WE'LL START OFF WITH THE ABM TREATY. WHY DID THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS GET SO INVOLVED IN THE ABM ISSUE IN THE LATE '60S, EARLY '70S, ESPECIALLY THINKING ABOUT IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION THAT CONGRESS HAD ACTUALLY BEEN PUSHING FOR DEPLOYMENT AND THEN AROUND '68, '69, THERE IS THIS TURNAROUND AND SOME PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST IT ALSO. WHAT WAS BEHIND IT.

I think the reason the public first became interested in the ABM issue in the last '60s was because the original proposal for deploying an ABM system made by the Johnson administration in 1967 called for what we now refer to as a thin, Chinese defense. That is a defense of the nation, a nation-wide city defense against a small attack, which was perceived then as being the growing potential of China and the defensive system would have been located near large, northern cities in the United States. And what that meant was that not only radars but interceptive missiles, which carried nuclear warheads, would be located near large cities and so citizens of Seattle, Milwaukee, Detroit, Chicago, Boston, Minneapolis woke up one day to find that the government was proposing this, to deploy a system which would have nuclear tipped missiles, so to speak, in their backyard. And this was an uncomfortable thought. And it caused citizen interest and instinctive reaction against missiles with nuclear weapons in their backyard. And this then brought a weapons issue to broad public attention. As people said, not is it good or bad for arms control at first, but do I want nuclear weapons in my backyard. Once the public was aroused and interested, then the discussion moved on to a Congressional debate. And in fact, shortly after the Johnson administration made this proposal, it was replaced in office by the Nixon administration. And the original idea of the Nixon administration was to abandon that plan, but to deploy the ABM system, that same technology to defend missile silos and retaliatory force. So it ceased to be a matter of quote, nuclear weapons in my backyard, but the issue was on the table. It had caught the public attention. And that forced in the United States Congress in 1969, for the first time that I can recall, a major national debate on a weapons system.

LET'S ASSUME THAT WE'VE SET UP CONSTRUCTION IN BOSTON AND SEATTLE...

There wasn't any construction...

WHAT...

The plans. There were, there were plans. And there were plans that were printed, but there was no construction.

MAYBE YOU CAN START WITH THE NOTION THAT WHEN PEOPLE DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE GOING TO BE MISSILES IN THEIR BACKYARD, THIS REALLY GRABBED THEM... AND LEAD THAT INTO CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN...

The when people realized that the original deployment idea for ABM would lead to nuclear tipped interceptors near their homes, near their cities, figuratively in their backyard, this caused great concern and a lot of editorial comment and discussion and that brought the ABM issue into the public consciousness. Shortly after the original plans were proposed by the Johnson administration, the Nixon administration came into office and changed them. It proposed to use the interceptor missiles, radars, etc. for defending our retaliatory forces. The hard silos, which were far away from the cities. But, and thereby the missiles in the backyard idea disappeared. But the issue of ABM had already become a public issue, and there was a lot of interest and this led Congress for the first time that I recall to have a major, national public debate on a major weapons system. And it was during that debate that some of the further consequences of the proposed safeguard system were appreciated. It's impact on the arms race. It's impact on stability, whether or not it made any technical sense, and this is in fact, what led both to understanding and the political coalition out of which grew limitations and the ABM treaty.

AT THAT TIME, DID YOU FEEL THAT THE PUBLIC CONCERN AND THE PUBLIC GETTING INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE, DO YOU THINK THAT COULD REALLY INFLUENCE A DECISION?

Well, I think the answer is that we have seen now two cases where public interest, public pressure have influenced weapons systems. The ABM issue was the second of two cases. But there had already been an earlier example dating back to the late 1950s, early 1960s, when there was an aroused public around the world concerned about fallout from continued atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, which was leading to a build up of radioactive fallout from isotopes that were circling in the upper atmosphere as a result of atmospheric tests. And one had aroused public concern. Not so much about arms control, but about environment issues, namely, is this good for my friends, my family, me. And so one had an aroused public in the world, protesting continued, atmospheric testing, and this was an important force, I believe, joined together with in-government analysis of how important it was to continue atmospheric testing. How much could be learned to protect one's national security just by underground testing. In fact, the question was ever raised, do we need to test at all? Had nuclear weapons come along so far that one could have a comprehensive test ban treaty. But the aroused public created a political pressure which meant this issue received very high priority attention among governments. And I believe is an example of how important a sustained, informed, effective, politically broad-based public constituency can be in helping shape our policy on nuclear weapons. And so that was case one. I think the ABM debate was case two.

CAN YOU SAY IT A LITTLE SHORTER...

Yeah. Yeah. As for the value of a public constituency and public interest in helping shape nuclear weapons policy, I think the atmospheric test ban treaty grew out of grave public concern and broad interest in the effects of radioactive fallout from continued atmospheric testing. And so one had a political from the outside joined with the analysis of government scientists on the inside, saying, yes, it made sense national security wise to stop testing in the atmosphere, and one could, with the coalition, here in support of both the outside and inside forces, one saw pressures build and we indeed negotiated in 1962, the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty.

LET'S CARRY THAT THOUGHT THROUGH WITH THE ABM.

That was the first example.

START AGAIN.

Yeah, that was the first example of a public constituency playing a major role in helping shape nuclear policy. I believe the ABM treaty growing out of the no-nuclear weapons in by backyard discussion, is the second example.

WHAT, IN YOUR VIEW, THINKING BACK AROUND 1959... WHAT WAS WRONG WITH SAFEGUARD?

As a technician, as a physicist, I believe the main problem with safeguard as proposed to defend hard silos, was that it couldn't meet effectiveness criteria. It was a system built of hardware not designed to do that job and I thought that if we were to go ahead and deploy it for far smaller expenditures, the Soviets could with counter measures, overpower it or destroy it or evade it. In other words, the counter measures that were available to the offense, I felt were effective. They were less expensive and so that the system wouldn't meet any criteria of military effectiveness to improve our national security, in addition:, to which, in addition to which, of course, if one starts building a defense and the other side starts building offense, pretty soon you find yourselves in what we like to call an arms race. Enhanced competition with the offense being built up to make sure it negates the effect of the defense. And if it's, if the offense can do that and can do it especially at lower cost, well, you haven't gained anything. And so I thought that the argument for safeguard was flawed fatally by the ineffectiveness of the system, the ease with which it could be counter measured, and the great expense it would involve which wouldn't bring any results.

WHAT IS IT ABOUT HARD SILO DEFENSE THAT MAKES IT DIFFERENT FROM?

