A few words about myself. Er...I happened to be in charge of German affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and, naturally, I dealt with US-European relations from 1950 on. In order to do this (work), I had to look through all the WWII period documents, and, also, the most important documents of the post-war period. Therefore, speaking of whys and whens of the clash of interests, when a possibility of long-lasting cooperation (between two countries), so cherished during the war, with such hopes for the post-war period, when all of those were ruined—speaking of that, one should start with more distant events. With the events of the years 1943, 1944. Without that, it would be difficult to understand what happened in 1945 and 1946. We have to go back, in particular, to the events of the autumn of 1943. Then, according to the context of the Churchill-Roosevelt summit, the main lines of the American and British future policy were worked out. As we'd say today, the main directions of the Western (international) policy were defined. Among others, the project of the head of Strategic Service, Donovan, was discerned. This (document) said—its minutes have been preserved and exist today--that WWII should be considered as a US loss if the US failed to control Europe in the end; if (post-war) Europe, independent of the US, should have a country or countries—be it Germany or the Soviet Union--which would be able to control future development without the United States. Then it was agreed that the US should avoid this (such a possibility) by all means. Let us live alone the discussed option of the US withdrawal from the anti-Hitler coalition, of the relations with Germany which could be barely called ally-like toward the USSR As it was emphasized (in the document) with the Nazis in Germany...or with Nazi generals. And all that (should be done) in order to turn the whole force of the then mighty Germany against the Soviet Union. I repeat that all that was taking place (as early as) in the autumn of 1943. The position recommended by certain members of the Donovan's staff had not been formally approved by Roosevelt. But the proposed ideas, as history proves, had not died, neither with Roosevelt's death nor with other members of his circle. One could say, that from 1945 on, these ideas started gaining more and more influence in US policymaking. And Harry Truman's period of power brought a new atmosphere among your leaders. It contributed quite a new philosophy to American politics; quite a new philosophy in US-USS.R relations. The question is, naturally, suggested: why, where was the core, what were the roots of…the ideas that appeared in the US, I repeat, in the midst of war, and gained such power by the end of it? The answer is not so simple. But with all the complicities, one should inevitably notice a growing factor of the nuclear energy and nuclear arms. By the spring of 1945 nuclear arms had become an important factor in defining US (foreign) policy. The other question would be of natural interest to you, as well as to other thinkers and analysts. What were the Soviet intentions? What did the Soviet Union desire? I think you would believe me, considering the evaluations by your intelligence of the period 1944-45, which fully proved what I am about to say. The Soviet Union--that lost in the war (WWII) more than 20 million people, ruined by war to an extent hardly imaginable by anyone in the US--was naturally, thinking of the end of the war as the end of the most unhappy period in our (USSR) country's history. We needed peace! And we were counting on a enduring peace which would be guaranteed (as it was agreed to in both Teheran and Yalta) by both the US and the Soviet Union, acting together, to keep it unshaken by anyone. We were very sympathetic to the ideas often declared by Roosevelt, who, in 1945 said that reliable peace could never be reached without stopping the arms race; that the armed world causes inevitable military conflicts? that the very logic of the arms race calls for these conflicts. Apart from that, we were very sympathetic to the President's ideas (which said) that in the atmosphere of an (escalating) arms race it would be impossible (to build) a healthy world economy (system). One can either participate in the arms race or...develop optimal conditions for (creating) a healthy international trade to the certain profit of all countries, all nations. Those ideas were very close to ours. And, using that principle as the basis, we hoped to cooperate (with the Americans) in supporting peace. Actually these ideas served as the corner stone to our efforts to create the UN, as well as of tuning our system of mutual