MR. GELB, I'D LIKE TO START WITH A QUESTION ABOUT THE OVERALL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL CLIMATE IN 1977, WHEN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION CAME INTO OFFICE. WHY WAS IT THAT ALTHOUGH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TRIED HARD TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS, THERE WERE ALREADY TENSIONS AND THEY GREW?

The Europeans, in early seventy-seven, particularly the, the leadership in Europe, began to feel that they had been left out of the arms control process, that there had been years of the United States and the Soviet Union dealing with each other about strategic arms and doing very little about the arms, nuclear and conventional, in Europe. And they wanted some attention paid to themselves.

LET'S TURN NOW TO A SPECIFIC AREA WHERE PROBLEMS AROSE. HOW AND WHY DID THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS COME ABOUT ABOUT THE CRUISE MISSILE, PARTICULARLY?

The cruise missile history is, is really quite complicated and, to tell you the truth, ah, I'm not sure I remember all the, the twists and turns of it, ah, myself, either. When the Carter administration began, the cruise missile question was already an, an issue, because it had come up in the negotiations between Henry Kissinger and the Soviets. And Henry Kissinger had made various proposals to include cruise missiles in a strategic arms agreement. Now, when the Carter administration began, we too went at the question, but it was more... after the question than it was, er, coming up with answers, because ah, myself, for example, I had no decent idea, no decent intellectual idea, of where cruise missiles fit into the, the military balance. I didn't know what their impact would be on war-fighting, ah, on deterrence, on arms control, and I thought it was terribly important to, to take a hard look at those questions before we came up with proposals. But you often don't have the luxury of the time. The negotiations are going on, ah, the President and the rest of us were eager to ah, to make progress in Soviet-American relations and on arms control, and cruise missiles were thrown into that pot.

BUT WHY DID THE EUROPEANS COME TO SEE THEM AS KIND OF "FORBIDDEN FRUIT" THAT THEY WERE DENIED?

The ah, Europeans brought, brought up cruise missiles very ah, very early on, as a principal concern, in, about the negotiations we were conducting with the Soviets, and what I heard from them was 'here seems to be a new and promising technology, one that ah, may help us in ah, in ways that we aren't even clear about now, ah, a weapon that could be of considerable importance in the European theatre, and we're concerned you'll just bargain it away with the Russians and that we won't get a full crack at the weapons system. I think that was the issue.

LET'S MOVE ON NOW, TO THE EVENT WHICH BROUGHT ALL THIS INTO FOCUS, OR SO ONE IS LED TO BELIEVE, WHICH WAS THE SCHMIDT SPEECH IN '77. CASTING ASIDE ALL THE BARNICLES WHICH HAVE ACCUMULATED ON THIS SINCE THEN, CAN YOU TRY AND REMEMBER AND TELL US WHAT THE REACTION THAT YOU SAW INSIDE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS?

Well, the Schmidt speech hit us like a thunderbolt. Ah, it really shocked and unsettled the whole Carter administration. Ah, the, the feeling was that ah, the German Chancellor was challenging President Carter, ahm, on Soviet-American relations and on arms control, and that he was saying: either do something militarily to meet the new, ah, threat from the Soviet SS-20 missiles, or come up with an arms control proposal for eliminating that threat, but don't think you can get away with another ah, strategic arms agreement with Moscow without taking care of this problem.

WAS IT AS CLEAR AS THAT AT THE TIME? DID YOU HAVE TO GO TO THE GERMANS AND SAY: WHAT DOES SCHMIDT WANT?

Well, Peter, you're quite right. I thought it was clear. I thought the plain, ah, meaning of the words ah, was, as I just said, ah, but then when you went to ask the Germans, the ah, ah, the message became increasingly muddy and the interpretations changed from week to week, as Mr. Schmidt and others began to fight over, ah, the meaning of what he had said.

