FEBRUARY 12TH, 1987: AN INTERVIEW WITH DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY, IN NEW DELHI, INDIA. DR. SWAMY, BETWEEN 1962 AND 1969, YOU WERE AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY. CAN YOU TELL ME SOMETHING ABOUT HOW YOU GOT INVOLVED IN THE INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY AT THE TIME?

Well, at that time, the main event which made us all very interested was the Chinese nuclear test. And we had already a... a war with China in '62 in which we were quite badly humiliated. So it made us all think about nuclear weapons at that time, and the overseas Indians were particularly interested in the problem.

WHAT DID YOU DO?

Well, first of all, we called a meeting of overseas Indians in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Scientists from MIT and Harvard and other places. And we discussed the issue, and we felt that... that the... India ought to have nuclear weapons to safeguard its position in the world, which was declining after the Chinese attack.

CAN YOU MAKE THIS THE FIRST PERSON, IF POSSIBLE?

My main contribution was to demolish the myths that India couldn't economically afford nuclear weapons. Of course I made these political arguments too, but the main contribution I made was a study of the cost of acquiring a credible deterrent, and show that it was within the budget of India, and it would not be an unbearable burden.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT THE PETITION WAS ALL ABOUT?

Yes, I also organized with a... another professor who was visiting at that time at MIT called Raj Krishna to obtain signatures of a large numbers of very prominent Indians resident in the United States, and write to the Prime Minister to say that India should go in for nuclear weapons; that was one petition. And the second petition we sent was in '67, to urge the then-Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi not to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These were the two petitions.

WHY DID YOU FEEL SO STRONGLY THAT INDIA SHOULD PERHAPS GO AHEAD ON THAT KIND OF PROGRAM?

Well, there were two reasons; one was, clearly that, China... we had to protect ourselves in China, we didn't want to be caught napping, so to speak, like last... like '62. The second thing we noticed which was disturbing us a lot is the amount of international prestige that China was getting... from a country which was considered as a bankrupt country in '61, '62, to a country which was being equated to a superpower, only because they had acquired nuclear weapons. So I think both these arguments were finding favor with us.

WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL REACTION AT THE NEWS THAT THE CHINESE HAD EXPLODED A BOMB?

I... my reaction at that time, when I didn't know the Chinese as well as I know them now, was that they would use it against India.

LET'S JUST GO OVER THAT AGAIN... WITHOUT THE REFERENCE TO THE PRESENT DAY.

I was alarmed; I said... I felt suddenly India was in a helpless state. And... I felt that India ought to... ought to make a... stand its own feet to protect itself, because on this question I was quite sure, that India would not get any international protection.

CAN WE JUST DO THAT AGAIN... THERE WAS TRAFFIC NOISE. ...

I was alarmed; I felt India suddenly, totally helpless on the international stage, and considering the... the way China was being promoted as a superpower... all over the world in the international media, I think... I thought India would be all alone, and would have to fend for itself.

YOU SAID YOU THOUGHT THEY'D USE THE CHINESE BOMB ON INDIA. COULD YOU JUST SAY THAT ONE MORE TIME?

Yes, at that stage I was also convinced that the Chinese would use... I thought the... India would be the victim... they would use it on India, and they wouldn't hesitate, and that we were... would be all alone in the world, and China was being lionized by the media, and I felt... I thought that we'll have to fend for ourselves.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THIS ANTAGONISM BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA AT THIS TIME?

At that time? I certainly think the antagonism came out of a mistaken notion amongst the Indian people that the Chinese aggressed on us, and they thought, the... Indian people, they... At that time, the antagonism was clearly one of... arising out of the fact that China had... come into possession of what we considered to be Indian territory, and the... what we thought was... unprovoked 1962 war that China launched against us. The antagonism came out of a sense of betrayal, that Indians felt regarding China.

HOW ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, AT THIS TIME, WAS AN INDIAN BOMB PROGRAM?

At the moment it's a very small part.

IN THIS PERIOD.

In this, in this period, I... I estimated that the cost of the bomb would... and its delivery system would not cost more than about 750 crore rupees, which in... which is roughly about ten... about a billion dollars. And a billion dollars would have meant about 15 percent of our budget, which I thought we could afford.

LET'S JUST GO OVER THAT AGAIN... THERE WAS TRAFFIC NOISE.

The... the cost of a credible nuclear deterrent, I calculated, at that stage, was about a billion dollars. And a billion dollars would have meant about 15 percent of our budget, and I thought that, that's very easy to set aside for the program, and I didn't think that was a burden.

HOW DID THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF L.B. SHASTRI, RESPOND TO YOUR PETITION?

