WEBVTT FILE 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:11.849 Interviewer: BEFORE WE START COULD YOU TELL US, SO WE'LL HAVE IT STRAIGHT, IN 1963, DURING THE PERIOD WE'RE GOING TO BE TALKING ABOUT, WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION THEN? 00:00:11.849 --> 00:00:16.367 Daniel: I was Editor-in-Chief, director of L'Expresse. 00:00:16.367 --> 00:00:39.346 Daniel: And L'Expresse, was to develop..., the managing director was Francois Hereau, and Jean-Jacques Cervanches-le-Repaire (?), and at the same time I was the French correspondent for New Republic, which was run by Gilbert Harrison at that time. 00:00:39.345 --> 00:00:45.804 Interpreter: HE WAS THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF L'EXPRESSE, WHICH WAS A WEEKLY MAGAZINE. 00:00:45.804 --> 00:00:50.170 Interpreter: DO YOU WANT TO KNOW DIRECTED BY AND ALL THAT...? 00:00:50.170 --> 00:00:51.289 Interviewer: NO. 00:00:51.289 --> 00:00:54.329 Interpreter: ...AND WAS AT THE SAME TIME THE FRENCH CORRESPONDENT FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC. 00:01:05.986 --> 00:01:16.393 Interviewer: IN YOUR OCTOBER 24 MEETING 1963 WITH KENNEDY HOW DID YOU HAPPEN TO BE TALKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF CUBA? 00:01:16.393 --> 00:01:26.908 Daniel: Kennedy agreed to see me so quickly because he knew that I was going to Cuba already. 00:01:26.908 --> 00:01:43.291 Daniel: It was Ben Bradley, who is now the director of the Washington Post, and who was at that time the head of Time magazine in Washington. 00:01:43.291 --> 00:02:00.898 Daniel: Bradley told Kennedy at a party of Joe Craft's, that I was to do a long interview with Castro, and that Castro had agreed to see him at length. 00:02:00.898 --> 00:02:09.457 Daniel: And these circumstances are why, Kennedy agreed to see me so quickly. 00:02:09.457 --> 00:02:17.649 Daniel: I do not think that he would have otherwise called to meet with me. 00:02:17.649 --> 00:02:54.706 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:02:54.706 --> 00:03:03.193 Daniel: Ben Bradley was a very close friend of mine, because he stayed in Paris for Time magazine before Washington. 00:03:48.764 --> 00:03:56.228 Interviewer: DID WHAT KENNEDY TELL YOU ABOUT CUBA SURPRISE YOU AT ALL? 00:03:56.228 --> 00:03:58.834 Daniel: Yes, it surprised me a lot. 00:03:58.834 --> 00:04:08.696 Daniel: Less, perhaps, by the content of his statements than by the form, the tone, the passion which he emitted. 00:04:08.696 --> 00:04:17.722 Daniel: There was something else which also surprised me, and that was the self-criticism which he made. 00:04:17.722 --> 00:04:25.910 Daniel: Both at his own actions and at the comportment of the United States with regard to Cuba. 00:04:25.910 --> 00:05:02.302 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:05:02.302 --> 00:05:04.382 Daniel: Could I add something? 00:05:04.382 --> 00:05:15.271 Interpreter: HE'D LIKE TO ADD SOMETHING. 00:05:15.271 --> 00:05:33.471 Daniel: The general sense of this self-criticism was that Kennedy had the impression that communism in Cuba had come about by the fault of the United States. 00:05:33.471 --> 00:05:44.269 Daniel: And that they seemed to him (the United States), guilty for these unfortunate communists. 00:05:44.269 --> 00:06:04.507 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:06:19.098 --> 00:06:27.884 Interviewer: COULD YOU SAY A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT? WHY DID KENNEDY FEEL THAT IT WAS THE UNITED STATES FAULT THAT COMMUNISM HAD COME TO CUBA? 00:06:27.884 --> 00:06:33.651 Daniel: For many reasons... 00:06:33.651 --> 00:06:41.507 Interviewer: EXCUSE ME, COULD YOU START OUT BY SAYING KENNEDY FELT...PUT IT IN A COMPLETE SENTENCE? 