MR. GELB, PERHAPS YOU CAN RECOLLECT FOR US SOMETHING OF WHAT HAPPENED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SPEECH, WHEN YOU WERE TALKING TO THESE GERMAN OFFICIALS TO TRY AND INTERPRET THE MEANING, THE SUBTEXT OF WHAT SCHMIDT HAD BEEN SAYING.

Well, as I said, I thought the message was quite clear. Ah, fix the military situation through military means or through arms control. But ah, the Germans didn't seem to think the message was terribly clear at all, and over the next few weeks, first one German official claimed authorship and said the meaning was such-and-such, then another would claim authorship and em, ah, attribute a precisely opposite meaning to the speech. So it quickly became ah, terribly difficult to figure out what the, the Chancellor was really saying.

WAS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST REACTION TO SAY "LET'S GIVE SCHMIDT WHAT HE WANTS," OR WAS ITS REACTION TO SAY, "WHAT THE HELL DOES SCHMIDT WANT?" WERE YOU PREDISPOSED TO HELP HIM?

I think the reactions were all, all these things jumbled together. There were some who said, we've got to give him what he wants because we need German support for the arms control process; that the ah, strategic arms agreement is on the line here. There were others who said, ah, I'd be happy to give him what he wanted, if I could only er, divine his, his meaning. And, and still others who felt that they wanted to accommodate him, but were very, very angry at the public challenge.

THE EVENT WHICH THEN HAPPENED WAS THE NEUTRON BOMB EPISODE. CAN YOU QUICKLY TELL US WHAT YOU FELT WENT WRONG IN THE HANDLING OF THE NEUTRON BOMB?

The story of the neutron bomb really is very important to understanding European-American relations in the Carter years. It's one of those symbolic events that ends up crystallizing feelings, ah, on, ah, on all sides, in ways that er, that would become very difficult to manage. In the first place, ah, to be ah, quite blunt, I don't know anyone who, when we first took the decision to deploy the neutron bomb, thought it was going to be an explosive issue. Ah, we thought we were taking a reasonable and relatively unprovocative step to modernize a, a capability. And ah, those who knew Europe somewhat better warned that er, it might not be smooth sailing, but when the, when the public explosion occurred, when people talked about this bomb that would kill people, but not destroy buildings--the capitalist weapon-and when the Germans, in particular, seemed to go mad over the prospect of deploying this weapon, ah, we knew we, we had a ah, a real problem on our hands, and we set about to deal with it in a, in a careful way. And over the course of three or four months, we had extensive consultations with the Germans and the other Europeans on a formula ah, that would allow us to deploy the neutron bomb, ah, and would clearly show that the Europeans acquiesced in this deployment, but would also make clear that it was the United States' responsibility, was our deployment. And we worked it all out. It was very difficult, very delicate and ah, we were even going to do a dry run, we were going to have a ah, announcement that NATO ahm, ah, ha--had more or less practice form on Monday, and then the official announcement that the US had decided to deploy the neutron bomb would be made at NATO headquarters in, in Belgium on Wednesday, followed by press conferences in the various European capitals, where ah, the European leaders would say they supported the American decision to deploy the bomb. So, it was very care, carefully crafted balance. Then, ah, President Carter, at the last moment, decided that he didn't want to do it. And, if you have a moment, I'll tell you the, the story. The Saturday before all of these announcements were to, to take place, ah, Secretary of State Vance asked me to prepare a memo for President Carter, to tell him exactly what was going to happen in the next few days. Ah, and ah, I said I would do it and then he, he told me: now, prepare it as the decision memo. And I asked why, because it didn't seem to me there was a decision to be made at that point; everything had been agreed on. And he said, "Well, you just don't want to send him the memo cold. Do it as a decision memo, but you know, we'll again make clear that everybody is on board and this is all in train." And ah, I worked with ah, Defense Secretary Brown and ah, with a, a member of Mr. Brzezinski's National Security Council staff, and we came up with a memo saying we're all agreed and here's what's going to happen. The next morning, ahm, ah, Reginald Bartholomew, of Mr. Brzezinski's staff called me, and he said, you wouldn't believe that happened. I said, happened about what? He said, on the neutron bomb. President Carter checked the wrong box. And that was the decision to hold up on the, on the process. Now, what that did was to shake, profoundly, European confidence in us. It made it look as if we, we had the nuclear allergy, we were afraid of these weapons, which only reinforced European fears of nuclear weapons, it made it look as if we were irresolute, ah, unpredictable, at a time when it was even more important to Europeans to feel a steady American lead.

