COULD YOU DESCRIBE TO ME FIRST THE MOOD IN GERMANY IN THE EARLY 1950S, ESPECIALLY TOWARDS THE ISSUE OF GERMAN REARMAMENT?

Uh, in the early '50s, I would say, a great majority in the German people, but especially among the, uh, former officers, were against rearmament, and they had, uh, actually lost the war, but they were also blamed, and they lost their profession, they didn't, uh, receive any help from outside, and they had to look to live. And, uh, because it was even for the second time that the German officer, officers, uh, were blamed and degraded, I would say, a little bit degraded, before the war, they were always a little bit too high graded, but then they were down, and, and... also... you say "non-commissioned officers," they of course didn't like to join again in a thing which didn't work well, uh, and, uh, it had really, they had to be convinced, um, to say yes to rearmament. Uh, Adenauer, I guess, was quite clear, he, he was sure that, uh, about 70 percent or something were against it, and, and he had to switch the majority to feel in favor of rearmament. And I would say the only reason that he could use, and the only reason, as I think really... existed, was that there were... on the other side, were our freedom. Uh, the Americans, and the western powers, who at that time were the dominant power in Germany, uh, they... wanted us, uh, to join in the defense, the common defense, against, uh, eastern pushing, uh, and... they... let us know that if we didn't join, they perhaps would not defend us so much as we would like to be defended, and therefore our people were before the situation, either we are in danger or we have to bite.... a third time in a bitter apple. And I, they did it... they, they...

OF COURSE, THE OTHER PEOPLE WHO WEREN'T SO KEEN ON THE IDEA WERE THE FRENCH, WEREN'T THEY? WHAT WAS THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS GERMANY AT THAT TIME? DID THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE ALLIES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION?

Uh, if, what the French attitude was, I would say they were perhaps divided. The French government, at that time, it was the government in which...Robert Schumann was a dominant figure; even if he was not prime minister then he was foreign minister. And he... were wide-looking man, or far-looking, you say, a far-looking man, and he said...we have to go together in some way or the other with those Germans, and, and he... thought, best thing is to bring them in an European community, and to make strings, uh, in this community and... keep Germany strong on the western and leaning on the French and the Netherlands and so on side. But there were of course other forces in France, too; and at that time, especially, DeGaulle himself, DeGaulle, he thought, and one can't blame him for that, because he had to fight in the war against us, and... by sheer...effort, big effort of his, he was on the winning side after the war, and then he, of course, he wanted to secure that situation, and the familiar thing for French since... since generations was to be rather friendly with Russia, to keep Germany down... And... it took some time for him to realize that things had dramatically changed in the world. And therefore I think big powers uh, uh, big forces in France really were not so much in favor of a, uh, a strong Germany, and especially in defense, strong Germany, and that was one of the reasons that the EDC failed.

I'M VERY INTERESTED IN THAT IDEA, BUT I WONDER IF YOU COULD PHRASE IT AGAIN FOR ME WITHOUT THE REFERENCE TO DE GAULLE SO MUCH, BECAUSE I THINK IT WAS TRUE OF A LARGE PART OF FRENCH OPINION.

Yes, I, I can say it again. Uh... the French attitude, um, in the early '50s, perhaps was... was not so clear, for instance, as... as the American or the British, uh, situation at that time. Uh, the government, um... and there's a strong figure of Robert Schumann, they wanted to bring Germany strongly in the Western alliance, and of course they began on the economic field. But they also envisaged, and it was a French proposal, the Plevin Plan, that envisaged the European defense community where Germany would be a part of it. Of the six. Um, but there were strong political groupings in France, who did not like this point of view, and...uh, which were still in the old line, in the pre-wars line, pre-two-world-wars line, uh, being more friendly to Russia insofar as perhaps: to be able to get it to keep Germany quiet, or, or, or down, or how you, how you like it. And, at that time, in the early '50s, in the long run, the, those groupings... were stronger, because they succeeded in making the EDC fail.

AT WHAT TIME DO YOU THINK THE FRENCH REALIZED THAT THINGS HAD CHANGED, AND THE REAL ENEMY WAS THE SOVIET UNION?