Well, the... nothing was told to us in writing, but the visiting ministers of the Shastri government told us that the prime minister was very sympathetic, and because of the international factors this was not going to be made public, but they appreciated what we did. They were therefore quite appreciative.

HOW WAS THIS IDEA OF HAVING AN INDIAN BOMB COMPATIBLE WITH TRADITION?

Well, I think there is a misunderstanding about Indians' traditional views. India did send army into Goa, India did send an army into and fought a war in Kashmir in 1948, India did get Hyderabad by force... I think the narrow projection on the international... arena distorted India's image. India was not a pacifist country at all. India placed great emphasis on the higher value on... on violence. But it was never a substitute for not doing anything, or for cowardice. We... we, in our ethos, do... give a place to the use of force. So it wasn't inconsistent at all. It was basically Nehru's projection in the world which the world misunderstood to be India's spiritual values; I'ts not so at all.

COULD YOU JUST DO THAT AGAIN, BUT A BIT BRIEFER?

Well, I, first of all think that the Indian nuclear deterrent is not inconsistent with the...

(QUESTION REPEATED)

The traditional Indian view was to protect our independence; it was therefore quite consistent with the requirements of the time and the feeling of the people. What may... the world may have been misled by Jawaharlal Nehru's own international projection, which in fact had no reality on the ground.

CAN YOU JUST SAY THAT NEHRU'S TRADITION...WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN CHANGED.

The... as far as Nehru's own... (projections) are concerned, it didn't get translated in terms of... the reality at home... we did use the army in Goa and in... in Kashmir; so I... I don't find any inconsistency here.

WHAT KIND OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY DID INDIA HAVE AT THAT TIME?

We certainly were capable of producing eight to ten bombs, at a cost of about $250,000 each; and we had Boeing 707s to deliver them if we needed it, so I think we had a crude capability already at that time.

HAD THERE BEEN MUCH PROGRESS DURING THE SHASTRI PERIOD IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY?

Yes, there was; in fact, the... power reactors that were set up, with the help of the General Electric really came to fruition during his period. And... and many more programs on... on nuclear fuel processing were okayed during his period. He did give a... a clear go-ahead to Homi Bhabha, who was then the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

COULD YOU EXPLAIN THIS GO-AHEAD?

Shastri in fact had given, according to my understanding, a clear indication to... Bhabha that he should go ahead to make the program as self-reliant as possible; the budget of the Atomic Energy Commission between '63 and '65 was increased by... a large amount... I don't remember the exact percentage, but I think by 50 percent... and the space program was launched during this period as well.

COULD YOU SAY, "ACCORDING TO YOUR UNDERSTANDING..."

Yes. The... I... am basing it on the... published reports in Parliament of the department of atomic energy.

HOW DID RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AFFECT INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS AT THIS TIME? DID THEY AFFECT INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY?

No, I think Pakistan was not a factor at all at that time. Because there was no talk of Pakistan having any capability. The main factor was China. And the international prestige that China was getting as a consequence of having its own nuclear weapons.

WERE YOU IN FAVOR OR AGAINST NPT?

I was very violently opposed to it, because I was for India making the bomb. In fact I had assembled an even bigger petition, on the NPT, and submitted it to Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who had become prime minister. And I... believed that that petition was seriously considered by the... by the prime minister and her cabinet.

HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE MRS. GANDHI'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND DID YOU AGREE WITH IT AT THIS TIME?

Well, she was totally pacifist... she wanted the... India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was Mr. Desai's objection in the cabinet which stopped it. Mr. Desai opposed it on moral grounds. Mrs. Gandhi was persuaded to sign the agreement, on the grounds that we'd get a lot of transfer technology if we signed it. But her... she had no commitment to the nuclear weapons program at all, at that stage.

SO WOULD IT BE TRUE TO SAY THAT YOU WERE IN FAVOR OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION FOR INDIA?

I was. I was. I wanted India to exercise it... Yes, it would be true that I wanted India to exercise its option... produce nuclear weapons. I wanted India to produce about a hundred... intermediate ballistic missile... missiles and a hundred twenty-kiloton bombs... as a... deterrent.

AND WERE YOU DISAPPOINTED AT THE RECEPTION?

The reception generally was very hostile in the intellectuals, and in the international community of scholars, but the general masses in India responded very favorably. Wherever I went, there was a tremendous reception to this view of mine. Which has now become the... view of the country now.

DURING THE PERIOD THAT MRS. GANDHI WAS IN OFFICE, THERE WAS AN INDO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP. HOW DID THAT CHANGE GLOBAL RELATIONS?

