if uh you could avoid, you could avoid the, the, the launch on warning option if, if you had adequate second strike capability.

AT THE TIME WE READ THAT THERE WERE MANY SCIENTISTS WHO FELT THAT THE SENTINEL HARDWARE JUST COULDN'T BE MOVED IN AND USED FOR HARD SILO DEFENSE. THAT IT JUST WASN'T GOING TO WORK AND THAT THE RADARS THEMSELVES WERE GOING TO BE THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE SYSTEM. WHAT WAS YOUR RESPONSE TO THAT?

Well, I think that was a, that was a legitimate concern. I don't think it had anything to do with whether you used it for hard silo defense or not, they had the same problems for, for whatever use you put to it. There were some weaknesses in the system. One of them the large perimeter acquisition radar with a very big installation. It was so large and expensive that you couldn't have redundancy and clearly if that if that, if that element were knocked out, the limited terminal defense you had was, was much less uh capable. Actually I think we felt at the time that we were really stressing technology to do what we were trying to do with the ABM system and that's one of the reasons why I thought that might be a good thing for us to trade off in negotiations which was eventually done.

SO, WERE YOU THINKING THEN FAIRLY EARLY ON IN CONTEMPLATING WHAT TO DO WITH THE ABM THAT THE BARGAINING CHIP FUNCTION WAS IMPORTANT?

I didn't, I didn't understand that.

OK. IN YOUR THINKING ABOUT THE ABM, IN CHANGING FROM SENTINEL TO SAFEGUARD, WERE YOU ALREADY EARLY IN 1969 THINKING ABOUT SALT AND ABM AS A BARGAINING CHIP?

Yes, as a matter of fact, there were discussions going on about SALT about the arms limitation issue very early on. We had urn, numerous meetings on that subject at the same time we were looking at the Soviet capability and trying to decide what to do with our own forces. And, actually I recall at one time feeling we weren't getting anywhere in these formal meetings and maybe Gerry Smith and Dick Helms and I and your Alex Johnson ought to sit down ourselves and see if we could come up with some idea and we did have such a meeting. So we I was very much interested in, in trying to find some direction that we could sa-, properly take in, in a arms limitation course.

DID YOU FEEL THAT IF THE UNITED STATES DIDN'T PURSUE AN ABM SYSTEM THAT ANY SALT LEVERAGE WAS NOT GOING TO BE THERE?

Well, obviously all of these systems are talked about as bargaining chips and that was the, the discussion at the time. I honestly felt that the ABM that we were working on would provide some additional security for our land based missiles. I was had known enough about the technology to feel that there would be some benefit there... I recognized it would be marginal, it wouldn't be perfect, but I felt that even the additional uncertainty would be helpful in, in terms of stability. But I didn't I didn't originally see this as, as a bargaining chip until we got further down into some of the detailed discretions on the, on the SALT issue.

WHAT ABOUT THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT AGAINST SAFEGUARD? WE'VE HEARD IT SAID THAT IT WOULD BE TEN TIMES CHEAPER JUST TO BUILD MORE OFFENSE ON OUR SIDE, RATHER THAN PUT IN MISSILES TO DEFEND MISSILES.

Well, that was, that was one of the arguments and it's only reasonable to try and look at the least costly of the options that you have. On the other hand I felt there was a certain benefit in, in having some mix in technology, that provided, as I've already said, some uncertainty, and uncertainty itself is a deterrent in this kind of a situation. I didn't, I didn't think that it would be a wise choice to simply undertake to greatly enlarge our land based missile forces. I thought we'd be better off to try and provide a, an option to defend those that we had, even though it was a limited option.

ONE LAST QUESTION ON THE SAFEGUARD... FROM THE OTHER SIDE, FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, THOUGH, IT'S ALSO A LOT CHEAPER FOR THEM TO OVERWHELM THIS PROJECTED SYSTEM THAN IT WOULD BE FOR US TO BUILD IT. HOW DO YOU ANSWER THAT?

Well uh that again is probably true and of course at that time, the Soviets had not yet deployed a, a, a complete MIRV system. They had they had multiple uh warheads, but they didn't have, as far as we knew, independent accuracy. We anticipated that they would achieve this very shortly and that made that made uh a build-up for them uh less expensive. But here again I don't think you can evaluate these things strictly on a cost basis. I think you have to look at the other factors and, and I think at a broader range of options and the uncertainty that that adds I thought was worth... continuing with the ABM program.