policy in Europe. Speaking of Europe, first of all of Germany as the center, the core of all our two-sided efforts to secure a lasting peace in Europe. We thought there would be a unified democratic Germany, with a friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union, at least not our enemy. (We thought) of Germany without armed forces, of Germany with all kinds of military propaganda being prohibited…all the propaganda of ideas that might create a good soil for the repeat of events which took place in Germany after WWI... (We thought of) a Germany, I repeat, which would be neither the enemy of the Soviet Union-- nor, by any means, that of the United States-- of a Germany which would serve as the stabilizing factor on the continent. The question of changing Germany's social system had never been raised (by us), of creating something different from, let...er...say, the Weimar Republic. A propos, we would return to this question over and over. That all the processes inside Germany, (that is) how to live, how to build their life, which social ways to follow, all that (those aspects) had been left by us to be decided by the Germans themselves. Why wasn't this (vision) of Germany...appropriate to your leadership? We have a rather definite answer based on documents...a number of American documents...This type of Germany was considered as being...too serious, too powerful a rival to the USin terms of economics. At least, in certain circles (of the power-brokers) of your country...especially...to be more precise, in Great Britain, which had a great deal of influence on your policymaking. This Germany was considered as being too...easily influenced by the Soviet Union. You needed not a neutral Germany, but a Germany firmly linked to the US, (a Germany) that would be under constant control of the US, and...would actually fulfill the US will. I repeat, these ideas were not born in 1945, but much earlier. You thought that the post-war Soviet Union had gained too much power, reached too favorable, too influential a position in Central Europe, (you thought) that it shouldn't last long; that it (this situation) had to be changed somehow. And, when asked how, you answered: with a Germany allied with the US against the Soviet Union, there were no ways to reach this goal. Therefore, according to your (political) thought, the Europe of ...spring, 1945 was already split. Europe... (was cleaved) (divided) into...Europe, the military-political ally of the US and the Europe which was, as you used to say, under the control of the Soviet Union, and which had to be freed from this control. That was something new, some new philosophy, different from that worked out in Yalta, or earlier, in Teheran. (However) your President Roosevelt in his last address to the Congress (in the beginning) of March, linked the fulfillment of these agreements (Yalta and Teheran) to the "to be or not to be" question regarding World War III... (He linked this question) to the fulfillment of the Yalta agreements by the US itself. Here lies the source of all the complications that followed. And it came to...I want to quote one of your scientists who used to say: "These changes in US politics had never been inspired by the Soviet Union, they happened not because Soviet policy had left you no other choice. It was your own choice, dictated by your own inner reasons, motivations, influencing factors.” A policy, when defined, usually goes through several steps in its development. The public knowledge usually has access to just the tips of this development. So, the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49 could be called one of these tips or, the opposite, one of the lowest points in the history of our relations and of the European situation. Why did it occur? What caused it? Why did relations get to the point where the US had to consider as decisively, and practically as, probably, never before, the option of using nuclear weapons. As I mentioned before, mentally, you had Europe and Germany already split much before (than in 1948). To prove this, I refer to the document signed at the beginning of the year 1946. That was the so-called experimental Pincher Plan that planned nuclear strikes against 20 Soviet cities. According to this plan...it was said that there was no single country, unoccupied by the Soviets, that could remain neutral. With the possible exception of...Switzerland and Sweden. All the rest had to become military allies of the US 1946, the beginning. That means, as it is clearly understood in this document, that those countries which were partially controlled by the US, such as West Germany and Austria, also had to become US military allies in the following year, 1947… After the Gouver's recommendations, the plan of creating a separate West German state was already approved. 