THANK YOU. NOW, WHAT WAS THE REACTION WITHIN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO THIS REALIZATION THAT THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAD PLACED THEM IN EUROPEAN'S MIND IN THIS POSITION?

I think a combination of ahm, concern, panic and desire to get down to work to fix it.

HOW WOULD YOU FIX IT?

The main route for fixing it was to try to find some formula for the neutron bomb, to reconstruct that decision somehow. And there was a good deal of work done to, to patch it together, which, which we eventually did. Ah, and secondly, I, I think it reinforced the feeling that we had to do something with medium-range missiles, to show that we were serious guys.

DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE EUROPEANS NOW WERE MAKING THE RUNNING, OR WAS THE UNITED STATES MAKING THE RUNNING? WHO WAS NOW IN THE DRIVING SEAT?

Well, the United States, in the end, always makes the running and, and the question is whether we're being er, shouted and whipped by the Europeans in the process, and I think it was the case of a lot of the latter.

WHO WAS DOING THE SHOUTING AND THE WHIPPING? WERE THE BRITISH INVOLVED NOW?

Most, most certainly they were. Ah, I think all of the Europeans at that point were looking to us for ah, some firm, strong action and some, a clear demonstration of concern about European interests. And we were going to give it to them.

IS IT NOT THE CASE, THOUGH, THAT THE EUROPEANS HAD DOCTRINAL, AS IT WERE, REASONS FOR WANTING TO INSTALL SOMETHING IN THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE, AS WELL AS THESE OVERALL POLITICAL WORRIES ABOUT THE UNITED STATES?

Some Europeans had doctrinal reasons for wanting the medium-range missiles deployed, ah, some felt that the whole concept, NATO concept, a flexible response, required a, a US capability at the medium-range level, and they did raise questions of doctrine. But mind you, the real issue underlying all of this, from the Schmidt speech on, ah, was doctrine in the profoundest sense, that is, belief, or not, in the American deterrent in Europe. That's all we were really talking about. Let's be quite direct about it. So it wasn't simply a matter of how one carried out the faith with the deployment of medium-range weapons, it was: could you trust the American commitment to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets attacked Europe? That was the, ah, the issue.

SO THE WEAPONS WERE BEING DEPLOYED FOR POLITICAL REASONS TO REASSURE THE EUROPEANS.

To reassure the Europeans about that, certainly. It was a, a, it was the principal reason.

NOW, THIS IS SOMETHING THAT THE MAN ON THE CLAPHAM OMNIBUS DOESN'T NECESSARILY UNDERSTAND, THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION GET USED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THIS TO US? THAT THIS IS WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THIS INSTANCE?

Sure. You know, throughout, there's hardly any discussion of how nuclear weapons would be used, ah, or if they should be used, or what the consequences would be. It's ah, it all takes place at a rather abstract level, the discussion about the need to shore up deterrence, which, which was a discussion that had the larger political doubts and concerns.

IN TERMS OF THIS PROCESS, WHICH THEN WAS SET IN MOTION, CAN YOU VERY BRIEFLY, TELL US WHAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GUADELOUPE MEETING WAS?

For those of us in the State Department, the Guadeloupe meeting was somewhat unsettling, because it was terribly unusual, ah, ah, meeting. Ah, it didn't include members of the foreign ministry of any of the participating countries. And when you're not at a meeting, er, it always makes you very nervous. When you're there, you're bored; when you're not, you're disturbed. And we, of course, were disturbed. And ah, we weren't sure of exactly what went on there, and even when, ah, President Carter came back, ah, the minutes of the meeting were not distributed to the State Department. Secretary Vance had to, had to go over there and ah, and to the White House and read them. But er, what ah, what we found out about the meeting was that it involved the beginning of a commitment on the part of the principal European leaders and our own president ah, to begin taking steps toward the deployment of medium-range missiles.

