WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 673000-675000 VLADIMIR LOMEIKO

Militarization of Europe

Interviewer:
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR... WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOLUTION OF GERMANY... THAT PART OF EUROPE?
Lomeiko:
I think the different approach to the solution of the German problem can be traced back as early as the (Second World) War, during the meetings of the leaders of the Soviet Union, America and England. Recollecting the events, I... — by the way, Churchill had the idea to split Germany into not three, but five parts! And he wrote about it in his memoirs. So, the idea of splitting Germany into many sections existed in the West (earlier), both in America and in England. The Soviet Union had a different point of view, that Germany should be unified. This aspect seems to me very important, principal which manifested after the War. After the War when the Potsdam Conference was underway contradictions were also appearing with respect to the way to approach the German solution; but, nonetheless, then we managed to reach an accord. However, after the death of Roosevelt, contradictions between the policies of the Soviet Union and those of the United States of America began to accrue with regrettable speed. And... well the principle of our approach was that Germany should remain unified, but demilitarized, as well as de-Nazified. That is, the very roots of Nazism, militarism and the military-industrial complex which helped Hitler to take over had to be extirpated. To our regret we, at first sensed and, later confirmed that America had a number of protectors of those militarist and monopolistic forces in Germany, the West one, naturally. And this process of alienation was increasing more and more.
Interviewer:
...FOR A VERY SHORT ANSWER, BUT --
Lomeiko:
Please...
Interviewer:
-- WHY WAS THE SUBJECT OF GERMANY SO EMOTIONAL, SO LOADED FOR THE SOVIETS?
Lomeiko:
For us, the question really was just as you stated, primarily, because in a sense, not just for one generation, but for two, three generations, Germany represented the fate of Russia. Both in World War I and World War II, the Germans came into our territory. They not only burned and looted the cities, they killed not only soldiers, but civilians as well. During the Second World War, we lost 20 million Soviet people, and, in essence, the war is still within all of us, because the war wounds are felt even in families that no longer have any direct participants in the war. This is a very big issue for us; therefore, we could not and cannot be indifferent to what happened and is happening in Germany, and now in the two German states.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE FORMATION OF NATO AND THE REARMAMENT OF WEST GERMANY?
Lomeiko:
You know, the reaction consisted of mixed emotions... indignation and great regret, and pain, and hurt feelings — it was a tangle of emotions. Because to us it was not just another political event — it was, if you wish, a betrayal of the great Anti-Hitler Coalition goals, for which we fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Americans and Englishmen during the Second World War, in order to combat Fascism. And it was a betrayal of the oath taken by our soldiers... Americans and Soviets alike on the Oder River, when they met there. And, you know, that was a feeling of something like,"Was it really that everything was in vain? Could it really be that we hadn't learned anything from that horrible past?" "How come the things we swore to root out forever," — both Americans and Russians did, and not only soldiers, politicians also, remembering Roosevelt! We all swore that never again would a war erupt form German territory, that we'd do our best to root out the militarism — "How come, suddenly, all of that once again became a reality and once again was upon us!?"
Interviewer:
THERE WAS ALSO A MILITARY REACTION... THERE WAS A FORMATION OF THE WARSAW PACT WHICH INCLUDED SOME GERMAN MILITARY ENTITIES; HOW DOES IT COMPARE AND CONTRAST, WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE...?
Lomeiko:
You know, there is a very important fact: neither our people, nor our government ever wanted to split Germany or Europe. To us... it was so important, such a matter of principle, that it was even demonstrated by the fact that the Warsaw Treaty was created six years after NATO. And it was not for nothing that it was. That was, mind you, an attempt, despite everything, to arrange, to prevent the schism of Europe, it's militarization, the split of Germany which was growing before our eyes; an attempt to do everything possible to prevent all this... That's why we waited for six years, and it's a huge period — just remember that as early as 1949, only four years after the end of the War, NATO was created and turned against us — during the six years we had been waiting, trying to reach some arrangement before the Warsaw Pact was created. It was created in 1955.
Interviewer:
CAN YOU SAY WHAT THE PROBLEM... WHAT THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCE IS BETWEEN THE TWO PACTS?