WHEN YOU WERE DEFENDING SAFEGUARD IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, YOU WERE HAVING TO RESPOND TO THE TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS BEING MADE BY THE SCIENTISTS WHO SAID THAT IT WOULDN'T WORK. AND AT THE TIME YOU ALSO KNEW THAT ONE OF THE REASONS YOU WANTED THE SAFEGUARD WAS POTENTIALLY TO TRADE IT AWAY AGAINST THE SOVIET ABM. I WAS WONDERING WHETHER THERE WAS PRESSURE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO SUPPORT SAFEGUARD IN SPITE OF WHAT YOU KNEW TO BE SOMEWHAT FEASIBLE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT BUT THAT YOU COULDN'T TELL THEM THAT WE WERE ARGUING FOR IT TO TRADE IT AWAY AT THAT POINT.

Well, as a matter of fact, I felt at the time that, that I understood the technology well enough to feel that it was a doable system and one of the things that I learned that I hadn't known as well before I came to Washington is that a lot of scientists are influenced more by political pressures than they are by their scientific knowledge and I came to lose a little respect for some of my scientific friends as a result of this.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE BIT MORE? WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL PRESSURES ARE APPLIED ON...

Well the there weren't any political pressures, but some of the scientists who were against the system were not against it for scientific reasons. They were against it for political reasons or, or for the fact I guess they felt guilty about inventing the nuclear explosive in the first place. And so I found that there was that scientists are not always logic logical about non-scientific issues.

POLITICS IS HARDER THAN PHYSICS. OK, ABOUT SALT... IN 1970 I THINK YOU URGED DR. KISSINGER TO TRY AND GET A QUICK, OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT AT SALT BECAUSE YOU FELT THAT CONGRESS WOULD SOON BE CUTTING THE DEFENSE BUDGET. WHAT WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY AT SALT AND YOUR APPREHENSIONS ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN TO YOUR DEFENSE BUDGET?

I don't think there was any connection. I don't we were looking at this issue in terms of what was the logical thing to do... We might not be able to do it if this budget were cut but I didn't, I don't recall a, a thinking about our SALT negotiations in terms of the fact we thought our budget was going to be cut. The budget was being cut primarily because President Nixon wanted to put more resources into domestic programs rather military programs and I don't I don't think the budget pressure was, was any- I didn't, don't recall that as being any lever in, in talking about the Salt issue.

WELL, DR. KISSINGER, IN HIS BOOK, I THINK THAT'S WHERE WE READ ABOUT THIS, SAID THAT HE GOT A MEMO FROM YOU... SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE SALT AGREEMENT WERE REACHED BEFORE THE BUDGET WAS CUT, THEN A BUDGET CUT WOULD LOOK LIKE GOOD INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES TO GO ALONG AND DECREASE. BUT IF IT CAME FIRST, THEN IT WOULD PUT US IN A DIFFICULT POSITION IF WE HAD TO REACH AN AGREEMENT...

I don't rec-, I don't remember that.

WELL MAYBE IT COULD BE PHRASED IN TERMS OF WAS THERE SOME URGENCY IN LIMITING SOVIET OFFENSIVE ARM LIMITS BECAUSE THEY WERE GOING AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAMS AND WE WERE NOT.

Well, I don't recall that there was any urgency in terms of, of the issue, the day-to-day budget issue. It was quite clear that the Soviets had been engaged in a rather long term build-up and there were a good many people that they were, they were going to catch up with us and then they would level off. I did not think that would happen and it indeed did not happen. And I felt that the Soviet build-up was going to, was going to continue for quite some time. I didn't see that that any budget cut on our part would, would be any particular lever. I think we all agreed that, that if there could be some mutual agreement to level off, or perhaps go down, it would be a very positive development, but I don't I 'spose we might of thought at that the time about whether which came first had one effect on the other or not. I don't, I don't recall that however.

WHAT WAS THE REASON THAT YOU WERE HOPING WE COULD REACH AN EARLY OFFENSIVE LIMITATION AGREEMENT?

Well, I didn't intend to say that I hope we would reach an ear-, an early one. I hope, I hoped that we would reach a good one in due course, I think that's what I'm talking about. I don't, I don't recall any time urgency on it. There was urgency because it was an important thing to do but, I don't recall thinking that it made it any different whether you did it in December of this year or December of next year if we were going in the right direction.

WHAT WAS THE MAIN THING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WAS TRYING TO GET OUT OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS? WHAT KIND OF INSTRUCTIONS WOULD YOU GIVE. IF YOU DID THIS, TO PAUL NITZE, FOR EXAMPLE, AS TO WHAT DOD WANTS TO ACHIEVE?