...ABOUT THE ARMS CONTROL INGREDIENT, WHICH THIS PACKAGE REQUIRED, HOW AND WHY DID THAT GET TACKED ON?

On this ah, my memory is absolutely clear. None of the Europeans we talked to, from the leaders of the ah, countries on down to the experts, believed that there was any chance of our being able to gain the necessary political support for deployment, unless it was accompanied by an arms control proposal to the Soviet Union. That in order to have the deployment track, you needed an arms control track, as well. And I knew of no one who disputed this at the time. It subsequently became an issue in the mind of people doing mischief, rather than understanding the historical circumstances.

SO HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THE PEOPLE WHO SAY THAT WAS THE WORST MISTAKE OF ALL? TURNING THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE FOURTEENTH MEMBER OF NATO?

I say that ah, er, they're full of nonsense. Because there was no other way to do those deployments. Ah, given the ah, the situation in Europe, ah, it would, er, it would've been totally untenable to try to deploy without trying to deal with the, the issue through negotiations. Er, as I said, there was no one at the time, whatever he may say now, or they may say now, who argued then that we could do one without the other.

THANK YOU. NONETHELESS, WAS THIS A SERIOUS THING? WAS IT SERIOUSLY EXPECTED THAT THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE WOULD WORK, OR WAS IT JUST A KIND OF SMOKESCREEN?

It, it was really ah, basically a smokescreen. Because very few of us, either in the Carter administration or in the European ministries, felt that it would be possible to work out an arms control agreement here. You know, this was an area of arms control that we hadn't really paid attention to, intellectually. And it was very difficult in the early stages, to figure out how it would all work, and most of the judgments were quite pessimistic. So the feeling was, we would make a plausible arms control proposal, a serious one, not in the expectation that it would succeed, but er, with the expectation that it would be seen as legitimate enough to justify the, the deployment of the missiles.

AND CERTAIN OF THE EUROPEANS, WHO PUSHED RATHER HARD ON THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE? THE DUTCH, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE GIVEN A FAIRLY SHORT SHRIFT.

That's a very interesting and important story, here. Ah, when the special NATO group was set up to consult on this issue, and I, I was the chairman of that group, ah, one of the first things we agreed on privately with the er, British and the French and the Germans, was that we did not want to get ourselves in a position of making an arms control proposal that would trap ourselves and prevent us from deploying the missiles. We were very concerned that, if you made an arms control proposal, the Soviets would come back and say, eliminate ah, all, all of your missiles, or we'll make sharp reductions, and that that would prevent us from making any deployments. So, we agreed, privately, that we would not make a proposal to eliminate all medium-range missiles on both sides. Now, when we went to one of the early meetings of the special group, we knew that the Dutch had another idea in mind, that they were going to propose, in effect, the first zero-zero option. And ah, as expected, the Dutch representative did just that at the meeting. And, as planned, the rest of us jumped all over him and succeeded in gaining the agreement of the group, to avoid a zero-zero option.

LET ME ASK YOU A GENERAL QUESTION, NOW. WHAT LESSONS DO YOU NOW DRAW FROM THIS WHOLE EXPERIENCE OF ALLIED HANDLING OF THESE KINDS OF NUCLEAR ISSUES?

In, in my opinion, the management of the medium-range missile issue, ah, was the most important event in the life of the NATO Alliance er, in a decade. Maybe more, for various reasons. Ah, first of all, the Alliance was really thrown into crisis by the Schultz speech and by the concerns about the, the credibility of the American nuclear commitment.

[MISC. DISCUSSION ON PREVIOUS RESPONSE; I.E. "SCHULTZ" FOR "SCHMIDT."] WHAT LESSONS DO YOU NOW DRAW FROM THE PHASE THAT YOU WERE INVOLVED IN OF THIS WHOLE EPISODE?

