WHY DID YOU LEAVE LOS ALAMOS AT THE END OF THE WAR?

I came back rather late from Japan, that is after--long after the end of the war, months, and by that time, I suppose 3/4 of the people had left Los Alamos. I stayed there to finish up things and to start some activities and the peaceful use of plutonium which I thought was something I could do and then of course in--at the beginning of the next fall term, I left for the University where I wanted to go. And one nuclear war was enough.

LETS JUST DO A TIGHTER FRAME AND WE'LL JUST TRY THAT ONCE MORE. MAYBE YOU COULD JUST SAY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME, THE SAME THING...A LITTLE LESS DETAIL.

When I got to Los Alamos which was from Japan which was sometime after the end of the war, I found that most of the people who had left or who were soon to leave, I joined this group uh, because I too want to get to the University when I could which was the following autumn to start the fall term. One nuclear war was enough.

I'M GOING TO ASK ABOUT YOUR REACTION, YOUR PERSONAL REACTION AND REACTIONS AMONG SCIENTISTS TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SOVIET BOMB IN THE FALL OF 1949.

When we heard over the detection of the first Soviet explosion, August, September '49, we were quite satisfied in a way because it bore out our feeling of how the world worked. We had always said, the Russians will do it in five years and here it was about four years and they had done it. That bore out our predictions and made it clear that our forecast was pretty sensible that if you didn't make an agreement, you would find yourself in a race. And we were somewhat surprised that the uh, public clamor to-that this was extraordinary and had to be explained by some special phenomenon. Not at all, that was simply what you could imagine from the kind of effort we put into it, in a world where after all every physicist knew just not what to do in detail but how to start along the--along the road to explosions.

JUST FOR SAFETY HERE LET ME JUST ASK, ASK THE SAME THING AGAIN...MAYBE YOU COULD MENTION UH--IN ADDITION TO YOUR NOT BEING SURPRISED THAT SOME PEOPLE HAD THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN 20 YEARS BUT THAT MOST OF THE SCIENTISTS WERE PROVED RIGHT IN THAT IT WAS ONLY FOUR OR FIVE.

When we heard of the detection of the first Russian atomic bomb explosion in September of 1949, we felt, well it was what we expected and it bore out our forecast that that's what was bound to happen. A great nation with resources available and the impetus of being behind would do it in four or five years as we have done. After all the hardest part was to show that it could be done. That was done in 1945. After that you could be sure that it would happen elsewhere in a short time. Some people believed it would take 20 years, because they underestimated the degree to which the Russians could mobilize high technical skills. We knew that was wrong. And we had a respect for the technical community there as indeed in all great countries and we knew it would not take that long. So for us it didn't come as a surprise but as a kind of a rueful uh confirmation of our forecast about the world.

JUST ONE LAST TIME. WOULD YOU PICK IT UP WHERE YOU SAID "SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE 20 YEARS BUT WE KNEW..."

Some forecasts felt that the Russians would take 20 years to do such a thing but we knew that was unrealistic, that the kind of effort that they would put into it and the kind of skills that they could bring to bear would make the thing possible. In about the same time it had taken us, which was after only four or five years. The hardest part was showing that it worked at all. And that had been done in 1945.

DO YOU THINK THERE WAS MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE ROLE OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE?

I think the role of espionage is primarily political. It doesn't help you very much to have some secret papers snitched and given to you. Don't believe it anyhow. Looking at my own views of the whole matter, I would not believe it. I would be very skeptical. I would try to test it all internally. I think of that's--of negligible importance, compared with the really important thing which was that we saw three explosions in the close of 1945, and again the test in '46. Those were the things that made it clear that the Russians could do it and then they had the way clear. Oh yes, I suppose if you heard some direction or other you might save a few million dollars by omitting this false start or other. But it's not something of genuine international importance. It's main importance is politics.

WERE THERE SOME PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY WHO PLAYED UP THE IMPORTANCE OF ESPIONAGE IN ORDER TO GET THE GO AHEAD TO DEVELOP THE HYDROGEN BOMB?

The entire post-war period, from the--just before the outbreak of the Korean War until, through the demise of Senator McCarthy was very largely galvanized by the concern about espionage and intelligence leaks and atomic bomb secrets and all the rest. In my opinion, primarily a politically contrived justification for moving towards a terrible policy, anti-Democratic and anti-peace.

DO YOU THINK IT HAD ANY RELATION TO SHIFT TO THE DECISION TO DEVELOP THE H-BOMB?

No. It had relationship, it didn't. It was made before that happened. The decision. The public acceptance of it was made in that language, but before the espionage was known, the decision was essentially made in secret. So it had a great deal to do with the public acceptance of the decision, but not very much with the decision itself, as I read the timing. I might be wrong, but I think that's true.

COULD YOU SAY THAT AGAIN...

I believe the decision to make the hydrogen bomb...

START AGAIN PLEASE...

I believe the decision to make the hydrogen bomb was reached at in secret within the councils of the government before the end of 1949. But the first well understood and known cases of espionage didn't come up until 1950. So I think it couldn't have affected that decision. It certainly affected the public support of that decision and the general air of competition that overcame us afterwards.

WAS THERE ANY PARTICULAR PEOPLE WITHIN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY OR THE GOVERNMENT WHO TENDED TO PLAY UP THE IMPORTANCE OF ESPIONAGE IN THE PUBLIC EYE?

I can't recall. I mean, there was-a lot of clamor about it. The newspapers almost printed nothing else. The name that comes to mind, of course, is Senator McCarthy. But whether there were others before him I'm sure, but I don't remember just which persons they were.