What makes hard site defense different from city defense is that if you're, if you're defending a hard site, say a missile silo, a hard and underground missile silo, first of all your target is small. Secondly, because it's hardened, with lots of concrete steel, the nuclear detonation must be relatively close to ground zero, to target, in order to do the damage. So that the volume you have to defend is very restricted and you can carry out the defense very near the target because of the detonation is kept out. Keep out volume is large enough, say close to a few thousand feet... then there will be no damage done to the target. Finally you don't have to have a defense that is one hundred percent effective to save your deterrent force if you're defending a hard silo. Because the, what you need to accomplish is an offense, defense trade-off, or a cost exchange ratio that makes it not of advantage to the offense to attack. If the offense has to use more weapons than he destroys of yours then at the end of the engagement, he's not better off. In contrast, if you think of a city or a nationwide defense, the city is a very large target. It's a soft target, and you don't have to have a nuclear detonation very close to a city in order to destroy that city. Hiroshima, remember was destroyed by a small bomb about fifteen kilotons. Fifteen thousand tons of TNT equivalent. That is a bomb which is comparable to the trigger of our modern day more devastating bombs and that was detonated at an altitude of some fifteen, sixteen hundred feet, and it leveled the city. So you're, to defend a city you have to defend a much larger volume and you have to defend it with a much higher percentage of success, because the minute the first nuclear detonation occurs over the city, that's pretty much the end of the city. So the standard of effectiveness is much higher, the volume you have to defend against is much larger, because any detonation near a city will do just unparalleled devastating damage.

COULD YOU TALK AGAIN ABOUT THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE TRAIL OFF IN HARD SILOS.

Yeah. In, in analyzing the effectiveness of a hard site defense, what you have to satisfy yourself and the would-be attacker must also understand, is that he cannot gain by making the attack. And the way you do that is by having a defense that is sufficiently effective so that the price to the attacker to succeed is higher than the cost to you in terms of damage done. In other words, if the attacker has to use many more of his own missiles, or warheads to destroy a smaller number of yours, then he hasn't gained anything from the attack. So you don't have to succeed in destroying all of the attackers' incoming missiles or warheads. You just have to succeed in destroying enough of them that at the end of the exchange, the attacker is not better off. In fact, can't even conceive that he might be better off. Let me be a little more precise with a numerical example. Suppose your missiles in hardened silos each have one warhead. But it would take an attacker say, three or four warheads to make sure one got through on each silo. Then he is to expend three to four times as much of his armory as he can destroy of yours. If, on the other hand, you have a MIRVed missile in your silo, say a Minuteman III with three warheads, then you would like to insure, in order to have an effective defense that the attacker would have to expend five or six warheads in order to destroy your missile, because then he would still be expending more warheads that you, then he's been able to destroy. So there is the cost exchange ratio in terms of resources, of what fraction of his force he has to use. And then, of course, there's the financial aspect. If the cost to the defense to protect N warheads is greater than the cost of the offense to make sure he destroys the N warheads, then your defense can run you broke and not be effective. So one has to worry about cost exchange and overall effectiveness against number of attacking warheads.

HOW DOES THAT RELATE TO THE SAFEGUARD...

During the 1969 hearings, the first year of ABM a point was made that there was a need for outside, expert review of the plans to judge their effectiveness in meeting the criteria set for the system. And so a panel was created following the authorization and appropriation debate in the Congress to review the plans of the Defense Department. And this panel was chaired by Dr. O'Neill of Riverside Research Corporation of Columbia, and I served on the panel. And at one point during the 1970 hearings, the director of Defense, Research and Engineering, Dr. Johnny Foster, was asked had there been outside technical review, and he said yes, there was. He mentioned this panel. He mentioned me as a member of this panel and said that the panel had agreed that the safeguard deployment as proposed would meet the objectives set for it. And Senator John Sherman Cooper and his staff immediately called several of us who were identified as members of the panel and in particular asked me if that were so, and I said that I believed that Dr. Foster had misspoken because we had not addressed the question, would it do the job that it was designed to do? We looked at the technical parts of the system as we were instructed to do and commented upon what the technical problems were and the technical potential was, but we never asked this general question because we were not asked to. Would it do the job that it was designed to do? In fact, we specifically said we didn't address that question. So I was called in to testify and made this point. The testimony got a little bit excited, or, you might say, tense, because Senator Fulbright tried to solicit, elicit, I should say, he elicited, tried to elicit the testimony that Dr. Foster had lied to the Committee and I said that I did not believe that was so. That in fact Dr. Foster was a very busy man with many things on his mind and sometimes, when I'm going back and forth between Washington and my academic duties at Stanford, I can get issues confused also, and that I had no reason whatsoever to think that Dr. Foster was lying to the Committee. And since politically there was a wish on some member's part to get such a statement, this caused a bit of tension. But I think that then and I think now that in a matter where you have many responsibilities, many reports it's not at all unreasonable to think that someone can confuse reports, conclusions, and sometimes even one's own wishful thinking.

WHAT WAS THE MAIN MESSAGE OF YOUR TESTIMONY LEAVING DR. FOSTER OUT OF IT FOR NOW?

Well, what it was we, the message that we gave about safeguard from our panel was a limited one. We were asked to look at the technology and we looked at what the technology could do, what were the problems, what were the possible counters to it, and we gave a technical assessment. We, we were not asked in that committee, I gave my own personal views... that I thought that the ease and the relative cheap—cheapness with which you could overcome a defensive deployment made it look to me like it was not a sensible thing to do. And I expressed my concerns about how it might stimulate further arms competition. Because you have to remember that at that time, we were just entering an era where the United States was beginning to go forth with the MIRV program. And that was done in response to the original deployment of ABMs by the Russians around Moscow. And we were seeing how, as a result of a Russian ABM deployment around Moscow, the Americans were responding in order to maintain our deterrent against any possible evolution of that Russian ABM system. We were responding by MIRVing our force. That turned out to be the most effective. Cost effective and militarily effective way to overpower an ABM system. And one could see how a unilateral move toward ABM not only did not improve security. Certainly the ABM system around Moscow provides no effective defense of Moscow against nuclear destruction, but how a unilateral move toward defense stimulated further arms build-up. Because MIRVs were going to make each missile into a Hydra-headed monster, put a large number of warheads in the front end of each missile, and this would certainly not improve either arms race stability or crisis stability. So one could see the serious arms control implications of moving ahead with ABMs. And that's where one began to emphasize how important it was, if we're going to improve security and try to make the country safer, to try and limit the forces by arms control, rather than looking at some sort of technological fix.

SO IT WAS YOUR OPINION AT THE TIME THAT THE SAFEGUARD, THE ABM SYSTEM WAS JUST NOT COST EFFECTIVE?

My opinion...

YOU USED THE FIGURES.

It was my opinion at that time that the cost of safeguard was far greater than the cost it would require to build an additional number of missiles or warheads to overpower the system and maintain the same level of damage as existed before the safeguard was deployed. In other words, if you could, if you could with your attack cause a certain level of damage, that you could maintain that same level of damage in the face of a safeguard deployment by spending much less money for more warheads and missiles then the entire safeguard deployment would cost. And so that was certainly one of my conclusions. The other was that as a result of that competition, we would end up with more weapons too. And you would also have the property therefore of an enhanced arms race. The problem of an enhanced arms race... An airplane went by.

IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT SO MANY PEOPLE IN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY SEEM TO BE NOT IN FAVOR OF THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM, WHY IN YOUR VIEW...WHY WAS THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WAS PUSHING FOR SAFEGUARD?

I don't really know. The President had said in 1969 that there was no possibility of a nation-wide defense, and this easier, less demanding task of silo defense was then developed. I think there was a growing concern that as one projected the Russian missile force and its MIRVing that one saw a threat to our land based deterrent, the land based missiles, so called ICBMs. And one was looking how to maintain the land based ICBMs as an effective deterrent against that threat. Eventually the argument that was finally settled on for advocating the safeguard deployment was that it was a good bargaining chip...if you look at the record because I think that the Congressional testimony and the analysis was convincing to most people, that, in fact, safeguard wasn't a cost-effective way to achieve a defense of the ICBM force.

SO WERE YOU AWARE AT THE TIME OF THE BARGAINING CHIP RATIONALE?

Well, again, there were a range of scientific judgments. These are hard judgments to make. It's not just a simple, I think, black and white affair. I was persuaded it wouldn't work. I was persuaded that there were rational things for the Russians to do to as I say with relative ease, overpower it. But these are very complicated systems. They, the, they the analysis has to make assumptions of what the Russians can and will do. And it's not unreasonable that there are different views. I was convinced that the arguments in favor was a weak one and a flawed one. Certainly as the argument for the technical merits of safeguard were more and more persuasively stripped away, the argument of bargaining chip became more and more prominent.

WHAT IN 1970 WAS SEEN BY THE UNITED STATES AS THE MAIN THREAT TO COUNTER AND... WHAT WERE THE MORE EFFICIENT WAYS TO COUNTER THE THREAT?

Well, as the potential of the Soviet missile force grew, the American approach to maintaining a confident, reliable survivable deterrent was to continue to develop mobile components of our deterrent force. That was why there was great emphasis starting in the Sixties on having a triad of three components to our deterrent. Not only did we not want to have a force which might have a common failure mode for all of its elements, we also wanted to have mobility so that the system couldn't be targeted. And that's why great emphasis was placed on the submarine launched ballistic missile force, or Polaris force which evolved into the Poseidon and today, the Trident force. Because one felt that by maintaining good operational discipline and first-rate technology, one could be confident that submarines, moving quietly under the surface of the ocean could not be targeted. And therefore, a retaliatory force based on, missiles based on submarines, nuclear submarines, was developed as a, as a major component of our triad. Likewise, the strategic bomber force was continually being upgraded and modernized with newer and newer models of the B-52s at that time to maintain a force that could not be targeted because given warning of an attack, which our early warning systems was, were providing and improving given that warning, the bombers could take off. And not be caught sitting on the ground. And in fact, they could be recalled if it was a faulty warning. So, we had the bomber force, the long-range strategic air command bomber force. We had the submarines, both of them mobile, and we has the ICBMs as one third component of our force, fixed land base missile force which we built in stronger or harder silos. But we recognized that with improved accuracy of missiles, and accuracy in guidance systems were improving as testing continued, that at some point the land base missile force would grow vulnerable and so the issue was what to do about that. People thought about making the Minuteman mobile. There was original proposal to put it on railroad cars and move around the United States, which seemed to have very severe security and societal consequences that were undesired. And the ABM was considered as on possible was of defending it. And had it been technically a attractive way to do it, one that could meet technical criteria of being survivable...namely, the force itself couldn't be destroyed and cost effective, that would have made sense. But because of the cost exchange ratio being unfavorable, and something that I should add. That is that the system depended upon very large radars the size of a football field for its eyes and ears, if you wish, to catch the incoming targets and begin to form the track, against which have to program your interception. And there was no way to maintain those, themselves from being the Achilles heel of the system by being directly attacked. And so one should emphasize it's not only cost-effectiveness, it was survivability of the system. There were these large, Phase s for early target acquisition and then building a trap to manage the engagement. They were both radars. So-called missile site radars and perimeter acquisition radars. And how was one going to defend them? And not make them the target of attack. Because once you lose your eyes, your radar, you can't carry forth the engagement very well.

WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN YOUR SUGGESTION FOR DECREASING THE VULNERABILITY OF THE ICBM FORCE?

At that time, my view was that the most effective first step needed to limit the vulnerability ICBM force was to limit the threat to it through arms control. And so I felt since there was no technology that looked attractive, one needed a research program to continue to probe technology to see what sort of new technological developments might change the balance away from being favorable to the offense. And at the same time to try and limit the growth of an offensive threat by limiting the by, through arms control. Now, one, at a certain point I believe that it might have been effective to limit the threat by limiting the testing of new missiles and the development of a more accurate force. Because to threaten an ICBM in a hardened silo, you have to have a very accurate attack. If the missile misses by a half a mile or a thousand yards or something of that sort, it's too far away to damage the silo if you've made a hard silo. So one could hope by qualitative limits, testing limits, to prevent the improvement in accuracy and reliability from leading to an enhanced threat to the silos and one could hope by quantitative limits, numerical limits on the offense to prevent the threat from growing. And so I felt then as I still do that the path to a more stable and safer world is paved for the largest part of the way overwhelmingly by possibilities of progress in arms control, which I don't think there's a straight technological fix to this problem.

WHY SO MUCH CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF THE ICBM FORCE WHEN WE STILL HAVE THE REST OF THE TRIAD TO RELY ON?

The concern about the vulnerability of our ICBM forces part of the Triad, I think, I believe is based upon the fact that we still have an uncertain future with regard to arms control. We don't have effective limits on growing threats to the other components of our force. We are not s—we can't be totally confident that twenty years down the road our submarines will be survivable. I don't have the slightest idea of a threat to the submarines right now. I believe with good technology and good operational procedures, they are very quiet. They are very secure. And I, it's to the limit of my technological vision to say they will remain that way. But that's, nobody's got it that's such a long view on technology that one can be totally confident. Likewise the bomber force. We are modernizing it with long range, air-launch cruise missiles so we don't have to overfly extensive Soviet air defenses. And we are developing technology. So we are modernizing. In a world with real arms control, with real limits, one could seriously, I think, and one should seriously think about giving up the Triad and going to the Diad. Or worrying less about the survival of the ICBM force. But I think that's got to be done in an effective arms control environment.

There were other reasons that some felt that it was important to maintain an effective ICBM componentable deterrent. It was the most robust one in terms of command and control, at that time in the 1970 —

START AGAIN. INSTEAD OF SAYING THERE WERE OTHER REASONS...