On the question of the Soviet Union there was no difference in their attitude on the... on the nuclear question, the Soviet Union and the United States are at almost identical position as far as India was concerned. Both wanted India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty; both wanted India not to have nuclear weapons. The Indo-Soviet relations had a negative factor, because it created a psychological atmosphere in the country that we could depend on a Soviet umbrella, and that therefore there was no need to produce our own deterrent. That was the negative factor as far as I was concerned.

HOW DID THE WAR WITH PAKISTAN IN 1971 INFLUENCE YOUR OPINION ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUES?

Well, it only confirmed my view that... that Pakistan is not a factor in the nuclear question. That Pakistan ceased to be even less important as a fact, even if it had nuclear weapons. Pakistan was halved in its size, it became a much smaller country, and became much more vulnerable, and easily... a country that can easily handle by conventional means, and I think the '71 war only further emphasized that the nuclear weapons decision had to be based on non-Pakistani questions, like China and the international position of India.

CAN WE TALK ABOUT CHINA AND THE US INTERVENTION IN THAT WAR? HOW DID THAT STRIKE YOU?

The only issue that came up at that time was whether nuclear weapons were on board the USS Enterprise task force, which was sent to the Bay of Bengal. There was a common rumor that nuclear weapons were on board, and that the United States government had indeed issued a nuclear threat in a very real way. That gave a certain amount of impetus to the nuclear debate, and it did get more strength from Establishment circles. But I think the USS Enterprise task force only served as a catalyst in the debate, but it was not something which created the debate — the debate was there already.

SO YOU WOULDN'T DESCRIBE IT AS A TURNING POINT.

No, I wouldn't call it a turning point. I would call only 1964 as a turning point.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS THAT INDIA HAD SUCCESSFULLY EXPLODED THE NUCLEAR DEVICE IN 1974?

Well, I had a feeling of exhilaration. It was the only good news that I heard for a long time under Mrs. Gandhi's regime, so I welcomed it fully, and hoped that it... will lead to something more, which it didn't. The program fizzled out after that.

HOW DID THE INDIAN PEOPLE REACT?

Oh, they were... they were wild with joy. There were sweets distributed on the streets, I remember, just around here. I remember I was in... in parliament at that time; I had just entered parliament; people were personally congratulating me... sweets were distributed, people may have shook hands with each other, party lines were all forgotten; there was genuine exhilaration here at that time.

WHY DID INDIA WAIT UNTIL 1974 TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS TEST?

I think Mrs. Gandhi used it as a political weapon more than as a weapon for... as part of our... policy, or long-run policy. She was having one failure and one setback after another in 1972, '73 and '74 there was a terrible strike here of the railway men, which paralyzed the country. There was a great... feeling of gloom in the country here, and I also believed that she knew that Pakistan was working feverishly on the bomb, and so she used the nuclear tests as a way of recovering some of her lost popularity, which it did momentarily, actually. I don't think she had a goal; I was at that time a member of the consultative committee of parliament on atomic energy, and she was the chairman of it. And I remember asking her, after the... just after the explosion... in the... in the meeting of that... consultative committee of parliament... that what is your objective in this explosion. She said, well, there was nothing to it, except that this is part of the peaceful program, and indeed the program... the nuclear program did undergo a decline from 1974 to 1978. I think it was really essentially a political... for her own personal political popularity, she had that explosion. The scientists and nuclear... in the nuclear establishment, were of course pressing very hard for... for this. I know, because I represented that part of the constituency... the Trombay part as being... as part of my parliamentary constituency. And I know they were pressing very hard to be able to see what they have created, in the form of an explosion, but... but finally what made Mrs. Gandhi take the plunge was her decline, from 1972 to 1974. And she wanted to change that, that decline.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE AMERICAN AND CANADIAN STATEMENTS AT THE TIME, THAT INDIA HAD BROKEN HER PEACEFUL USES ONLY AGREEMENT?

The general reaction of most people, including myself, was so what? We have to do it in our national interests, and I knew for a fact that we hadn't broken any agreement really; we had a small reactor tucked away in Trombay, which was totally unsafeguarded, and we used material only from that, butm basically there was no effect and we felt little annoyed... many of us felt a little annoyed that on the question of China, the western world was taking a much more lenient view, whereas on the question of India they were acting very hard, and we felt that was a bias in the approach of the western countries.

CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN HOW INDIA CAME TO HAVE THAT CAPABILITY?

