WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 650000-652000 BORIS RAUSCHENBACH

Early Rocketry of Russia and United States

Interviewer:
THE FIRST QUESTION, SORT OF, WHAT CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE BEGINNING OF SOVIET ROCKETRY?
Rauschenbach:
So, the beginning of the Soviet missile technology occurred as far back as the pre-revolutionary period, approximately at the turn of this century. This comprised mainly the work of Tsiolkovsky, Zander and Kondratyuk. They laid, so to speak, the theoretical foundations for the possibility of missile technology. Therefore, in the early 1930s, we had in the country a theoretically clear idea of what a rocket technology is and so on and so forth, that we did not have to learn from anybody else, that's what I mean. And one of these scientists, Zander in particular, he began to work with Korolev in the early '30s. Unfortunately, he died early, and the work was carried on by Korolev. That is to say that work, practical work, not just theoretical, began in the early '30s. The work was carried out in Leningrad and Moscow, mostly. There was a gas-dynamic laboratory in Leningrad dedicated to military work. In Moscow, there was a group studying jet propulsion. It was basically for non-military areas, mostly for sport-scientific areas, if you like. Then they merged and formed the Institute of Jet Propulsion Studies, the world's first institute dedicated to rocketry, a state organization, a research institute dedicated to rocketry. I myself enrolled in this institute. I do not know [...] may be possible.
Interviewer:
LET'S ROLL, OKAY. THERE WERE SOME VERY EARLY SUCCESSES OF SOVIET ROCKETRY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. I THINK THAT'S...AND KATYUSHAS AND SUCH. CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT?
Rauschenbach:
Yes. Well, I will speak Russian. OK then. The work in our institute of Jet Propulsion ended before the start of the war by the creation of the famous rocket artillery. It was mainly the achievement of the Leningrad colleagues. They [...] to near Moscow and created the most efficient rocket artillery of the Second World War. Now, everyone knows these large installations, which played a major role in the battles, these artillery installations, they were ... these were solid-fuel rockets, shells of various calibers and so on. At the same time, the institute was working on liquid rocket engines to install them on rockets, which we now refer to as ballistic missiles (such a concept did not exist at the time) and to be mounted on the winged aircraft. The peak of this development ... the last one to work on this was Korolev himself. The peak of this development was the flight in 1940 of the pilot Fedorov on an airframe designed by Korolev, which was equipped with a liquid-fuel rocket engine designed by Glushko. Thus, in this way, before the beginning of the war, we already had a manned rocket flight [...] in the atmosphere. By the beginning of the war, these activities had been discontinued, or rather suspended ... or rather suspended, since the war required other efforts, and they resumed only after the war. When the war ended, the work resumed. During the war, Korolev in particular and Glushko, worked on the installation of liquid-fuel rocket engines on aircraft. This way, they tried to improve the flight data of combat aircraft. Well, this was an intermission. A lot had been achieved, but still, it was an intermission. The real missile technology resumed its development; the work started before the war resumed around 1946, 1947. Something like that. Shall I continue?
Interviewer:
DO YOU WANT TO TRY AND TALK IN ENGLISH?
Rauschenbach:
I understand English, but to speak, no.
Interviewer:
OK. LET'S GO. YES? THE CAPTURE OF THE SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS OF THE GERMAN V-2 AND V-1 EFFORT, THERE WAS A SPLIT BETWEEN AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN CAPTURES. HOW DO YOU CHARACTERIZE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO WHAT HAPPENED HERE?
Rauschenbach:
Well, about the role of German rockets - this, of course is about the V-2 - I can state that the majority of German experts, led by von Braun, went to America, this is known. And not only von Braun but all of his assistants. I am well acquainted with some of them, and we are good friends. So they told me how it all happened, and how they all ended up there. First of all, practically not a single specialist got into the Soviet Union. And second – at least the Soviet experts had the opportunity to examine the tangible components, the material part of it, and it certainly played a role, too. But I must say that even before the war, all the essential elements needed to [...] missiles, we had already made. Well, first of all, there were already flying missiles, the first such ballistic type missiles, there were those types of rockets. Secondly, all this always caused [...] in the west, while they had already put them all on autopilot, i.e. in principle, the V-2 did not give us anything new, although, of course, some technical solutions, they were taken into account for further development. The subsequent designs, which were created by Korolev, contrast sharply with the V-2. For example, such a thing as the carrying tanks, and namely the inclusion of the tanks into the missile's structural design, meaning that they would not [...] it was not on the V-2, it was done immediately by Korolev. And so on. There are a number of things which show that here is our own school, and this is evidenced best by the fact that to an expert eye, U.S. missiles made by von Braun and the Russian ones, for specialists they are different missiles, many things are done differently, in different ways. And that's that.
Interviewer:
CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE SCIENTISTS AND THE TECHNOLOGISTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES? THE AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS IN THE AREA OF ROCKETRY?
Rauschenbach:
Well, of course, certainly it can be discussed. But it's hard for a non-specialist to talk about this, of course. A non-specialist will find it hard to explain. But some things are clearly evident. And since we are talking about the 1950s and '60s, this is about that period, we can say that in the U.S. the military rockets at that time were mostly solid fuel type, while in the Soviet Union they were based on liquid components. This is a fundamental difference. Then, if we consider the missiles, which became the first Sputnik, and the corresponding American missiles, they differ sharply in their design approach. Here, we have these rockets, the Gagarin rockets and rockets of the first Sputnik, they have side-mounted liquid [tanks], something like a first stage, while, at the same time, in America the structural design, the look was completely different, they stacked them upon each other. In general, there are many details like these, but some things just catch your eye. So, one can say here... of course there's a lot in common, because one and the same problem was being solved, it always happens this way. But the handwriting is completely different, different style. We were faced with this when, for example..., I feel this applies better to spacecraft, to the development of spacecraft. There, we can state that our development line of manned flight was as follows: First, everything must work in automatic mode, and only then to be operated by humans. In America - on the contrary. Everything is done by a human - docking done first by a human, docked two spacecraft at the same time, and spacecraft control was by done hand at first, in general [...] the astronaut was very busy. In our case, everything was done by automatic devices; we had more, as strange as this sounds today, more automation and it was of a higher class. If one compares the Soyuz with Apollo, the American side drew attention to the fact that everything in the Apollo is done in the old-fashion manner, in aeronautical sense, while we had more advanced automation. Well, this is how it was. But that does not mean that the U.S. [missiles] were worse, it's just a different style.
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Interviewer:
CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE FIRST ROCKET THAT YOU HAD SEEN FIRED? AND DESCRIBE WHAT IT MEANT FOR YOU PERSONALLY...
Rauschenbach:
I can tell you about two first times. Well, about the first time, that was before the war (WWII), and about the first time which already was about the real space rockets. Before the war… I'll tell you about those few launchings of small rockets that we were producing—and it is of little interest... today... because those little, rockets were really toys from today's point of view...(IN ENGLISH) They were toys. As for the first time when I saw a real rocket, it was a launching of the Luna 3, the apparatus for photographing the backside of the moon. You see, this apparatus for taking pictures of the back (the invisible) side of the moon had a system of aiming and control which I had developed. Hence, I had to be there. That was a night launching, it was in the darkness, and, I have to admit, it really amazed me. Because after the war, little, toy-like rockets I'd been watching a real launching. Though I'd watched it from the distance of 1 or 1.5 km, it was a really spectacular scene. Later on, I sort of, got used to it. But, I still remember that first impression, it remains clearly in my memory.
[END OF TAPE 650000]