Lomeiko:
To us this difference between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is that first, the Warsaw Pact emerged in response to NATO, merely as a defensive alliance. By the very fact of NATO's spearhead directed against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the People's Democracies we've been forced to create the Warsaw Pact after the negotiations failed. And ever since 1955, the doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty as well as its practice, were exclusively defensive. And the best proof of it; mind you, is in the fact that from the very moment of the Warsaw Treaty creation until today its participants continue to offer to dismantle both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. This point of view is one of principle, and it...was and still remains the political platform of the (Warsaw Pact's) appeal to NATO.
Interviewer:
THE STANDARD VIEW OF NATO IS THAT IT WAS ESTABLISHED BECAUSE RIGHT AFTER THE WAR THERE WERE 170-SOMETHING SOVIET DIVISIONS, AND 12 OR SO DIVISIONS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN... DO YOU THINK THIS DISCREPANCY IS CORRECT? AND WHAT IS THE MEANING OF IT?
Lomeiko:
You see, I've heard this... these arguments before. One has to consider, though, that during the same period of time there were also in Western Europe, West Germany, in particular, the American troops... as well as the English troops, the Canadian troops; therefore to claim that only the Soviet forces were in East Europe, without mentioning others wouldn't be correct. OK, let's suppose that NATO, or more correctly, the West was afraid of offensive. But there was no offensive! And, as far as we've been informed, both the military and the U.S. State Department's documents of that period clearly evaluated the Soviet Union's supposed intentions to attack Western Europe as quite improbable. Some American experts, by the way, still think that, had Stalin wanted to seize Western Europe, he had the best opportunity to do so exactly in 1945, on the tide of his gigantic victory, when... all Europe welcomed the Soviet troops, and did it wholeheartedly, with great enthusiasm. It would take no effort then to reach Britain, I mean the Western shores of West Europe, but that was not our intention whatsoever. It contradicted the very essence of the liberating mission of our army, the very core of our agreements between Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill. It couldn't have happened because it would have been monstrous... And it was, is and will ever remain monstrous, — the very idea of the seizure of Europe; in spite of repetitive nonsense about it — I refer, for instance, to a book by the Belgian senator Robert Claus, "Defenseless Europe" which he wrote ten years ago; it claims that the Russians can reach the banks of the Rhine River in ten hours. These are myths. They have absolutely no basis, this is a fairy tale, a lie about the Soviet threat, and it has a quite definite political function.
[END OF TAPE 673000]

Nuclear Forces in Europe

Interviewer:
DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WAS TO THE INTRODUCTION OP NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ENGLAND, WHEN ENGLAND...?
Lomeiko:
You know... Yes, I'd like to say, the response was the usual regretful reaction, and I'd say, it was the same feeling of a certain — perhaps, even, with an overtone of betrayal — a sense the response was absurdly inadequate given the reality of world events, because nobody ever planned to attack England. England was to us, and remains so even today, a historical participant of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, and we remember that the Sword of Coventry is observed in Stalingrad. Both cities are brethren, and it's not just a formality. We remember British sailors that were on cargo ships going to Murmansk; the Ameri... the German submarines were there to sink them, both British and American sailors swam with their life vests, as Fascists were killing them. And we remember it all, as the wildest barbarism... And when suddenly, all of that was forgotten, and the nuclear forces were deployed and directed against us, supposedly based upon the reason of our intention to attack or to threaten England... it is so incompatible, with the real situation, with the real events... that nothing is left but, to spread, as we say in Russian, our hands (equal to "shrug our shoulders" — the reaction to the sheer absurdity of something. NOTE OF THE TRANSLATOR). So, that was our response; and also, understandably, that was also considered a threat to us and a pressure upon us to undertake some counter-measures. That also partially explains the emerging of nuclear arms on our side in Europe, in the European part of the Soviet Union.
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Interviewer:
IN 1960... FRANCE CREATED ITS OWN INDEPENDENT DETERRENCE FORCE. WHAT DID IT ALL MEAN TO THE SOVIETS?