Well, the Indian explosion was in fact a very special kind; it was what is called an implosion; that is, we brought various masses of the fissile plutonium together, and created a... critical mass, which exploded, underground. This... India was the only country which... which came... its first test was underground. And it was... the capability had already been achieved, I think, in '64, '65, basically, and what we were really doing was testing the technology of that period. And the most difficult part was the trigger... the triggering mechanism, which is where the controlled reaction takes place. And here, I must say, I met the scientists in Trombay. I had a very high regard for them; I'm sorry some of them had to resign and go now, but it was nothing very... there was no great leap in our technology at that stage.

WHO DO YOU REGARD AS THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTORS TO THAT?

Bhabha certainly, number one. I would certainly... put Dr. Sethna and Dr. Ramanna as people who worked for Bhabha loyally, and therefore contributed heavily. But the brains, clearly, was Dr. Iyengar, who has just resigned. And there were some other scientists who have now... some of them are deceased, and some of them have gone away. But barely... basically the... the motivator in the theoretical realm, in terms of self-confidence... sheer self-confidence... I think Dr. Iyengar was excellent.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO ME THE FACILITIES THAT WERE REQUIRED AND USED FOR THAT EXPLOSION?

Mo... all the materials that were required for the explosion was available in Bombay and in Trombay itself. There was essentially a bomb that was planted underground, and connected by a wire, which was then put in the station and then it was ignited. The tough part was the... the trigger, which once the signal went in, it had to control the reaction and bring these various little pieces together. And it's an implosion; it wasn't an explosion. Most of... the Hiroshima bomb and all were explosions. This was in a... critical mass is broken apart, and that... is the explosion. Here little pieces were brought together, and they were controlled, and I think all the material was easily available already, in Trombay, and I don't think... and the reactor... we had our own reactor there, which was unsafeguarded, which produced the fissile plutonium. And there was nothing that we got from outside.

WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT YOU'VE JUST DESCRIBED AND AN ACTUAL BOMB?

Well, the only... the... making it smaller size, and being able to fit it onto... onto a missile or carry it on board a plane... The difference between a bomb and what we exploded was essentially in the packaging part. This was a large-size one, and it... detonated with the help of a wire. That's because... we were only testing. But now... the next step is just to cut it into a shape and size where it can be fitted onto a missile, or... or it can be carried aboard a plane. It's the packaging part only. We were in fact a nuclear power, by all rights, in 1974, after that explosion, and there, the remaining portion was the... only the packaging part.

DO YOU KNOW FROM PERSONAL INTERACTION WITH THESE SCIENTISTS IF INDIA HAS THE KNOW-HOW TO PRODUCE A BOMB? AS EARLY AS THIS PERIOD?

Yes, certainly; I knew... I had made... paid a visit, in 1967, to the atomic energy establishment... on a visit... I had come from on a visit during summer vacation from Harvard. And I was taken round the complex, and shown what was available, and I could put two and two together and... and also, on the basis of confidential confidences... exchanged, as one scientist to another; at that time I was a scientist myself, in the sense I was an economist. I think... I... became convinced in '67 itself that we could make a bomb.

CAN YOU GIVE US AN EXAMPLE OF A CONVERSATION WITH ONE OF THE SCIENTISTS?

I asked Dr. Iyengar, straightforward, that "Do you think we can make the bomb?" He said the only difficulty was the trigger, and he says, that we have. And in fact that's the, the difficulty that Pakistan has today... it... it still hasn't mastered that problem. And it was a very direct... it wasn't a hint at all. They showed me the reactor where, besides plutonium can produce, they showed me the fuel rods which have to be withdrawn a little earlier than... than for a power reactor, which would produce the fissile plutonium; they showed me where it is stored, and they also told me that we would have to have an underground explosion, because we don't have any islands where we can have an overground explosion, and... plus we have a treaty, which we signed in 1963, which forbid us from having an... overground test.

WAS THE CONVERSATION WITH DR. IYENGAR IN '67? CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS, AND CAN YOU SET THEM IN TIME?

In terms of the number of bombs?

THE WAY THAT YOU SAID DR. IYENGAR TOLD YOU, BUT WITH THE DATE...

Well, the date I'll tell you exactly. It was June 7th, 1967, that's the day that I visited.

CAN YOU SAY, "DR. IYENGAR TOLD ME IN 1967..."

Yes... Dr. Iyengar told me in June, 1967 when I visited the... establishment, he was deputed to take me around; Dr. Sethna was the director, and he asked him to take me around; he explained the whole thing on a blackboard, how... what the program was, and then I asked him a direct question: Is this of any use to the bomb? They already knew that I'd written about the bomb, that I'd sent petitions and so on, there was already great empathy and sympathy with me. And therefore, they told me that, certainly we can... if they... if they tell us, and we would like to also. Many of them said, "We want to see it happen. We want all our equations that we have put in; we want to see it, whether it really works underground or not." So, in June '67, I... I myself became convinced that we could have the bomb.