1947, March. We'd been still formally negotiating with you. The Foreign Minister's Council still-existed formally. There were problems with the peace treaty, with the whole Germany still being discussed there, the problems of free elections in that country, and so on and so forth... But you had already decided between yourselves, that nothing of that kind would ever happen. But, that is what you had decided among yourselves. However, this also had to be decided between the Germans and instead of the Germans. But how? In order to achieve this, you had to create a situation that could show the Germans that you were their friends, while the Soviets were their enemies. You had to create a situation that would destroy the activity of the Foreign Minister's Council, that would ruin our Control Council for Germany, all of it should be ruined. In what way? To do this one should organize something really extraordinary. So, you, your politicians, decided to go for Berlin. (As a good excuse) To start, you chose the financial reform of 1948. Then, despite the agreement that there form would not embrace the territory of West Berlin, a recognized part of the Soviet Occupational Zone, you did it, de facto. And the Soviet Union... You forced the Soviet Union to resort to defensive steps. Dulles... John Foster Dulles declared openly: we can, he declared then, we can solve the Berlin problem even tomorrow. It's just enough to accept the Soviet point of view on non-expansion of the financial reform to West Berlin. But we don't need such a solution, these are Dulles' words, we need the West Berliners thinking of us as their saviors, and of the Russians as their foes. The rest is logic. The Logic of fight. Confrontation has its own logic, cooperation, its own. And...your intention to create a separate Western German state caused the responsive actions of the Soviet Union. Your logic of turning West Berlin into the cheapest atomic bomb in the center of...the Soviet occupational zone, as the politicians of that period used to say, also had its consequences. Everything came to results quite different from those we had hoped for in 1945, especially at that significant spring of 1945, when both of you and we had cherished great expectations from the (peaceful)future. In 1949, when the front lines were already defined, when all the following events were already pre-set (pre-determined), if to be frank, (I mean) two German states and so on, then we met you, we agreed on (the conditions of) the cessation of the Berlin blockade. But, the price of this was the mutual acceptance of a divided Europe, it's turning into two armed camps (formations), as it still exists today. It was you who wanted to pay this price. The United States needed it for securing its political-military position. We didn't want it. We had different goals at that moment. But dealing with events on such a grandiose level...one side can never compensate... for...the flaws of another side's policy, its nearsightedness its failure to be fully oriented toward a foreseeable future.

RADIO: ...and denied publicly those American militant circles, that call for immediate aggression against Cuba. But the atmosphere is dominated not by these realistic statements but by bold (brazen) threats which, in fact, eliminate all the positive aspects of... list countries possessing the means (of destruction?) which are, at least, equal to those of capitalist countries. Therefore, today we have to solve (our) disagreements not by clanking trifles, not by threatening other countries, but by looking for real solutions, by working out the ideas that would secure peace among all the nations....and by the unshakable, iron-clad principles of the modern international life I Therefore, the Soviet government considers it a necessity to raise a voice of warning, and to call the attention of all members of the UK...to the serious consequences of the USA's policy (toward) the Republic of Cuba. If the representing countries really want to save the integrity of the UN? if they want to secure its role as a functional tool of a steady peace, they have to condemn decisively such a policy, such actions. It's impossible today, especially......nations of the world. This program will come true, as soon as humans give up their prejudice of the inevitability of the arms race and war...as soon as firmly......(means?) of delivery...nuclear arms......the exception was made (only) for the agreed upon and strictly limited number of the intercontinental global missiles, for the antimissile rockets,...