Well, we, we had a, we had a great many detailed discussions with Paul Nitze as a matter of fact... he, he was our adviser in this matter... and we were trying to look at things which would provide a more stable system. And and that was a difficult issue, as I've said already, because the, the capability was not matched so you had, you had to evaluate large Soviet missiles versus some other things that we had in advantage and at that time, of course, we had some, some advantage in the MIRV program. We felt we had some significant advantage in the ADM program and those were the, those were the things that we, we thought we could, we could benefit from. But the, the whole, the whole discussion as I recall was, was, had a bottom line to try and improve the stability of the sits, of the situation.

WHAT WERE YOUR HOPES FOR SALT I? WHAT DID YOU, GOING INTO IT IN LATE 1969 -- 1970, THINK REALISTICALLY COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED?

Well I think the best I can recall we, we felt that, that if you could get a, a viable first step in an arms negotiation agreement, that this would provide the basis for continued progress. I think we felt that at that time that there was no likelihood of, of getting a major change in the level of forces on either side and we felt that particularly the ABM technology was somewhat marginal and that would be at least a place we might be able to get to some agreement because I can see that we could be, we'd be willing to live on our ABM installations if we could get something from the Soviets that we felt was of equal value. So I recall this primarily as let's get the first step in this strate-, strategic arms limitation issue going and then maybe we can find some way to take the second and third steps.

WHAT ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF LINKAGE THAT NIXON AND KISSINGER HAD TALKED ABOUT? DID YOU THINK THERE WAS ANY REALISTIC WAY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS AT THE VIETNAM WAR AROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THE SOVIETS?

I don't recall thinking that was a likely issue. Of course we knew that the Soviets were providing the main support for the North Vietnamese but, I don't recall thinking that that was linked in any significant way with our with our SALT discussion.

I THOUGHT THAT WAS THOUGH. COULD WE CHANGE...

Well, it may, it may have been I'm speaking of in my mind I didn't see it that way.

[SOME BACK AND FORTH DISCUSSION WITH REQUEST TO REPEAT]

Well, in then, in my, in my view, I did not see this linkage as, as a particular issue. Now I felt that our, just to maybe fill in the reason why... I felt that negotiations with the North Vietnamese would be best encouraged by our developing of what we eventually called Vietnamization. If we could demonstrate to them that the South Vietnamese could stand on their own, that seemed to me to be the best lever that we would have to get the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Now Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Rogers didn't agree with me on that but that was my position. I felt very strongly that was the case. I didn't see this linkage as in the same way they did.

HOW DID THEY SEE IT? COULD YOU STATE HERE?

Well, as I re-, I recall matter of fact, I asked for a meeting with Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger on this subject and I recall distinctly that Bill Rogers said well, we're just sure if we can just sit sown with these people we'll find some way to negotiate a settlement. I said I think you're absolutely wrong.

DO YOU THINK THAT ARMS CONTROL NEEDS TO BE PURSUED ON ITS OWN AND NOT LINKED TO FOREIGN POLICY?

Well, I think that, that's right. I think that that well, at that, at that...

[SOME CAMERA INSTRUCTIONS]

At that time I thought the, that arms control should be approached on its own and not linked with the Vietnam situation.

DO YOU THINK THAT'S A GENERAL RULE THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULDN'T BE LINKED WITH POLITICAL.

Well I don't think you can answer that without knowing what the, what the other circumstances might be.

WHEN THE SECOND SALT SESSION WAS BEGINNING IN VIENNA, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS DISCUSSING FOUR MAIN PROPOSALS, TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT TO PUT ON THE TABLE FOR THAT SESSION. AND, IF YOU RECALL BASICALLY WHAT THE FOUR OPTIONS WERE...

I don't recall, I don't recall what they were at the time. I know we looked at several options but I haven't kept up-to-date on it so I've forgotten.

BASICALLY, THE ONE CALLED OPTION A WAS TO ESSENTIALLY LIMIT THE OFFENSE AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF THE UNITED STATES OFFENSE AND HAVE A FULL TWELVE SITE SAFEGUARD AND THE OTHER OPTIONS WERE A LITTLE MORE CONSTRAINING... ZERO OR ONE ABM SITE, OR ADDING A MIRV BAND TO THAT OR GOING FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS. I HAD READ THAT YOU FAVORED THE FIRST OPTION WHICH WOULD KEEP THE SAFEGUARD TWELVE SITE SYSTEM AND LIMIT OFFENSE TO THE PRESENT LEVEL.

I think, I think that's probably right.

I WONDER IF YOU COULD TELL ME THAT IN A STATEMENT AND EXPLAIN YOUR REASONING BEHIND THAT.