ICMBs and Sputnik

Interviewer:
WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE FIRST ICBM ROCKETS THAT WERE TESTED IN '67?
Rauschenbach:
Well... I did not take part in that work, as I told you before. I never took part in any of it. Well... er... though I knew that there was such work under way. It was known to me...as a specialist in a close (related) area. Well the tests were, quite surprisingly, a success. I was sure that there would be much more unsuccessful launchings. Those were purely experimental tests. What really surprised me was that the very first try, was practically, a success. Second, I was really surprised by the reaction of the West, which, at least apart of the press was calling a bluff, meaning that there were no launches at all. Therefore, the first Sputnik launch to me, apart from being an epochal achievement, was mostly proof that there were no lies in the first report, that there were tests. Because it was clear to everyone that the Intercontinental Ballistic did really exist if the first Sputnik was launched. And from that moment, nobody could deny its existence. That's shortly, all I can say.
Interviewer:
CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOUR FEELING, BOTH AS A PROFESSIONAL AND AS A PERSON, WHEN THE SPUTNIK WAS LAUNCHED AND BECAME PUBLIC? HOW DID YOU VIEW THE TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENT, AND HOW DID YOU FEEL AS A PERSON?
Rauschenbach:
Well, first of all the Sputnik launching was not a surprise to me. Because I'd been working for several years already, on the following space ships. One might say that the Sputnik was an uncontrollable space ship. The first Sputnik the, second, the third—none of them had a control had already system. As for me—I had already worked during that period on space, control systems. The first control system was installed in Luna 3 for the purpose of photographing. Therefore, I accepted the first Sputnik launch...well, for granted. It was... understandable... absolutely, I knew it should happen. Nothing was unexpected in that... and... at had really surprised me had more to do with the press. Our papers, unlike those of the West, had reported the launch with petite letters. That surprised me a lot. Only on the second day (did I notice) the big front page headlines with one-foot characters and the full page stories describing the event. That proves how many people simply did not understand what had really happened. I mean first of all, the reporters, of course.
Interviewer:
...PRESS WERE BIG RIGHT AWAY...
Rauschenbach:
Yes... And... I damned near started speaking English... And our... media had, in fact... It understood only by the Western newspapers' response what was actually happening... And, well, and I have to admit that my impression was that our papers... our press had comprehended the events by the Western journalists' (reaction). They had read the Western news reports the next day; they understood what had happened, and started printing their reports with big letters also. Please...
Interpreter:
...ONLY FROM WESTERN JOURNALISTS, AND ON THE NEXT DAY THEY CAME TO COVERING IT IN A PROPER WAY WITH BIG HEADLINES AND DETAIL ABOUT--
Interviewer:
WAS IT CLEAR TO PEOPLE HERE THAT THE SAME KIND OF ROCKET THAT COULD TAKE SPUTNIK 1, 2, AND 3 TO SPACE CAN ALSO MOVE A WARHEAD ACROSS...?
Rauschenbach:
It was clear to the specialists. I do not know what others thought. I would not comment on that. But, speaking of professionals, they all understood that it was the same (Sputnik and ICBMs). It was exactly the opposite: first, intercontinental, and only then, Sputnik (had been launched). Sputnik had sort of... followed... You can translate... I think.
Interpreter:
[INTERPRETER TRANSLATES]
Interviewer:
DO YOU KNOW JACK RUINA?
Rauschenbach:
No.
Interviewer:
JACK RUINA IS A PROFESSOR AT MIT...
Rauschenbach:
Yes, I see, but we've not been acquainted.
Interviewer:
HE DESCRIBED -- THE SPIRIT OF IT -- DESCRIBED WHAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SAW WAS A SOVIET ROCKET GOING UP, AND AN AMERICAN ROCKET BEING BLOWN; SOVIETS SENDING A DOG, AN AMERICAN ROCKET BEING BLOWN; SOVIETS SENDING A GOAT, AN AMERICAN ROCKET BEING BLOWN... YOU UNDERSTAND.
Rauschenbach:
Yes, that's how it was at the beginning...Yes...
Interviewer:
THE SOVIETS WERE THROWING ALL THESE ANIMALS, AND AMERICAN ROCKETS WERE EXPLODING ON THE STAGE.
Rauschenbach:
I think that was a mistake of the American administration, that they didn't support the work of the German team of von Braun. I don't mean to say they're right (in claiming that they would go) ahead (of the Soviet Union), but, anyway, there would have been less accidents. Their qualification was the highest in the US in that period.