Lomeiko:
Well, you know that traditionally our relations with France were and still are... of cooperation, of mutual understanding. During the (Second World) War we had also been together allies in our struggle against Fascism. I guess that the emergence of the nuclear forces of France... one should approach within the context of the general trend that at that time swept all Western Europe. It was both England and France who wanted to have their own nuclear forces as if I can say, as a symbol of the great power status. We know that France was always emphasizing its doctrine of omni-directional defense, but naturally, France was a member of NATO, and even after its departure from the military system of NATO it remained a member of this alliance. Therefore, the French nuclear forces are a factor to us which we cannot disregard. And not because we suspect the French in something no-good, but because not only the French military, but also General Rogers, the Chief Commander of NATO, for instance, in Europe, says that they are satisfied with the situation when France is..., though, being sort of out of NATO, but in case of the X-Day emergence, in case of a confrontation between the East and the West, the French nuclear forces would certainly be on the Western side. Therefore, it is both an affliction, and also a political fact of life. The fact that the nuclear forces of France are a part of the European nuclear potential, that cannot be disregarded by us.
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Interviewer:
FRANCE WITHDREW FROM NATO IN '67, AND THE FRENCH...TALKING ABOUT AIMING THEIR ROCKETS IN EVERY DIRECTION, ARE YOU SAYING THAT YOU SUSPECT THIS STATEMENT?
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Lomeiko:
I said already that we know about this doctrine. We wouldn't like to suspect France in anything bad, but nuclear weapons are not toys. These weapons do exist, and I'd like to emphasize, yet again, that — and it is said not by us, but by some French military and, I repeat, by NATO commanders — that, in the case of conflict, these weapons will, naturally, be used by the West against the East. What do you expect us to think about it? What do you suppose we think of when we hear such clear messages? We just can't ignore it. That's why we're saying that this potential must be considered. Not mentioning the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev made a great concession when he said that in order to facilitate the way toward a nuclearless world, we could temporarily disregard these weapons together with the British ones, providing our agreement with the Americans about the liquidation of nuclear arms in Europe as a part of the general, liquidation of nuclear arms would be negotiated. Though, I repeat, this... threat still exists, inasmuch as it's being talked of, it's being hinted about, and this a fact, I repeat, which we cannot afford to ignore.
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Lomeiko:
Can be possible to take only the first part of this answer? If you... yes.
Interviewer:
THERE WAS A THREAT FROM KHRUSHCHEV, OR BULGANIN AT THAT TIME, AGAINST BOTH FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS, DO YOU THINK THAT IT MIGHT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE FRENCH DECISION TO GO NUCLEAR?
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Lomeiko:
I don't think that France based its conclusions on any particular event. I think that a decision such as creation of its own nuclear forces and deployment of them is a decision of such great political magnitude that before it is made it is prefaced by lengthy consideration by the General Staff with many factors considered, and I doubt that a single political statement, could trigger this complex process. I think the decision was made as matter of political principle by the leadership of France. And, of course, before all, by the military-industrial complex of France.

Berlin Crisis

Interviewer:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN FORCES... NO, LET ME MOVE AHEAD... YOU WERE IN BERLIN IN THE SIXTIES. DO YOU REMEMBER THE BERLIN CRISIS?
Lomeiko:
Yes. Sure. I remember those days quite well because that was a period of the highest tension when every 10 or 15 minutes and, later, even more frequently, the reports were transmitted by radio about the convergence of Soviet and American ships. I mean the period... the most critical moment when they sailed toward each other and the unthinkable seemed to be inevitable if both our countries' leaders didn't reach an accord. I well remember this time of tension, a time when the world was on the verge of hell.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS IT ABOUT?
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Lomeiko:
Well... you know,... this crisis situation...perhaps I was somewhat incorrect while answering your question, because when you asked me your first question about the Berlin Crisis, I somehow recalled the Caribbean Crisis. Therefore, I beg you to forgive me for that first... I want... yes,... I'd like to answer your first question and then the second. Yes. Yes, what I want to say is I was in Berlin during both the Berlin and Caribbean Crises but, speaking of the Berlin Crisis I do remember the tension which was generated those days in that city. First of all because a state of siege was declared and the means of communication between West Germany and West Berlin... were cut regarding the very fact of the agreements being violated — the three-sided agreements which existed regarding the German problem. (They were violated) by the Western powers and — well, then this airlift emerged when they began air transport of all sorts of cargo to West Berlin — and there was, of course, great tension. And all that emerged because, in spite of all kinds of efforts to reach an accord between Allies, nothing came out of it, and if you wish, Western powers bared their teeth in this situation. And, in reaction to it countermeasures were then undertaken, i.e. it was a wave,... a war of wills emerged because of Berlin and demonstrated how vulnerable and fragile peace was, not only in Central Europe, but also throughout Europe. To us, today, it is a reminder of how necessary it is to do everything we can to establish peace and security, first of all in Central Europe. And, later, this purpose was fulfilled through the negotiations on the West Berlin problem, the negotiations by the four powers that, as you know, in 1971 resulted with the conclusion of an accord, the Agreement of the Four Powers on West Berlin which, in turn, corroborated the basic principle that West Berlin never was and still isn't today a part of West Germany; it should have a specific status and is under the jurisdiction of the great powers.