Well in the first place, I felt that there would be no chance of getting an agreement for a, a major reduction in the, in the offensive forces. I kind of started from that premise, whether rightly or wrongly, and I felt that a legitimate a reasonable goal might be to get the Soviets to level off their forces and not continue their build-up, which had been going on for some time. That that option would have been better for us if we could have a full twelve site safeguard that would have provided some additional survivability for our land based missiles and I felt that was a desirable benefit from our standpoint primarily because they had some larger missiles and larger warheads and I felt that would be a reasonable trade-off.

WELL WHAT HAPPENED, I BELIEVE, WAS THAT NIXON AND KISSINGER DECIDED TO INSTRUCT THE DELEGATION TO PRESENT WHAT THEY CALLED OPTION C AND D. BOTH OF THEM HAD LOW -- ZERO OR ONE-ABM AND ONE OF THEM HAD A MIRV BAND, ONE OF THEM DIDN'T. DO YOU RECALL WHAT YOUR REACTION WAS WHEN THEY PRESENTED THOSE OPTIONS RATHER THAN THE ONE YOU WERE HOPING FOR?

Well, I don't recall particularly, but, of course, we, we were also concerned about inspection... whether you could whether you could de- depend on, on them living up to their agreement or not and it looked to me at least that a MIRV band would be a very difficult thing to monitor. Presumably, of course, they would have demonstrate it in testing which you could monitor to some extent, but they might be able to do a good deal of the work without testing. I felt while a MIRV band would be a desirable thing, I thought it would be very difficult to assure that it was, that it was lived up to and also I had a feeling that the Soviets were not likely to accept that kind of a band. We had MIRVs and I was pretty sure that they, they had a great desire to get MIRVs also and I felt that's just an unrealistic thing to expect.

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT EARLY IN '69 THAT SOME SCIENCE ADVISERS, IN PARTICULAR, WERE ADVOCATING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE A MORATORIUM ON MIRV TESTING, OR AT LEAST SLOW DOWN THE TESTING, SO THAT THERE COULD BE SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT REACHED AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE THAT FAR AHEAD WHERE THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT COME TO AGREE.

I don't well I think there, there were people who, who felt that if we gave some demonstration of restraint on our part that the Soviets would follow. I don't recall supporting that, that issue. I felt it would be a, a very difficult, We had already leveled off our program on land based missiles and they showed showed no signs of responding and everything that we saw in terms of not only the things that were visible in public, but the things we saw through the intelligence channels indicated they were, they were still moving ahead very strongly and I didn't think there was much chance of getting that kind of agreement with them.

WELL I GUESS A LOT OF THIS BOILS DOWN TO YOUR ATTITUDE OR THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE. WHEN YOU FIRST CAME INTO GOVERNMENT AS THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF TALKING TO THE SOVIETS AND NEGOTIATING AND WAS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY THERE FOR TRUST?

Well, I had I had not been very actively involved in defense issues when I, before I went back there so I had, had to try and learn as quickly as I could some of the background. I had, however had some interest in a um, arms control negotiations and I had a, a desire to try and see something done in that area because I felt that was a very important matter for both our, both the United States and Soviet Union to find some way to, to level off this nuclear build-up.

DID YOU FEEL THE SOVIET UNION WAS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO SLOW DOWN OR END THE ARMS RACE AS MUCH AS WE WERE AT THAT TIME?

Well, I didn't, I didn't I don't recall what my view is before I got back there, but after I got there and saw the evidence I was quite sure that, the, there was no indication that, that they were slowing up and no indication that they wanted to slow up.

I JUST WANT TO GO BACK OVER SOMETHING... FOR SOMEONE LIKE YOURSELF, COMING INTO A FAIRLY HIGH POSITION IN GOVERNMENT, FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, HOW DID YOU FORMULATE YOUR APPROACH TO OUR ADVERSARY? HOW DID YOU COME TO VIEW THE SOVIET THREAT?

Uh, well, of course I had I had read a good deal about the, about our relationship with the Soviets before I... came there, in, in the nontechnical aspects of the, of the issue. But one of the, one of the first things that I did, of course, was to learn as much as I could about the situation, and I spent a great deal of time... um, in various briefings looking at the intelligence, and looking at everything that we knew about what was going on. And that was the... there was a lot of information, a lot of information that you received that could be interpreted in different ways; and I felt after looking at a good deal of the intelligence and so forth that everything that I saw indicated that they were, they had a strong commitment to a continual buildup and I saw no evidence to the contrary. But, all of these I think all of these matters are probably biased to some extent, uh by your own background. I had been, uh a student to some extent of the, uh the Communist situation in the Soviet Union before I came back there and, and was very had a very strong bias against Communism, obviously.

