WHEN THE PRESIDENT CAME BACK FROM VIENNA, DO YOU REMEMBER HOW HE WAS FEELING. WHAT IT WAS LIKE?

Well, in 1961, after the Vienna conference, he came back from the conference with the aide-mémoire that Khrushchev had put on him, and he was quite unhappy because it was a, it was a threat, it's also, it was had put him down pretty badly. And he had, it was, he had all of us read and examine that aide-mémoire carefully. And it was in his mind, from that point on the attitude of Khrushchev toward him, especially, and toward the US

YOU WERE QUITE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT, PERSONALLY. WHAT WAS HIS FEELING AT THAT TIME AFTER...

Well exasperation, I wouldn't say, anger,

CAN YOU SAY "THE PRESIDENT..."

Oh yeah. Well President Kennedy's attitude was one of exasperation and a little bit of frustration, because he had hoped to get along with Khrushchev and come to some better understanding, but he felt that he had not been understood, and was also being challenged. And it didn't please him.

WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT?

Well, the official job of military aide is basically anything the President wants you to do. And fundamentally you're the liaison between the Army, or in my case, at that time with the Defense Department, and the matters he has. But, they gave me an additional assignment President Kennedy did, of handling the intelligence briefing every morning. My job was to go down in the situation room, gather the intelligence report from CIA, Defense Department, State Department, and any other thing that pertained to the intelligence, and then get it ready so that any time from, say eight o'clock on, we'd brief him on what he ought to know and what he had to know. And we didn't have a lot of time to do it, and he relied on the briefer, namely me, to sort out the things and bring him only the important ones.

WHAT WAS KENNEDY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS. I MEAN, I UNDERSTOOD...HE TOOK A LOT, HE READ ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF NEWSPAPERS AS. WELL, AND ONE GETS THE FEELING THAT PERHAPS HE HAD A LOT OF INTEREST IN WHAT THE JOURNALISTS AND REPORTERS WERE SAYING...AS WELL AS WHAT YOU WERE TELLING HIM IN THIS OFFICIAL BRIEFINGS...

Well, President Kennedy had an intense interest in all sorts of information gathering. He went through the newspapers, four or five of them as the first thing in the morning. And when you arrived for the briefing or it was your turn to go into the office after he had set the schedule for the day, he would say, 'well, now here's what I read in the NEW YORK TIMES. Here's what I read in the HERALD TRIBUNE. What's this got to do with it, you know.' And there would be sometimes others in the briefing, General Max Taylor occasionally, Mac Bundy, quite often, but it was mostly a one on one thing of assembling the data rapidly and he had a special report made up for him which he described as newspaper style. And this was called the President's intelligence checklist. And CIA prepared this every morning. It came over to the White House and one copy for him, period. And one copy for me to work with. And on the left hand column, he described this...he wanted just the headline. On the right hand column, a longer, regular who, what where, when newspaper write up. Which was quite a change for the intelligence community. And he would look at the headline, take one glance at the material, and say, I need more on this. Or, where did this come from? How did they decided this or come to this conclusion? So he had a continuing interest.

YOU WERE ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAN WHO CARRIES THE CODE, THE BLACK BOX...

Well, referred to as the 'black box' and sometimes jokingly as the 'football,' and there was a group of twenty-four warrant officers, who had these, the materials that were in this suitcase, this little bag, it was more like a briefcase, which had the codes that the President could use in communicating with the military command or other people in case there was a nuclear threat and by law, he was charged with making the decision, not only when, but what and where we'd use such things. The twenty-four warrant officers were on a twenty-four a day schedule and the rule was that they had to be within the minute of the President all the time, with that, with those codes. The warrant officers could open the box and the President could have access to the material, but the reason for one of the aides, the military aide or the naval aide or the Air Force always being very close by, one of us, so that we could help him interpret it, get the communication they needed and if necessary make such a decision.

DID YOU EVER HAD TO OPEN THE BLACK BOX AND USE IT?

No, it was never, as far as I can recall, it was, we never had to use it. But we had to go over it with him on a regular basis. Ah, keeping it fresh, and if there were any changes in it, notify him. So, I would say about every three months, we went over that, the material in that code box with him and also with the Vice President, who in case if anything happened with the President, would have to make the decisions as a delegated authority.

WHAT WAS KENNEDY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS? TOWARDS THESE CODES, THIS BOX...WAS IT A BURDEN TO HIM AT ALL THAT HE HAD THAT KIND OF DECISION THAT HE HAD THAT AUTHORITY...