00:06:41.507 --> 00:07:10.763 Daniel: Kennedy felt guilty for the United States, because he thought that the United States had shown a colonialistic attitude towards Cuba, not directly colonialist, by the possession of the island of Cuba, but by the manner in which the United States used Cuba. 00:07:10.763 --> 00:07:30.911 Daniel: In the months following my meeting with him, he two or three times, particularly in a speech at Miami, made allusions to this attitude, this using by the United States of Cuba. 00:07:30.911 --> 00:07:48.555 Daniel: With general puritanistic religiosity, he felt that the comportment of the United States debauched Cuba, and that it was humiliating for the Cuban people. 00:07:48.555 --> 00:07:53.678 Daniel: That was the thing which struck me the most. 00:07:53.678 --> 00:08:11.550 Daniel: Then, when Battista was overthrown, and Castro took power, the United States was guilty for not showing the Cuban people that it approved of the revolution. 00:08:11.550 --> 00:08:21.681 Daniel: Kennedy claimed he always said that it was not the idea of the revolution which the U.S. 00:08:21.681 --> 00:08:35.682 Daniel: deplored, it was the fact that it was a communist revolution, and a communist revolution associated with the Soviet Union. 00:08:35.682 --> 00:08:42.513 Daniel: But it was good that the people were allied against Battisa. 00:08:42.513 --> 00:10:00.374 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:10:00.374 --> 00:10:26.437 Daniel: You have to remember that...there was at any time, that Kennedy was saying that he wasn't a Marxist, that he wasn't a communist, and at that time when he had just tried to see Nixon, that Nixon had left him standing had very unhappy ... 00:10:26.437 --> 00:10:34.966 Interpreter: YOU MEANT TO SAY THAT "CASTRO WAS SAYING THAT HE WASN'T A MARXIST…." YOU SAID KENNEDY. 00:10:44.548 --> 00:10:59.341 Daniel: It is necessary for you to remember that Castro, Fidel Castro, several times declared that he was not a Marxist, that he was not a communist, and that he repeated this or he tried to repeat this when he came to Washington. 00:10:59.341 --> 00:11:07.235 Daniel: And when he was received by Nixon, but not very well, he was left to sit alone in an office, he found this humiliating. 00:11:07.235 --> 00:11:24.751 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:11:24.751 --> 00:11:55.553 Interviewer: YOU WROTE IN YOUR ARTICLE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC IN DECEMBER OF THAT YEAR THAT YOU COULD SEE THAT KENNEDY HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARDS CUBA, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND THE CIA ACTIVITIES, AND THAT HE WAS SEEKING A WAY OUT. 00:11:55.553 --> 00:11:59.553 Interviewer: CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE? 00:11:59.553 --> 00:12:22.847 Daniel: Kennedy estimated that he had been fooled by the CIA, and perhaps, in my own personal interpretation, his personal advisers regarding the popularity of Castro and his companions with the public (or lack thereof). 00:12:22.847 --> 00:12:42.094 Daniel: And he himself kept a bitter memory of the Bay of Pigs, and other attempts at arguing with Castro, thus he sought another voice through which he might use to deal with Castro. 00:12:42.094 --> 00:12:44.609 Daniel: That was the reason... 00:12:44.609 --> 00:13:01.122 Daniel: that was the reason that Kennedy used people who were not diplomats, he sent many people, he had sent many people who were specialists in information. 00:13:01.122 --> 00:13:12.057 Daniel: Now he had no confidence in professional intermediaries which he had had between Castro and himself. 00:13:12.057 --> 00:14:04.490 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:14:19.235 --> 00:14:31.754 Interviewer: WHAT DO YOU FEEL THE IMPACT OF THE MISSILE CRISIS WAS OK KENNEDY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA? DID IT CHANGE HIS ATTITUDE? 00:14:31.754 --> 00:15:14.895 Daniel: This changed his attitude because as he repeated and said to me, because of Cuba the world was on the edge of a nuclear war, and therefore, he pondered to himself the question of whether Castro was extremely conscious and responsible, or whether Castro was an adventurer who played with the fate of the world, or if actually Castro was simply unconscious of the risks he was running with the entire world. 