HAD YOU EVER BEEN TO THE SOVIET UNION?

Yes, I've been to the Soviet Union on a number of times let me just think a minute, yes, I went... I went to the Soviet Union in 1959, or 1960, when Khrushchev was still in power, and I went to the Soviet Union a number of times since; our company had an office in Moscow, and so I'd had a good deal of first-hand exposure to the, to the Soviet Union as well as, what I'd read.

FROM YOUR VISITS, ESPECIALLY BEFORE YOU WENT TO WASHINGTON, HOW DID THAT COLOR YOUR VISION OF HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

Well, it, it gave me a very strong feeling... that it was very desirable for us to, to keep up with communications with the Soviet Union, and therefore I was a very...

CAN YOU SAY THAT AGAIN WITHOUT SAYING "IT"?

All right. Well, my visits to the Soviet Union gave me a strong feeling that it was very desirable for the United States and the Soviet Union to, have open communications and to keep those communications open, and I think that was a strong influence and in my strong support for the idea of détente. I felt that however, in my visits to the Soviet Union, I found that you could see a, a great many things that they were doing that they'd let you, allow you to see, but you had great difficulty in learning anything that they were doing in the military field. And it was quite clear that they had put a much larger portion of, of their technical capability... in military programs than we had in the United States. So that re-, reinforced my view that we'd better be careful about how we deal with them, in our negotiations.

IS THERE ANY INCONSISTENCY IN YOUR VIEW BETWEEN ADVOCATING DÉTENTE ON THE ONE HAND AND CONTINUING TO STRIVE FOR STRONG MILITARY POSTURE?

No, I don't, I don't think so. I think what we're saying is that you have to be very careful in, in considering détente, to not let that, lull you into thinking that the Soviets don't have, strong military interests and strong military objectives, and I think you have to keep the two separate. What you'd like to do is to find areas of common interest and there are many at-, areas of common interest, and utilize those, but to, to expect that those are going to change the military posture of the Soviet Union in any, in any short term, at least, I think, is quite unrealistic.

I KNOW YOU WERE OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT BY THE TIME SALT I WAS FINALIZED, BUT HOW DID YOU REACT TO THAT?

I thought it was a good agreement, and... in the terms I've already alluded to, that I thought it was very desirable to take a first step in this matter, and get something started, so... I thought it was an agreement which, was not did not pose any particular risks as far as we were concerned; I think I've indicated that I recognized there were some limits to our ABM technology at that time, and I had no trouble with backing off from the twelve-site down to the two-site issue; and um, so I was generally satisfied with what was agreed to at that time. And now I'm, I might say, I didn't expect it to accomplish very much except be the first step towards, hopefully, something further.

DID YOU FEEL, HAVING SIGNED THE SALT AGREEMENT, THAT WOULD LESSEN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US CONGRESS TO FUND WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND TO STRIVE FOR UPGRADING THE EXISTING SYSTEMS?

I, I did have some concern about that, knowing the, the Congress is... is influenced by... public opinion and so forth, that if they saw this as, as a real step toward reducing the, the, the military threat from the Soviet Union that might induce them to conclude we needed a smaller defense budget. I don't recall I was greatly concerned about that matter, however.

BUT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE COMING INTO OFFICE, SCHLESINGER, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS THERE THAT FEAR IN GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME? IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT?

Well, um... that, that issue, that's, of course, a little hard to evaluate, because he was influenced by the at-, atta-, Vietnam attitudes in the country, and I think it's very difficult to separate out, what was influencing the Congress; as you know, there was a very strong anti-military, anti-establishment bias in the, in the country, and that did result in lower defense budget, for a period of time, and I don't, I don't think the I don't think the SALT agreements were, were... the only factor in that; I'm sure they were not the only factor. I would think they were not even the most important factor in the, in the anti-defense, anti-establishment attitudes... during that period of in the early 1970s, and through the mid-1970s.

THAT MUST HAVE BEEN A VERY DIFFICULT TIME FOR SOMEONE IN YOUR POSITION, OR ANYONE IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WHO'S CONCERNED ABOUT KEEPING UP THE US STRENGTH, WHEN PUBLIC OPINION IS SO ANTI-MILITARY.

Well, it was it was a, not a very...friendly situation you're quite right. On the other hand I think every- one who was working in the department had a great deal of confidence that we did have good strength, whether we'd like to have a little more or a little less was not as important as the fact that we felt we had a good capability; and I for one did not feel there was any... risk of a, of a nuclear war; I felt that the deterrence was adequate and, and that you might improve it a little bit or lessen a little bit but, there was no, no likelihood we'd get into a, a... all-out nuclear war.