Interviewer:
TELL ME MORE ABOUT THE DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES. WHY WAS IT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GOING WITH LIQUID-FUEL ROCKETS?
Rauschenbach:
It's very hard to explain. Very hard to explain. Because these things... there are two equal ways. You can do both ways. And there are many... When there are two equal ways...many things depend on coincidence. Someone could manage to convince someone... Someone just liked somebody more than others, etc. You see, it is not... no... it could not be explained in a rational way. It is rather an irrational line to follow... And later, when the tradition is formed—well, then (one could say)—the habit is the habit. That's how I would answer this question, more or less.
Interviewer:
I UNDERSTAND. LATER ON IT BECAME A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PROBLEM IN TERMS OF PREPAREDNESS. THERE ARE NOTIONS THAT THE SOVIETS REQUIRE A LONG TIME TO PREPARE THE ROCKETS, VERSUS AMERICAN ROCKETS THAT CAN BE PREPARED VERY FAST?
Rauschenbach:
Well, that's true to some extent... Solid-fuel rockets are, indeed, more prepared for launching in general. But... Soviet designers had developed all kinds of...
Interviewer:
LET'S STOP. FINISH IT... PREPAREDNESS...
Rauschenbach:
Well, I understand... preparedness. Are we talking about preparedness?
Interpreter:
YES.
Rauschenbach:
Well, one had to say that, indeed, solid-fuel rockets require less time to get ready (to launch). Less time... than the liquid-fuel ones. But... here the specialists on liquid-fuel rockets have developed devices effective enough to equalize, in fact, these differences in time. You have also to consider the fact that the preparation period depends not just on type of engine. For example, the gyroscopes speeding is also quite time-consuming, and it is the same in both types (of rockets). So, as a result, the difference is, practically, not that big. Though, each type has its own advantages. But speaking of that period, I mean, late '50s, early '60s, quite irrationally, this tradition had been established in our country.
Interviewer:
AT THAT TIME ONE IS ALSO IMPRESSED BY THE DIFFERENCE IN SIZES. THE AMERICAN ROCKETS COVERING THE SAME RANGE ARE SMALLER. THE RUSSIAN'S ARE SO MUCH BIGGER. WHAT IS THE EXPLANATION?
Rauschenbach:
Well, here... One must take lots of reasons into account... The first American projects were also bigger. Eventually they were diminished... And this is the trend which all the military rockets (technology) are following. First... May I?... At the beginning both the Soviet and American projects were of the same size. Later, the Americans managed to cut their rocket sizes. They did manage, (I say) because the smaller the rocket, the better it fits the military purposes... in general. In the Soviet Union,... it was decided not to make it smaller. What were the motivations, don't know, perhaps, some military reasons, maybe, the bombs (warheads?) could be of a bigger size-- I don't know. But one of the reasons was the possibility of conquering space with the bigger rockets. That was an additional... And, indeed, after the invention of ICBMs, the next step in both America and the USSR was to make missiles smaller, while space rockets had a tendency to be enlarged, to be bigger and bigger. Those were two different directions: military rockets (went) toward diminishment, while, space (ship carriers)--toward enlargement. There was a good race, I'd say, (between the two countries), because from the very beginning we,... Korolev, probably, foreseeing the consequences of the first Sputnik (launching) had designed such a rocket that was able to launch after the first Sputnik also the Gagarin's (manned) ship—after some adjustments and so on... All this line of space Achievements) had been made possible while the Americans were facing enormous difficulties (squashing their space equipment into small rockets)... Their Gemini was, for example, twice smaller than the Vostok. No wonder there were no automatic (Systems) there. They simply didn't have enough room for it. So the big credit has to be given to Korolev who understood that that was not only a military (achievement), but also a beginning of development (in) space. It's hard to explain such things. First, there were the same (sizes), then, eventually both American and Soviet (rockets) had become smaller—military rockets, I mean... and the spaceship carriers became bigger, and bigger, and bigger. We just...had made a good start. I even guess that Korolev was probably thinking of space conquering as the first priority.