Yeah. In 1970 reasons for wanting to maintain the ICBM component, the land base missile componentable deterrent, included the more secure commanding control system for communicating with the missiles on our national sovereign territory as opposed to submarines at sea. Also the fact that the accuracy of these missiles given the technology of guidance systems at that time was greater. And so some emphasized the relative importance of maintaining the ICBM force both for accuracy and good commanding control. Course, in time, that those technical factors changed and as one looks in 1986, and with our upcoming Trident II force, one can say that the difference in accuracy between the land based and sea based forces is getting much less significant and the commanding control means to the submarines have improved greatly. But as seen in that period when the technology of intercontinental range missiles was relatively young, one wanted to have a diverse force with no common failure mode. Therefore, one wanted the bombers which one knew how they flew and could be recalled if there was a mistake. And one...and I still believe the bombers are an essential component of our deterrent because it is not a first strike force. It is a retaliatory force. It takes hours, not just minutes to deliver the attack. And it's one that you can launch and recall under warning. But in addition, the, to have two different missile forces with different possible vulnerabilities seemed a prudent way to proceed.

SO AT THAT TIME, FROM READING YOUR TESTIMONY, IT SEEMED LIKE YOU WERE IN FAVOR OF SOME KIND OF HARD SILENT DEFENSE. IS THAT CORRECT?

In 1969, 1970, early seventies period, up to today, if I knew of a cost effective survivable way to make hard site defense, to make my retaliatory force more survivable, to give me more confidence in the survivability of that force, I would favor it. Problem is, to be technically realistic about it, and decide whether one can meet the essential criteria of a system that's survivable. That doesn't have any vulnerable Achilles heals, a system that's cost effective, that doesn't get us in a competition where we're going broke to try and build a defense when the offense can, with much lower expenditures, overpower my efforts. There's no problem, in my mind, with, in principle, with a hard site defense. Except I don't know how to do it as a technician.

DEFENDING THE HARD, THE SILOS IS NOT, IN YOUR VIEW, AND I'D LIKE YOU TO CONTRAST THIS IN YOUR ANSWER, IS NOT DESTABILIZING AS IN A CITY DEFENSE.

A defending my silos and making retaliatory force more secure, I consider contributing to stability, and it can, if it can be done, I would favor doing it in an appropriate arms control regime. Now, as to a city defense, the main thing is, I don't have the slightest idea how to do it. I don't see any technology coming down the road that can make a nation safe from destruction by nuclear weapons, unless we get rid of the nuclear threat or we reduce it by enormous amounts relative to what we have now. But if we strive for a city defense, which means we're striving to deny our opponents deterrent, and we can't achieve it, then we're going to see the dynamics of the arms race whereby the Russians will try to maintain their deterrent force as we are desperately trying to defend our cities. We saw that before. We saw that the Russians tried to defend Moscow and started building the first stage of what looked like it would be a nationwide defense. There were the deployments around Moscow. They were the beginning deployments at Paulinne, near Leningrad, in that area, which looked like the Russians were headed toward a nationwide ABM defensive system. We, in our analysis, didn't think that they could succeed in denying us our deterrent capability, but we found it...wise, prudent to enhance our offensive force to make sure we had a competent deterrent. And what's more, to make sure the Russians knew we did. Because there must be no mistake in their thinking either. Deterrence is after all, a state of mind. You both have to recognize that there's no conceivable advantage to attacking one another, because you're committing suicide if you do. And so, look at the story of the first Russian ABM deployment. The only deployment.

OK. LET'S PICK IT UP WITH THE POINT ABOUT DETERRENCE IS A STATE OF MIND.

Deterrence is after all a state of mind. You have to be convinced and your opponent has to be convinced that there is no conceivable advantage to attacking first. The effectively, you would be committing suicide because your opponent will always have the capability of striking back and destroying you. And so in that circumstance, if one side sees the other trying to defend one's nation, as we saw the Russians doing in the sixties. One will insist upon increasing one's offense to maintain one's deterrent capability and you can see from the experience when the Russians started building their defense what happened. We MIRVed and we built many more warheads. So the effort to build a nationwide defense, unless it's built to, based upon technology that you know can succeed, and that you know will be cost effective, it's just going an arms race and increase instability.

TRY IT AGAIN WITH THIS NOTION, IN THE TESTIMONY, I THINK IT WAS YOURS OR DR. GOLDBERGER'S, WHO SAID "IF SAFEGUARD FAILS TO DETER THE ATTACK, IT HASN'T SAVED ANYTHING". MAYBE YOU COULD MAKE THAT KIND OF STATEMENT.

Maybe back a minute, we were talking then about hard point, or...at...you were going to go back to hard point from city now. I continue to believe in today's technology, that there is no way to make an effective nationwide defense without severe limits from the offense. In other words, arms control is an essential part, still, of this whole offense-defense issue You'll say it again somewhere else.

WHY WASN'T THERE SO MUCH OUTCRY IN THE CONGRESS ABOUT MIRV AT THE TIME AS THERE WAS ABOUT ABM? THEY SEEMED TO BE EQUALLY IN TROUBLE —

I think there were two reasons why the congress didn't push the MIRV issue in it's debate as strongly and as effectively as it did the ABM issue. The first is that the ABM debate was triggered by a large public interest because the original deployment was going to lead to nuclear tip missiles near large cities, near populations and that therefore, grabbed the public attention and made it a more public issue. In contrast, MIRVs just meant putting more warheads on existing missiles and existing silos in areas of the country, the northern plain states, which were far removed from populations. So there was less public pressure on it. Secondly, I think it was realized that there was no way to limit MIRVs until one had accomplished a limit on the ABMs. That is, remember MIRVs were born as a response to Russian ABMs in order to make sure that our deterrent could overpower whatever continued evolution of their ABM system we might see. Not only overpowered it to our confidence, but also that the Russians would know we could overpower it so they wouldn't be tempted to rely on their ABM system to protect them from counter retaliation by the US. So I think that one had to solve the ABM problem first, before one could put limits on MIRVs. But remember there was a debate. There was serious issue. Senator Brooks of Massachusetts passed a resolution in the Senate expressing the sense of the Senate resolution that we shouldn't deploy MIRVs. So there was a lot of attention on the subject, but it wasn't one that spread outside the senate to the editorial pages of the public nationwide. And therefore, it lacked that element of a public constituency and public pressure. In addition to which, it really was number two in the queue for arms control. It was no less important, but I thought there was no way we could negotiate limits on MIRVs until we had negotiated limits on ABM. Tragedy is that after we negotiated limits on ABM, we still let the MIRVs go ahead. We didn't try to negotiate seriously limits on them. And in today's world, we have MIRVs. We have four times as many missiles warheads, approximately, as we had when we started the SALT discussions for the, seventeen years ago now. And that just shows you one of the problems of trying to make progress in arms control. Mainly that technology is easier and faster and gets there quicker. As Albert Einstein said, "Politics is much harder than physics."

