It may sound strange, but I think that...that there is not serious basis for the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Because at the same time, there is a lot of conflict. But if you try to look into the possibilities of conflicts would, the Soviet Union and the United States have no idea to the real demands, so to say, to each other. Ah it can. There is no economic struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is not very much, not very much trade, but ah no struggle. Ah struggle for the influence in contemporary world, I think there is a lot of...of, a lot of very superficial, so to say, in the notion of those foreseeing that there is struggle for influence. So certainly, there are, there are differences in system. And system in the Soviet Union is quite different from the one existing in the United States. So there are systematic differences certainly. But at the same time I think that ah at least our side recognized long ago, long ago, that systematic difference should not lead to war. And lately we recog...I think we recognized that the systematic difference should not lead to...to confrontations. To political confrontation even. Ah it...it seems to me that ah there is a growing understanding in the United States of the difference of systems. Maybe to arguments, to disagreements. But ah not to ah, not to, not to struggle, not to political struggle. Not to speak about our struggle. Certainly a lot of, a lot of things we should in hysteria. Push, both sides to struggle. Arms race push has ah, both sides to struggle. And I think that the arms race is not only the result of these differences, but in that ah some kind of inner mechanism. In-built mechanism which push has, both sides to struggle.

CAN YOU SORT OF TRY TO CHECK OFF THOSE HISTORICAL EVENTS WHICH IN YOUR UNDERSTANDING, BUT DOING SO RELATIVELY BRIEFLY WITHOUT MUCH INTERPRETATION. YOUR UNDERSTANDING CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH OF THE COUNTRY. I MEAN THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY.

To the growth of conflict?

YEAH.

You know ah, first of all what we call, what we call cold war, where actually all major roots of post-war conflict originated. It is a certainly greatly debatable point where the, it was inevitable, the cold war was inevitable, onward inevitable. I think that more and more, especially when we step more and more from this period when ah it is more and more, moves more and more into history. More and more people think that it was not inevitable. But although it did happened...

So first of all it was cold war which sometimes ah...ah, which sometimes ah...ah approached the war during the crisis in Berlin in 1940s. Ah war in Korea, Cuban Missile Crisis and others. And ah at that time mentality developed on both sides of which drove both sides to more confrontation. To more zero some game approach. When sometimes ah if ah, any side—Soviet Union or the other, or the United States. Ah to do some harm to the other side, was already a good Russia now for doing this thing. Which is foolish ah from the point of view of common sense. But ah...ah the approach which developed and which existed, and ah I think ah, I do believe very much that ah my nation, that our country have dropped this approach. And this is not present in our push today. So ah historically they've been. This psychology of...of such confrontation of thinking and confrontational approach. Ah influenced very much. Certainly the idea of logical differences and what were called ideological struggle, also influenced, added additional...additional burdens so to say to this process of confrontations. So the...the origin of confrontation is very, on the one hand is very complicated and is in many quarters. On the other hand it is rather simple and originated really in the, in the cold war the first post war years.

WHAT DO YOU THINK OUGHT TO BE THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE WEST/EAST RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF APPROACH SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION TAKE IN THE FUTURE?

First of all it is ah the approach, it is not only what I should think. But I think what is the thinking in general going on? There are no...no...no agreements from every points. Many things people discuss, and many there are disagreements. But on the one hand, I think it is clear that the differences of the world understanding, of approaches, the differences of approaches to particular areas of the world, to particular situations. The differences will certainly continue. And ah it would be naive to think that ah the next ten or fifteen years will be the years of overall calculation. But at the same time, it is quite clear that it is necessary first of all in general form to make these differences as small as possible. Or to try to ah, whenever it is possible, to reduce these areas of differences or disagreements. And secondly, what is most important, is to ah, to eliminate the qualitative element where these differences lead to confrontation to political confrontations To arms race, to some kinds of military confrontations. And in this sense and in this sense, ah I think that various, really various simple things of common sense should be introduced, of give and take, of understanding that ah if you want to get something from the other side, you should make concessions yourself. The bigger you want to get from the other side, the bigger your concessions should be. That ah you should not be afraid of compromises or of losing faces. And should be quite bold in making steps of compromises. Sometimes even doing more in order to get the proper response from the other side. Ah that ah, the areas which were traditionally the areas of calculation, the economic cultural calculation, should be very carefully looked into and into. Ah and certainly in the major area of confrontation that is defense political, or military political areas, that really a bold step should be undertaken by both sides. And the side which make all the steps I think will get more created ah from all over the world and from the future ah in reducing, in reducing this area.