Yeah, I think the French, when the French changed in their attitude, uh, some people, some French... from the beginning, were of this opinion. But they were perhaps not the majority. Uh, I think it was, um, because of the, of... behavior... of the Soviet Union in other parts of the world. And even perhaps in the Suez crisis, for instance; but more in Hungary, or in Czechoslovakia. Or, years ago, but still, um, considered... of some importance, in the Korean affair. And, um... uh, realizing that, uh, Russia became stronger and stronger, and was not the old Russia, which was quite, I would say, a normal European power, but it was a superpower. Then they gradually, uh, recognized that if there was some danger, it wasn't just little Germany any longer, but it was a neighbor in the East.

WHAT WAS THE FEELING IN WEST GERMANY IN 1950-51 AT THE TIME OF THE KOREAN WAR? WAS THERE A REAL FEELING OF THREAT THEN?

... The Korean War, surely made a big difference, uh, and, uh, it perhaps was also what we talked about earlier, uh… kind... one moment in the building of the convictions that we had to rearm, unfortunately, another time. Um, uh, there were many people in Germany who thought that the Russians would, after some years or another, would go a little bit more into... the West, and of course we were the next, uh, to be kept. And, and, um... uh, this feeling, I would say fear, against, or before fear against the Russians was, uh, rather strong in the, in the population more than in the government. Adenauer, I think, um, he never was really convinced of an actual danger for our country. Uh, in the population was more fear before, uh, against the Russians, and that was still the result of the war.

CAN YOU ACTUALLY REMEMBER ANY PARTICULAR INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED IN YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, WHEN YOU WERE PART OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION, THAT COULD HELP US UNDERSTAND THE TENSIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY AT THAT TIME?

Of course, a very strong thing, which, uh, was, uh, uh, an apple of discord, do you say so? I don't know — an apple of discord between France and Germany was the Saar, uh, land. Because the French wanted to have it, because of the coals there, uh, and, uh, of course the Germans didn't like that they were losing again, a little bit of their country. And, and, uh, that, that was for years, quite a, a difficult thing between the two... but, on both sides, after some years, uh, realistic views were overwhelming, and the French agreed then that the populations them-, uh, itself, in the Saargvite, should say where they wanted to go, finally, to France or to Germany, And when they, I would say, agreed to this decision, uh, then it was also good for us, because if the Saarlanders would have said Yes, we want to go to France, then of course there was nothing to keep them, and, uh, and the other way 'round. I think that was a, a very active, or no, a very, um, actual, a very--

RELEVANT?

Relevant, yes, a very relevant, uh, thing between the two countries, and when that was over, much was paved in the way.

NOW, IN 1954, WHEN THE ADC NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSED, THE LONDON AND PARIS MEETINGS IN WHICH GERMANY WAS ACCEPTED INTO NATO, HOW IMPORTANT DO YOU THINK WAS ADENAUER'S AGREEMENT NOT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Yeah, if I may say to the EDC, when the EDC failed it was of course a very big deception for our political figures and especially for Adenauer himself. Uh, it was not, perhaps, such a big surprise for the German normal people, the German public, and when there was offered the solution then, to enter NATO, they were more or less content with that, because they said, uh, they didn't, uh, not, not everybody in Germany, uh, uh, saw it clear that, um, this EDC was not only a, uh, uh, an instrument for defense, but also an instrument for political binding-together, in Europe. They saw, more or less, the danger from the East and who will defend me, and then they said, The EDC would defend me, but NATO would defend me perhaps even better. Um, of course it was, uh, uh, it was the aim... uh, after when, when EDC would have been constructed to combine it with NATO and, uh, that was clear, but, uh, to be a real member of NATO wasn't bad at all, and insofar, I think, the deception of the German public wasn't so big. And, but, um... what concerned, uh, now was the one question, if, uh, the renunciation of ABC weapons was important, I think it was important, in, to, to get those discussions, to, to bring them to a good end. Uh, otherwise, uh, France would never have, I think, or others perhaps too, wouldn't, would not have, uh, agreed to Germany coming to NATO and, and to be a real member and to be rearmed, and so on. Insofar, uh, it was important politically; for us, it was not such a big renunciation, because we didn't have those weapons, and, uh, as we'd spoke before, uh, the German wish to rearm wasn't so strong, uh, in the, in the big masses, and they weren't so strong to have ABC weapons neither. In, insofar as they didn't lose much, um, uh, um, and insofar, I think, this, uh, decision was, uh, was acceptable in every respect.