The, the management of the medium-range missile issue was, in my opinion, ah, perhaps the er, the event of greatest importance to the NATO Alliance in a decade or more. Ahm, from the Schmidt speech on, the Alliance really was in crisis about the American nuclear commitment, ah, about our reliability. And there's nothing so fundamental as the question of trust, and that was raised by it. Ah, secondly, there was enormous opposition building to the deployment of these missiles and it began to look as if the Russians would have a veto, for all intents and purposes, over future American deployments of nuclear weapons to Europe, and we felt we simply could not allow that. And there was a question of whether the Alliance could manage such a situation, whether we could deal with it. And I think, through the er, from the Carter administration through the Reagan administration, ah, we've proved that we and our European partners could get the job done. It was a, a matter of enormous self-reassurance.

WHEN THE DEPLOYMENTS WERE GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN EUROPE, BETWEEN '79 and '83, THE ARGUMENTS THAT WERE USED TOWARDS THE PUBLIC PLACED HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE SOVIET MISSILES, ON THE SS-20S. IN YOUR MIND, WHEN YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THE BUILDUP OF THIS THING, HOW IMPORTANT WERE THE SS-20s THEMSELVES, AS OPPOSED TO THIS QUESTION OF REASSURING THE GERMANS?

Well, our minds weren't one, one mind. Ah, ah, we had different opinions inside the US government, just as there were different views in Europe. In my own view, the SS-20s, in and of themselves, were not of great military consequence, because, in my own judgment, I knew that we had the necessary targets covered by American strategic forces, and I believed in the American commitment, nuclear commitment, still do, and did not fear that there was any gap in our deterrent posture. Ah, but it seemed to me, the gap would be created if, if the Russians said, you can't deploy these missiles, and then we found ourselves unable to do so. That one could really create a gap. So, er, to me, the missiles needed to be deployed, deployed to Europe, not to ah, ah, counter the military threat of the SS-20s, but to counter the need for the erosion of confidence in the Alliance itself.

BUT ARE YOU THEREFORE SAYING THAT THIS WHOLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ARISE FROM THE NEUTRON BOMB, LET'S SAY, IS THAT THE CRUCIAL THING WHICH MADE ALL THIS HAPPEN?

As I said, I think the neutron bomb incident crystallized the feelings that had been building for some time. They had started under er, Henry Kissinger and ah, er, his things that he did to cast doubt about, upon the validity of the American deterrent, things that he did in the negotiations with the Europeans, that ah, with the Russians, excuse me, that raised questions in the minds of Europeans about American commitment to European arms control. So, there, there were questions ah, er, behind the scenes all along. The neutron bomb only convinced many Europeans that their worst fears were true.

THERE'S BEEN A LONG ROAD THAT'S BEEN TRAVELLED ON THIS, AND DO YOU THINK THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS ABOUT THE TIME WHEN ALL THESE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN, WHICH ONE NOW NEEDS TO BE REMINDED OF, THE SORT OF CONTEXT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AT THAT TIME, WHICH ONE NEEDS TO REMEMBER, WHEN LOOKING BACK ON THESE EPISODES?

Quite clearly, ah, I think, as you've talked to all of us who, er, were involved in this, er, one of the great dangers is that the, the more years that ah, pass from our actions, the more heroic, ah, our own roles become. Ah, maybe even ah, less reliable, therefore. Ah, people do forget what, exactly what was driving them. Now, for some, the main thing to get, er er, to get out of the way was a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviets and to subordinate most things to accomplishing that. And down at the other end of the, the spectrum, there were people, ah, simply-panicking for fear that ah, they would be, forever after, ah, branded as wimps unless they did something on this issue. But those things tend to wash away and the explanations get more complicated.

IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS MORE DISUNITED AND SPOKE EVEN LESS WITH ONE VOICE THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN A GOOD IDEA, AND HAD BEEN NORMAL UP UNTIL THAT TIME; IT WAS MORE CHAOTIC IN ITS HANDLING OF THESE QUESTIONS?