YOU ELIMINATED MY OTHER…

Please do…

LET ME SHIFT TO ANOTHER PROBLEM. DO YOU THINK THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE, THAT SOMETIMES, THE HISTORIES IS ATTRIBUTED TO BE THE THREE ...WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ON THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL SPIRIT AS A POTENTIAL TREATY FOR THE PROCESS?

You know this is a point along which we debate very much with western allies. And ah I think that the whole, the whole situation ah in Europe, especially their deployment of missiles both SS-20s and American missiles to and get on cruise missiles. Ah we should look at...at it I think in a more complicated, in a more complicated context. That ah on the one hand, the situation in Europe started worsening in the second half, in the second half of ah, of ah 1970s. And in this sense their deployment of SS-20s was the residue of it. On the other hand, on the other hand ah their weapons at least I mean ground lodge cruise missiles and to, were developed in the United States even before Americans knew about the existence or even of testing SS-20s by the Soviet Union. So it had its own momentum. Today, we even support... support the arguments in support of this idea. Through American and western analysts who say that American ah, for instance American medium range, or intermediate range forces in Europe. Or...or should not be reduced because actually they were not deployed as a, as a, as a deployed to SS-20. Many people, many people ah spoke about that. General Haig said that several times. Ah lots of documents were published that ah which today, when those who are against ah the treaty, or this INF treaty, or what we call the treaty, one medium and short-range missiles. All those who are against it, all those who are critical on it say no, that it has nothing to do with the deployment of SS-20s. Because we had, we had some other reasons for it. That we were, what is their explanation today that ah, that because of these existence of generals, strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States which emerged in early '70s. It was necessary for the rest to make some ah, some additional layer of weapons ah because ah they were afraid that these existence of this capability to destroy each other will prevent the United States from supporting western Europe in crisis and they say this was the for and cruise missiles. And not SS-20s. The SS-20 was simply a political explanation for it. So in this sense I think that the situation, the situation was complicated. Certainly ah, certainly with a removal of these weapons on both sides, the situation will be much better. But I think that the reasoning on both sides was much more complicated. In this sense, in this sense, I wouldn't say that we could simply in a simplistic way say that the deployment of SS-20s triggered this ah, this western deployment. In the simplistic ah political propagandistic terms when especially we are needed. Ah needed an explanation for deployment. It was utilized very widely, I mean the Soviet Union SS-20s. But today when...when ah in a more complicated way, the history is being analyzed, and suddenly we found out that it was not.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE MOTIVATION OF PEOPLE LIKE SCHMIDT?

I don't know, you know because ah it seems tome the Chancellor Schmidt first of all changed his point of view several times. Ah he said one point of view when he spoke in London...London in 1977 at ISS meeting when he made this grand appeal so to say for the medium range response. Ah after that he was ah, he was ah, he was ah...ah I think very willing on his approach to the ah deployment of Pershing II, IIs and cruise missiles. Ah he was very strong certainly in support as I understand of zero option that is of removal of...of weapons on both sides which actually happened. So I don't know what his motivation. Possibly in his motivation, one of the motivations was the one I mentioned and which is now being presented by the best. Then I think we should also take into consideration general, the mentality on both sides. Now in the end of 1970s and especially in early '80s, still this dramatic momentum of confrontation of ah you know of ah trying to ah, trying to ah...ah, I cannot find the proper English word for it.