BUT MAYBE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FACT THAT, I MEAN, THE ARMY WAS ALWAYS HOPING TO GO FOR THE AREA DEFENSE.

Well, my judgment that the ABM was ineffective for hard site defense was based upon the technical properties of that system. It was based on hardware that had been originally designed for city defense, which was just by fiat transferred over to another mission, mainly, hard site defense. And it was my judgment, those of other technical colleagues who were of the same side of this debate as I am, that the system wouldn't be effective. It wouldn't be cost effective, that is, it would be easier for the offense to maintain the same level of effectiveness in destroying our silos at a lower cost than the system would cost us. It also wasn't survivable. Its radars, its eyes and ears could be easily destroyed and constituted an Achilles heal. Now, so what would be the effect of going ahead with safeguard? We would be deploying an ABM system, hopefully to make our silos more survivable, our ICBMs our land based deterrent more effective, but in fact, we would be triggering an arms race. Because the Russians would be building more warheads presumably at much lower cost to overpower the system. Just as they had triggered an arms race when they started deploying an ABM around Moscow and we MIRVed. Now, the effect of expensive MIRVing was to introduce a further element of instability in the arms balance, because once you have MIRVs, if they are very accurate and reliable and technology was moving in that direction, one missile that you launch with many warheads can, with a fair chance, destroy a number of silos of your opponent. And so you have a multiplier there which means that with just one of your missiles, you might be able to destroy a larger number of ...of your opponent's missiles. And that might lead you to think in time of crisis, there's an advantage to attacking first, because I'll do more damage than I expend my resources. And so, any time you make it look like it might be attractive to attack first, you introduce an element of instability into deterrence. It's a state of mind which is best served by both sides understanding there's no conceivable advantage to attacking first. The retaliatory effect will be so devastating that the damage they suffer will be at least as great as the damage they can cause, and therefore in effect, what they're chancing is committing suicide and nothing else... There was a crucial moment in the ABM debate of 1969, the first year, and that was triggered by a meeting in the airport on the way to Washington at the... and I believe if I recall correctly, it was in a TWA Ambassador lounge when Dr. Petrovsky and I met David Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And Mr. Packard was ex...expressing the view that the Nixon administration saw no real possibility for city nationwide defense, but was thinking in terms of safeguard for defending silos. And the fact that one was abandoning the city role was welcome on technical grounds 'cause it wouldn't work and on strategic grounds because of its impact for the arms race. But that led Petrovsky to be portrayed inadvertently as a supporter of safeguard for silo defense and this led his being called in to testify recount the ...the nature of the meeting and then go on to give very effective testimony in the first year which showed how easy it would have been for the Russians to counter safeguard, given the technology deployed to defend silos, just by adding a small number of warheads. You would have to put a vastly expensive,I hesitate to give a figure now, because I don't remember it as well as I should, but it was certainly close to ten billion dollars to defend a silo field which the Russians could negate just by a small number of warheads each in the few million dollar category of course. And that was what was one of the real eye openers in the debate, was just to do the arithmetic and to show what we call the draw bound curves. How easy it would be for a small number of relatively inexpensive additional warheads in the offense. Try to the offense, either by MIRVing or by more missiles to overpower and destroy the defense, and then accomplish the cask, the task of destroying the land based missiles.

DESCRIBE THE ORIGIN OF THE GROUP OF SCIENTISTS THAT CAME TO MEET WITH KISSINGER. MAYBE YOU COULD START OFF BY SAYING, ONCE KISSINGER BECAME NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR...

During the 1960s, during the Kennedy-Johnson years, there were many extensive discussions and analyses in the President's Science Advisory Committee on the defense-offense balance implications and deterrence, It was a very fundamental debate because deterrence in contract to defense in a certain sense, violates basic human instincts of trying to defend oneself. And it doesn't sit comfortably. And no president feels comfortable standing in the White House and saying, "I won't defend my country." Just in the same way, no family feels comfortable saying, "I won't defend my children." And so, every president has looked for means to defend his country and then ask for the studies — found out that technically can't be done. And when Nixon came into power in 1969, it was natural for him to ask this question and for his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger to be centrally involved in any discussion of, "Can there be a defense? What should we do with our deterrent force? How much should it grow? Do we need more warheads, etc., etc." These are the most fundamental questions and we were in a new era where for the first time in history, societies in the presence of nuclear weapons were beginning to realize they couldn't defend themselves. Back to Kissinger in his organization of his office and accretion of responsibilities chose not to work together with the President's science advisor and with the President's science advisory committee as had been before. And you have to get some wisdom noise coming. I can tell, I'll tell him to keep quiet.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO START JUST WITH "WHEN KISSINGER...

When...when the Nixon administration came into office and Henry Kissinger was ensconced in the White House as the National Security Advisor, he chose not to work with the President's science advisor and the President's science advisory committee, or PSAC in addressing the basic issues of deterrence and defense and the technical possibilities and problems and instead he formed a group of scientists — a group of five scientists who met with him about once a month for several year period in which in the White House, in order to discuss these issues in considerable detail. I was a member of this group and we had extensive discussions on what could and could not be done with ABM. What were the possibilities for limiting ABM deployment in verifiable ways because this was the beginning of the Nixon administration's efforts to negotiate arms control limits and arms control treaties are based upon provisions that can be verified, not upon trust, so what can...what kinds of provisions one can verify. How one can assure compliance had to be analyzed. Or was the strategic interest to the United States to have a limit on ABM's? Both Russian and US What kinds of — what range of parameters could be negotiated there What kinds of limits on offense should go together with the limits on defense. These things were discussed by this group of five scientists. We would meet typically at the end of a workday in the situation room in the White House basement, and discuss in detail that topic or those few topics that we'd agreed on at the previous meeting. And then the next morning we would come back, have breakfast and review the night's discussion. Usually it was apparent to us that Dr. Kissinger had thought about our discussion, had read our papers, and then we would decide on an agenda for the next meeting. And so this went on for about two years.

HOW DID YOU FEEL DR. KISSINGER PERCEIVED THIS GROUP IN TERMS OF THE WEIGHT HE WOULD GIVE TO WHAT YOU WOULD SAY AND COULD IT AFFECT ACTION?

I was never convinced whether Dr. Kissinger thought we were very valuable and he relied on our judgment to help form his thought, or whether Dr. Kissinger thought he understood the things without our help and in some sense, was you might say, using us. Perhaps for marginal better improvement is understanding and to say that he had a group of consultants. I never concerned myself with that question. I didn't understand Henry that well. He certainly engaged in serious discussions with us which made it to my mind a very worthwhile exercise. And after all, if you have a chance to talk with a key person in the formulation of policy you can hope that one has helped contribute to a more rational a safer world thereby. We have one country, you have an opportunity to try and make it at, in a more sensible way. You accept that opportunity as long you feel you're being listened to. But what he did with it, how he viewed us I don't think I ...ever had a clear view and I still don't.