Soviet vs. American Rocket Development

Interviewer:
THERE WAS A STATEMENT BY KHRUSHCHEV AT THAT TIME WHICH I WOULD LIKE YOU TO COMMENT ON. HE SAID SOMETHING LIKE "WE ARE MAKING THEM (ROCKETS) LIKE SAUSAGES..."
Rauschenbach:
I would like to understand first the nuance of the last question... what was the meaning... that Khrushchev--I understood it all right, just...
Interpreter:
KHRUSHCHEV JUST CLAIMED THAT WE COULD PRODUCE ROCKETS AS EASILY AS SAUSAGES.
Rauschenbach:
Well, it was, of course, more a political statement-rather than a technical one. Generally speaking, he, probably meant that we could, if necessary, develop a huge rocket industry. That was, perhaps, the sense of his statement. And... that was what he mentioned... perhaps... Because I doubt that at that period it was possible to make it just like that... sausage-like... Though, theoretically, it was possible, as we know, today they really pop up like sausages throughout the world.
Interviewer:
I THINK THAT'S WHY IT'S SOMEWHAT INTERESTING. MANY OF HIS STATEMENTS WHICH WERE SUGGESTIVE THAT A LOT WAS HAPPENING... WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT TRUE.
Rauschenbach:
Yes, it would be true...
Interpreter:
SEMI-TRUTH.
Interviewer:
A SEMI-TRUTH. THERE IS ONE SUGGESTION...THAT HE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, MOSTLY THE AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE, THAT WANTED TO BELIEVE THERE WERE ROCKETS BEING MADE LIKE SAUSAGES... I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE TO ASK YOU! I CAN ASK YOU ABOUT A LOT OF TECHNICAL STUFF...
Interviewer:
LET'S... COULD YOU TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE ROCKETS THAT WERE PLACED IN CUBA?
Rauschenbach:
No, no, no... I've nothing to do with it. I simply don't know. I know only the things that were described by the newspapers.