IN 1977 YOU WERE IN THE GOVERNMENT. CAN YOU RECALL PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT TO INDIA, AND WHAT HAPPENED THEN?

Yes, I recall very clearly, because I did play a role from the background. President Carter was coming in the... in a atmosphere that India was considering signing something called a full-scope safeguards agreement. Now, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had gotten such a bad name in India that almost everybody was against it without knowing what it stood for. But somehow, an impression had been created in the country that a full-scale safeguards agreement was a diluted version of it, that was not so... not so restrictive. In fact, it was much more restrictive, because of the pursuit clause. And I don't have to explain what the pursuit clause is, you know that. And, I'm... then... took it upon myself to go to the prime minster; I was again a member of the consultative committee of parliament, on atomic energy, of which the chairman was the prime minister, and I took it upon... myself to go to him and explain to him, and he wouldn't believe it. In fact, he too was under the impression that the full-scope safeguard agreement was a milder, much more diluted version of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and when I explained to him what the pursuit clause was, it is then that he woke up. By then Carter had already scheduled his arrival here, and I think the... at the lower level, the exchanges were such that the impression was created that we signed the full-scope safeguards agreement. And Mr. Carter came here and found Mr. Desai totally unrelenting, and unfortunately didn't perceive that there was a microphone on at that time, and in fact vented his anger at Mr. Desai, and said a cold and blunt letter should be sent to him for refusing to sign. In fact, Mr. Carter's whole trip was on that assumption that he would take the signature back with him, and he was a very disappointed man, so I did play a role in that, in bringing out the facts. And I may say that the Soviet Union also requires the same pursuit clause in its agreements now.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE RAPP ONE AND TWO?

Yes, in fact the Soviet Union had agreed to sell us some heavy water. And the... the agreement that we signed, which shocked me it was signed by... my government, but it was negotiated by the earlier government, Mrs. Gandhi's government. Now the agreement was that if heavy water is used in the... in the Rajasthan power project, RAPP, as you called it, and if any product that comes out of that out of those reactors is used in another reactor, somewhere else, say, in Bombay or in... in Madras, then that too would come under safeguards. And because of my intervention, I may say that as long as our party was in power, we did not use a drop of that heavy water. We just kept it without use. But since Mrs. Gandhi came back to power in 1980, that water has been used, and the safeguards apply once again.

YOU WERE A MEMBER OF THE DESAI GOVERNMENT, AND YET YOU WEREN'T STRICTLY IN AGREEMENT. HOW DID YOUR VIEWS DIFFER?

I was for the bomb. Mr. Desai was deadly opposed to the bomb. In fact at one stage when I threatened to bring a revolution of the party to him for implementation, he said he would resign and go, and it is on that I relented. I... I felt at that stage his being... prime minister was more important than our having the bomb. But we were diametrically... opposed as far as the question of nuclear weapons was concerned, but we were totally agreed on the question of India's... independence, and also keeping the options open.

WHY DID YOU THINK INDIA NEEDED A BOMB AT THIS STAGE?

I think the main reason why India needed the bomb was that it is a big country, which has responsibilities in these areas... I personally felt after the Vietnam War that the United States could not be relied on to intervene in any... intervention by the Soviet Union in this region. And I visualized India ultimately filling that vacuum. And I felt that nuclear weapons was an important part of our determination to fill that vacuum. We are a democratic country in an... sea of dictatorships in this area, and we have a responsibility to maintain freedom in this area, and I... I, my, my stand in the... in the late '70s was different from my stand in the '60s. In the '60s it was deterrence that I was for. In the late '70s and now, I'm for nuclear weapons on the grounds that India has a responsibility in this area, to fight against Soviet expansionism. And I think the United States cannot be relied on to do that, and therefore I would like India to acquire nuclear weapons as part of its overall psychological makeup. To be a factor in this region.

CAN YOU JUST REPEAT YOUR SECURITY CONCERNS AT TIME?

Late '70s, well, the... late '70s... we had already the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in '79, we had reports of serious differences between the Soviet Union and China, which was dragging us into the conflict... had potential to drag us... into the conflict; and we had the post-Vietnam situation, where the United States was... appeared to be in a position to do nothing outside its own borders, and I felt that with the Soviet Union patrolling the Indian Ocean, in a... in a much more increased way, and Brezhnev's accumulation of arms, which was... using under the cover of the SALT agreement, signed with Richard Nixon, that India's responsibility had now vastly expanded, and... and it is in that context that I saw the security concerns, that the... that if the United States... couldn't defend Pakistan, I felt it was ultimately India's responsibility to defend Pakistan; that's why I'm associated in this country with rapprochement with Pakistan. I'm associated in this country with rapprochement with China, even at the... to... at the expense of India in some... some areas, because I think the long-run problem in this area is Soviet expansionism, and it is in that context that I see the security scenario now, and in the 1990s.