IF YOU CAN DESCRIBE THE ATMOSPHERE THAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT.

Yes. The late '70s and early '80s, when you know which mentality that ah, you know, whatever the other side does ah our side should do something immediately in the response and which is the mentality actually of the traditional logical arms race. It existed on both sides. And it also influenced this process of which led to the situation of ah European seen with these missiles. Today for instance, for our side, when for instance as far as SDI is concerned, the Soviet Union thought about it and decided that our reply to SDI will be a symmetrical reply. Cheaper, possibly more effective. But ah ten years ago probably the Soviet Union would not respond in such a way. And ah instinctive response would be simply on every side. On Soviet side to repeat what Americans did and vice versa. Today we see that ah there are would be bigger possibilities for other responses. And possibly in today's situation, this deployments and counter-deployments in Europe could be carried on quite differently, I am very happy that they, that they are being eliminated and nothing new is being deployed certainly. So in this sense, ah in this sense I think that we should also take into consideration that mentality is changing and changing rather dramatically.

CAN YOU PUT THAT IN TERMS OF THE SHIFT IN SOVIETS NEGOTIATING AND IN FACT CARRYING OUT POLICIES FOR ALL, LEAVING GENEVA TO... CAN YOU SORT OF EXPLAIN?

No, I think it is better to explain maybe through practical examples. Because both general principles we don't, and I think you talked with many people. But I think in practical examples, in practical examples it was ah presented by the Soviet Union. For instance, the fact that the Soviet Union rather easily agreed ah to eliminate practically to Soviet missiles against one American missile. I think that ah it would ah, it would ah, it would not be possible say ten years ago when we were, when both sides were in the, in the rigid framework of traditional approach. Today ah today when people ah on our side think about security in more general terms, very much in qualitative terms. It is rather easy, it was rather easy to take this decision. On the other hand, you know like in chess so to say, we exchanged the quantity for quality because the Soviet Union gave up, not will give us, let us say so, ah at least two times more of missiles and warheads.

You know, as I said it was ah like ah in chess? The Soviet Union gave up quantity. Two Soviet missiles, two Soviet warheads against one American. But we got quality. Because some ah American medium range missies could reach Moscow. And Russians too could do it very quickly. It was, you know, in Soviet mentality, always 1941, the year of German attack is present. And ah the situation with Pershing II, I would compare like it was important on 1941 when the, any missile to say was ah at the doorstep of Moscow. And ah in a metaphoric way we may say that Russians too were at the doorstep of Moscow because of the short time. We had ten minutes. Some say twelve minutes, it doesn't matter. A very short time. So and ah by certainly if these missiles, certainly it is an ah...ah, it is an American concession to us. So it was really, what I like in this treaty that it was really a bold ah, a bold ah, a bold ah exchange of concession. I'm not talking about verification where unbelievable things has happened. I would say from both sides and so on.

CAN YOU PINPOINT TO THE LOGIC THAT'S MADE THESE KINDS OF THINGS POSSIBLE? AUGUST, 1981, IT WAS REALLY POSSIBLE, THE SOVIET DELEGATION MOVED OUT OF GENEVA.

You know the logic is ah, what we call new thinking. It is a very general term, but at the same for many of us it is a new philosophy of approach, of approach to international relations. And ah it is a philosophy which is directed very clearly at establishing over more secure words. Secure for us and for the other side. But ah at ah, at much lower levels, of much lower levels of defensive forces from both sides. That is, that is the logic. That is ah, let us say now, the philosophy of such an approach.

WHO BETWEEN '81 AND 8...?