No, President Kennedy was I would say at home with the responsibility. He never seemed to shy away from it, but it was quite obvious from all the times we spent together in discussing not only nuclear weapons but other things, that he, his goal was that this should never happen and we should never have to use it. But on the other hand, if we ever did, he knew he was the responsible person. Of course, he also real—ah relied heavily upon his advice from his Joint Chiefs of Staff, his Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, other people in the National Security Council, for background, so he felt the responsibility was his and he carried it willingly.

WHAT WAS HIS ATTITUDE TO THESE EVERY THREE MONTHS BRIEFINGS ON THE CODES...

Ah, it was never a brush off. It was never taken lightly. He was perfectly willing to take the time whenever we told him there were changes or that maybe we better bring it up to date with him. In other words, just refresh his memory, because if you're confronted with that with very little warning, if there'd been a surprise attack you then don't have time, you wouldn't have time if that had ever occurred to start reviewing the material, as it were. But of course, you have to realize that in addition, he wasn't doing this all by himself with one aide. He would, certainly the communications that we had with the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, would be instantly operative. And even...to the overseas commands, if necessary.

BEFORE WE GET INTO THE MISSILE CRISIS ITSELF, YOU HAD A STORY THAT MAY COME AFTER THE MISSILE CRISIS IN CHRONOLOGY, BUT IT RELATES TO WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT IS KENNEDY'S INTEREST IN COMMUNICATING WITH PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD... ...ABOUT A COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT YOU HAD SET UP AND THAT YOU WERE TESTING...

Well, uh the communication system available to the President was of interest to him more or less very seriously obviously, but I would say with great interest and basically it wasn't something I set up it was one—run by the White House communications agency and had been in existence at least in Eisenhower's time. And this gave him what we would call almost instant contact with the Prime Minister of England and also the Canadian Prime Minister, because by law those two people had to be consulted if there were possible time in any nuclear move we made. This was agreed long ago. Our objective to be able to get in touch with those people plus the Pentagon plus the State Department and all these senior commands. The Strategic Air Command out in Omaha, uh in three minutes that was our first goal. And we would have liked to have been able to put everybody on that network in a minute and a half. Well, to exercise this communications network we had to test it all the time. And we had arrangements where we could have what we called dry runs or I remember the code name to overseas, to Paris where we had connections with England, was 'white express'. We'd say this is white express and then we'd test uh—that meant we were calling and it was not to betaken anything but an exercise. If you forgot that 'white express' you've got an awful lot of people on the line in a hurry that didn't want to be there. As we developed it and finally there was of course on the President's desk a telephone, immediate access to this other communication system which wasn't the commercial system. And when we got it down to the three minutes from four and a half, five, by then we would go in occasionally and say we're testing this and we want to be sure you know--are familiar with it. So once in a while he would exercise the prerogative and say "Well how can I call Alaska...how about the commander in Alaska." And we'd say well, "Try it." He'd pick up the phone and say, "This is the President, give me the commander in Alaska." And instantly, within a minute, he'd have the commander on the line. But he couldn't quite believe this was happening. And also the commanders on the other end of the line didn't believe it either. They quite often said, oh now wait a minute and he'd say no this is the President I just wanted to chat and of course eventually, as we progressed and the communication system became more responsive, by once in a great while he would call all commanders there were basically six overseas commanders, CINCPAC, Alaska, various Europe and he would get them all on the line, SAC and he was always surprised, he said, they can't be just sitting there at that telephone, all the time--And I said, no, but they also have in their commands instant access and whenever they have to leave the phone, their deputy commanders will be the answering people. So once in a while he would get them all on the phone and then when they realized that it was valid and it wasn't somebody playing with the system why he'd quite often, well I'd say two or three times, I know of, would chat with all the commanders then.

...JUST TELL ME THE LAST SORT OF PART OF THAT STORY.

Well as the system developed and we reached the goal of under three minutes, contact all the commanders, we would get occasionally the President himself. President Kennedy would uh, just as an exercise pick up the phone and say "This is the President, get me the command set-up." And of course all the commanders would come in, one after the other. This is SAC, this is Alaska, this is CINCPAC in Honolulu, and when they were all checked in he'd say, "Well how are things going." And he'd have a...from the formal chat...but then when we got used to it and he was always amazed that one of them would answer and I explained to him that if he wasn't there 'cause they had to do other things, that the deputy commander always had to be on that phone, either the commander or the deputy within three minutes. And it worked, we got it down to where it was always workable.