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Interviewer:
AMONG THE WESTERN STRATEGISTS IT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE AN EFFORT OF WHAT THEY CALL...TO APPLY SALAMI TACTICS, CREATING A CONFLICT WHICH WAS NOT BIG ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY, OR TO MAKE SENSE IN TERMS OF... SO, THE NOTION THAT IT'S AN EFFORT TO SLICE INTO THE WEST — DO YOU KNOW... DO YOU KNOW THIS THEORY?
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Lomeiko:
Yes, the expression "salami tactics" is quite notorious both in Germany and, I think, in other countries, America included. But in looking at the world through the prejudiced prism with the notion that the East threatens the West, quite logically, such a doctrine emerges, or this notion of salami tactics... As for us...
Interviewer:
CAN YOU START AGAIN? CAN YOU SAY THE SAME THINGS AGAIN? JUST MENTION THE SALAMI TACTICS...
Lomeiko:
Of course...this expression "salami tactics" is notorious both in Germany and other countries, in America... and if we were to look at the development of world events from the point of view that the threat to the West comes from the East, well such a doctrine could emerge, as well as these kinds of expressions, but... you know, if to remember what war means to the Russians — and they lost the cream of their nation; two thirds of their national property was destroyed in Europe; war brought gigantic physical and psychological wounds upon the people, and to our people the idea that we would initiate war is unthinkable — then all of these talks (about salami tactics) would hang suspended mid-air being, as they are, without any basis. The real reason of the crisis was, in fact, that no Western powers wanted to see Germany as a unified, democratic, demilitarized state as was agreed in Potsdam. The very, creation of first bi-zoning, and later tri-zoning when the Western zones were merged, and later, the West German state emerged — only then was the GDR created. And...the separate money were introduced, again, first by the West. Subsequently, the militarization also began (in the West) — these were all actions directed against the agreements that had been reached by the powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition; therefore, we have more reasons to simply say that it was a salami tactic from the Western side — from the American side, i.e. to gradually take steps to slice away from East Germany and add to West the way I just put it, and thus, practically, to make the schism of Germany a fait accompli.
[END OF TAPE 674000]
Interviewer:
...ATTITUDE TOWARD WHAT GOT TO BE KNOWN AS "THE GERMAN FINGER ON THE NUCLEAR BUTTON," WHEN THERE WAS SOME KIND OF SHARING OF NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN GERMAN FORCES AND AMERICAN FORCES?
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Lomeiko:
Well, you know... that our people have always possessed and continue to possess the sense, if you wish a heightened sense of vigilance regarding the militaristic forces of West Germany. The reasons (for this vigilance) are purely historic. Thus, we were shocked when the agreements were violated and the creation of the West German armed forces, the Bundeswehr had started. Later on in West Germany there was a start up of talks saying that it wouldn't be bad to have, access to nuclear arms too. For the sake of truth, though, I must admit that it wasn't predominant attitude of West Germany; the majority of the West Germans were against it. But, nevertheless, certain ultra-militaristic circles never either directly, or indirectly excluded the possibility of access to nuclear weapons. By the way, these attitudes have not been totally extirpated even now; therefore, any manifestation of such attitudes were naturally received with particular vigilance and suspicion by our people. That explains why at that time large numbers of Soviet people began writing letters to newspapers, made public speeches demanding that outmoded West German militarists be baited in their quest for access to nuclear buttons...

Nuclear Policy

Interviewer:
THE... HOW WAS THE STRATEGY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION... UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT? THE AMERICAN STRATEGY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION AS DETERMINED BY DULLES AND OTHERS, HOW WAS IT UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN...?
Lomeiko:
Well, we perceived the strategy of massive retaliation as one of the most dangerous doctrines, inasmuch as, ...according to this doctrine the undertaking of a massive strike including nuclear arms was required on cities and heavily populated centers of both our country and that of our allies. We perceived this strategy as anti-human, barbaric, anti-humane, if you wish, a strategy of super-Hiroshima.