00:15:14.895 --> 00:15:26.370 Daniel: Therefore, he was in a stage of great anger and annoyance with Castro and with the Soviet influence in Cuba. 00:15:26.370 --> 00:16:06.292 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:16:33.811 --> 00:16:57.283 Interviewer: WOULD YOU MIND REPEATING THAT, WITH STARTING YOUR SENTENCE BY "THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS CHANGED KENNEDY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CUBA?" GIVE THAT THOUGHT FIRST AND THEN GIVE YOUR ANSWER. 00:16:57.283 --> 00:17:02.499 Interviewer: AND IF YOU COULD, MAKE IT A BIT SHORTER. 00:17:02.499 --> 00:17:15.372 Daniel: Kennedy's attitude changed simply because he had been... 00:17:15.372 --> 00:17:29.931 Interviewer: COULD YOU START AGAIN, BEING SURE TO MENTION THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS? 00:17:29.931 --> 00:17:34.311 Daniel: The missile crisis changed Kennedy's attitude. 00:17:34.311 --> 00:17:56.772 Daniel: In the process of this crisis, he was given the impression and even the certitude that the world was on the brink of nuclear war, and he asked himself if Castro was a man of conscience, or if he was a man who took the risks of an adventurer. 00:17:56.772 --> 00:18:17.953 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:18:17.953 --> 00:18:18.922 Daniel: I want to add something 00:18:18.922 --> 00:18:21.803 Interpreter: HE WONDERS WHETHER HE SHOULD ADD SOMETHING ABOUT THAT. 00:18:21.803 --> 00:18:27.534 Interviewer: SURE. 00:18:27.534 --> 00:18:36.131 Interviewer: GO AHEAD. 00:18:36.131 --> 00:18:45.591 Daniel: The missile crisis changed the behavior of Kennedy because Kennedy had also the impression of a huge... 00:18:45.591 --> 00:18:57.598 Daniel: a huge lie, a huge imposter, because just until the last moments Cuba with the Soviets lied when Castro claimed he had no missiles. 00:18:57.598 --> 00:19:07.786 Daniel: And Stevenson, who was then at the U.N., had to show the aerial photos of the missiles which did exist in Cuba. 00:19:07.786 --> 00:19:19.430 Daniel: That was the proof of the huge lie which Kennedy had felt fooled by, therefore this changed his behavior towards Cuba even more. 00:19:19.430 --> 00:19:49.106 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:19:49.954 --> 00:19:54.844 Interviewer: KENNEDY ASKED YOU TO SEE HIM AFTER YOUR RETURN FROM YOUR MEETING WITH CASTRO. 00:19:54.844 --> 00:19:59.859 Interviewer: DID YOU FEEL YOU WERE HELPING TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO CASTRO ON KENNEDY'S BEHALF? 00:19:59.859 --> 00:20:01.565 Daniel: Yes, in a sense. 00:20:01.565 --> 00:20:04.175 Daniel: It was, it was a message. 00:20:04.175 --> 00:20:21.535 Daniel: I don't believe at all that I had any diplomatic role, that I didn't take the responses seriously...about health...that I had a real journalistic, professional opportunity. 00:20:21.535 --> 00:20:29.763 Daniel: But at the same time, it is true that he asked me to say certain things to Castro. 00:20:29.763 --> 00:21:00.385 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:21:10.123 --> 00:21:35.003 Interviewer: COULD YOU TELL ME THEN WHAT WERE SOME OF THE THINGS THAT KENNEDY ASKED YOU TO CONVEY TO CASTRO? AND AGAIN COULD YOU START BY STATING, "KENNEDY ASKED ME..." WHATEVER THE FACT IS AGAIN SO THE AUDIENCE UNDERSTANDS WHAT YOUR ANSWER REFERS TO. 00:21:35.003 --> 00:21:38.956 Daniel: Kennedy asked me two essential things. 00:21:38.956 --> 00:21:55.782 Daniel: The first was to tell Fidel Castro that he, Kennedy, was not concerned about Castro's being a Communist, or that they got on well with people like Tito and Secuture. 00:21:55.782 --> 00:22:05.208 Daniel: Kennedy's concern was that he may have become an ally of the Soviet Union in an area of U.S. 00:22:05.208 --> 00:22:06.323 Daniel: influence. 00:22:06.323 --> 00:22:08.958 Daniel: That was the first thing. 00:22:08.958 --> 00:22:26.899 Daniel: The second thing for Kennedy, was to know to what extent Fidel Castro was again ready for a new settlement with the United States, provided that, desereselian with the Soviets. 