HOW DID THE INDIAN GENERAL PUBLIC RESPOND TO YOUR VIEWS?

The Indian general public is in favor of...Oh, in the... oh, the... for the... at that time, the Indian public found my shift too hard and... too quick to swallow. China was still enemy number one. Here I was saying no, it is not enemy number one, it's in fact the Soviet Union. The... India... Indians still are... were accustomed to see Pakistan as a major, pernicious threat. And I was saying no, Pakistan is a buffer state, now that the Soviet Union has arrived in... in Afghanistan; it's a buffer state for us, so we must strengthen Pakistan. The... the general atmosphere was very hostile, to my new articulation of the bomb, and they still wanted the bomb, but not the arguments that I was giving.

...THE CARTER NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT.

It only created bad blood between the Indians and the... and the Americans because people didn't see it as Carter's own missionary zeal on this proliferation question. They saw more as America breaking a contract. America was obliged to supply enriched uranium, and suddenly it was saying, no, it can't do it because we were not agreeing to additional conditions. And I think the argument for self-reliance in our nuclear policy got a big boost during Carter's period. And this has had an impact, because now India is in a position to enrich uranium by itself, in a place in Mysore in South India we have established a unit which is enriching uranium, and so we are... the self-reliance in India's nuclear program really got a big boost in ...'78, '79 during Mr. Carter's time.

OK, JUST BECAUSE OF THAT LET'S JUST DO THAT AGAIN. WHAT IMPACT DID THAT, THE 1978 ACT, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT INSTITUTED BY PRESIDENT CARTER, WHAT IMPACT DID THAT HAVE AND HOW DID IT AFFECT INDIA'S NUCLEAR STATUS?

It made India more bitter, it made India more conscious of the fact that we can't rely on... on Americans or foreigners for our vital national interests. It was perceived as Americans reneging on their agreement on their contract. It wasn't seen as Carter's own desire for non-proliferation, but more as an obstructionist American policy and creating difficulties for us. I think it gave a big boost to the idea of self-reliance in India's own nuclear policy and it led to India embarking on areas which it would never have done otherwise, particularly in the enrichment of uranium that we have now begun.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS IN THE LATE '70S THAT PAKISTAN WAS EMBARKING ON A NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT PROGRAM?

Well, my own reaction of the Pakistani program was that it would...

START AGAIN.

My own reaction to the Pakistani program was that this would provide the nuclear lobby another opportunity to... to press ahead with more vigorous program. But personally I do not consider Pakistan nuclear bomb as a serious threat to India.

DO YOU THINK THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE PAKISTAN BOMB EFFORT?

I do not think that the Chinese would part with weapons technology to any country, including Pakistan. I think these reports that come are propaganda largely let loose by the Soviet Union.

HOW DID YOU RESPOND TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO RENEW AID TO PAKISTAN DESPITE THE EVIDENCE OF THE BOMB EFFORT?

My own reaction to Carter's decision was that the Americans would act according to their national interests. It's no use our making a big noise about it. They're not going to listen. I did think that... that his decision should be used in this country really to put across our own policy points of view and make them more popular.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY SPEECHES IN THE LOK SABHA ABOUT THIS WHOLE BUSINESS OF THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM, THE A. Q. KHAN AND THE CENTRIFUGE PROCESS. DO YOU RECALL ANY PARTICULAR SPEECHES?

The only... I don't recall any speech in Parliament, but I do recall Mr.... Dr. Ramana telling me that much of Mr. A. Q. Khan's pronouncements are aimed at obtaining for Pakistan a prominent position in the international atomic energy establishment, as a country equal to India in the nuclear field. In fact Mr.... Dr. Ramana who I consulted very often here and there, mostly in airports where we met, or in meetings here and there, always viewed that the Pakistani pronouncements about the capability was far ahead of what they really were capable. And it was really aimed at international consumption.

WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE DEBATE WHICH TOOK PART IN THE LOK SABHA AFTER THAT?

The... if you know our Parliamentary debates they are like Parliamentary debates all over the world, they are very passionate. They are not very well informed. Largely because the government controls the basic information on this, and I find that most of the debates in our parliament on the nuclear question are gut reactions rather than informed debates.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY OF THE REACTIONS TO THE PAKISTAN PROGRAMS? DO YOU REMEMBER ANY REAL REACTIONARY SPEECHES?