WAS THIS A PARTICULAR CONCERN OR--OR GREAT INTEREST OF THE PRESIDENT'S IN A WAY TO BE IN THIS COMMAND AND CONTROL BUSINESS...

Yes he had a real sense of the Commander in Chief role and would play his part of it very willingly. President Kennedy first I think basically he liked the military. Secondly he was fascinated by (a), their communications; (b), their responses; and (c), the intelligence gathering process.

DO YOU THINK HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT CONTROL OF THE MILITARY BY THE WHITE HOUSE, BY THE POLITICAL LEADERS? WAS HE AT ALL WORRIED THAT MILITARY MIGHT DO THINGS ON THEIR OWN AND THINGS MIGHT GET OUT OF—OUT OF HAND ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE.

No, I don't sense that any at any time that he thought anyone of them would make move that wasn't approved by the Commander in Chief. One thing that was hard to discuss with anyone, was the possibility that he wou--might not be able or to--exercise that command and control and then who else would be there on tap. And the—'cause consequently it was the Vice-President who was the next man up and the third man in the line of command was the Speaker of the House. And we didn't make an effort that'd keep him abreast of things too, but not as well as we did with, Vice-President Lyndon Johnson.

NOW GETTING TO THE MISSILE CRISIS ITSELF...AND MAYBE JUST KEEPING ON THIS THEME OF COMMUNICATION, YOU WERE TELLING ME, I REMEMBER LAST TIME ABOUT SEVERAL INCIDENCES DURING THE MISSILE CRISIS OF THE PRESIDENT AND BOBBY KENNEDY I THINK, TALKING DIRECTLY TO CAPTAINS OF SHIPS OUT ON THE BLOCKADE...

Well, yes they did exercise their own prerogatives to call directly to see what was going on. In the missile crisis and the blockade was in place, they would quite often, not just President Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy, but other members of the EXCOMM would be there and I know at least a time or two the Chief of Naval Operations was there in the White House. And when their -- the tense moments were on about the blockade the President himself would be on the phone talking to the commanders down there asking them, "Well what do you see, what ship is coming up..." And this was not uh exactly what the military was fond of. I haven't heard any of them complain about it directly but, I imagine they felt this was a obligation of the proper chain of command. I know that the Navy felt that perhaps they had—this should be better left to the CNO to relay the President's commands and questions.

HOW FAR WERE THEY GOING IN TERMS OF TALKING TO THESE...TO THE PEOPLE ON THE SHIPS AND WHAT SORT OF QUESTIONS...DO YOU REMEMBER THEM ASKING? WE'RE THEY TELLING THEM HOW, HOW FAST TO MOVE THEIR SHIPS AND WERE THEY—HOW MUCH CONTROL WERE THEY TRYING TO EXERCISE?

No, the President wasn't trying to command the ships. But obviously from his navy background, he was very familiar with what was going on and they had discussed the details of a blockade at length, the legality of it, how it actually would take place, and when it got to the point of whether that Soviet ship would turn around or whether it was going to be shot at or we were going to run another ship across the bow, then they were quite concerned and the President, I think was pretty sure, was in touch probably with the commander of that whole blockade down there, saying what's going on, what's happening now. And I believe it's been described before when that Soviet ship stopped and it was reported back, "Their ship is dead in the water." That was a significant moment.

HOW DID YOU AS A MILITARY MAN YOURSELF FEEL ABOUT THIS? ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES GETTING ON THE TELEPHONE AND TALKING TO A SHIP ON THE BLOCKADE LINE AND WANTING THEM TO ANSWER HIS QUESTION.

Well, my training had been the opposite direction. Uh, where you gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff or whom ever your commander is a directive and give him the responsibility and the authority so it was a bit of a surprise to me, I won't say I was critically involved because I wasn't in the chain of command in any sense, but it was a surprise to see a president and I would say namely President Kennedy doing this. I can't imagine, although I don't know any examples of it, of President Eisenhower who had been trained in the other routine as a general, whatever, pick up the phone and start to exercise that kind of question/answer with the commander out there.

ONE OF THE...SPEAKING AGAIN ABOUT THE BLACK BOX AND THE CODES, YOU MENTIONED TOME LAST TIME THAT IN TERMS OF CUBA THAT THERE REALLY WEREN'T ANY PLANS FOR SOMETHING DOWN THERE. THAT EVERYTHING WAS POINTED NORTH. EVERYTHING WAS-- THE IDEA WAS THE SOVIETS WERE -- THAT THEY WERE GOING TO ATTACK AND BE COMING OVER THE NORTH. IS THAT?