Interviewer:
IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A DETERRENCE STRATEGY. IT WAS THE NOTION, I THINK... IT WAS INTENDED OR... THOSE THAT PROPOSED THIS STRATEGY AS A DETERRENCE STRATEGY RATHER THAN A MILITARY... AS AN OPERATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.
Lomeiko:
You see, the deterrent strategy, as it is, is essentially destructive because it is based upon the premise that an enemy exists who threatens the West, who wants to attack it, ruin it, annihilate it. And first, a myth is created about the Soviet threat and, subsequently, a strategy is developed to respond to this myth and, in that sense, is advocated as a defensive strategy and... even a positive one at that; but we cannot perceive it that way, simply because we never intended, nor do we intend to attack the West. First of all, it is in contradiction with our entire psychology, our culture, all of our policies, our global outlook and approach, if you wish, and, secondly, we clearly understood, far earlier than did Western politicians, that nuclear war was a catastrophe to civilization — by its very nature it is suicidal, by its very essence; there could not be any winners... Though this statement, this political attitude was comprehended by Western politicians much later; however, our people always had this attitude, this understanding always existed in our public opinion, insofar as nuclear war was unthinkable, because it was a deviation from healthy way of thinking. Therefore, we never considered nuclear war, or any strategy requiring it as an option. A preemptive strike strategy is not included in either our political or military lexicon. Not for nothing were we the first to propose, from the very start, liquidation of all nuclear arms, and, later, we were first to relinquish the option of initiating use of nuclear arms as a preemptive action. And... unfortunately, a paradox existed in that it was Americans who were first to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- for no reasonable political cause, by the way; it was merely an attempt to frighten the Soviet Union — they were the first to use nuclear weapons and, after that, it was they who invented the deterrence against the alleged Eastern threat, although we never used, nor intended to use nuclear arms, unlike the actual American plans to use nuclear arms — plans that had been in existence since 1945 on.
Interviewer:
WHAT WERE THE DYNAMICS THAT BROUGHT US FROM A NUCLEAR-FREE CONTINENT TO A NUCLEAR CONGESTED ONE IN THIS PERIOD?
Lomeiko:
You see... it probably sounds quite banal but, nevertheless, when it when we consider the underlying reasons behind the development of nuclear arms in the world, as well as in Europe which is only a part of the whole problem, — when it comes to the core, the core reason is the military-industrial complex. Thank God, I'd like to say, that it wasn't we, the Russians, who first mentioned it but, the American President Eisenhower who warned his people about the dangers of the military-industrial complex. The thing is that the monopolies that produce new models of armaments have that very development as the basis for their existence. This is their business, this is what their lives are all about. It is from this that their profits come. They are influential and hold in their hands, if you wish, a real power allowing them to dictate the development of many world events. Therefore, from all points of view they are the first to be interested in producing yet another new kind of nuclear weapons, one after another. The thing is that out of the 25 new kinds of arms that emerged after World War II and up until approximately 1980, 23 out of 25 were invented in the United States of America. I mean, the overwhelming majority of arms was always created by the military-industrial complex of the United States. And it is quite natural, since the US complex is the mightiest in terms of both technology and finance, and, when later did these nuclear arms spread throughout the world and in Europe, in particular, it was simply a matter of technicalities. This is, the core of the problem. And it can be proven, if you wish, by the point of view prevalent today. Who is the most resistant to the idea of freeing Europe from nuclear arms or freeing the world of nuclear arms, for that matter? Again, it is the military-industrial complex. We're jumping ahead a bit, but in considering the nuclearization of Europe starting from 1945... and, looking back on it, the entire history proves that it was the monopolies who continuously created new types of weapons and then proceeded to saturate the world market with them. Just for example, consider that Pershing II was conceived in design bureaus of American monopolies well before the subject (of its use) was raised — and only later came the so-called necessity of such missiles development in Europe. One shouldn't create these missiles to begin with, so it wouldn't be necessary to place them (in Europe). Alas, the decisions concerning the creation of nuclear arms are made by those who reject or refuse to sign agreements about the ban of the new types of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the nuclearization of Europe is a product of, if you wish, the military-industrial complex of the USA, who wants only to hold the Old World by the throat using its nuclear hand and, by that, dictating the terms.
[END OF TAPE 675000 AND TRANSCRIPT]