FIRST OF ALL, COULD YOU INTRODUCE YOURSELF, AS A PARTICIPANT IN A STORY...

Uh, first, I'm a scientist. I'm a physicist. I have been involved in Israel's nuclear program almost from the start from between 1965 and '84, for about twenty years. I was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. I was as minister of science and development between 1982 to '84 the commission reported to me. Prior to all that back in the fifties I was a member in 1952, I was appointed a representative of the minister of defense. At that time I was not a scientist yet but I was director of defense planning. I was on the board of the Atomic Energy ah, presenting the minister of defense. In the early sixties I was the scientific director of one of the two atomic energy establishments in Israel, the...research establishment. In my everyday life mostly I do research in physics in some topics which are rather far from the actual use of nuclear energy. I, I deal with more fundamental problems.

WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT BEN-GURION?

I knew Ben-Gurion well and I worked with him. He was extremely interested. He felt that a state born in 1948 as Israel was had to look at the future. He... he felt that nuclear energy was part of the future. He also felt that in a general way, even the security aspects of Israel had to be connected with knowing what's happening in the world in that field. So he established the Atomic Energy Commission rather early. I think that by 1950 we had '50 or '51, we had a commission going. He, he had an adviser who was the late professor Bergman. And I know that with him and with me he often talked of the subject even though I was not yet a scientist at that time.

WHAT WAS THE FEAT OF INTEREST THAT RESULTED IN THE COOPERATION WITH FRANCE?

In the fifties most of the effort of the Atomic Energy Commission in Israel was devoted to developing know-how, personnel. We sent people to study abroad. We created ah, centers of excellence under... purely scientific sides so as to have people in the know who could make a judgment. By the late fifties, it was felt that we needed more than that. We needed actual research establishments. And we, we did have in Israel establishments that could deal with theoretical science, but there was a problem of having...nuclear reactors. One nuclear reactor was purchased from an American firm and MF, and this was a swimming pool reactor at (Palmachim, Yavne?). And with France in the late fifties and early sixties we purchased another research reactor. The one that stands near Dimona. And together we have altogether we had two nuclear centers in this way.

DID YOU BENEFIT AT ALL? OR IN WHAT WAY DID ISRAEL BENEFIT FOR THE ATOMS FOR PEACE?

The American reactor, the MF reactor was connected with that program.

CAN YOU MAKE IT A FULL SENTENCE?

The American reactor was a part of America's offer at the time of in the framework of the Atoms for Peace program.

WHAT OTHER INTERESTS WERE SHARED BY ISRAEL AND FRANCE AT THE TIME THAT MADE THIS KIND OF SYNERGY VIABLE?

Well... In 1956 we established a practical alliance with France. At that time France had interests that brought it into a clash with the Arab world because of Algeria mostly. Israel was at that time threatened by Nasser and his dreams of empire. And so it was rather natural that we were helped by France. But this was really in the purely military aspects. Gradually it developed into financial and also scientific contacts and technological ones.

THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF RUMORS, PARTIAL INFORMATION TALKED ABOUT ISRAELI CAPACITY, CAPABILITY AND SO ON. WHAT DO YOU THINK TODAY IS A DESIRABLE NUCLEAR STRATEGY ON THE PART OF ISRAEL?

In fact we established our strategy or, I would say our policy with respect to the idea of nuclear weapons rather early. The idea was that it was not paying for Israel to become a nuclear power, to have a nuclear deterrent because that would bring about the same thing happening with our adversaries. And between us and the Arabs it did... it did not look, and I, I would say that even nowadays, it doesn't look as if you could have a quiet and stable balance of terror if both sides would have nuclear weapons. It wouldn't be stable because, first of all, we are extremely vulnerable. We are a very small country with three centers for the, of the population. And their world is spread on two continents. So strategically it wouldn't make sense. The second reason is that the whole idea of a deterrent is based on the regime in the country that holds the weapons. Being a responsible regime and also caring about human lives. And the problem is that in the Arab world, the idea of the importance of human lives is very different. I'll give you an example. For instance, Sadat was one of the most, the more I would say open of the Arab leaders. He writes in his memoirs of what he calls the October War... He says that he expected to lose 100 thousand dead in crossing the Suez Canal. He lost only about 20 thousand and he's happy about that. But to him, just to cross the canal, which was not really a matter of getting rid of Israel; it was worth 100 thousand dead. So we are talking with, about countries that have a completely different view of what it would mean to lose large numbers. Oh, I can also quote the former king of Saudi Arabia who once said that it would be worth the Arabs to lose even six million dead to get rid of that cancer, I mean Israel, in the middle of that, of the Arab body. So we don't feel that nuclear weapons would be a stabilizing factor here. Uh...