WASN'T IT KIND OF A FRUSTRATING SITUATION TO BE IN ADVISORY CAPACITY AND NOT REALLY HAVE ANY POWER? OR DID YOU JUST FEEL THAT WAS NOT YOUR ROLE?

You never really have power if you're an advisor to the government. What you need is access to the vital information. The ability to study, to make...valid analyses thereby and the hope that as a result of your analysis, the decision makers, in this case, the President of the United States, will act more wisely. Now the President has to make political decisions in deciding what our policy will be in terms of nuclear weapons, deterrence, defense versus offense, these decisions which are fundamentally political, have a crucial technical component. The President cannot wish a policy which violates the laws of physics. And so it is necessary that he be aware of the physical realities and technical limitations to whatever goal he wants to achieve. For example. President Nixon expressed very early his understanding that no matter how hard we tried, we could not make an...a nationwide city defense. That it was technically not within our power to do so. He said that. And then the question was, "Could we make an effective defense of concrete, of hard silos, a much lesser task. And the, one of the goals here was to indicate that with the technology available then, not for a future time, but with the technology available then, the answer was still no. A survivable, cost effective defense could not be made and then to ...to state the case; how one could verify with confident limits on such programs, if they were negotiated, how one could achieve a safer balance by verifiable limits on the offense and how one could improve, if you wish, also, the ability to verify treaty compliance. These were issues that we had a chance to make impotent, are very important. We had serious discussion whether we were listened to or not. Well duh, I learned long ago that in the government advising game, the output to input ratio is distressingly small. But if it's pal, if there is some output, one makes the effort that one feels one can make if there's any benefit at all because we are dealing with issues which are of unparalleled danger to the world, when you're dealing with nuclear weapons. We're dealing with issues of technical complexity that no political leader on his own can possibly master without the best technical advise and above all, we're dealing with issues whether you do not have the luxury of even making one mistake.

LET'S TALK ABOUT MIRV WITHIN THAT CONTEXT. WHAT DID THE GROUP OF SCIENTISTS ADVOCATE ABOUT WHETHER TO CONTINUE MIRV TESTING.

We strongly advocated that every effort should be made to avoid widespread deployment of MIRVs. We strongly advocated that every effort should be made to avoid widespread deployment of MIRVs. We anticipated the problems that we have seen since then. For example, if the Russians had a large MIRV land base missile force, which developed inaccuracy, as we projected it could and would, then there would be the possibility that the Russians by shooting a small number of their missiles, but containing many warheads because of the MIRV, the Russian shooting a small number of their missiles might threaten the survival of a large number of our... land base missiles. And that this would be inherently a worrisome situation, because we would have reduced confidence in one of the important legs of our triad, of our deterrent force, and this would possibly make it seem like first strike would be advantageous. Which is a threat to deterrent stability. So, we certainly foresaw that if we MIRVed and if MIRVs were not limited, the, one had to expect that the Russian SS-9 force would evolve into a large MIRV force. We saw how, within the restraints of the silos, they could put larger missiles, they could stuff in missiles that have so called cold launch. That is, they pop up out of the silos with gas before they're ignited...rather than igniting the engines in the silos. That's what you put larger missiles in thick silos, and so that the, one could expect a much larger Soviet missile force with many MIRVs and indeed that's what we got. And that created what became in the 70s the alleged window vulnerability and our grave concern about the large number of Soviet land base MIRVs. We foresaw that. And we argued, but we were not able to be persuasive in terms of policy.

AT WHAT POINT IN THE LATE 60s, BEGINNING OF 70s, WHEN YOU FIRST STARTED TALKING TO KISSINGER ABOUT MIRVS, WHERE WAS OUR MIRV PROGRAM? WAS IT AT A POINT WHERE TESTING COULD BE STOPPED? WERE YOU ADVOCATING MORE, THINKING ABOUT SALT IN REGARD TO THAT?

I felt that in the late 60s one had two choices; either to stop the testing program before we had reached a point of being able to deploy a MIRV and ban test by all countries. And that can be monitored successfully, because we see the number of warheads deployed during a missile test firing. We had that option, or the other option was to develop and test MIRVs, but not deploy them, but then we would have had to allow the Russians to develop and test them...but not deploy them. Now, the difficulty there is, that once they're tested, you can't tell whether they're deployed or not. Because once a missile's been tested, a particular type of missile with N warheads, 310, whatever, warheads and it's a reliability, and it's accuracy has been established, there's no way you can verify that the deployed missiles don't have that number of warheads. So, if we were going to prevent a large deployment by the Russians, we had to stop ourselves before we were at the point of being able to deploy. We were unwilling to do that. Why we were unwilling to that is a matter of conjecture. Certainly we could not turn off a MIRV program if we didn't have an ABM treaty. Because it, MIRV was one of the best ways to maintain deterrent against the possibility of widespread nationwide deployments of ABM systems. So it was necessary, as a first step, to get a...an ABM treaty. We — the tragedy is that we didn't also, once we had the ABM treaty, realize MIRVs were no longer necessary, and so that we didn't slow down our program, terminate it and manage to negotiate a MIRV ban. Could we have done one at that time? I don't know. Mr. Kissinger was the center focus of all work in this field. Some people call that great management. Other people call it megalomania. But there was no question that he and he alone in his office was the creator, the arbiter, the controller of our nuclear strategic policy and I think he understood correctly that the first requirement was to get an ABM treaty. Why he didn't also go for a MIRV ban or didn't see the virtues of a MIRV limitation, I don't know. I know that since then, he's been quoted in the newspapers as saying, had he understood then what he understands now about the implications of MIRVs and their threat to stability, he would have tried to prevent it, I find that a rather strange statement, because it certainly was talked about within, hour upon hour with him and some of his assistants in the situation room. I have my own views that Mr. Kissinger might have concluded that he could only successfully carry through one arms control measure at a time, and in that event, getting the ABM treaty was the right way to go. One can only conjecture, had there been another channel, whether it's the arms control and disarmament agency and it's negotiator, Ambassador Gerard Smith, or the President's science advisor, or someone in the defense department, independently in a position to carry out the argument against going ahead and deploying MIRVs. One can conjecture maybe we would have hit it off, this competition in MIRVs that has not, I must say, added to the world security. I don't know. It's a g...it's one of those conjectures we'll never have the answer to.

WELL, I THINK KISSINGER SAYS THAT TO LIMIT BOTH ABM's AND MIRVS WOULD HAVE DAMAGED THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY KIND OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AT THAT TIME, AND LEFT THE UNITED STATES IN A POSITION OF INFERIORITY. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THAT?