IN THAT CONNECTION, MUCH LATER, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN STRAUSS AND THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS IN THE FIG ARMAMENT AGREEMENT AND EURATOM AND SO ON, IN THE MID-'50s AND LATER ON IN '60-'61, THERE WERE DISTINCT FEARS BY ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS AND THE BRITISH, THAT THE GERMANS AND THE FRENCH MIGHT GET TOGETHER ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WAS THIS A REALISTIC FEAR?

Uh, I think, um, uh, that there was never, uh, any kind of a lobby for a German force de... But, to participate in the French force de... there, I think, there was, uh, a lobby, and that even some different strong lobbies altogether. Um, because, um, um, how this corporation would, uh, work or not, that was never a question, and of course, um, uh, the main things would have to be decided in France, and headed and commanded by France. But to participate, um, I think that, uh, that some people would have liked it. Uh, as it is now, out, alone of technical things, because they said, If you are not in the first drawer in technical advance, then you fall back, uh, in, in other fields too, not only in weapons, uh, questions, but also, I would say, in, how do you call it, going a satellite around the earth, or a satellite to the moon, or something like that. Therefore you have to be in the front row of the technical nations. That was for one kind of those people who wanted it. Others, uh, perhaps even thought it might knit, uh, Germany and France a little bit closer, and, uh, more definitely together. And, uh, but of course every other group, too, uh, who, who feared that; uh, they didn't fear France, in the neighborhood and the friendship of France. But they feared, of course, the scorn for forcing England, and they didn't, uh, to, to bring those against us? and that was a dilemma. Uh, to be very close, and on a very friendship, uh, way, to Washington, and also to London, and to Paris, to, in some time was not, not really feasible. You could only try to keep close enough to both, not letting go both sides, but you couldn't really join one side very closely. That was the dilemma.

YOU WERE QUITE CLOSE TO DR. ADENAUER IN THE LAST YEARS, 1960-63, WHEN THE GAP BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON WAS GROWING WIDER ALL THE TIME, ESPECIALLY OVER NUCLEAR ISSUES. WHAT WAS DR ADENAUER'S DILEMMA AT THAT TIME?

Uh, the dilemma of Adenauer was that he wanted to be still, or to, to remain a good friend of, uh, Washington, of England too, and to come closer to France. And that the latter thing to, coming up to, towards, and to make a kind of a union between France and Germany, that caused, uh, the difficulties. Difficulties, or, I would say, fears, or something like fears, in Washington, and, in London, and, also fears in Germany itself. And, uh, actually, I would say, the majority of the German deputies, uh, of the parliamentarians, the parliamentarians, uh, they, they wanted to be friend to France, but not at the expense of a lesser friendship to the Anglo-Saxon nations. And, uh, they in the long run, succeeded, I would say. It was, uh, therefore the close link between France and, uh, Germany, was not didn't become a reality. It was good, but it didn't get closer, and, uh, the friendship to the Anglo-Saxons, and especially to Washington, could be maintained. And under... the successors of Adenauer, of course, for instance, Erhard, uh, he was in an absolute, uh, priority, had he for Washington. And... and the next man, Kissinger, he was a bit to both sides, more, uh, it, it, it changed always a little bit. But, I would say, in the back was that the relations remained, and France and Germany having come together better than before, but not very close, and that is still the status today.