00:22:26.899 --> 00:22:34.500 Daniel: Those were the essential concerns; the rest were just nuances and details. 00:22:34.500 --> 00:22:50.718 Daniel: The essential in all this was to say that he very much wanted to know, that he was very curious to know what his response was, because I had reported it to him. 00:22:50.718 --> 00:23:43.190 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:23:57.960 --> 00:24:08.415 Interviewer: WOULD YOU MIND RESTATING THAT? 00:24:08.415 --> 00:24:35.592 Daniel: The second part of what I would call the message was to ask Fidel Castro whether he was planning a settlement with the United States, which... 00:24:35.592 --> 00:24:42.433 Daniel: of these ties with the Soviet Union. 00:24:42.433 --> 00:24:52.989 Interviewer: I'M GOING TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS NOW ABOUT YOUR INTERVIEW WITH CASTRO. 00:24:52.989 --> 00:25:09.537 Interviewer: HOW DID CASTRO DESCRIBE HIS FEARS REGARDING THE UNITED STATES' INTENTIONS FOR CUBA LEADING UP TO THE MISSILE CRISIS? 00:25:09.537 --> 00:25:23.468 Daniel: Castro told me a long story about the reasons why he believed that he had been threatened by the United States. 00:25:23.468 --> 00:25:43.496 Daniel: He added that it was even more interesting that he also feared that there was a kind of agreement or resignation between the Soviet Union and the United States. 00:25:43.496 --> 00:26:00.911 Daniel: To pardon it, which is dying, this long story justified this ennui problem that he was using any weapons he could to protect his revolution. 00:26:00.911 --> 00:26:34.582 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:26:34.582 --> 00:26:53.215 Interviewer: AT THAT TIME DO YOU THINK THAT CASTRO FEARED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PLANNING ANOTHER INVASION? 00:26:53.215 --> 00:27:03.815 Daniel: Castro did indeed believe that he couldn't absolutely rule out another invasion of Cuba by the United States. 00:27:03.815 --> 00:27:07.380 Daniel: We were in the time of the blockade. 00:27:07.380 --> 00:27:32.722 Daniel: He often told me that if there were a Soviet ship, which had arrived but two days earlier, which made port to replenish its electric power supply, and of the principal also, the principal commodities, so Castro believed that there would be a new invasion of Cuba. 00:27:32.722 --> 00:27:57.078 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:27:57.078 --> 00:28:13.451 Interviewer: WHOSE IDEA WAS IT TO PUT THE NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON CUBA'S SOIL? WAS IT CASTRO'S OR KHRUSHCHEV'S? 00:28:13.451 --> 00:28:22.825 Daniel: I've read a number of books regarding this question, and I haven't managed to formulate an exact idea. 00:28:22.825 --> 00:28:31.653 Daniel: But I can tell you what I was thinking at that time, when I spoke with Kennedy, and with Castro. 00:28:31.653 --> 00:28:46.486 Daniel: And at that time, it seemed to me that Castro had requested the missiles that he hadn't waited long for them; he finished, then, by accepting them from Khrushchev. 00:28:46.487 --> 00:29:08.217 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:29:08.217 --> 00:29:18.489 Daniel: I want to add that Khrushchev was much more of an adventurer than Stalin. 00:29:18.489 --> 00:29:27.790 Daniel: He was ready to take many more risks, and he was less responsible. 00:29:27.790 --> 00:29:42.366 Daniel: He was perhaps more liberal, in domestic policies, but he was much more adventurous in foreign policies. 00:29:42.366 --> 00:29:59.580 Daniel: And I believe that the idea of impressing and making the United States fearful was a Soviet idea that came from Khrushchev. 00:29:59.580 --> 00:30:02.496 Daniel: I believe that today. 00:30:02.496 --> 00:30:33.654 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:30:41.063 --> 00:31:00.773 Daniel: I would like to tell you more, other things about...the nuclear risk that, there were experts, strategists, who believe to the contrary that, at the time of the missile crisis, that was the first moment of détente. 