That' s a common charge about the administration as a whole that I think, ah, ah, is much more complicated--That's a charge against the Carter administration, I think there is a good measure of truth to it and, at the same time, I think it's also misleading. The truth of the matter is, there was disagreement, substantial disagreement inside the Carter administration. There is in every administration, as you get different views within the State Department, between the State Department, the Pentagon and so forth, that's inevitable, natural, and desirable. But it's up to a president to pull all these different views together, to establish a direction, if not a perfect ah, intellectual and logical fit among the different views, just to get everybody going toward the same goal. And here, I think, is where the, the charge has validity. President Carter really didn't do that. He, himself, was, on a number of these issues, ah, often of two minds.

BUT WHAT EMERGES VERY CLEARLY FROM WHAT YOU'VE BEEN SAYING IS THAT SO MUCH OF THIS IS A REACTION TO A MISTAKE. THIS WHOLE EPISODE IS A KIND OF REACTIVE TRAIN OF EVENTS. PEOPLE NOT IN CONTROL; THERE'S THIS SORT OF REACTION AND THESE MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED PURELY TO GET OUT OF A POLITICAL MISTAKE, GET OUT OF A POLITICAL HOLE.

Well, in part it was that. It was a reaction to the, the terribly negative political fallout from the neutron bomb, but, as I said, it was also a reaction to these deeper trends and concerns inside the Alliance about ah, US Soviet relations and the future of NATO.

NOW, THE EUROPEANS ALL GIVE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION GREAT CREDIT FOR THE WAY IT HANDLED THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT, THE BUILD-UP TO THE '79 DECISION. DO YOU THINK, FROM YOUR CONTACTS WITH THE EUROPEANS, THAT THEY FULLY APPRECIATED THE POLTICIAL RISKS WHICH MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THIS DECISION TO DEPLOY LAND-BASED MISSILES IN EUROPE?

Yes, they did. Because ah, before we had reached the final decision on deploying ground-lodged cruise missiles and Pershings, there was a brief period where the Germans, in particular, Chancellor Schmidt in particular, did raise the, the possibility of deploying the cruise missiles on submarines instead of on European soil, but it was raised more in passing than as a formal proposal, and we agreed to dismiss it rather rapidly. So, I don't think the issue would've been raised unless he, he understood that deploying em, ah, in Europe would raise some real political dust.

WHAT I WANT YOU TO DO NOW IS TO CHARACTERIZE FOR US THE NATURE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP, THIS RATHER DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEANS, PRINCIPALLY THE GERMANS. NOW, THE WAY I WOULD CHARACTERIZE IT WOULD BE TO SAY THAT THEY'RE RATHER LIKE ADOLESCENT CHILDREN WHO WANT TO BE ABLE TO REVOLT AND BE ABUSIVE, BUT THEY WANT, FINALLY, TO BE HIT OVER THE HEAD AND TOLD WHAT TO DO, AND THEIR COMPLAINT ABOUT CARTER WAS THAT HE DIDN'T HIT THEM OVER THE HEAD AND TELL THEM WHAT TO DO. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT, IN TERMS OF YOUR EXPERIENCE?

Well, as I said, President Carter, himself, was of two minds in, in dealing with a lot of these nuclear issues. He realized the necessity of having nuclear weapons on the one side, on the other, he didn't like them at all. But if President Carter was of two minds, er, from the point of view of most people who have served in American administrations, the Europeans are almost totally schizophrenic; there's almost no way to please them. If you're getting along with the Russians, they worry that European interests are being sold out. If you're not getting along with the Russians, they think that ah, there's going to be nuclear war. And every administration has run into precisely this kind of double buzzsaw. Ah, European leaders do have a lot of historical, diplomatic experience, er, to draw upon and it's terribly value, valuable. Ah, on the other hand, when it all translates into a kind of frenetic nervousness about almost anything, er, it turns differences about policy, ah, into crises, and really eats at the, at the foundations of the Alliance.