You know, no, I think it is quite clear. I think it is in fact. That the new Soviet leadership which came General Secretary Gorbachev and other members, let us say, of new Soviet leadership who came since April of 1985. They started, they started with the support of the people, certainly started dramatically changing it. First at ah, first these elements of new thinking were presented by Mikhail Gorbachev, ah, in his ah, speech to the French parliamentarians, to members of the French parliament during his visit to Paris. Then, at Geneva, during meetings with President Reagan, have to talk about the stages. But then, on the fifteenth of ah, January in 1986, the major step was Soviet program for nuclear disarmament by stages. Then it was Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, where many new dramatic, dramatic elements in Soviet strategic thinking and political-military thinking were introduced, and so on.

DO YOU KNOW WHAT WAS THE INITIAL RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET MILITARY?

You know, first of all, first of all, in the Soviet Union, political leadership takes decision, not the military. And the military certainly are listened to, but they have to comply with what political, ah, people decide. Then, you should take into consideration the speci—the other specific of, of Soviet system. That the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or the Politburo, which works in between, consists of the people who ah, should, are all the time adjusting the priorities—economic priorities, defensive priorities, expenditures for education, I don't know for health, and ah, it is, ah, it creates, it, it creates the basis for balanced, for balanced approach. Where problems of defense, problems of defense are taken as a of problems, but which, which are the problems which would occupy proper place and not should be all-availment, so to say. You know, I am not in so much contact with the, with the military, but at the same time, judging by what the military has written in this, in this two and a half years, what they, our military, stated in their statements, how they behaved during the, their participation in different talks—for instance, because, if to talk about Soviet-American relations, in all the ah, three, the representatives of the military, were present, so judging from what they are saying, I don't know what are their inner discussion, but, on balance, as a result of it, it is a support of these policies. Because the, the task of the military is to worry about security of the nation, as one of the elements of the of the nation, and not simply of building up and building up. And in this sense, and in this sense, judging by pronouncements, the positions taken by the military, I think that there is...

CAN YOU PINPOINT THE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE POLICIES REGARDING INF AND SDI TOOK PLACE IN SOVIET THINKING?

You know, here, you remember, that uh, we may talk about several, several stages, so to say. There was a stage before Reykjavik, be-before Reykjavik meeting, when the Soviet Union tackled INF problem and probably more reduction of strategic offensive forces and ah, let us say, SDI, or adherence to ABM Treaty, or militarization of space, whatever is, is to be said, as separate problems... it was always stressed that we consider that, so to say, strategic ah, offensive forces and strategic defense are inseparable, are inseparable things. Now, after Reykjavik, for some time, the Soviet position was that the whole problem should be tackled as a package, and that INF problems should be looked at as a part of the package. What was the rationale ah, here? The rationale was that because we are talking about really dramatic reductions and because, from our point of view, the Soviet Union made very big concessions, that ah, if we made the concessions, we should have some gains; but, ah, gain in what form? That--but, the, this wound up... by making this passage, we could assure quicker movement on all the fronts immediately, including INF front. That, being connected with each other, they will allow all the things moving, moving to either. The experience-

[INAUDIBLE QUESTION]?

-the experience, the experience has shown that no, they are not moving quicker. There was, ah, there, many people in the west ah, ah, who are are saying that is to detach INF problem from the problem of strategic offensive, ah, forces and strategic defense. Ah, a lot was said, there was, in the beginning of ah, this year, there was a form--a forum, forum for survival of humanity...forum for...I don't, actually forgotten the official title of this forum, but it was a forum where people discussed genera--world problems of security and problems of prevention of nuclear war. And there, very many world personalities from different areas, experts, cultural figures, political figures, were present, and during this forum, many of western participants who ah, from our point of view, are occupying very reasonable position, generally on the necessity of improving security in the world, they were stressing that INP forces should better be detached and tackled differently. And after that, our government analyzed the position and the decision was taken that it is a, that these are reasonable appeals and that we should detach. That is how, how it happened and then, ah, though you know the negotiations in Geneva, they were always carried on in three baskets, so to say, one basket INF, the other basket, a reduction of strategic offensive forces and the last basket is ah, space, le-let us say, problems of non-militarization of space. But, after Reykjavik, the Soviet idea was that the two of the talks are, be, carried on separately; the agreement should be achieved together. Then, it was separated. Though the connection between strategic offensive forces of the defense, in Soviet mi--mind, continues to be and always was, ah, connected.