HOW IMPORTANT, IN WHAT AFTER ALL WAS A DEBATE THAT FUNDAMENTALLY AFFECTED THE WHOLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SHAPE OF EUROPE AND OF THE WESTERN WORLD, IN A WAY, HOW IMPORTANT WERE THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES OVER NUCLEAR ISSUES, OVER NUCLEAR ISSUES AND STRATEGY? WAS THAT THE ISSUE THAT MOST DIVIDED PARIS AND WASHINGTON, DO YOU THINK?

I'm not sure what really most divided, um, uh, Washington and Paris. Uh, if it was only the nuclear question or if it was, I would say, the kind of DeGaulle demonstrating that he wanted to be a little bit independent If perhaps he would have... joined, without any difficulties, uh, under the American way of policies, I would have, I, I think they wouldn't have, uh, objected, uh, his little force de frappe. But, uh, since, uh, he demonstrated in, in other fields too, that he wanted to build up a new force, uh, kind of a European force, uh, not absolutely independent from, uh, Washington, but, uh, with a bigger voice; uh, how the West had and where the West had, uh, to go, and not, uh, obedient, uh, in any way, uh... in every way, I think that was, uh, uh, he was a kind of, obstruction, perhaps they considered it, from Washington. And, DeGaulle thought it is necessary, because, uh, he had the feeling, uh, that he should, I, I think, uh, he had the feeling, that he should, uh, depart those two a little bit out, uh, from one to the other; to, to build in between them another force with a big voice and, uh, uh, which could, uh, hinder or promote, uh, things which the others perhaps didn't promote or hinder.

LET ME JUST BRING UP ANOTHER ELEMENT OF NUCLEAR POLITICS. AT THE HEIGHT OF THE BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS TO JOIN THE COMMON MARKET, WHICH GERMANY SUPPORTED, BRITAIN'S APPLICATION IN THE EARLY 1960s, THE BRITISH MADE THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES TO PURCHASE THE POLARIS SYSTEM. THAT CAUSED SOME ANNOYANCE TO GENERAL DEGAULLE, WHO TOOK IT AS AN EXAMPLE OF ANGLO-SAXON COLLUSION, AND VERY SHORTLY AFTER THAT, BRITAIN WAS EXCLUDED BY DEGAULLE. WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF GERMANY TOWARD THAT ANGLO-SAXON NUCLEAR CLUB, IF YOU LIKE?

No, uh, we had the feelings that there was a special relationship between the, the United Kingdom and United States. And that was absolutely admitted, I would say, in the world as fact, as a very political fact, and we had nothing against it at all. And... and it had been declared, from, from both sides of the tran... uh, no, no, no, trans-Atlantic, and, and even, also Mr. Asquith declared it, for instance, to, to Adenauer in the early '60s that he had a special relation, remained in a special relationship towards London. And, uh, that was... very much in our, in our sense too, because... we thought, if they are together, they are strong, and, uh, perhaps sometimes the British, uh, if they are not so strong as the Americans, perhaps they have a, uh, better political feeling, and could give a hint, in such and such way. Uh, the difficulty for us arose only... because, uh, at the same time, we wanted a special relationship to Paris, and, um... because... this grouping didn't, uh, find, uh, uh, uh, good... good feelings in Washington, that was our... difficulty.

THE OTHER BIG EVENT OF THOSE YEARS WAS THE BERLIN CRISIS. WHAT DID GERMANY FEEL ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE BERLIN CRISIS WAS DEALT WITH BY THE UNITED STATES AND, TO SOME EXTENT, BY BRITAIN DURING THAT PERIOD?