Well, unrelated to the black box or the nuclear codes, when the Cuban Missile Crisis arose and we as you know, President Kennedy and every-- the whole community had been aware of Soviet activity down there for some time. Troops in there, ground defense as the Russians called them all the time, just defensive weapons going in. And as it came closer to a realization that they were putting in missiles that could reach the United States, Cuba being only 90 miles away, there was a grim realization around that our defensive structure had been across Canada against the Soviet nuclear attack at this country, either by bomber or by missile. And it became quite apparent that we had aimed very little anti-missile toward the south. It was a... it was rather a surprise I think. Now there had been thinking that they had thought about it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had contingency plans, but it was never a serious threat. And then they began to realize that we were-- if you use a Churchillian phrase, we had a soft underbelly of the United States from that direction. And this was of concern.

THERE WAS A LOT OF ACTIVITY VERY QUICKLY AND FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT WHEN THE CUBAN...WHEN IT WAS...

When it was apparent that we were going to have a confrontation with the Soviets over what they were putting in Cuba, as you know the President mobilized an awful lot of power including the only field type anti-missile defense we had which were hot missiles that the Army had, and the Marine Corps. And they were brought to the south and the troops were mobilized in Florida and along the southern border because this was a very serious thing developing.

I'VE SEEN PICTURES OF THESE HAWKS SET UP ON THE BEACH, I THINK, RIGHT ON THE BEACH.

Yes, they were...they were de... deployed to use an Army term all around the possible I would say approach lanes of penetration, mainly against aircraft in case they decided to use Cuba as a... as an airbase.

WAS THIS A GREAT CONCERN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT SORT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS HADN'T BEEN MADE FOR ANYTHING...FOR YOUR SOFT UNDERBELLY SO TO SPEAK?

Well, President Kennedy was obviously concerned. So was everyone else. It was something I guess we had not anticipated. There were many people who would say, Oh yes, it was anticipated and talked about, but in the limited defense structure we didn't provide anything there, direction. Now the North American Air Defense Command out in Colorado Springs, which is jointly manned by the Canadians and ourselves with aircraft, had certain emergency plans so they could turn those airplanes and go the other way, but it wasn't as totally planned as a really strong defense. We were thinking about the DEW line in Canada, and the aircraft that would go up and from Alaska, and from Canada itself, but they could-- there was some capability, but it wasn't the kind we'd ever anticipated in depth.

YOU SPOKE TO KENNEDY I THINK SHORTLY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO, THE FAMOUS MEETING WITH GROMYKO DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE MISSILE CRISIS. WHAT WAS HIS REACTION TO GROMYKO? HOW DID HE FEEL AFTER THAT?

Well, President Kennedy confronted Gromyko with the charge that they were putting missiles into Cuba, and Gromyko flatly denied it. Ah, this and after he'd left, ah the President was considerably upset, because by this time we had photographs. We knew what was going in there and they were clearly identified and he said, "He lied to me. He just sat here and looked me right in the eye and lied to me." And then of course they began to think of what else they were going to do. But he was...he was very angry that Gromyko would sit in his office and...and tell him absolutely nothing to it.

WHAT TO YOU, IN YOUR MEMORY WAS THE MOST CRITICAL MOMENT IN THAT WHOLE THIRTEEN DAY PERIOD?

The most critical moment was when they had decided on a blockade instead of any of the other alternatives, like bombing Cuba or a ground...an invasion over the beaches. And they didn't know whether a blockade would work or it wouldn't work. And when those ships were moving toward Cuba, and our ships had formed a blockade, which is an act of war if you know, and any jurist or lawyer would tell you that that was an act of war, to blockade another man's transportation on the sea lanes, that was the critical moment. And I think you know the famous quote from an, Secretary Rusk where he said, "Well," he said, "We met them eyeball to eyeball and they blinked."

WHAT WAS THE FEELING AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THOSE EXCOMM MEETINGS, DURING THOSE DAYS? WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE? YOU WERE I GUESS OUTSIDE THE DOOR OR IN THE OFFICE NEXT DOOR OR DOWN IN THE BASEMENT. WHAT WAS?

Well, EXCOMM was a very small committee of planners and strategists that were put in charge of this Soviet confrontation. So none of the lesser lights were included in it. And the atmosphere was trying to create, we were trying to create an atmosphere of business as usual around there. So that there would be a certain amount of security to the EXCOMM activities. And whether we were --I think we were pretty successful in creating the atmosphere, that the President was seeing other people, business as usual. And here right in the next office, in the Cabinet room, why these day and night meetings were going on.