He's making a judgment which he's in a better position to make than I am about what could have been achieved in arms control. Had we not accomplished an arms control agreement on ABM, I think our security now would be diminished. I think the ABM treaty is a major achievement. It's the keystone of US/Soviet relations in deterrent. It's our...it formalizes our mutual understanding that the only way to survive in a nuclear world is to not have a nuclear war, because you can't defend yourself. So I think it's a major achievement and Henry Kissinger may be totally correct in his judgment that all the traffic would bare in this area, was an ABM treaty. That judgment he's in much better position to make than I am.

DID YOU FEEL AT THE TIME ALSO THAT THE MIRVS WERE JUST TOO SWEET A TECHNOLOGY, TOO GOOD TO GIVE UP ON? WAS THERE THAT COMPONENT TO THE DECISION?

It was the attraction to MIRVs really was that they were simple. They were relatively inexpensive. They didn't create any political problem among neighbors. And it seemed to me that as the MIRV technology looked sweeter and sweeter, all of a sudden, the missions for nuclear forces began to grow. The repertoire of desired missions expanded. All of a sudden, there were rationales for more warheads, to attack steel dyes, and steel mills and the beginnings of thinking in terms of limited nuclear war, nuclear war fighting began to emerge. Which I have to say, to my mind is the most subversive of all ideas I could think of. Namely the notion that there are limited survivable nuclear wars or that nuclear weapons have any other mission of a direct military nature other than to deter nuclear attack. But that certainly was coming along. It was, became hand in parcel with the technology and it was a relatively easy and attractive technology. So I don't know whether, given the forces, the political forces, the military backing, whether it would have been possible to limit both MIRV and ABM in the same time frame. I really don't know. I just conjecture that had there been other channels pushing, one might have gotten a little farther ahead in that. Because the argument for arms control stability was so strong, that it was in our interest to avoid MIRVing.

EXPAND ON THAT A LITTLE BIT.

Yeah. The argument was so strong in that it was in our interest to avoid MIRVing...

START AGAIN.

Yeah. Yeah. I feel the argument was very strongly to our interest to avoid MIRVing just because the deployment of MIRVs meant that one created a potential that a small fraction of your opponent's missile force, with many warheads, could threaten to destroy a large fraction of your missile force. And that introduces an element of instability because it makes it look like there might be some advantage to striking first. And that does not contribute to the stability of a deterrent relation in time of crisis.

DO YOU NEED A QUESTION OR ARE YOU POISED?

Well, one of the issues that was you might say, of advantage to the Soviet Union, if we went ahead with the MIRV race, is that they tend to build larger missiles with much larger throw weight. Their silos were larger. Their missiles are larger and therefore, as they modernized their missiles, they had the potential to put many more warheads on their missiles, and therefore of more land based MIRVs. And indeed that's what's happened, if one looks at the Soviet missile force today, they have a vast majority of their missile warheads on their land based ICBMs, the large as is eighteens and nineteens. And their throw weight, number of warheads on that force greatly exceeds the US deployment. The US in contrast has emphasized the technical quality of our force and has put the majority of our warheads at sea, on the submarine force, the Poseidon, now Trident force where we use their mobility to hide them from first attack, and we have now put, and are in the process of putting several thousand long range cruise missiles on our bombers. So in terms of the threat of a first strike from the ICBM the fixed ICBM force, the Russians are in a better position there. I think that when one looks at the overall threat to the deterrent, there is no window of vulnerability. I agree with the scope commission report on that. But it has created a concern, a nervousness when people focus on the large Soviet ICBM throw weight and the number of ICBM warheads. Because those are the most accurate and most reliable warheads today.

I WONDER IF WE COULD MAKE A FAIRLY CONCISE STATEMENT THAT STARTS BY SAYING, "THE FACT THAT WE CONTINUE TO TEST MIRVS BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTIES LED TO", IF YOU'LL AGREE WITH THIS, "THE INABILITY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AT SALT BECAUSE OF THE PROPORTION TO TECHNOLOGY, AND THEN IT LED TO SOVIETS EVENTUALLY HAVING...

Yeah. Sure. I can. Yeah. I can...I would say this follows, The fact that the US continued full speed in testing and developing MIRVs during the SALT negotiations and during this period of late sixties, early seventies, meant that we were foreclosing an opportunity to limit MIRVs. Because once we had tested and were ready to deploy it made it impractical to achieve the negotiation in which the Soviets were denied the ability to develop that technology and we would keep the technology asymmetry which was certainly, as they said, unacceptable to them. But once they had developed and tested MIRVs, how would we know that they haven't deployed them in their force? And so I think we by not being unwilling to restrain ourselves lost an opportunity to limit the MIRV competition and led to what one could have anticipated, certainly we anticipated, mainly, that there would be a very extensively MIRV Soviet land based ICBM force taking full advantage of the fact that they dealt with larger missiles and therefore could develop capacity to carry many more MIRV warheads.... I believe during our discussions with Henry Kissinger that he was very interested in establishing an arms control regime. Interested importance of arms control for security and that he very much wanted a an ABM treaty. I think he understood that any movement towards arms control had to start with obtaining the ABM treaty. That's correct judgment in my view. And that's what he wanted. Now as to how he viewed the possibility of or the desirability I should say, of a MIRV ban I have no clear picture.

BUT YOU WERE ADVOCATING THAT WAS...

We explained the group that met with Dr. Kissinger certainly did explain why we saw a great advantage and importance to a MIRV ban. And in fact, a more...a more comprehensive limit on the technology of nuclear weapons, through slowing the testing of new weapons and the like. That one had a good deterrent balance at forces at those levels. That one should start reducing. And that with an ABM treaty, there was no need in terms of what we believed deterrence meant to continue the technological entrees at any rapid pace.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN THE ABM TREATY BECAME A REALITY, WHEN IT WAS ANNOUNCED? DID THIS...

I was...I was very pleased. I though that was a major triumph of our foreign policy and I...

COULD YOU JUST SAY, "WHEN I HEARD THAT THE A—

When I...when I when the... ABM...when I learned that ABM treaty had been successfully negotiated and that the President and Mr. Brezhnev signed the treaty in Moscow in 1972, I was very pleased. I thought we had made the necessary crucial first step toward regulating the arms competition. I recognize that it wasn't everything that I wanted, that they started in 1972 allowing each country two sights. It was only two years later that it was amended to reduce the allowed the deployments to only one sight, but that was a very...a very good limit. Obviously, I would have been happier if it had been...zero. I would have been happier if the offensive interim agreement had been more restrictive. In particular, had been possible to avoid the MIRV competition, but I thought that it was a great achievement and was a basis, it was a first step in a process. Because the goal ...the main goal of the arms control regime is to make the use of these weapons less likely. It's to introduce a stability. A better understanding. To create a dialogue, a process that will be continuing. Just reducing the number of weapons is not a major goal. The major goal is to make sure we never use those things.

