Well, he was, let's say he was a...as a strategist or a conceptualizer, he was a, he thought historically. He, I think he was, may have been the last president we've really had that uh, got into that, was concerned, was self-conscious even about it. At the same time, within the man, the politician, the fairly conventional person, a man much more conservative than uh, he's been looked at uh, in subsequent hears with the evolution of Robert Kennedy and the positions of his, of his brother in politics now, he was, he was, he was back there much more cautious, ideologically and temperamentally.
And uh, Kennedy would, would uh, have, let's say, a, a grand concept, expressed in, in his inaugural address or uh American University speech, but at the same time, he was a, he was a very wary tactician, he, he was, he was afraid of over-involvement, and it was, there was the tension, again, between the sort of the large ideas, the hopeful spirit, and this, this much more, almost crabbed, internal tactical sense that, that uh [cough] conflicted uh, in, in what he was trying to do.
I think, I'll say in terms of Southeast Asia
, that uh, he thought we should do things there, and yet he, he uh, he approached it very warily, and he would, he would, he would step up the uh, the involvement uh, very gradually, even though it, it had tremendous consequences beyond the immediate number of people there.