Mishaps in Soviet Rocket Development

Interviewer:
CAN YOU DESCRIBE... THERE WAS APPARENTLY ONE MISHAP IN THE SOVIET ROCKETRY PROGRAM IN WHICH THE HEAD OF THE EFFORT WAS KILLED?
Rauschenbach:
You mean some sort of emergency situations that happened to us? Am I right? When somebody died, yes?
Interpreter:
YES.
Rauschenbach:
Well, we have...speaking of... I can talk only about space (programs).
Interviewer:
OKAY, YOU CAN NOT DEAL WITH THIS SUBJECT, RIGHT? NO, NO, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS MISHAP. I'M TALKING ABOUT A ROCKET, I THINK IN '59, THAT BLEW ON ITS STAND... IN BAIKONUR.
Rauschenbach:
Ah... I can only tell you in general that many rockets have exploded (on site). It is normal--in the process of tuning up. There were casualties, sometimes--that's also a fact. Though, it was not a significant number of them. I also heard about some accidents, but that had nothing to do with our area (of responsibility) with the Korolev's team. It was at different... If it happened, it happened somewhere else, with different people; I simply have no information regarding these matters. But generally speaking, all the devices linked to explosives are potentially dangerous, they explode from time to time. I watched these explosions myself--and, as you see, so far nothing still has happened to me, etc... That is, still before (World) War (II) there were explosions, as well as after the war... I mean rocket (on-site) explosion is somewhat a normal event.
[END OF TAPE 651000]

Soviet vs. American Space Programs

Rauschenbach:
Laboratory... Tukhachevsky...
Interviewer:
SOME OF THE SOVIET ROCKETS OF THE TIME HAVE A VERY DISTINGUISHED SHAPE--THERE ARE TWO DISTINGUISHED SHAPES. SOME OF THE EXPLANATION HAS TO BE TECHNICAL, BUT ANOTHER EXPLANATION PROPOSED BY JACK RUINA IS THAT IT IS A DIFFERENT DESIGN OFFICE...
Rauschenbach:
I think generally... Well, first of all, I have to note that all the missiles look alike. As all the planes remind each other. But every designer has his own signature. Let's take the planes designed by Antonov's bureau with their uplifted wings, etc. To compare it let's say to Ilyushin's models—one can tell the difference simply while looking at them... Without even knowing what you are looking at, you know who was the designer. In that sense, a rocket has also, of course,... not only a shape dictated by rational considerations, but also bears a signature (of its creator). The technical problem can always be solved by different ways. And the choice of this version... Here one can feel a designer's style, in the choice of a solution. Because you can always do things one way or another. Therefore... it is possible... I would explain it simply by... The thing is that all the rockets look alike—it's a matter of technology, of science. But their differences have to do with the (individual) signatures. That is the way I would put it.
Interviewer:
OK, I THINK I UNDERSTAND. CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE OF YOUR OWN EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANT COMPARISON OF... DURING THIS TIME, I'M TALKING ABOUT...
Rauschenbach:
Please. May I? Yes? To compare the US and the Soviet developments of space technology at the end of the '60s I would mark the following (events): At the beginning there was definitely a race. Who makes the first satellite, who orbits the first man in space, the second, etc... So the sportive element played a main role. At the beginning, that is for the first ten years... Then, the sportive aspect began to fade in the Soviet Union. They had probably decided that the first Sputnik and the first man (in space) was quite enough (to win). As for the Americans... who suffered twice a defeat figuratively of course, they were seeking revenge. Therefore, they created the Apollo program. It had no scientific value. Inasmuch as everything could be done by automation. As the Soviets did. In principle, she (the Soviet Union) could also send its cosmonaut to the moon. In principle, there was work researching that possibility, but since it had proven too expensive it was decided that the first Sputnik and the first man was enough. Next, these works were suspended... eventually they were stopped. That is, the Soviet Union, in my opinion, had shifted to the...space of business, not of sport a bit earlier. Well, eventually, the Americans also changed their approach toward purely business (aspect of) space. Today, the question of sport—who's first, who's second—doesn't play an important role anymore. Each country is developing its own ways. We have our disposable (rocket) carriers, our big space stations, our long-lasting trips—for half a year and more. In America, (there are) shuttles, multi-usable systems... which should be supposedly, cheaper, but so far, they are still expensive... etc. That's what... Well... It is not a race anymore. There are simply different ways of development. But speaking of the first ten years (of the space age), there was a very strong sportive aspect--who's first, who's first, who's first... Well... And we gave it up earlier than the Americans. First, it requires a lot of expenditure without giving any reward... Sport is sport...
[END OF TAPE 652000 AND TRANSCRIPT]