WE'VE BEEN LIVING WITH ARMS CONTROL NOW FOR QUITE A WHILE. BUT AT THAT TIME, WAS IT SOMEWHAT INCREDIBLE THAT THIS REALLY HAPPENED, THIS ABM TREATY?

Well, I think I...as to whether that first ABM treaty was incredible or not, I would say it certainly was a major — you might say disturbance or a major jolt...in the general public perception of life in a nuclear era. Because here was our government signing a treaty saying that it would not try to defend the American people. And that it would not increase the numbers of missiles. This really was arms control... in a nuclear world where weapons now had a different role. And this was saying deterrence of attack is the condition we live with. It was recognizing a condition that's unparalleled to history. It's an uncomfortable condition. That's... that the condition is we don't defend ourselves, but we live as mutual hostages to annihilation. And this was sort of codifying that, accepting it and so it was the basis of intense editorial comment and debate. There were senators violently opposed to this who felt that in dealing with the Russian threat, we had to do everything within our military power to make ourselves stronger and to try ceaselessly and relentlessly to defend ourselves, even if imperfectly but without regard to what if meant for the arms race. And so this really was a major achievement in my view. And I give enormous credit to President Nixon and Henry Kissinger for having been the two people who played so important a part in getting it. Of course, the unsung hero is Ambassador Gerard Smith and his colleagues who sat there and actually negotiated the details without which one cannot have a treaty. Because when you're putting your national security on the line, you've got to be very careful. You know what all the implications of the treaty are, what all the loop holes are, how you're going to verify compliance with it.

JACK RUINA SAID TO US THAT WHEN THE ABM TREATY BECAME A REALITY, HE FELT THE ARMS RACE WAS OPEN. DO YOU HAVE STRONG A FEELING AS THAT?

I'm an optimist. When I heard the treaty I didn't say the arms race was over, I said I hoped that this was the first of a series of steps that would regulated a process which will lead to a safer world at reduced weapons. And we kept hoping, but the period from '72 to '79 ended in a complete frustration when the SALT II Treaty was not ratified. In fact, there was another step of important progress and that was the Vladivostok accord when President Ford, after the resignation of Nixon...went to Vladivostok and met with Brezhnev and they agreed on a framework for further progress. I do remember that when I talked to my friends in the national security apparatus after Vladivostok, I expressed a certain amount of disappointment that the framework was as loose as it was. That it didn't call for more strict reductions or limitations. But I recognize it as a basis for proceeding, and thought it was a good one to work with.

AT THE END OF THREE OR FOUR YEARS OF NEGOTIATING ON SALT I, THERE NEVERTHELESS WAS AN ADDITION OF MANY THOUSANDS OF WARHEADS. HOW DO YOU REGARD — WAS IT REALLY AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT?

SALT I is often criticized as having limited severely a very ineffective weapon system that couldn't work very well. While not limiting very effectively much more dangerous weapons systems like the MIRV, which was a multiplier on our missile forces and Soviet forces. I recognize that argument, but I think that SALT I was the crucial first step in a process which said that we agree on the fundamental principles for negotiating toward a safer world. Mainly, that deterrence is a condition that we're going to live with. Now once we had recognized that, the hope was that in steps two, three or beyond, one would then have reductions. Numerical reductions, maybe qualitative restrictions that were not accomplished in SALT I. Certainly, as a scientist entering into national security issues in the sixties, one had visions that in 1972, the first treaty would have accomplished more than it did. But political reality is tough. And we learned as Einstein said, "Politics is much harder than physics." SALT I was a major achievement. And one just, there was no point in saying, "It's a disappointment. We should have done more. It's ineffective." It was a major achievement in setting a foundation for process. My disappointment is not in SALT I. My disappointment is that from 1972 to 1986 we have failed to build on that achievement... in any effective way. It's a little harsh statement because the SALT II Treaty, although never ratified, did establish some counting rules that didn't exist before. It did set some subcategory limits on MIRVs. And at least as of November the eighth, 1986, we were still living under those SALT II counting rules. And I hope we will continue to.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD BE THE BEST ROAD TO TAKE NOW AND WHAT DO YOU SEE OVER THE, WHAT DO YOU REALISTICALLY HOPE FOR OVER THE NEXT TEN OR FIFTEEN YEARS? TO INCREASE THE STABILITY OF OUR SITUATION.

As I look in 1986 ahead to the end of the century, the most I can hope for is that we recognize that at least in this time frame, there is no alternative to deterrence. The Catholic Bishops and their pastoral letter said it well. Deterrence is not acceptable as an end in itself. But because it offers the prospect for avoiding conflict, it's a morally acceptable policy...

WE'RE GOING TO STOP HERE. I'LL ASK YOU TO START THAT OVER.

As I look forward to the, what I think of the realistic prospects for arms control and a safer world by the end of the century, I see no alternative but to make deterrence work. To stabilize the nuclear balance. I endorse the statement of the Catholic Bishops who said that deterrence is not acceptable as an end in itself, but because it offers the best prospect of avoiding conflict, it's a morally acceptable policy as long as we're taking steps towards gradual disarmament. So the long term time scale, I think has to be viewed as one in which we have to get rid of nuclear weapons. Man has used every weapons we've invented. Even though restraints were put, we've used every weapon sooner or later. We have to get rid of nuclear weapons. But for the time scale of my children and my grandchildren, I see technically and politically no alternative but to make deterrence work. And that means strengthening the ABM Treaty. There have been technologies developed in the fourteen years since it was negotiated. We have to clarify the interpretation of the treaty as applied to these new technologies when... It's article five says that...development testing and deployment of space based, mobile land based, sea based and air mobile systems is forbidden. We have to clarify that. We don't need a new treaty. We just have to clarify the interpretation. Research will continue to see if the technological prospects change. With strength in the treaty, we also have to resolve the compliance issues. But the effort should be to work within the treaty and to now that, both the United States and the Soviet Union have comparable level of nuclear forces. In order of magnitude, more than we need. That the effort should be within the ABM treaty restraints, also to begin severe reductions of the offensive weapons. And I'm delighted that the leaders of the US and Soviet governments are talking so openly about cutting those forces in half, as a step on the way to getting rid of them. I think those kinds of goals and visions should be presented. But they should not be used as a distraction from the necessary hard work of day to day efforts to resolve compliance issues, to strengthen the ABM Treaty regime rather than trying to escape it, rather to holding out false visions of some astrodome or some defensive shield which has got no technical reality. Prepare for a safer world, today as fourteen years ago when we negotiated SALT I, is going to be paged by the patient slow process of arms control negotiations, civil political dialogue to reduce the risk of these weapons being used. And I think technology is an escape from that difficult issue. There is no technological fix that I see to our present dilemma of trying to survive in a nuclear world.