LET ME MOVE TO SOMETHING ELSE. I AM TRYING TO ELICIT SOME EMOTION TO AN IDEA WHICH NOW IS SLIGHTLY. DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR OWN EMOTIONS ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN FIRST ARRIVING TO POWER, MAKING STATEMENTS ABOUT SOVIET STATES, SOVIET POLICIES AND SO ON? CAN YOU ARTICULATE? CAN YOU REMEMBER IT NOW?

Let me try to remember this. You know, I am talking about my emotions. You know, it was—my first emotion was a great surprise, I would say, because I thought that it is, well, so anachronistic, you know, that the President describing the Soviet Union in such terms, that I believed before that that both our nations already left this stage of our relations long behind us. Because in 19—in late forties, in early fifties, ah, both sides hurled, so to say, not very pleasant words in direction of each other, and I should say that our side was also not very much lagging behind the Americans, at that time. But, I'm sure, about our side, that, ah, ah, people long already understood that it was a great anachronism, you know, to deal with America in sim-simplistic terms, you know. And then suddenly, this, this ah, uhr, this simplistic approach suddenly emerged, and the first feeling was, even, not of fear, not of concern, not of worries, but just of surprise and ah, but then, little by little, other feelings of concern ah, added to it. Though on the one hand, on the one hand, we have accustomed, in a sense, to live in a state of comparative security. It was not so before the beginning of 1970s, but after, after we understood that there is a capability of both sides to destroy each other, that there is a comparative balance of nuclear forces, then with all these worries about possibility of accidental war, nuclear winter, and certainly with all this inner feeling that really, the war will bring the end of humanity. On the other side, on the more, so to say, everyday level, some feeling of security developed, that ah, in a sense, at least for some time, that there is a security. And ah, and when these actions on the side of Reagan administration started—early actions and pronouncements, with increase of defense expenditures, I personally looked at it through the, I would say sense of humor, because the, you know, the regent, still balance exists, and it is so thick that it is impossible for any side to overthrow it. And by the way, the results of this Reagan buildup, which, of which we are very critical that they spend $2 trillion for this military buildup; it did not bring the United States anything. America, America did not reach, achieve superiority in any other field, any other field. Not, first of all, because the Soviet Union counter-balanced it, but possibly, if our country would not do anything, possibly they would not achieve something, because really, the, the balance, as I said, it is so, so thick. But little by little, certainly, the concern, the concern, concern developed, because on the one, on the one hand, we feel of needing more security, on the other hand, all of us understand that it is rather precarious feeling, because accidental, as it were, as, as a development of some sudden crisis, something may happen. So let us, if to talk about purely emotions, not rational analysis of this, I would describe my emotions like this.

HOW IS PRESIDENT REAGAN READ IN THE SOVIET UNION? IT'S NOW THE SAME MAN PAYING RESPECT TO GORBACHEV, HOW DO PEOPLE UNDERSTAND IT?

You know, first of all, first of all, ah every political fever, I think, in the case that your most let us say, most of political fever, maybe it would be wrong to say. But most of political fevers in this world, that.... But what is more important, the environment in which every political figure is working is ah changing all the time. Domestic environment, and international environment. And ah, I think that we should recognize the domestic environment for the, before President Reagan has ah involved and developed into something different than it was say almost. And international environment has changed. I think it relates to everyone. It relates to the Soviet Union. Certainly domestic situation in the Soviet Union. They destroyed good glasnost and other things. Certainly it influences Soviet foreign policy. And change of international environment certainly influences Soviet foreign policy. And I think influence, most of them are influencing in the positive way. Making it more often, more involved in the presentation of different initiatives. More ready for give and take, or compromises and so on.