The... the Berlin crisis, um, began in '58. Uh, first it was considered to be very difficult, but... the West succeeded in, I would say, uh, um, making slower the Russian, uh, moves, and... and we were, of course, not sure how we could eventually really, uh, defend those, uh, Russian attacks on Berlin, political attacks on Berlin. But they wouldn't have tried to take... military measures neither... if it would have been of success. In any way, that was the question. And, uh, then, uh, Berlin of course... for the Russians, it was wonderful, because they always could make the screw a little bit, uh, tighter or not, um, in this field, and that always hurt the West. The three powers, the three Western powers, immediately, because they were the bosses in Berlin, but us of course, uh, at least, in the same extent because we were Germans. And, uh, Berlin had once stood a wonderful position in the, uh, uh, blockade, uh, time of '48, uh, and, um, the Berliners themselves felt absolutely friends of the Americans since that time, since the Berlin blockade in, in '48, and, uh, they considered them to be their best friends in their lifetime, and they of course relied absolutely on them, and then after sometime, I guess, uh, I guess it now, I didn't guess it at that time, but I guess it now, they came, uh, understanding, I would say, beneath uh, yes, the surface, beneath the surface, uh, that, um, once... Americans admitted to the Russians, uh, to take over the eastern part of, uh, Berlin, whereas we, until that time, considered Berlin to still be a unit, and if not be governed unitedly, at least, uh, they could pass from one side to the other's, there were, uh, 40 or 60,000, uh, every day going from one part to the other to work there, because they're working in... in their old, uh, places. And that, of course, and, and the families were, were, of course, very... very close, and that was divided from one day to the other. And... yes, and, um, that was... emotionally... it was like big vague — do you say "vague"?

WAVE?

No... "Wave," yeah, big wave, big emotional wave in Berlin, of course, but also, I would say, in the rest of Germany, in our part of Germany, um, that, that couldn't be, that it was impossible, uh, to treat, I would say, uh, people, uh, yeah, they were like prisoners now. And the, the, the last door, which they could have escaped before, with, with some danger, because they lost everything when they got over to the West, and they even risked, uh, imprisonment or something perhaps even, sometimes, even, that they were shot, but they had the possibility still to go over from East, uh, to, to West, and this last little door into freedom was closed at once. And, nobody in the Western side did something against it and, and opened this door a little bit with a, or another door, some other possibility, but they just said no. Good, we can't do very much; uh, we can't, uh, use atomic bombs, for, in this case, and...that's not of course... uh, uh, high enough to risk a war; and, and, that was clear. Uh, they couldn't act otherwise. They couldn't risk a war, uh, or, or a real embarrassment with the Russians. But, uh, perhaps one should have, one shouldn't have told, until the last moment, and I remember that Kennedy still spoke a very big speech on the 25th of July, very much in favor, that of course everything will rest, remain as it was in Berlin, and, uh, a fortnight later... it wasn't just true. And it was emotionally a terrible situation. We could have, of course, perhaps we should have, from the German side, we made mistakes too, we should have, um, calmed down more... those emotions, um, in a better way, um... because, you can take a people emotionally only by your own leaders, um, insofar our Chancellor Adenauer should have, uh, uh, acted otherwise, I admit that. He could have, he had the strength to... and the position, to calm down the Germans, and to say, Yes, now understand this, and, uh, we can't change and we have to adapt, and all some things. He could have said it in, like... a father. But unfortunately, uh, he reacted... not strong enough, and he didn't react because we were just in a election campaign. And his adversaries his opponent was Brandt, who was a major in Berlin, and therefore, he would have, I would say, together they would have had to calm down, and... It was very unfortunate. It was as unfortunate as the Suez crisis, with Hungary, and so on. In any way...

CAN YOU SAY THAT AGAIN? YOU JUST TALKED OVER MY WORDS.

Yes, um... um... in, in that time, I would say, notwithstanding what the political figures thought, or, or did, uh, the German public, to an overwhelming majority, in my eyes, felt let down. Let down, perhaps they had imagined it only, but they had thought this friend, nearly... only pretend, the Americans. He could do, they thought, he could do what he wanted. And at least he could hinder that something wrong happened in the region where he was the master. Uh... they weren't clever enough, or not prudent enough, I... would say.. And, and, uh, from the political people... in the western world, in Germany too, there were not, uh... good enough, uh, to manage those emotions, because they couldn't have been calm, but it... didn't happen, and therefore, there was a break.

AND WHAT WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THAT, FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES?