THE NOTION THAT TRADITIONAL CONVENTIONAL THEORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE — IT MIGHT NOT WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Again... Ok. The idea of nuclear, a nuclear deterrent being a stabilizing factor is based on both sides caring about great losses, and not wanting to, to lose large numbers in human lives. And therefore refraining from going to war. But in the Arab worlds losses are much less considered as a factor. And an Arab leader if he would have the chance of getting rid of Israel might very well take the risk of the annihilation of some Arab cities.

I THINK WHAT YOU HAVE STATED IS SORT OF THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI POSITION.

No, but... what it lacks still is to explain what we thought we should do.

[OVER EACH OTHER] WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS POSITION TO THE ISRAELI THINKING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Well, what it meant to us was that we had to build up the potential... the potentialities of Israel in that field to create —

FULL SENTENCE. WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL FAILURE OF DETERRENCE?

Yes. Considering the fact that we might be faced with the Arabs getting nuclear weapons we felt that it would be important for Israel to create for itself an infrastructure, both on the human side and in terms of equipment. So that if the need ever should sever arise we would be able to make the transition and go nuclear. But at the same time we had ever good reason not to cross that threshold and just to keep the potential there, in order not to triggers the other side into getting also i-into nuclear weapons.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF PREVENTING THE OTHER SIDE?

Uh, at the same time that we built up our potential but stopped before th-the threshold we also had to supervise the situation all over the Middle East. There are twenty and some Arab countries. And we had to see to it that we shouldn't be surprised by nuclear weapons appearing in the hands of one the Arab countries. This means a strong intelligence surveillance of everything all over the area in that field, and at the same time, whenever we saw a project starting to create a threat where we had to bring all our attention to deal with it. A situation of that nature happened with the Iraqis when they received the French reactor that was capable of producing nuclear weapons.

WHAT ARE SOME OTHER CASES IN WHICH ISRAEL DETECTED INTENTIONS AND...?

There have been several cases in the Arab world of Arab leaders trying to build up a nuclear weapons program. Most of these never matured. Here and there, though the danger was...in different way. For instance,(?) the former editor of (?) tells in his book how Qaddafi went to China and tried to buy two bombs from the Chinese. He offered them enormous sums. And the Chinese wouldn't give it to him. Of course there is now and always the danger that countries like India or Pakistan, or other countries might under with the temptation of a large number amount of money or agreements with respect to oil might do such a step. So we have to be very careful about that.

WHAT MADE THE IRAQI REACTOR (OSIRAK?)?

It, the Iraqi reactor was obviously...to doubt in such an obvious way as a weapons device producing plant that there was no way to evade the issue and hide behind the things saying, "Maybe they mean something else." You see they did not go into nuclear power. They had in fact all the...they wanted from the French sat an earlier stage a nuclear power station. But that was - The Iraqi reactor stood out in such an obvious way as a nuclear weapons producing plant that you couldn't evade the issue and you could not even hide behind thinking that it was meant for something else because it couldn't be meant for anything. The Iraqis at first talked to the French about a nuclear power station when they thought that the French could supply a power station that produced large amounts of plutonium. The French had meanwhile changed their, their nuclear power program and they offered another kind of nuclear power station, so the Iraqis dropped that. They went over to a supposedly research, technological research reactor buts for research you have to have some scientists. Iraq doesn't have scientists. They had one. They put him in prison. So it was obvious that there was nobody who could really use that reactor for the scientific purposes for which the same model was being used in France. On the other hand, it was in a very obvious way a reactor with sufficient power to produces if you were to put into it a uranium blanket, it could produce large amounts of plutonium for bombs.

IS THAT AN EVALUATION SHARED BY OTHER SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, OR DOES IT STAND OUT AS ISRAELI...?

There was a French scientist committee of three who published a report and saying precisely the same thing. Hussein, the present leader of Iraq, He himself, after we destroyed the reactor called on the Arab world to help him build the Arab bomb. So he, he didn't even hide the fact. He, he said it explicitly after the event,

BOTH OF THE POLICIES THAT YOU OUTLINE, THE ONE OF KEEPING ISRAEL ON THE THRESHOLD AND THAT OF THE PREVENTION, IT CREATES INTERESTING QUESTIONS OF THE THRESHOLD. WHICH IS THE THRESHOLD THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO ACHIEVE AND LET'S START WITH THIS ONE. WHAT IS DEEMED TO BE THE APPROPRIATE THRESHOLD FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE THE POTENTIAL DETERRENCE AGAINST ...?

This is a point the question of where do we stop precisely? What does it mean not to cross the threshold? This is a point that we have generally kept rather secret. It would be saying things about the precise situation with respect to how many days or weeks or months or years we need in order to do it, and that is something that we could not divulge.