HOW WAS THE PRESIDENT DURING THIS TIME? YOU, I'M SURE WERE QUITE CLOSE TO HIM PERSONALLY. WHAT WAS HE GOING THROUGH? WHAT WAS HIS MOOD?

Well, no man can actually say what another man is thinking or doing. But just from his outward attitude he was calm, he was serious. He was concerned, I'm sure, from all he said and did that Khrushchev was really drawing a line and confronting him as strongly as he had ever imagined. And he was determined not to make any mistakes in that period. He moved cautiously, but he spent hours reviewing what were — things that were recommended, discussing them with EXCOMM, and with others.

HOW ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER? WHAT WAS HIS SORT OF INVOLVEMENT IN THIS? WHAT WAS HIS CONTRIBUTION? WHAT WAS HIS MOOD, HIS STYLE DURING THIS PERIOD?

I'm really not a good judge of what Bobby Kennedy was doing and how involved he was at that moment. I know from all I've read and...and everyone else has talked about that he was very close to the whole operation and participated in especially the negotiations with the Soviet embassy and the Soviet representative. But I would say it was a mark of the same loyalty, the same close association that he had throughout the whole administration. He was the President's closest friend and...and defender in a sense, seeing that no one put anything over on him. It's it was a brother... brother relationship. And other than that I... I'm not very good at it.

WHO WOULD YOU SAY WERE THE CLOSEST CONFIDANTES OF THE PRESIDENT DURING THIS PARTICULAR PERIOD? WHO WERE THE PEOPLE THAT HE WOULD COME BACK TO AND SIT ALONE WITH LATER AFTER THE MEETINGS WERE OVER AND REALLY TALK TO?

Well, during this missile crisis, I would say the hour upon hour was spent with Bobby, and then I think General Taylor and Dean Rusk were certainly people he relied on. And talked with. I don't know how many people came to lunch or dinner or spent the evening discussing this crisis but certainly there were friends who he did talk to --to whom he talked and whom probably gave him friendly support.

DID HE EVER CONFIDE IN YOU DURING THIS TIME OF SOME THINGS? HOW HE WAS FEELING ABOUT THINGS?

No, mostly it was I'd say the President didn't confide in me to use that term. It was mostly, I was doing my job bringing in the intelligence reports, keeping track of things he wanted kept track of, seeing that messages were relayed when he had something on his mind. But it wasn't a matter of sitting down with him and discussing the...the situation.

REMEMBER THE DAY WHEN-- IT WAS A SUNDAY I THINK THAT THE NEWS CAME THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD AGREED TO WITHDRAW THE MISSILES. DO YOU REMEMBER THE ATMOSPHERE, WHAT HAPPENED IN THE WHITE HOUSE?

Well, as you know there were President Kennedy took a very active hand in replying to the messages that were going back and forth. And there were quite a few. And I recall vividly that when one of the more threatening messages came in he said, now look we're not going to answer this one. Let's let him think about it for a while. Let's wait until he sends another message because if we answer him defiantly now, we'll corner him. And in preparing the messages back to Khrushchev, especially getting him to withdraw the last time when they really put the pressure on him to withdraw the missiles, he said, "Remember this, never -- be sure and write these messages so Khrushchev can find a way out. Never corner a bear. Always leave him an exit." And then he himself had a big hand in writing the message where the Khrushchev reply came in and said, yes, we will withdraw our missiles. I believe it's quite apparent from other people's knowledge and what's been written, that somewhere in this process they agreed to take the missiles out of Turkey, our missiles out of Turkey, so that there would be something for Khrushchev in the bargain. Not only to keep faith, keep face, but so that he had something to report back to his group.

WHAT WAS THE MOOD THAT SUNDAY MORNING WHEN YOU GOT THE NEWS THAT KHRUSHCHEV WAS GOING TO TAKE THE MISSILES OUT? DO YOU REMEMBER THAT DAY?

No, I don't remember that particular thing. I... you'll get that better from somebody else.

DO YOU THINK THAT KENNEDY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MILITARY AND THE USE OF THE MILITARY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES IN A SENSE CHANGED DURING THE TIME YOU KNEW HIM? GIVE ME A SENSE OF THE EVOLUTION OF HIS THINKING.