WHETHER IN THE SOVIET THINKING THERE ARE ATTENTION TO THE ONE THAT YOU'VE SEEN IN AMERICAN THINKING BETWEEN THE LARGE.

You know, if I'm not mistaken, and maybe I'm wrong. But I did not, first of all there is no discussion of such type ah...ah like it was in the United States. And like the thinking is in the United States. There was no discussion here at all in the Soviet Union. Rightly or wrong. It may be wrong. I think it would be nice to have such a discussion, possibly in future such problems would be more widely discussed. Ah but if we talk about the elements of this problem. I think that ah, I think that ah in practical action, but also in some statements, the Soviet Union just, or...or...or Soviet tax better to say. Not Soviet Union maybe, have shown interest in some of these problems. For instance I think that it was more and more recognized that based strategic weapons are more so viable. And in this term ah fixed, the fixed ones. And ah that ah, and especially if it could be connected with the reduction of general number, because ah all ah, the mainstream of Soviet thinking is how to find ways of reducing, reducing more. If mobility could be connected, if mobility would not lead to increase of the number, but numbers, but would uh, lead to decrease of the numbers, from my point of view it is a very good thing. And certainly, more survivable weapon is better than less survivable. Then even in ah, just from the point of a very simple arithmetic to say, if your weapon is more survivable, then you need less of them ah, than fixed ones. Uh, take in other areas for instance, there was so much talk for the last two decades about heavy Soviet missiles. Because it happened so because, mostly because of technology, partly because the Soviet Union is a land-based nation and not sea-oriented, or less sea-oriented nation than the United States. There was so much talk about heavy missiles, which were three hundred plus of them. And the Soviet Union, the Soviet side, in Reykjavik, agreed that, it was confirmed later, agreed that their uh, heavy missiles about which Americans are so much worrying should be in the process of fifty percent reduction. Should be reduced proportionally. That is, uh, their numbers should be reduced by fifty percent. Now, after Washington meeting, Washington Summit meeting, it is already presented in practical figures of how many warheads, what would be their ceiling for the warheads, and it is— it was put on paper. So in this sense, in this sense also, the Soviet, the Soviet thinking is developing. But again, ah, from my point of view, any analysis, any analysis of any defensive posture... ...

...ARE VERY FIRMLY ON THE ARMS CONTROL FRONT...THAT THE PROBLEMS OF STABILITY ARE MORE IMPORTANT FROM-

Yes, certainly. This is completely, this ah, if you have tape, I... So, and ah, so in this sense, this is ah, being recognized by Soviet side, then certainly, the notion of stability is very much in—not simply very much—more and more is entrenched in Soviet minds, in all minds, political minds, military minds. And here, yes, I think that and ah, ah, it was ah, it was always on, on their minds but never so visible, so practical as it is today. And I think that this apprehension of stability, the apprehension of stability is growing and growing in the Soviet Union. First traces of it, you could even find, find in some sta—in some statements which were signed in 1979, in connection with SALT II Treaty. In the document, in the, I was in as an expert in Vienna at that time, too. In the document on the future talks. Soviet-American talks, on, strategic weapons ah, limitations and reductions. This notion of stability did already appear, as a bilateral notion. But certainly, they were very, very small traces; today, it is fully-developed concept, of the necessity of strategic stability, of what are the elements, what should be the full structure which will be most stable and, and ah, less destabilizing. All these elements are present here. Certainly, when we are talking, you started with mobile missiles, certainly the problem of verification will arise, but personally, I think that it is not so important problem today, especially after breakthroughs which were achieved in INF Treaty. Certainly, verification of mobile sys—of mobile land-based systems, ah, should, ah, not only land-based, but sea-based system, also, submarines, should be more complicated, more ah, more hard, more harsh, so to say, than it is in INF Treaty, but because major problems of principle are decided, it is much more technical problem than a problem of principles.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THESE MOMENTS FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW, HOW DID YOU FEEL? WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND?