WHEN DOES THE RESEARCH EFFORT IN OUR WORLD BECOME — WHERE DOES THE THRESHOLD IN TERMS OF ISRAEL DEALING WITH THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS RATHER THAN...POSITION?

The Arabs might get weapons in two ways. They might get them ready made by either receiving them from some nuclear power. We hope that doesn't happen but the, it potentially, it could happen. They might also use their contacts with terrorist organizations to steal the bomb. For instance there are ten thousand American bombs in Europe. And the idea, the question is are these bombs safe from being stolen by terrorist organization that could pass them to the Arabs. It is a worry.

DEFINING THE TOLERANCE OF ISRAEL VERSUS AN ARAB THRESHOLD?

You want me to repeat what I said? There are three ways in which the Arabs could get nuclear weapons. One would be getting them from nuclear power. We hope that won't happen. We have to be on the lookout especially with powers that are not the great powers but countries like Pakistan or India and so forth. The second possibility is the Arabs using the terrorists that they sponsor to steal a bomb from let's say, an American base in Europe. And so we have to be on the lookout, or in, in that sense it's not us perhaps under the danger of bombs being stolen is an international danger. To certain stabilities the Arabs embarking on their own program to build power and nuclear plants that could produce weapons. Now this the Arabs generally can't do by themselves. They need foreign experts for that, foreign companies. One of the good results of the fact that we destroyed the reactor in Iraq has been that there is much less of an offer coming from third parties to the Arabs nows seeing that Israel is serious about not letting such things develop. There is much less willingness on the parts of Italian, French, English, German and other groups to come and offer the Arabs a cheap way of making a bomb.

WHAT KIND THRESHOLD DOES ISRAEL SEE AS VITAL TO MAINTAIN AND HOW WOULD YOU STATE IT...

We have to look at the hardware. As long as it's more theoretical, as long as there's no real hardware then...I would say that it's not dangerous. We have to look at the hardware, see when actually they might be creating a means of producing fissile material. And perhaps the rest of the paraphernalia that goes with that. So it's very concrete and as long as the program is not directed in that direction, it doesn't bother us and it's, it's none of our business.

WHEN IT BECOMES, YOU THINK, ISRAELI BUSINESS, WHAT SHOULD BE THE INSTRUMENT...?

My own opinion is that then we should react. I can't say what the government of the time will do. It has been published — there are several books that have come out about the case of the Iraqi reactor and one can read in these books that everybody's opinion was that we should already act. Some people were for waiting. Mr. Begin decided I think wisely to do it, Mr. Begin decided I think wisely to do it just before the reactor went critical. Because if he would have waited another month there was a risk of our being accused of spreading ...activity and people would say that in fifty years from now children will be dying in Baghdad because of that...activity, dying of cancer. So I think Mr. Begin was right in deciding to do it just before the reactor was going to become critical.

IN THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW WAS, I THINK THE FORM OF AN OFFICIAL POSITION OF ISRAEL. ARE THERE SOME OTHER CASES WHERE YOU PERSONALLY DEFERRED FROM THAT? DO YOU THINK THAT ISRAEL SHOULD DO SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE OFFICIAL POSITION?

No, I, I'm very much in agreement with the policy that I shared in formulating and realizing for years. There are other opinions in Israel. There are at present several groups in Israel who have tried to lobby for an actual nuclear deterrent, an explicit nuclear deterrent. Several reasons are given for that. One group says that with the price of defense becoming so high it would be more economical to go over to nuclear weapons. That has been one group. One professor who was connected with General Dayan at the time for...has been pushing that view. The second line is one saying maybe if we had nuclear weapons we don't need to be so careful about the borders we have. Maybe we can then take risks in terms of the...geographical structure of Israel. We can give up territory. There is a third group who say, they say, well the, the Middle East is going to become nuclear anyhow. You can't stop that kind of thing. So you might as well do it now and establish some kind of stable equation. I'm opposed to all three views.

YOU ALSO EXPLAIN THEN WHY YOU'RE OPPOSED TO THE THIRD ONE. WILL YOU EXPOSE WHY YOU'RE OPPOSED TO WHAT WAS I THINK ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY DAYAN, THAT THERE IS A LIMIT TO THE CONVENTIONAL CAPACITY OF ISRAEL AND THEREFORE THE ALTERNATIVE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEING BUILT.

Yeah. I was and I am opposed to that view simply because I think that...