TALKING A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OP THE PUBLIC, WHY DO YOU THINK THE PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS GOT SO INVOLVED WITH THE ABM ISSUE IN '69 AND '70, WHEN, JUST A FEW YEARS EARLIER, THE CONGRESS HAD BEEN PUTTING PRESSURE ON MCNAMARA TO START TO DEPLOY SOMETHING, AND THEN BY LATE IN THE DECADE, IT FLIP-FLOPPED THE OTHER WAY.

Well, I think if you look at the record of Congress, they, they flip-flop on a lot of things, on almost a continuing basis! There was there was concern about the Soviet buildup in the mid-1960s. That was overtaken by, I think, by the Vietnam situation, that attracted so much public attention, so I think it was quite logical that... the Congress was, was more interested in, in proving our, our nuclear capability, nuclear strength... versus the Soviet Union in the mid-'60s, and, and toward the end they got involved in the, in other, pressures from back home.

WHAT ABOUT THE PUBLIC OUTCRY ABOUT THE SENTINEL SYSTEM? WAS IT SURPRISING WHEN THE CITIES WHO WERE TO BE PROTECTED WERE THE ONES FIGHTING IT, RATHER THAN WHAT THE MILITARY GENERALLY ANTICIPATED WAS GOING TO BE THE REVERSE ISSUE?

Well, I think that, I think that's a normal situation; you know that same thing happened with the MX, when they wanted to base the MX which had a completely different scheme, that nobody really wanted it I think the general public um, has an aversion to having nuclear installations uh close to their homes... their cities I think, a perfectly natural, natural reaction. I don't think it had anything to do with their concern about whether it worked or not, I think even if they'd assumed it worked perfectly, they would have preferred to have it somewhere else.

DO YOU THINK THE PUBLIC VOICE AND REACTION IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN REACHING ANY KIND OF ARMS CONTROL? IT'S BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THE TEST-BAN TREATY CAME AFTER A BIG PUBLIC OUTPOURING OF SENTIMENT...?

Well, clear, clearly, the, the attitude of the general public has a very large influence on the Congress, particularly the House, because they get the most rapid feedback; and obviously the public opinion has an attitude on the administration, because they are, they're concerned about being reelected again, in addition to whatever else they're working on. So I don't think it's surprising that the public... reaction it does influence what both the Congress and, and the administration does; and probably, in many cases the general public reaction, has a certain element of common sense in it, and a good many times they're right.

I WANT TO ASK YOU ONE GENERAL WRAP-UP QUESTION: WHAT ARE YOU HOPING TO SEE IN THE NEXT 15 YEARS, BY THE END OF THE CENTURY?

Well, I think... it's very likely that, we have, we're now far enough along in worldwide concern about... nuclear weapons that it's possible now, I think to reach the kind of an agreement you couldn't have undertaken 15 years ago. I think the fact that the Soviet Union is now talking about the possibility of a substantial reduction, is encouraging; I think I think they have some pressures at home, and... I think there's a real chance of us, of us getting somewhere now. I keep referring to the, the SALT I agreement as a first step; it took us, it's going to take us a long time to get to the next step; I think there's a good probability of a significant reduction in nuclear arms under an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union... by the 19... by the '90s or earlier, mid-'90s could possibly come faster but, you talk about these issues in general terms and you have to get down into a lot of details and sometimes, as you know, the details make the general terms difficult to achieve. But I'm encouraged, and I think we have...an opportunity to make some real progress in this regard.

WHEN SALT II STARTED, AND IT WAS REALIZED AT THAT TIME THAT MIRVS WERE GOING TO BE A BIG HEADACHE, DID YOU REGRET NOT HAVING PUSHED FOR A MIRV BAN EARLIER?

No, I don't... as I indicated earlier, I thought a MIRV ban was probably, uh impractical, that you... really couldn't monitor it well enough; and I had very serious doubts that the... Soviets would be willing to even talk about stopping a, a MIRV program, we already had one, so I just thought it was no sense in, in bothering about it. It clearly would have been desirable if, if, if the MIRVs had never been invented. But, once you have, once you have 'em invented, you can't put 'em back in the box, and that's, that, that's a dilemma that we have.

SO THAT SORT OF WENT FOR OUR SIDE: EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN INTERESTED BEFORE, WE PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAVE WANTED TO STOP THAT PROGRAM.

Well, I, um... I think it would have been difficult, Well, again, that's, that's an issue you can't, you can't evaluate, because we, we didn't get that far. And I can't judge what we would have done if the Russians agreed to it, so, there's no way to do that.