00:31:00.773 --> 00:31:23.691 Daniel: They believe it was a confrontation between the French and the Americans; they believed that by placing the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev knew that he was saving Cuba, but that the missiles would have to be brought back, returned, one day or another. 00:31:23.691 --> 00:31:39.826 Daniel: So, that was a time when the world was also more fearful of a nuclear explosions, or a nuclear conflict that the...strategy was launched; this conflict was, to the contrary... 00:31:39.826 --> 00:31:44.134 Daniel: at that moment, it was, to the contrary, ended. 00:31:44.134 --> 00:32:13.180 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:32:13.180 --> 00:32:26.008 Interviewer: WHAT DID CASTRO THINK ABOUT PLACING THE MISSILES IN CUBA, DID HE THINK SOMEHOW TO PREVENT A WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. 00:32:26.008 --> 00:32:27.483 Interviewer: AND THE USSR? 00:32:27.483 --> 00:32:44.179 Daniel: Fidel Castro refused my questions on this subject, because he said that a country was going to use all the threats it could to protect itself. 00:32:44.179 --> 00:32:57.489 Daniel: And that he understood the difference in size between his country and the United States, he could only accept it. 00:32:57.489 --> 00:33:13.601 Daniel: It was not a good idea to make use of the weapons that he proposed to Khrushchev; their purpose was rather to obtain protection for Cuba. 00:33:13.601 --> 00:33:21.424 Daniel: Fidel Castro also didn't believe there would be a global conflict. 00:33:21.424 --> 00:33:28.078 Daniel: But he didn't want to address the question on this point. 00:33:28.078 --> 00:33:55.684 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:34:30.045 --> 00:34:41.396 Interviewer: IN YOUR INTERVIEW WITH CASTRO HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT KENNEDY HAD INHERITED A DIFFICULT SITUATION WHEN HE CAME INTO OFFICE. 00:34:41.396 --> 00:34:43.947 Interviewer: CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT, PLEASE? 00:34:43.947 --> 00:34:47.114 Daniel: That was the situation... 00:34:47.114 --> 00:35:04.284 Daniel: No, Castro said that Kennedy, when he took over the presidency of the United States, had inherited all the American prejudices against Cuba. 00:35:04.284 --> 00:35:12.809 Daniel: And the proof was that he tried to explain the Bay of Pigs adventure. 00:35:12.809 --> 00:35:32.659 Daniel: He said that in order for his government to make such a mistake, the background dossiers on Cuba that he found when he reached the White House had to be stupid... 00:35:32.659 --> 00:35:38.747 Daniel: dossiers that were both stupid and irresponsible. 00:35:38.747 --> 00:35:48.002 Daniel: So he granted that Kennedy was surrounded by some extenuating circumstances. 00:35:48.003 --> 00:36:42.777 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:36:52.769 --> 00:37:00.892 Interviewer: CASTRO TOLD YOU THAT AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS THAT KHRUSHCHEV DESCRIBED KENNEDY AS A MAN THAT YOU COULD TALK TO... 00:37:00.892 --> 00:37:05.456 Interviewer: WHAT DO YOU THINK CASTRO'S IMPRESSIONS OF KENNEDY WERE AT THAT TIME? 00:37:05.456 --> 00:37:16.377 Daniel: The night I talked with Castro, he believed, in fact, that Kennedy was a man with whom he could now talk. 00:37:16.377 --> 00:37:18.953 Daniel: At that time, certainly. 00:37:18.953 --> 00:37:48.006 Daniel: Not because he believed that the American chief of state was a particularly understanding and open man, but because he could deal only now, after bad experiences, after the Bay of Pigs, after his...after attempts, after the missile crisis, that it wasn't easy to be done with Cuba. 00:37:48.006 --> 00:37:56.248 Daniel: With those experiences behind him, he was indeed a man with whom one could talk. 00:37:56.248 --> 00:38:16.601 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:38:16.956 --> 00:38:26.175 Interviewer: TED SCHULTZ HAS QUOTED CASTRO AS SAYING IN THE LAST MONTHS OF HIS LIFE KENNEDY WAS RETHINKING HIS POLICY TOWARD CUBA. 00:38:26.175 --> 00:38:33.362 Interviewer: WHAT DID CASTRO MAKE OF YOUR VISIT? WHAT WAS HIS REACTION TO WHAT YOU TOLD HIM FROM KENNEDY? 