You know, ah, ah, I was sitting in the hall where we were waiting for General Secretary Gorbachev to arrive and to give his press conference and ah, you know, first feeling was that they are on the verge of agreement and that the result of this meeting, which continued and continued because it was delayed about one and a half or two hours, ah, and first feeling was that, well maybe some details are to be settled and they will emerge triumphant, and ah, certainly when we saw—it was shown on television screens there, and immediately, ve—or very soon after, General Secretary Gorbachev has arrived, President Reagan went to Reykjavik Air, Air-base and the General Secretary came to the hall and gave his press conference. By the way,... and ah, you know, when they were leaving, most of the people understood that...something went wrong, you know, that there is no agreement, and ah, by the way, General Secretary Gorbachev at his press conference at his press conference in Washington remembered this moment, you know? And ah, when he was, he said, I remember how I gave press conference in Reykjavik, what was the situation that was tense at that time. He asked the people, he said, those who were in Reykjavik raise their, your hands. And I think several hands, rose because many of the people were also in Reykjavik, and ah, and certainly the press conference ...which he gave in Washington was much more relaxed, much more, so to say, with the feeling of something fulfilled, you know. Although, if to talk about Reykjavik, I think from the very beginning, ah, and though it and the understanding of it developed later, ah, from, but from the very beginning, many people thought that psychologically and even politically, Reykjavik was breakthrough. In practical terms, it was not breakthrough at all, but in psychological, political meaning it was a, it was a really great breakthrough.

CAN YOU GIVE ME ANOTHER SORT OF PERSONAL ANECDOTE—SOMETHING THAT IMPRESSED YOU, PERSONALLY, IN TERMS OF THE ENCOUNTER.

You know, not in Reykjavik, first of all, certainly I'm not boasting, but I think that, really, possibly for the first time, ah, I don't know rightly and wrongly that it was so unexpected for Americans, but possibly for the first time, the Soviet Union presented the result, presented very dramatic, very dramatic new proposals. Ah, some of ideas which were expressed, they er, er, were a departure of tradition of several decades, and all of them were concentrated, were concentrated in Reykjavik. I mentioned already, for instance, one about heavy missiles, about heavy missiles. Their mmn, wholly accepted idea of a very dramatic reduction in strategic offensive forces, fifty percent reduction. I think it was not very easy to do, because only, on the one hand, ah, fifteen years in the Soviet Union achieved ah, ehr, ah, comparative equilibrium with the United States on strategic forces. On the one hand, it was a, ah, not very long-term, but from historical point of view it was, it was very short-term, and ah, and ah, it needed some political boldness so to say, political bravery, to step aside from so, from the idea of so cherished balance which was achieved with such difficulty, and to say all right, let us reduce this balance by half, and in future even more. And I think that, yes, there was a feeling on excitement on th—on the Soviet side and, ah, I would say, even pride, ah, that such big things are put on the table and in many of them, you know, not some single achievement but just across the board.

CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THIS PROCESS IN WASHINGTON, AGAIN IN PERSONAL TERMS? WHAT WAS YOUR SENSE...?

You know, I think that in Washington it was continuation not only for the Soviet side, but for American side, too. Because, if you take joint statement, joint statement practically, in this joint statement there are big elements over so-called framework understanding of strategic, strategic offensive forces and of this joint statement ah, from my point of view, serious, serious advance, serious advances and ah, possibly ten years ago, it would take years to develop these compromises. Here it was done very quickly and practically in a couple of months, and completed very quickly at this meeting. Because, as, as far as I know, most of the discussions between the two leaders were connected, were connected with the problem of ah, strategic, ah, strategic, reduction of strategic offensive forces. And ah, the results of it are on the, on the table, so it was, I think, that here created should be taken equally by both sides.