Ah, President Kennedy's attitude about the military and toward the use of military power was always one of this is a very important part of our security. And it should be supported. A very distinct difference was that up to that time for example in military budgets before President Kennedy was President they said this is how much money you've got to spend. And then the budgets, the--the wish list was geared to what they offered. President Kennedy told the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Secretary of Defense and from the beginning, I'm not going to set a budget. You're going to tell me everything you need and how much it costs and then we'll see item by item what we can support. We can't have everything, but at least we'll know what the ultimate demand for the security of the country would be. And this was a whole new approach to budgeting and to military buildup. And it was that that marked a difference, a different attitude although I must say the military men didn't assume that they were going to get everything that they'd thought of, but they did know that he had an attitude of positive rebuilding the military. And he was especially alert to the fact that we had been relying on our strategic weapons, our superiority over the Soviet Union to be our shield. And that this wasn't going to do, that wasn't going to be enough and that conventional forces had to be reestablished.

YOU HAVE THAT LITTLE BOOKLET AND YOU HAVE THE PHOTO THAT WHICH WE'LL MAYBE TAKE A PICTURE OF LATER TO ILLUSTRATE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING. WILL YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT IN TERMS OF THESE THINGS? KENNEDY'S INTEREST IN PERHAPS SORT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF WARFARE...A DIFFERENT TYPE OF USE OF THE MILITARY?

Well, very early on we were all made aware that he was concerned about the speech that Khrushchev had made on January 6th, just before his inauguration in '61. And in this—

START AGAIN.

Oh, from the very beginning President Kennedy was aware that Khrushchev had threatened the United States an entirely different way. In Khrushchev's January 6th speech in 1961 before inauguration he had indicated that they would fight us and our allies in many different ways, many different fronts and small wars and big wars, and this did cause the President great concern, when he found that we had very little capability other than a European World War II-type of war. Plus, of course, the strategic missile war, which we're all aware of. And this led him to constantly asking what we had, what kind of weapons we had, and his focus was on what was happening in Southeast Asia, and consequently the kind of "guerrilla warfare" that we might be faced with. This led him to asking me one day to assemble all the weapons that the army had that were specifically capable of being used for guerrilla warfare. And he was not only horrified but quite surprised when the only weapon that came across to show him was a .45 caliber pistol, which was not the most famous weapon in the world at that moment except for just officers and men having in hand. With a little more probing, they brought forth all the training manuals that we had on guerrilla warfare. That consisted of about one book, and had probably not been studied carefully for a long time. One of the things that was interesting, he said, "Well, there's an Irish book on this subject." I said to the President, I don't know, why would they have a book? He said, "Well, you find it." He said, "There's a little Irish book." And so I through the military and through our own military attaché in Ireland got them to send me his the little Irish pamphlet, "Notes on Guerrilla Warfare," Issued by the Irish Republican Army, price two schillings. And this has a good deal of how you would fight a guerrilla warfare although this wasn't quite the kind of guerrilla warfare we were thinking of. One of the weapons after a little more probing that came over was a crossbow. Not the old crossbow that you would remember, but a crossbow that had a steel rod in it, that would when released by this very heavy mechanism would penetrate a twelve inch tree, and of course a very lethal weapon. And then they brought over their latest rifle to show him that this was certainly capable of doing a lot of damage, and a lighter, newer weapon. When we were, he wanted to have some pictures taken with it, and when we were taking the pictures, I put the crossbow on his desk and showed him how it worked and I was holding the rifle. And he said, "Wait a minute. We're not going to print a picture. You hold the crossbow, I'll hold the rifle." So he even had a sense at that moment of what we had to develop and he said, this is all we've got? I said, Mr. President, that's all that they can come up with. He said, something has to be done about this.

WHY WAS HE SO INTERESTED IN THESE TYPES OF WEAPONS, THESE CROSSBOWS AND SMALL ARMS AND THE GUERRILLA WARFARE PAMPHLET FROM THE IRA? WHAT WAS IN HIS THINKING ABOUT THE NEED FOR THIS TYPE OF MILITARY?

Well, the…the threat on the horizon right then in the early part of his administration was Southeast Asia, Vietnam. And if we were...if we were to be engaged he wanted to know what we had to do it with. He was aware of the charge that was current at the time that the Army was really not thinking of fighting the kind of wars that Khrushchev threatened us with, but its focus was on fighting World War II all over again. This is a common criticism. And his mind was going to the other threat to see what we had, and we at that moment, it could have happened any other place, not necessarily Vietnam.

THERE WAS TALK OF COURSE, AND MUCH DEBATE DURING THE MISSILE CRISIS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INVADING CUBA OR DOING AN AIR STRIKE ON CUBA OR BOTH. DO YOU THINK THIS TYPE OF MILITARY WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL IN THAT TYPE OF AN OPERATION?