Logic of confrontation had inevitably involved (sucked in) other countries in the region. That included Greece. I remind you, Greece was one of the few countries, that had liberated itself on its own at the end of 1944, beginning of 1945. Nobody had landed in Greece; the Wehrmacht occupation troops had left under the pressure of the circumstances, as well as the results of attacks by the Greek partisans. There was not a necessity of any foreign forces (participating) to provide Greece control over its own situation. But the English thought differently. They thought that Greece needed a king--to secure order. And to secure the king--it needed British troops. Er...the British troops arrived--and the battle started, the ones of wider range than those of the period of German occupation. There were several thousands of casualties--in Athens alone--as a result of this English action. The action, let me emphasize, was by no means favored by America either. Roosevelt had protested against the British actions. And...the American military had even undertaken such steps as refusing to provide their landing troops for all these British operations. I'd like to emphasize, it all happened at the end of the (Second World) War, and proved the extent of incompatibility of the certain actions of Britain, your ally, with the very spirit of...with general atmosphere that dominated the alliance at that period. But, the cold war had started. And the things which you considered as being wrong had suddenly become right, when applied to yourselves. You were already busy securing your future military positions. And, therefore, you needed Greece as a convenient (military) base in the Mediterranean Sea. That had caused the certain inner processes in Greece itself, it, caused a natural, I think in this situation-resistance of the leftist forces, which in turn led to the armed struggle, especially in the northern the areas of Greece. That struggle didn't end with the victory of the left that time. Greece, at the end, found itself being drawn into the North-Atlantic block, though. (Geographically) It belonged to the East—Mediterranean region. The United States was putting dots all over there , which was required by their actual (concrete) military policy. The policy that had been called first, the restraining of the Soviet Union (its expansion); and, later, during the Eisenhower period, they started calling it the policy of rejection. Austria's fate is a good example, in many aspects. To be honest, your policy prepared the German style future to it (Austria). Many of your leaders—Dulles was no exception—had favored the idea of splitting Austria. By the way, the reasons were rather simple. Austria was a link between Germany and Italy. Between the American armed troops based in Germany, the Western Germany and, in fact, the American military position in Italy. The absence of this link was really shattering the whole military system of NATO. That was one of the motivations—the main one—in your approach to Austria. Therefore, our leader had been repeatedly noticing US efforts to provoke such an aggravation surrounding Austria (question) which would lead the Soviet side, too, to the evil fruits of logic of confrontation. But there was one very serious difference in all that. You, the United States, had failed to persuade the Austrians that this solution, the split of Austria, would be the ideal for the Austrians. If, as in Germany's case, you had managed to attract, with your idea of division, the leading economic as well as political bourgeois force, the case of Austria was not your success. In Austria...practically, through all the periods of its existence…(they were always against this option), and not only those whom we used to call folk masses, hut also political leaders, representatives of financial, business, and clerical circles--all of them were against this option for Austria. The idea of neutrality as the solution was so popular in Austria, that at the end it broke through. And the fact that our leaders had also decided that a neutral Austria would be the optimal solution to us, and the desirable one, that fact required a certain courage on our part. In as much as...we had been fully aware of the necessity to struggle for neutrality, the real one of Austria. To struggle for the obligations to be really meaningful, not just the formalities...In order to achieve this, the Austrians had to be firm also with certain circles of the Western world, which had planned from the very beginning, and we have lots of things to prove this, for this neutrality to become a, more or less, purely formal paper matter. And...as I am glad to state, the Austrians proved able to look ahead and to be clever.

...NOT IN THAT SPECIFIC CONTEXT...

You know, the question of our relations with the Socialist and Communist parties (of Europe) has always been a complicated and bumpy one. Of course, the War (II) had unified all the leftist forces. It consolidated all the Communist parties; it opened the eyes of the Social Democrats as to the importance and necessity of the cooperation of all leftist forces. One cannot deny it. Perhaps, in order to disintegrate these forces which opposed the bourgeois circles...the bourgeois force...and, to some extent, the policy of yours (the United States) the Cold War was invented…. The atmosphere of military hysteria was created ...the atmosphere of total mistrust...the atmosphere of incompatibility of ideas and of inevitability of future conflicts. Frankly, I have to admit, that not always, nor everywhere, were we able to foresee...distant future events...what would happen and how...to foresee what would happen in the next five, ten, twenty years...er...Well... you see...considering our limited resources...and...our resources were limited,...really limited after the war.... All our resources...the administrative ones, the personal, the financial ones— you name it... Considering the lack of time and limited space to maneuver, considering the black and white picture (approach to) everything that happened… We fell far from always making the decisions and steps that would have been justified by (Knowledge of) the distant future. If we wouldn't admit it, we would depict ourselves better than we were. But don't you depict us as worse than we are. We were far from throwing our problems onto some one else's shoulders. Even less did we intend to take on others' problems; we had our own problems in that period, bigger than one country and one party could bear. Therefore, we were struggling for our own existence. We thought that, as an important part of our survival, as well as of the world's as a whole...and of human progress…of the movement toward a better world and better situation in Europe...the strong, influential leftist forces should exist, (in Europe) the Communists, included. As experience shows, a Communist Party (in the Western World) is an important corrective element in a system of bourgeois countries, an important factor stabilizing the bourgeois states' policy for the sake of the common masses' interests, for the sake of the democratic world, democratic in a real sense of the word, not just by name. Therefore, not only for the reasons of ideology, not only for the class sympathies, we've always tried to be somehow useful to our friends, er...to be useful to Socialist forces; but, if you wish the more general situation, deeper motivations were, also justifying this kind of cooperation. It was a necessity caused by the whole world balance of power, by the general tendencies of development.