00:38:33.362 --> 00:38:48.460 Daniel: I believe that if Kennedy had not been assassinated he would have in effect modified, corrected his politics towards the United States. 00:38:48.460 --> 00:38:59.451 Daniel: But the assassination of Kennedy on the contrary frightened Castro, even radicalized his attitude. 00:38:59.451 --> 00:39:18.767 Daniel: After the assassination, he was afraid that there was a movement for revenge because at certain times it was said that Kennedy was assassinated by Cubans, pro-Castro Cubans. 00:39:18.767 --> 00:39:25.317 Daniel: And he again at this time drew nearer to the Soviet Union. 00:39:25.317 --> 00:39:29.980 Daniel: He was hesitant because of his entourage. 00:39:29.980 --> 00:39:37.973 Daniel: There was a difference of opinion between Che Guevara and Raoul Castro. 00:39:37.973 --> 00:39:47.742 Daniel: Guevara, after the missile crisis, estimated that Russia gave in too easily to the U.S. 00:39:47.742 --> 00:39:53.181 Daniel: and that it was necessary to turn towards China. 00:39:53.181 --> 00:40:04.172 Daniel: And Raoul Castro on the contrary said that the tie with the Soviet Union was the one to depend on. 00:40:04.172 --> 00:40:17.271 Daniel: But one should not say as Ted Schultz that these changes took place because of the assassination of President Kennedy. 00:40:17.271 --> 00:41:39.476 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:41:39.476 --> 00:41:57.271 Interviewer: WERE YOU ACTUALLY WITH CASTRO WHEN YOU HEARD THE NEWS OF KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION, AND IF SO, COULD YOU DESCRIBE HOW HE REACTED? 00:41:57.271 --> 00:42:14.417 Daniel: Yes, I was in the middle of lunching at Castro's villa, which he has on the sea, when he received a telephone call announcing that there had been an attack. 00:42:14.417 --> 00:42:24.465 Daniel: And on the telephone he asked, if the attack was serious, and was told it was very serious. 00:42:24.465 --> 00:42:45.105 Daniel: He came back to the table and said, "It's bad news, very bad news." The first reaction of Castro's, when he learned of the attack, was to be crushed by the news, as if he were in mourning. 00:42:45.105 --> 00:42:56.791 Daniel: But I could not say if he was emotionally unhappy or whether he found this very serious for Cuba, or both. 00:42:56.791 --> 00:43:14.811 Daniel: But in the heart of the moment I was certainly very surprised, because I never got the impression that he reacted as an enemy would be expected to react to the news. 00:43:14.811 --> 00:44:19.114 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:44:19.114 --> 00:44:33.038 Interviewer: FROM YOUR VANTAGE POINT, DO YOU THINK THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THIS ASSASSINATION HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH CUBA? 00:44:33.038 --> 00:44:41.111 Daniel: This is a question which I cannot answer, I cannot know, I have no impressions. 00:44:41.111 --> 00:44:50.900 Daniel: I believe that it is a historical mystery, and what I can say is to continue what I said before. 00:44:50.900 --> 00:45:06.441 Daniel: In the 48 hours after the Kennedy assassination which I spent in Cuba the island of Cuba was also in mourning for what had happened in the United States. 00:45:06.441 --> 00:45:16.230 Daniel: I cannot explain this to myself, because it was at the same period when they considered the U.S. 00:45:16.230 --> 00:45:36.615 Daniel: enemies, trying to dethrone or overthrow Castro, and they had posters up against the U.S., against the "Yankees." Just before the assassination these people were living as enemies of the United States. 00:45:36.615 --> 00:45:44.385 Daniel: Just after the assassination, there was general mourning, and consternation. 00:45:44.385 --> 00:45:52.156 Daniel: It was even as if they themselves were another state of the same government. 