WHAT WAS THE REASON THAT YOU LEFT THE GOVERNMENT IN 1971?

Why I left?

YES.

Well, I couldn't afford to stay. No, I'm, well, I think that's a, that's a specific issue; you see, I had to, had to agree not only to give all of the dividends from Hewlett-Packard stock to, to charitable insti- institutions; I had to also agree to give any appreciation. So it cost me 20 million dollars to spend three years in Washington, and I figured, that's enough.

WHAT DID YOU THINK OF HENRY KISSINGER'S ROLE IN MANAGING THE SALT TALKS?

What did I think of Henry?

YEAH.

Well, I worked really very closely with Henry Kissinger... all of the time I was there, and, I developed a great respect for him; he was, he was very thorough, and wanted to be sure that, all the homework was done, and he was analytical in his, in his approach, and I had a... great respect for him. Now, I didn't always agree with his conclusions, but I think in looking back on it, I think I probably agreed with his conclusions more often than some of my friends at the State Department did so I always looked on that Henry Kissinger as someone I admired and I enjoyed working with him.

HOW CLOSELY DID YOU WORK WITH ADMIRAL MOORER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS ON FORMULATING POLICY?

Well I worked very closely with Admiral Moorer and the Joint Chiefs I... We discussed these issues with them, and we, when we, when we changed the, the thrust of the ABM program to defense of our, land-based missiles from the defense of the United States we had a intense discussion in, with the Joint Chiefs, and I remember Westmoreland voting against it because he thought we ought to try and protect, all the people in the country and I, as I told him, well, you, you just can't do that, and he still voted against it, so we had some great many discussions, and I got to know and admire Tom Mora spent a lot of time with him, uh; he used to come out and go hunting with me at my ranch every summer, so we, we worked very closely together on these issues.

I KNOW THERE WAS AN ARGUMENT OVER THE SS-9s, WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN TESTED WITH MIRV WARHEAD OR AN MRV WARHEAD. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING?

Uh... There, there was, there was some concern about about the SS-9, and, we didn't I remember we didn't know for sure what the, what the multiple warhead capability of, of that missile was... I was more concerned, as I recall, about it simply because it hadn't... it had a very large size, and a, a large payload, and, um... felt that even if they didn't have the accuracy or the MIRV capability at that time, they probably wouldn't, wouldn't be able to develop it. And, we had nothing coming along in our arsenal that was comparable to that.

SO DID THAT WORRY YOU?

Well, again, as I recall, I guess I felt it would be desirable to limit MIRVs, but I didn't think it was feasible.

YOU MENTIONED BEFORE THAT YOU FELT THAT SOME OF THE SCIENTISTS WHO CAME TO TESTIFY WERE POLITICALLY BIASED. IS THERE SOME SORT OF OVERRIDING DIFFERENCE IN THE WORLD-VIEW OF SOMEONE WHO IS ARGUING FOR ARMS CONTROL, VERSUS SOMEONE WHO IS MORE CONCERNED WITH KEEPING A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE...?

No, I think, I think I think these people, take these positions from an honest basis; they, I think they're all interested in making the world safer, and, I think they they see this as one way of doing it and they're, there's simply two schools of thought.

WHAT ARE THEY?

Well, one school of thought is that one very important school of thought... at that time, was simply if we took the lead in reducing our forces, the Soviets would follow. Now that, I did not believe that; as you recall during the Carter administration the first two years they took that position and, and Harold Brown made the statement that indicates the, that... e, we... that... the Soviets were not influenced by what we did; therefore, we had to build up our... forces, so that, during the middle of the Carter Administration, that whole philosophy turned around. It got, got back to where I was in the first place.

THERE WAS A BIG ARGUMENT AT THE TIME OF THE SALT RATIFICATION, THAT WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS WANTED AT THAT TIME WAS A BIG STRATEGIC MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, AND MANY PEOPLE TESTIFIED THAT THE SALT AGREEMENT MADE THIS UNNECESSARY FOR THE TIME BEING, BECAUSE WE HAD BASICALLY AGREED WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT WE WEREN'T GOING TO GO FOR A DAMAGE-LIMITATION POSTURE. WHAT DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT ARGUMENT?

I don't recall, I don't... say that again; I don't think I understand.

(REPEATS QUESTION)

I don't recall that I don't, I don't recall having any particular opinion on, on that subject at the time; I was, that was in the period after I left, uh....

COULD YOU TELL ME AGAIN WHAT YOU WERE SAYING A MINUTE AGO ABOUT SALT I?