Not, I don't think that we would have considered a guerrilla warfare type of operation because we'd had a rather bitter experience with the Cuban invasion early on, and it's quite evident if you were going to do anything in Cuba that the President would have to mobilize a real amphibious task force. The other surgical strike that was considered was taking airplanes and bombs and just striking, killing off the missiles that were being installed. But this would involve killing lots of Cubans and certainly some of the Soviet workman and...and advisers that were in Cuba. So I would say they mobilized a force big enough to invade Cuba if they needed to, and certainly the Air Force was ready to do any strike that was ordered. But that was put down much lower priority. I don't know what would have happened. No one else knows what would have happened if it hadn't worked out the way it did.

WERE YOU...HOW CONCERNED WERE YOU PERSONALLY DURING THIS TIME ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR WAR? DO YOU RECALL BEING FRIGHTENED? DO YOU RECALL GOING HOME AND WONDERING WHETHER YOU WERE GOING TO WAKE UP THE NEXT MORNING?

That's a hard...a hard thing to remember how a person felt at the moment about it. But I believe that the reaction I had was probably typical of a lot of people, that this isn't going to happen. We're not going to get into nuclear war, and I believe a great deal of that feeling came from being around President Kennedy and knowing his own attitude. This was not going to take place as far as he was concerned, and I don't think it could take place without it, his... his own giving such an order. And I never felt that this would ever come to that.

DO YOU THINK IN LOOKING BACK AT THAT WHOLE PERIOD WHAT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON WE SHOULD DRAW IN TODAY'S WORLD FROM THE EVENTS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

If one had to draw a conclusion of how the Cuban Missile Crisis appears to us now as far as what we-- the lessons we should learn, I believe that the first thing we'd learn was that we have to be prepared for other kinds of war besides a nuclear strike. This isn't going to protect or help anybody. Consequently they have built up a great capability in the Armed Forces, our Armed Forces for other kinds of war. Transportation though, we find still it was a rough moment then. We didn't have the shipping to launch an invasion of Cuba even. And still we're short of the transportation necessary to project our military power if need be. We've worked very hard on it, there's a much greater airlift. And I think we learned that we have to have all of the components if we're going to be a world power. You can't-- we can no longer revert to hiding behind our nuclear umbrella.

HOW DOES THAT PERIOD OF TIME COMPARE WITH THE OTHER TIMES YOU HAD AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE? WAS IT PERHAPS THE MOST CLEAR IN YOUR MIND, OR WAS IT IN SOME WAYS THE MOST IMPORTANT TIME FOR YOU?

Well, there... there were several moments around the White House which were, you'd say, nerve-wracking. I think the grimmest moment was the Cuban Invasion. And when President Kennedy assumed the responsibility for the error? that taught us an awful lot and we had to regroup an awful lot of our thinking after that. Then this was a very serious moment. The Cuban Missile Crisis. That became as nerve-wracking as any ten or fifteen day period I can recall. Obviously the most tragic moment was the assassination in Dallas and the transition in the government that Lyndon Johnson had to undertake. That shook the White House and the whole country as much as anything I can remember. There were good points to remember, and I would say President Kennedy's trip to Europe, and the acceptance, and his trip to Mexico were high points of oh, you might say, euphoria. But his prestige in the... among the foreign countries, was so high and so gratefully received, I think those were the good high points. You might add the Civil Rights problem...in the South was a very, very difficult and trying time. Again confronting a President who hadn't been there very long.

--I'VE ASKED YOU THIS A COUPLE OF TIMES BUT IF YOU DON'T MIND ME JUST HARPING ON IT A LITTLE BIT, THIS BUSINESS OF TALKING TO THE SHIPS-- WAS THIS THAT KENNEDY DIDN'T TRUST THE MILITARY, OR HE DIDN'T TRUST THE SENIOR PEOPLE IN THE MILITARY OR WAS IT JUST A SORT OF A FEAR OF THINGS GETTING OUT OF CONTROL, WHAT WAS IT?

Ah, President Kennedy's, you might say, intercepting, or interceding in the communication to the people out there on the front lines and the ships at the blockade was not a matter of mistrust as much as his own involvement in everything. He liked to know directly what was being said and who was doing it and what the answers were. And I'm sure that he felt that the CNO and the Army Chief of Staff were telling him all they needed to, but it was slow. It wasn't instant. And he was impatient to that extent. He couldn't sit back or give orders and then wait three hours for somebody to report. Well, we relayed the message, the message has come back. And I would say mostly it was not mistrust as much as his own desire to be a participant. It's just part of his human nature.