No, no. Only that Congress members who previously were dovish became very hawkish. I don't remember anything specifically, only this.

...A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE ON THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES BE?

Well, it's a bit late now because the Pakistani program...

THIS WOULD BE IN '81?

Even as late as '81, I think a... as early as '81, the Pakistani program was fairly advanced. And the main reactor, the Kahuda reactor is set deep into the mountains. And I think it's not at all possible for any preemptive strike to be successful. The Iraqi situation doesn't quite obtain at all in... in Pakistan.

LET'S MOVE TO A CLOSE-UP. DO YOU RECALL ANY CONVERSATIONS — I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT MRS. GANDHI AND HER POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN IN GENERAL. DO YOU THINK SHE TOOK A HARD ENOUGH LINE?

Well, she was very much concerned, but there was very little she could do. She was very concerned about the Muslim minority in India which has a corner for Pakistan, and that was a pillar of her electoral support. If somebody else had done it for her, for instance if the Israelis could have done it for her she would have welcomed it, I'm quite sure about that. But basically Mrs. Gandhi felt powerless on the Pakistani nuclear development.

WHAT WAS HER POLICY AT THE TIME VIS-A-VIS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION FOR INDIA?

I don't think she had a fixed policy at all. She was a lady who reacted to situations. And she had no inhibitions. I don't think she was opposed to that bomb at all. But she... if... she never saw the need for it. And therefore it was totally ad hoc. When I would talk to her she would say yes, if it... becomes necessary we'll have it. And the nuclear test was conducted by her in 1974. So I think Mrs. Gandhi had a totally flexible... approach. There was no ideological baggage behind it.

IS IT TRUE THAT SHE WAS PRO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

No, she was... she was pro-Mrs. Gandhi, and therefore if it... if her life depended on it she would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but if her life didn't depend on it then she would just as well keep it open. I don't think Mrs. Gandhi had strong feelings on these questions.

LET'S GO RIGHT UP TO DATE NOW, AND WHAT IS THE CURRENT INDIAN THINKING? WHAT IS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S THINKING AND DO YOU AGREE WITH IT?

I agree with one aspect of the current Indian government's thinking and that is to update the technology in nuclear and the missile, space technology, and electronics. And they've gone at it in a big way. And I must say by the year 2000 we'll have probably 10,000 megawatts of electric power capability. We will have enrichment of...uranium to any degree. Capability will be in a position to have nuclear propulsion. So there is a whole array of the technological inputs that are being made by the new government and I agree with it. But where I don't agree with it with this government is that there is no clear policy as to what to do about the nuclear weapons question. And that clear policy would require a strategic doctrine. Then you have a bomb, then what do you do with it? When are the occasions when you're going to use it? When are the occasions when you're going to threaten to use it? In fact, you see although the bomb has not been used since 1945 the threat to use the bomb has been there probably 12 times since 1945. And these... threats have been very effective. And they've been very effective particularly when a nuclear threat in a country threatens a non-nuclear country. So we must have a doctrine. And a doctrine is one thing that is not... the present government is totally ad hoc. And it has not given any deep thought to the subject.

HOW DO YOU ENVISION THE NEXT TEN YEARS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE?

I think the... there is no doubt that the nuclear weapons of the 1960s the nuclear weapons was thought as the answer. Now there is a doubt in almost everybody's mind including mine as to whether these weapons are of any use at all. If we could come into some kind of a civilized agreement, I think nuclear weapons... I see for the first time a possibility that nuclear weapons can be made irrelevant. But for that to come about would require my opinion... many more countries getting the nuclear weapons. Because the world doesn't understand the dangers of nuclear weapons yet. And for a few to have it would give undue advantage to those few. And all the countries can only recognize the seriousness of the nuclear weapons question. Only say, 15-20 countries have reached that stage of having nuclear weapons. But the nuclear weapons I see definitely can be made irrelevant in the 21st century.

OKAY...

The policy of nuclear deterrence in South Asia is a meaningless concept, because we can't really use nuclear weapons against any of our neighbors. They are very small countries, they can't really threaten us. Only Pakistan can pose us possible threat. But the problem is that the wind factor is such that we were to use nuclear weapons against Pakistan, many of our cities of North India would die of radioactivity. And the only answer to Pakistan in my opinion is conventional army. And therefore, I would not use the nuclear weapons as a...a deterrence mode in the South Asian situation. Nuclear weapons can be of assistance to India in terms of India becoming a pole in the multi-polar world. India becoming a protector of small countries. India asserting its rights to prevent intervention by superpowers in this region. But as a deterrence I think it's totally out of date and meaningless in South Asia.