Yes, well, I felt that the SALT I agreement was not a, a terribly significant event, um as I've already indicated, I thought it was a first step to some effective negotiations on nuclear weapon. But in the first place, it involves some technology and the ABM at that time... that was marginal, it could, add something to our capability, but, but not a great deal; we felt that the Soviets were doing some work in the defensive capability but, we also felt that and I felt, particularly... strongly that they didn't have the ability to do even as well as we could do, and so the whole thing, I thought, was a rather minor problem. And it, it's unfortunate that it was not possible to take the next step and for quite a long period of time I think as I've said already, I think there's some chance now that maybe we can take another step; the time is better, the, the, the whole atmosphere is better now than it was in at that time.

IF YOU COULD TALK ABOUT THE FACT THAT YOU THOUGHT THE ABM TREATY WAS NOT ALL THAT SIGNIFICANT, AND IF I UNDERSTAND YOU, ONE OF THE REASONS WERE THAT YOU THOUGHT THE ABMs WERE NOT THAT IMPORTANT, AND FAIRLY EASY TO GIVE UP, AND THAT THE OFFENSIVE LIMITS WEREN'T SUBSTANTIAL.

I spent a good deal of time working on the ABM issue when I was there, and, I felt that we, we could do what we were trying to do, but it was a very difficult problem; we could just just barely do it. And therefore I felt that... agreeing to give up the ABM was, was not a major concession on our part, and I didn't see the, the SALT I treaty as, as being of...as important as a lot of other people, felt. And I think my view, I still have that view that nothing much has come of it yet, that we may have slowed the Soviets up to some extent in their development of defensive capability, but, I don't see that anything of great importance has, has resulted from that treaty.

WHAT ABOUT THE OFFENSIVE LIMITATION, IN TERMS OF DOING THAT? DID IT REALLY ALTER OUR PLANS? DID YOU THINK THAT THE INTERIM OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT WAS A SIGNIFICANT ONE AT THAT TIME?

Well there again, I think it was a step in the right direction... but it...the unfortunate thing is that, uh... those agreements did not result in the substantial follow up action that would have could have resulted in... in a real reduction in our, in both the Soviet and the United States nuclear capability. So that while there was a step in the, in the right direction, I don't see that they've accomplished a great deal; whether they... have slowed the Soviets up or, or not's a real difficult question to answer. It's not obvious that, that these did slow the Soviets up in their, in their, nuclear, armament program. Um...

IS THE US, AND FOR THAT MATTER THE SOVIET UNION, ANY MORE SECURE NOW THAN BEFORE THE SALT I AGREEMENT?

I, I don't think the situation has, has, has changed... seriously; at that time we had, both had adequate capability to completely destroy each other, probably destroy the world we have a little bit more of that now, but, I don't think that's of any great, great significance, so that we're secure only to the extent that we understand on both sides that, that this is an option that's, is not acceptable. And I think perhaps there's been a better understanding of, of that in the interim period. I don't think I don't think anyone could... could consider the nuclear forces as anything more than a very important deterrent; and, that has not changed significantly.

THE POST-SALT WORLD IS NOT NECESSARILY SAFER THAN THE PRE-SALT.

I think that's, I would say that's right. That's, that, that's probably the, the, my feeling is--

CAN YOU PHRASE THAT SO WE CAN USE IT?

Yes, I think that, uh--

(INTERRUPTION)

Well, I don't see that the world is any safer as a result of the SALT I agreement, and I don't see that it has... significantly slowed up the, the buildup; both the Soviets and we have continued to build up our nu-, our nuclear capability. So I think that, while it was a step in the right direction, I don't think it was an important step; it may turn out to be if we can, subscribe to it, the, the fact we can move on from there. We've not done so yet.

ARE YOU CONTENT WITH THE IDEA THAT OUR NUCLEAR FORCES ONLY DETER EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR FORCES AND DON'T PROVIDE US ANY LEVERAGE FOR CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION IN OTHER WAYS?

I don't I don't see our nuclear forces have very much... impact; they didn't... we shouldn't use them in Afghanistan, I don't think we'd use them in the case of a conventional war in Europe so I think that the primary value of the forces is to deter each other, to keep them from being used, and I don't see that Neither the Soviets nor we have the capability to to extract any, any particular action as, as a result of our nuclear forces.

THEN WHAT IS THE REASON FOR CONTINUING THE ARMS RACE?

Well, it's unfortunate, but these tell to be, tend to be, self-perpetuating and we are concerned that our forces may not be enough, so we're adding some things to it; the Soviets are doing the same thing. It's a, it's a race that requires a common understanding and some common objectives and, until we in the Soviet Union can reach a point of some common mutual acceptable objectives, it's gonna be very hard to avoid the continued buildup in military capability.