00:45:52.156 --> 00:45:54.679 Daniel: This struck me very much. 00:45:54.679 --> 00:46:39.414 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:46:39.414 --> 00:46:53.925 Interviewer: CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY LESSONS WHICH CASTRO AND KENNEDY HAD LEARNED FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS? 00:46:53.925 --> 00:47:10.856 Daniel: I believe that Kennedy learned two lessons...The first that it was not possible to trust the Soviet Union, and that we could not be naive in the cooperation for détente. 00:47:10.856 --> 00:47:15.935 Daniel: About this he told me that the Soviets were liars. 00:47:15.935 --> 00:47:31.871 Daniel: And the second lesson was that at any price the Alliance for Progress--you know the Alliance for Progress was the grand project of Schlesinger--was his advice. 00:47:31.871 --> 00:47:42.926 Daniel: And that the United States must have courage, to support the revolutions in the Third World against communism. 00:47:42.926 --> 00:47:46.512 Daniel: He wanted this alliance to succeed. 00:47:46.512 --> 00:47:51.193 Daniel: These were the two lessons learned by Kennedy. 00:47:51.193 --> 00:47:56.073 Daniel: On the part of Castro, it was a little the same. 00:47:56.073 --> 00:48:06.331 Daniel: That is, that Castro also saw it necessary to continue their important alliance with the Soviet Union. 00:48:06.331 --> 00:48:23.362 Daniel: At the same time, it was also necessary to pursue other possibilities with their neighbor, because their neighbor (the U.S.) had shown its determination would go very far. 00:48:23.362 --> 00:48:59.668 Interviewer: COULD YOU JUST STATE AGAIN THE LESSONS YOU THOUGHT CASTRO LEARNED? 00:48:59.668 --> 00:49:03.511 Daniel: As for Castro, on his part, he learned two other lessons. 00:49:03.511 --> 00:49:19.211 Daniel: The first was the same as the one learned by Kennedy, that it was necessary to develop the alliance with the Soviet Union because the Soviets would propose to put in and take out missiles from Cuba without really even consulting Castro. 00:49:19.211 --> 00:49:27.293 Daniel: And the second lesson was that it was absolutely necessary to find some sort of agreement with the U.S., because the U.S. 00:49:27.293 --> 00:49:35.838 Daniel: was their geographic neighbor and this neighbor had demonstrated that it would go very far, even to confronting the Soviet Union. 00:49:35.838 --> 00:50:57.795 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:51:05.387 --> 00:51:14.331 Interviewer: TO WRAP IT UP, COULD YOU SUM UP YOUR ROLE AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN CASTRO AND KENNEDY? 00:51:14.331 --> 00:51:37.450 Daniel: By chance, and by circumstances in effect I found myself in a place or a role for which I was not particularly qualified; I was a simple journalist, not particularly known in France, and a foreigner. 00:51:37.450 --> 00:52:01.032 Daniel: And yet it is true, since I in the circumstances did have the meeting with John Kennedy and since Fidel Castro attached such importance to this meeting I had had, that I was made by this into a messenger. 00:52:01.032 --> 00:52:32.128 Interpreter: [INTERPRETER TRANSLATES] 00:52:32.128 --> 00:52:46.018 Interviewer: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? 00:52:46.018 --> 00:53:03.909 Daniel: I believe...I don't think I could answer anything because I don't have in mind what your position is regarding the risk of the nuclear war. 00:53:03.909 --> 00:53:23.461 Daniel: What I will perhaps say is that, to return to the experts I mentioned, I believe that it is true that the beginning of détente emerged from that crisis. 00:53:23.461 --> 00:54:21.094 Daniel: And I believe that, at this time, we are also witnessing, several hours after four o'clock, that by depleting what could create fear, the bombing of Libya by the United States on the assumption that Libya is slightly closer to the Soviet Union, assuming that the Soviet Union declares that its interests aim at assimilating Libya, a reason, a kind of nuclear risk, I just recently came to understand the possible connection between the two situations.