I JUST WANT YOU TO REPEAT ONE QUESTION WHICH WE DID EARLIER. IT'S A REPETITION JUST BECAUSE I THINK YOU CAN DO IT BETTER AGAIN. CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN IN THE EARLY '60s HOW YOUR VIEWS ON A BOMB FOR INDIA WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE TRADITIONAL INDIAN VIEWS?

The traditional Indian views has been taken to mean pacifist. I'm sorry that's not so. The bomb in the hands of India would be perfectly consistent with the traditional...

AT THAT TIME IN THE EARLY '60S HOW WERE YOUR VIEWS COMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERAL IMPRESSION AT THE TIME THAT INDIA WAS A COUNTRY WHICH BELIEVED IN NON-VIOLENCE, WAS TALKING ABOUT DISARMAMENT IN THE UN?

That was all... the general Indian... the general view about India was valid as long as the 1962 war with China didn't take place. When we suddenly found ourselves at a war without the necessary equipment to meet the Chinese. I think the... the ethos in this country changed overnight, and the people here wanted India to be fully prepared for all eventualities. And in that context having nuclear weapons was perfectly consistent with the ethos at that time.

THANK YOU. INTERNAL DEBATE, DOMESTIC DEBATE OVER NUCLEAR POLICY. WHAT WERE THE FORCES WORKING AGAINST YOU AT THAT TIME?

Well, there are two...

START AGAIN.

The first group of people who were very much against what I was advocating was the bureaucracy, which was basically an Anglicized bureaucracy, which fitted in with the general worldview that Indian couldn't afford nuclear weapons. The second... the other group which was very much against was the army surprisingly, because I myself experienced this, and I... the army was against nuclear weapons for a very special reason. That they... this was just after the China war, this is just after the Pakistan war, and they wanted a lot more money to refurbish the army. And they felt that a nuclear weapons program would subtract from their resources, and they didn't feel the same sense of urgency for the nuclear weapons. So they also came out against the bomb in all... all the meetings that I attended with them.

DID THE VIEWPOINT EVER CHANGE ON THAT?

Yes, I think today you will find the army talking in terms of tactical nuclear weapons and the need to maintain the morale of the army in the face of... of an adversary with nuclear weapons. I think that has been a change there.

HOW DID INDIA RESPOND TO THE STORIES IN THE PRESS ABOUT A. Q. KAHN?

Well, those were in the... who were knowledgeable, they knew that this was hot air. That Pakistan was trying to acquire membership on the board of the International Atomic Energy Commission association, the I.A.E.A. And they were boasting essentially to be taken more seriously. This was the view expressed to me on a question that I raised with Dr. Amana in one of my chance meetings in the airport with him. The general public of course was alarmed by what Dr. Kahn was saying, but those in the know didn't take it very seriously. Even today I would find most of our scientists would say that Pakistan is still some years away, because of its lack of trigger... the trigger mechanism which controls the actual reaction.

CAN YOU JUST SUMMARIZE FOR ME WHAT INDIA'S CAPABILITY IS TODAY?

I think we can produce about 100 bombs a year of the range of 20 kilotons each. We have a stockpile for about 50 already. And we have the capacity to produce intermediate range ballistic missiles which can go to China, it can go to parts of the Soviet Union, it can go far... as far as Hong Kong. And we have bombers which can deliver weapons. I think India has a modest... as De Gaulle used to say, today I think we have that capability.

CAN YOU SEE A DAY WHEN THEY'LL ACTUALLY DECLARE THAT CAPABILITY?

I think the younger generation in... is less bound by loyalty to Jawaharlal Nehru and perhaps even to Mahatma Gandhi. And I would say by the year 2000, there will be very practical politicians in power. I myself am seeing how unpopular I was on this issue 20 years ago, and today, how much more acceptable I am on these views. And I foresee that in 15 years the new generation will be less subject to the hang-ups of the past. And indeed, a declaration can be possible then.

CAN I JUST GET YOU TO REPEAT, HOW MANY DAYS AWAY FROM ACTUALLY BUILDING A BOMB IS INDIA?

I had asked this question once of a scientist recently... that's... recently means about four months ago. And I was told that it can be done in three months time... No, I'm sorry, he's still there.

LET ME JUST ASK YOU AGAIN. AND I'M NOT ASKING YOU FOR THE NAME. CAN YOU GIVE ME AN IDEA OF HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE INDIA TO ACTUALLY GO AHEAD WITH BUILDING A BOMB?

On the basis of what was told to me by a specialist in the Atomic Energy Commission, it would take three months to really get going and producing in a... not one bomb, but several bombs. And I think the capability's there, I think the stockpile of the plutonium is already there. It won't take much time. Three months at the outset.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.