LET'S MAYBE JUMP A LITTLE BIT...AND DEAL WITH... NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE...CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HUNGARY...

Okay. 1956, er...is memorable by lots of events and, before all, by the better understanding between the US and the Soviet Union, by (understanding) the question of what may and what may not be possible. As for all the other countries, they also began to comprehend that we (the world) just entered a new phase (of development). Of course, you in the United States remember the events of 1956...er...in the Middle East. The triple aggression of England, France and Israel against Egypt. You remember it because independently of each other, the Soviet Union and the US had taken, in fact, the same position. The Soviet Union and the US insisted the offensive should be stopped; the offensive troops should have been withdrawn. Our efforts to contact you then were not...successful. We were not acting together, but rather, in parallel...In parallel...to achieve a concrete goal: the withdrawal of troops; the cessation of war. But our paths crossed...when we started thinking about the post-war period. What is the meaning of the so-called Khrushchev ultimatum which is usually called "the nuclear arms threat" by the West? What was the real meaning of it? Khrushchev, as well as the Soviet leaders, had stated that in the nuclear age nobody can act violently—as England did—even being the nuclear power with the non-nuclear one. That the non-nuclear powers could have (mighty) friends. That non-nuclear countries could also have their pride. That events in the critically important regions of the world could not be solely of, let's say...of England's, France's, Israel's, and Egypt's concern. The (the events) had grown far beyond the (regional) framework. They were already concerned with the US and the Soviet Union. That was the meaning. And that meaning had been comprehended by England and France. That act had fulfilled its political mission. The war had been stopped. Had the US proven more ability to foresee, we could have also avoided the 1967 war, the 1973 war, and lots of other troubles, which, looking back, could not be considered as the piece of cake by either of us. There are contradictions to some extent. Some of those (events) you consider as great achievements by you. But, after all, if we forget the details, even the important ones... You, the United States, we the Soviet Union, all the world, we had lost a lot because of our failure to find a mutual language, to gather our mutual interests on the hot soil of the war in 1956.

In order to understand the goals of the Vienna Summit '61--I was taking part in it as an expert...To understand how many hopes were linked with that summit, let us recall just one event: the failure of the previous summit, in 1960, a year before. (It failed) because of your unlucky action, the American action that... The United States then sent (Francis Gary) Powers, the pilot, to (fly over) the territory of the Soviet Union, and this pilot eventually was downed. A positive shift in our relations which had begun to be noticeable at the end of the '50s--this shift toward better relations was badly shaken by that mishap. Or, at least, was seriously challenged. Khrushchev, then the Chairman of the Council of Ministers...and President Kennedy had faced the necessity of answering the (crucial) question. (The question was) whether it would be possible to build-up the bridge (of friendly relations) over this unpleasant…er...mishap...over this unpleasant...let's call it...incident, and to concentrate that positive potential possessed by both sides in order to improve mutual understanding. What were the advantages and the flaws of the Vienna summit, as I see it personally? First of all, both Soviet and American sides had been trying to challenge each other from the position of power--to the great disadvantage of the summit; (they tried) to challenge the firmness of each other... the Soviet side and the American side... (to check) how eager each side would be defending its point of view and its interests. The positive aspect (of the Summit) was in their approach: what would have done practically in that particular period of time. Whether there were any presuppositions to achieving it. But, as often happens— there were good intentions, all the pluses and minuses were well-balanced in those situations, but when it came to putting these intentions into practice, the minuses, the desire to demonstrate power, to show-off one's firmness—these aspects overwhelmed. That's what actually happened. And... Kennedy's words "Cold winter is to come to us"-- they described this