[INTERRUPTION]

Yes. I, I'm opposed to basing our defense on a nuclear deterrent because I think it wouldn't work. In fact it wouldn't deter anybody. The problem is that Israel is small. First of all, you don't... it's not credible that we should launch a nuclear action. Suppose if the enemy just attacks (?), or attacks Northern Galilee. As long as the life of the state is not in danger it would not be plausible that we should go, go over to a nuclear action when that would bring about annihilation of Tel Aviv. So...it's not credible. Now when would it be credible for us to use nuclear weapons when the enemy would be at the doors of Tel Aviv? But in that case it would be too late anyhow. Even using nuclear weapons wouldn't do it because the size of Israel is so small that within half an hour we would be finished. So the whole — also incidentally, if we would, were to use it then against the enemy in the field, there it would hit our, our people just as much as the enemy because the country's so small. The distances don't exist. So we — there is no real way of basing our defense on nuclear weapons. They, they, they may be essential someday if the Arabs get nuclear weapons and that might be one way of deterring them from using them, but it's not even clear that that would help at that time.

WELL HOW DO YOU UNDERSTAND DAYAN? HE WAS A MILITARY MAN OF THE FIRST ORDER, AND HIS FEELING WAS THAT IT MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY, NOT AS A DESIRABLE OPTION BUT AS A NECESSARY ONE.

Uh, I was very close to General Dayan. Perhaps closer than anybody else for a number of years. And he was not always right. People make errors. He, he was moved at that time by the feeling that the burden of conventional defense was becoming extremely heavy. And she thought then that maybe that would be a cheaper way. But I think that he himself, I think later on saw that we would then have to have both the ordinary, the conventional and the nuclear one. And that would be even heavier.

THE COMMENT THAT TRIGGERED THE WAR TO SOME EXTENT WAS THE COMMENT OF PRESIDENT...AT THE TIME. HOW WOULD YOU...THE STATEMENT AND PUT IT IN PERSPECTIVE? WHAT DID HE WANT TO SAY?

No, I think uh. President Katzir told that meeting at the time — he was being asked about Israel's nuclear potential. And he said that we want to be prepared but he said pro... I think roughly what I've been explaining, that we, we, we won't cross the threshold but maybe somebody then said — Yes. This means that the session is starting in a quarter of an hour...Well I think President Katzir said roughly what I was saying, that we don't want to cross the threshold but we have a potential. And he was asked by somebody in that audience, "But aren't you worried...?" I don't know what that person wanted to say in there. "Aren't you worried about that?" And he said, "That's not, we're, it's not us who should be worried. It's the Arabs who should be worried." All he meant was that there's nothing to be worried about when we — that in the fact that we have an, a certain potential. We, we are not the, the aggressive in, in the Middle East equation. And as I explained we have no interest in turning the Middle East into a nuclear region.

HOW DOES THE ISRAELI POLICY VERSUS THE...INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY NPT, — THE QUESTION IS TO WHAT DOES THE ISRAELI POLICY COINCIDE...

You know that Israel is rather worried about the United Nations in general. We have never found the United Nations to be a very sympathetic place as far as Israel is concerned. Countries that have nothing to do with us and, or, if at all, were benefited from our help are rather quick to vote against us and we find ourselves in a very isolated situation in the United Nations because of the fact that the Arabs carry 21 votes and they have, there's also the Soviet block. And automatically they all side against us. So in a general way we have been rather reluctant to rely on the United Nations when it comes to our security. Another example is that whenever an Israeli patrol crosses into Lebanon because of the fact that there are terrorists there who attack us we are brought before the security council and there are other variations. Compare that with the fact that Iraq invaded Iran back six or seven years ago in, back in 1980 and with that invasion, six years later we are yet to hear the United Nations declaring... Iraq an aggressor. So we, we don't rely on the United Nations in a general way. The NPT we feel is a rather dangerous kind of document because a country like Iraq, by signing the NPT gives a third party the possibility to sell it anything, because France or Italy or some other country can say "We sold it to Iraq but we know that Iraq has signed the NPT. Therefore it won't use it for aggressive purposes." And then after Iraq has that equipment nothing will stop Iraq someday from tearing the NPT to pieces and using what they have. Or...not even the...the NPT document. Or simply going ahead and, and committing aggression. We've seen Iraq using gas against the Iranians in the war between Iraq and Iran. So the, the NPT is a paper, document that in a, in some way is a, is a dangerous one because it's, it makes you, it makes it possible for third parties to rely on that and cover themselves from any responsibility by when they place very dangerous machinery in the hands of potential aggressors.

WHAT ABOUT SOME...MACHINERY OF INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION BY ALLIES?

Israel has been pushing for years and we have been joined by the Egyptians also for a regional agreement withs mutual surveillance. That is our answer to the possibility of preserving the Middle East from going nuclear in a peaceful way.

WHAT ABOUT COLLABORATING WITH UNITED STATES ON SOME PROCEDURE THAT MIGHT REASSURE WHAT NEEDS TO BE REASSURED?

It doesn't work and American policy has changed in that sense. For since President Carter America has gotten rid of any direct responsibility and turned it all over to the United Nations in, in these fields and that makes it in fact impossible for us to consider such things.