The immediate... there was an immediate... internal German, um... I have to repeat it because I have to make sentence... um, the, um, the... The immediate reaction of, uh, this... wall in Berlin was, I would say, very, in Germany it was not very good at all, and it changed the political... forces in, in Germany. But that perhaps was not so, so strong than, uh, that many Germans from that time on had the feeling that the Americans are not only pretend, and that they would not, under any con, condition pursue the good, what we thought is a good in the world. But that, uh, one has to adapt, uh, and to make compromises, and from that time on, I would say, there are, uh, there are more contacts also... to Moscow, and so on. And, um, I think that is perhaps... that is a result of this. It is not too strong, and I'm sure that Washington and London, Paris see it very clear, how strong those feelings are or not, but before they didn't exist at all.

THERE WAS A SUGGESTION IN THE PLANS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINGENCY PLANS AT THE TIME OF THE BERLIN CRISIS DID CONSIDER USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR A NUCLEAR WEAPON. BUT THE GERMAN REACTION WAS VERY ANTAGONISTIC.

I would say, um... that, uh, to, in that time, uh, nobody of the political level, I would say, above minister and so on, uh, got a proposal like that. There was no proposal from the American side to use a nuclear weapon in this, uh, circumstance. Uh, and of course there was no denial from our side, neither. Uh, it, uh, there are always people who say, Yes, I can't rely on this man, or on that man, because he does, uh, not, uh, stand firm in the moment, but, uh, those are, uh, they are of no importance, those remarks, because they are not true. They are not true in, in, in this, uh, specific case. Nobody proposed it... in the, in the western, uh, uh, line of any importance, of any importance, political importance, and nobody denied it either, and of course, if it would have made, I think, uh, everybody of...political importance would have, uh, denied it, and would have said, No, that is not the case for a nuclear bomb, in any way, no uh, that was not the question... the question was only, I would say, um what, um... could have been done in order yeah, one would have had, um, to inform the majority, uh, in Berlin, and also in the other part of Germany too, that one wouldn't, one couldn't fight... about everything. That there were some things which one had to admit, because of the realistic situation. That would have been very good if that would have been done before, but when it hadn't been done, and, uh, the Wall was erected, something had to be done in the moment. Um, one had, one should have, uh, said immediately, and it lasted too long, uh, to, uh, said immediately, "Now, keep calm. That is very harsh, and we don't like it at all, but of course we can't risk any blood for that, bloodshed, from either side.

WHAT WAS THE GERMAN REACTION DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

Uh, the Cuban Missile Crisis, in my eyes, is one of the most important points in the history since the Second World War. Perhaps it has been underestimated until now in, in many circles in the western world, whereas I hope in the, in the historical world it is... understood better and better.

CAN YOU LOOK AT ME AS YOU'RE SAYING THIS?

It is, um, is a, um...The German people didn't, uh, know much about it, because it came up very quick, and then it was over rather quick; and they were not very well informed about, uh, uh, the effect and, and the moves and, and so on. But I would say, in, uh, in the German government it was rather well observed. And I even might say... that, uh, we, for instance, from July, we had at that time, to add that, no diplomatic relations with Cuba; we had broken with, uh, Cuba; and, uh, therefore we had only, uh, an, uh, men there who, I don't know how you call it, was a second man.

A COUNCILLOR OR SOMETHING.

But he had reported, and, uh, it was very interesting... since middle summer, that, uh, there were always, uh, Soviet ships coming on, and with weapons, and he, after some times, he, even, because he couldn't observe it himself, he only was, had to rely on the gossip in this part of the world, that there were, uh, rockets too, and so on, and he informed us. And I personally, uh, talked to the American ambassador here about those questions, what he thought about it. And we were, to make it short, we were very much astonished that the Americans for a long time the, the American government, government, for a long time didn't react very much. They... they made as, as didn't exist, this danger... and, to a certain extent, it is real, the issue... nearly unfeasible. How, you say, did slip that? And... a person explained it, that, um... uh, Kennedy had, uh, an election in November, of '62, and he wanted of course to win it very high. It was a, for the representative's house.

IF YOU CAN KEEP THIS FAIRLY SHORT. WHAT I'M INTERESTED IN IS THE GERMAN REACTION...