AND I GUESS THIS CRISIS PERHAPS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, ONE REALLY HAD TO KNOW MINUTE TO MINUTE RATHER THAN HOUR TO HOUR WHAT WAS HAPPENING.

Exactly, because that crucial moment was going to be in — handled in a matter of not more than five minutes. Did the ships stop? Or did they not? And if they didn't then what is the President going to do next? And no one else could authorize him to shoot at the Russian ships or authorize that commander to move across their bow. So he was really he had the button in his fingers and he had to make the decision based on what was happening, and it wasn't going to be two days later that we would chase those Soviet ships into a Cuban harbor.

HOW DID YOU FEEL DURING THAT TIME ABOUT THOSE SORTS OF DECISIONS. I MEAN WAS IT? DO YOU REMEMBER THAT MOMENT WHEN THE SOVIET SHIP WAS APPROACHING THE LINE AND EVERYONE WAS?

Yes, it was as quiet a moment in the Oval Office as anyone has ever seen. There was absolute silence and tension while they waited to hear from the Commander down there on the water what was happening to the Soviet ships. And they said, well they're slowing down. And as you recall, they-- we had photographs of what they had on deck. But we didn't know what was in the things on deck. It looked like missile carriers and missile covers, but you really didn't know whether there was anything on those ships or not that was a war-like gesture. So the fact that they would stop instead of us having to board the ship and examine the cargo was a very tense moment. It was very quiet and we were all very concerned. Of course, we all had our eyes on the President, President Kennedy to see what he would do if they didn't stop.

IT'S INTERESTING THAT IT WAS QUIET. WHAT WERE YOU DOING? WERE YOU LISTENING ON A SPEAKER PHONE? WERE YOU WAITING FOR A PHONE CALL? WAS THERE AN OPEN LINE?

There was an open line by this time on the President's desk, and he had it in his hand. And there -- nobody else had any other communication. It was his line. There were alternate communication lines, but they weren't open to the Oval Office.

WHO WOULD BE ON THE OTHER END OF THE LINE PROBABLY? WOULD IT BE—

I presumed although I never asked, Admiral Anderson would certainly know, but I think it was the-- either the Admiral in charge of that flotilla or the Captain of the lead ship that was running the blockade.

YOU REMEMBER THAT QUITE CLEARLY IT SEEMS, THAT QUIETNESS AND THAT TENSENESS DURING THAT PERIOD. WERE YOU THERE? WERE YOU IN THAT ROOM? WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN STANDING AROUND OR SITTING AROUND?

Well, I believe General Taylor was there and certainly Bobby was there, and I believe Dean Rusk was there. McNamara. I think I was probably the hanger-on in the back of the room, because things were getting pretty tense in those days. And we were, so, you can remember vividly that sort of thing, just as you would remember all of them assembled around a television set when the first astronauts went up. Those are very vivid memories that—

CAN YOU PAINT THAT PICTURE FOR ME ONCE AGAIN, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ON THE PHONE AS HE'S GOT THIS OPEN LINE. PEOPLE ARE SITTING AROUND AND IT'S QUIET AND CAN YOU JUST TELL ME THAT STORY AGAIN A LITTLE MORE VISUALLY?

Well, as push came to shove President Kennedy had taken over the line to the lead ship, our ships down at the blockade. I don't think anybody was sitting around. They were standing around and he was on the phone, and they were waiting to see what questions he asked and what answers he got. Just all eyes on him, with the one telephone holding it to his ear and asking the question and getting it described to him by phone by the commander down there.

AND WHAT HAPPENED. DO YOU RECALL WHAT HAPPENED?

Well, there was a certain note of excitement when he reported, "They've stopped. The ships have stopped. Well, they're not turning around yet, but they're dead in the water. The captain reports they're dead in the water." And of course I can remember that everybody breathed a rather large sigh of relief.

IT'S AMAZING HOW YOU CAN REMEMBER SUCH INCIDENTS SO CLEARLY EVEN AFTER 25 YEARS. IT MUST HAVE BEEN A VERY SORT OF TENSE, TENSE MOMENT FOR YOU AND FOR EVERYONE STANDING THERE.

Well, it's not too hard to remember the very exciting and tense moments, but it's also something that you can verify because there's so much been written about it since that maybe your memory is refreshed from time to time by thinking about such things, and realizing -- at least I feel -- that we had a President and a Commander in Chief who was vitally concerned and really in control of the situation.