final result (of the Summit) they summed it up. I'd like to emphasize... to point... that October of the year eighty... first... er... sixty first, was, perhaps, the most dangerous (period) in the US—Soviet Union relations since the end of the (World) War (II). At that time we (as well as the whole world) had been staying in 200 meters from the beginning of war. Would the tank duel have started then in Berlin--and everything was running toward it--the events, most probably would go beyond any possibility of control. However, the combination of those two momentums: the Vienna Summit and the deepest, the sharpest crisis in Berlin...and...that flexibility which brought (both sides) an opportunity to give up without losing face--that combination provided (both sides) with the prerequisites necessary to continue the constructive talks between your President and our Premier. Which they did for almost the whole year of 1962.Those were wide-ranging talks, very interesting talks, unfortunately, un-resumed ones--again, because of another crisis--that time the Cuban one which stopped this constructive dialogue. I think, you will talk a lot about the Cuban crisis, so I'll skip this topic. I'll only say, as our folks use to say, there is no wrong thing without good sides. One year after the Berlin (crisis) had tried our firmness, and our nerves, and what not--we found ourselves again on the verge of of disaster--that time regarding the Cuban (problem). And, probably, that very combination of the Berlin and Cuban crises, of those two situations, caused your President's speech of June 1963. (In that speech) He admitted the facts which we had been trying to prove to him (for months). We did it to Kennedy, as well as before, to Eisenhower, and, at a certain point, to Truman, too. (He admitted the following facts:) True, the US was a superpower, it was a country, especially at that time, of enormous force. But still, it did not have enough power to change the whole world, to create the world as similar (to the US) as they wished it, especially in that period. As Kennedy admitted in his University speech in Washington, the US had to accept that world, and to learn to cope with that world, (not necessarily conforming to US outlooks). And, I would like to say, our leadership had studied this speech with great attention. This speech of Kennedy's was received very seriously. And I witnessed this personally, there were opinions expressed (saying) that your President would face enormous troubles in his own country. He would have a very hard time at home, because the point of view then expressed by Kennedy was totally out of tune with the views of very powerful circles...of those who were seeking a US-Soviet confrontation, those who were convinced that the US should talk with us, as well as with the, rest of the world using a language of military threat.

CAN YOU COMMENT ON MAD? DID THE SOVIETS EVER HAVE A SIMILAR IDEA?

You know, we were always very critical of this concept, the concept of mutual threat, of mutual destruction, of mutual annihilation. We were always convinced, and this has nothing to do with demagoguery--that nuclear arms are evil. That nuclear arms cannot solve a single problem, not a social one, nor political nor economic. Therefore nuclear arms bring the very (idea of) violence to the point of absurdity. This, perhaps, is the only positive aspect of it: that nuclear arms embody the impossibility of solving the problems of present and future by force. Of course, (the fact) that we both possess enormous destructive arsenals has brought us both to the situation of inability to use power in solving at least those global problems where our interests are crossing each other. And in that sense, the (nuclear) arms are useless. I quote Bismarck who said once: 'even one pfennig spent on useless army is… and absolutely mad...embezzlement, it's a... spendthriftness. It's a waste--that's the word of Bismarck. We're now practically in an absurd situation. The arms now produced (supposedly) should not be used under any circumstance, and, nonetheless, we keep producing them more and more, and trying to create yet more destructive ones. (And all that goes on). Instead of decisively admitting that truth which is comprehended (that simple truth) as we did and are openly admitting it...that we need to solve all the problems of present and future by goodwill agreements only; we should follow the principle of the Bible that is so understandable to your masses: approach your neighbor the way you want him to approach you. We need nothing more... nothing else. We wouldn't need then a concept of mutual threat, because fear, as like as anger, is a bad inspirer.