Ah. Yeah. It is, um, the reaction of the, of the government... was, uh, first, um, uh, that we tried to make the Americans, um, uh, a little bit vague in this problem, because we immediately thought it could have repercurrents, how do you say that?

REPERCUSSIONS.

Yeah, repercussions. In, in, in Berlin, for instance, or in other parts, and we were much astonished that they didn't do very much, but then, and it was, I think, was it the 16th of October or something like that, that they really, uh, realized the danger which was immediate. And then they reacted, and of course, they wanted, uh, and then they reacted, uh, firmly and, um, as they informed also the, uh, uh, the, the nations which were united with them in NATO, uh, how to do because, they said, It is for, for the time being, it is a thing between Russia and us. But of course it can be, uh, repercussions on, on your, uh, countries too, and therefore we want to inform you and even to listen what you advise. Uh, and, uh, for, in, in this reason, uh, the American ambassador, um, uh, several times came to our chancellor, and asked, informed him and asked him and always our chancellor said, uh, uh, Adenauer was it, um, he said, um, "We stay on your side. And we, uh, if you think you have to take difficult, or even very dangerous decision, decisions, take them. We stick to you, and, uh, what might come." And he did it in such an... convincing way, that, after this, in, in, in the public, I think it's said that DeGaulle too said this. He made a little reproach, uh, in addition, but, uh, in general he also said, "We stick, uh, to, to the United States," and, uh, when the... crisis was over, uh, uh, Adenauer got more, uh, than one letter from Kennedy, uh, thanking him for this attitude and, uh, that they knew that they could, uh, count on us, whatever might be the outcome of this, uh, big crisis.

DO YOU THINK, LOOKING BACK ON THAT DECADE, WHICH COULD HAVE TUMED OUT IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS FOR EUROPE, THERE WAS ANY WAY IN WHICH A DIFFERENT KIND OF BALANCE COULD HAVE COME OUT IN EUROPE, EITHER A UNITED NEUTRAL GERMANY OR A FRENCH-GERMAN BLOC APART FROM THE UNITED STATES, WAS THERE ANY OTHER SOLUTION THAN THIS DIVIDED CONTINENT?

I don't think that, um, another real possibility existed after the war. It didn't exist because of the, I would say, the attitude of the big, the two big powers. They are, in a, uh, they are contestants, how you say it?

YES

They are contestants, and, um, first, perhaps... the Americans thought that the friendship of the war, the war friendship, could be maintained, and that perhaps both big nations, super nations, could do something together or let the other people... let, let the other do what he wanted in his part of the world, but, uh, when, uh, they realized, um, that the, the attitude of the, the Russians was... the other way around and... not only that they had taken the Baltic states, like we say... that this kind in Czechoslovakia didn't please them at all, uh, uh, then I think they realized that this was not real friendship, but, uh, that there were two powers, and that they had to defend their own power. And therefore, if, uh, in, in Europe, say, there was, um, the only power which was really, perhaps, strong to a certain extent, was England. France was beaten too; it was on the winner's side, but it was very weak, and it couldn't envisage anything like building up a new force together with, from, with Germany, no way, because it was the enemy in, uh, insofar this was impossible, but, but, uh, there was no possibility neither for instance, um, that, uh, there could be a united, uh, Germany neutralized, like Austria, or like Switzerland, or so on. Uh, I think it would have pleased many Germans. Uh, they would, they wouldn't have taken this, uh, fate, uh, because I think for some time, some generations, even, uh, thought that uh, Switz... uh, well, well on with their, with their destiny there. Uh, but, um the two powers wouldn't, uh, let it go this way. And especially, and they realized it very soon they realized it, first they governed Germany together, those four big forces, um, and mainly the Americans and, and the Russians. But, uh, then, um, the Russians observed even if they had free elections, in the eastern part of Germany in '50, uh, '6. And they had thought, the Russians had thought, of course, that the Communist party, or, it, it was called Socialist party, uh, which were on their line, would win... a majority, or at least a big part of the population. But then the only free election in this part of Germany, they only got as much as the Communists had before the war, about 19 or 18 percent. And that was of course a big disillusion for them, and they thought, No. Uh... if we really admit elections, then we lose the part we have, and that they want, they didn't want at all. They wanted to keep it, and, uh, therefore they not only, I would say, um...uh...did not admit free elections any longer, uh, but they made government there Germans, they were Germans, but by the way, Wilbrecht, the first, um, East, uh, German commander, he was, uh, uh, he had both nationalities, he had also the Russian nationality. In any way, uh, uh, they said, "We keep what we have." And, uh, when they made proposals in direction of reunification, they of course wanted a Socialist-minded Germany. And that, the... majority of the Germans didn't want, but fortunately, the Western powers neither. Because we alone, perhaps, wouldn't have been strong enough to hinder it, uh, but the, uh, the, uh, Western powers, uh, they, uh, they made free elections here always, and the Communist party was always admitted, but they didn't gain more than two percent or something like that, uh, and, um, insofar, uh, they... it, they kept their procession, or, I mean, it wasn't, processions there...

WE HAVE TO STOP BECAUSE OF THE HELICOPTER. I'M JUST GOING TO ASK A QUESTION ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND AGAIN, I JUST WANT A FAIRLY SHORT ANSWER, IF YOU CAN DO THAT. DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF A UNITED, NEUTRAL GERMANY, WAS THAT EVER A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY?

I think that it was no realistic possibility. Um, uh, we wanted, uh, a united, uh, Germany, but I would say, a demo, a democratic and free, uh, Germany, and, uh, they didn't admit that, and the Russians, of course, would have admitted and... very voluntarily admitted a united, uh, Germany with socialist government, but that... the majority of the Germans didn't want, uh, in free elections they always, always repudiated them, and, uh, the western powers, uh, kept to us, stick, stuck to us.

DO YOU THINK THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE PARTICULARLY, AND EVEN THE UNITED STATES, ALTHOUGH THEY OFFICIALLY SUBSCRIBE TO WANTING A REUNIFIED FREE GERMANY, DO YOU THINK THAT THEY REALLY WANTED THAT, OR DO YOU THINK IN SOME WAYS THEY WERE QUITE HAPPY TO SEE A DIVIDED GERMANY?

I would like, um... to the question... England and France really wanted a united Germany, uh, or the Americans, I would really like not to answer, because I... all three powers promised it, and in written form, at least seven times. And I want at least to maintain that they perhaps meant it.

YOU SOUND AS THOUGH YOU THINK THAT PERHAPS THEY DON'T.

Uh, there were forces who did not, yes, I'm sure, and, um, but perhaps things might change, and then perhaps the, the, the... words still stay.

BUT OF COURSE, A UNITED GERMANY THAT WAS FREE NOT ONLY TO ELECT THE GOVERNMENT OF ITS CHOICE, BUT ALSO TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE THAT IT CHOSE, WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

No. The, the Russians couldn't accept a Germany, a whole, a united Germany which was, even in defense matters, on the Western side, on the whole. That they couldn't admit.

SO EITHER WAY IT WAS NOT REALISTIC.

I think it is still a realistic, uh, view, but in a very long run. Things have to change in other parts of the world, and for, perhaps for 10, 20 or so years, but then, then it, uh, it is no danger, and everybody's convinced that there's no danger, that the Germans are united in that way or the other, then I think they will also admit it, because, uh, it is, uh, a right which is conceded to every nation in the world, to be as united as they want to be or to be divided or not, and why should they, uh, be so, I would say, egotistic, uh, not to admit it to the Germans.

DO YOU THINK THAT FOR GERMANY, AT ANY RATE, THE WORLD WOULD HAVE BEEN A WORSE PLACE WITHOUT THE INVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

We have, uh, I guess we have many nuclear weapons on our soil, but we think that the policy of, uh, deterrence will function until a new policy is found, which will avoid war too. I don't think I, if not something excep... exceptional will happen, that there will be no big war between the Russians and the Americans and insofar, I would say the nuclear weapons, for some time, perhaps, they have been even necessary to prevent war, and that I think insofar was in our favor.