WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 9123-9124 TAKEO FUKUDA

US Use Atomic Bombs on Japan

Interviewer:
SINCE THE BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, WE HAVE BEEN LIVING IN THE ATOMIC AGE, AND IT IS THIS FACT THAT HAS INSPIRED US TO MAKE THIS PROGRAM. SINCE WE ARE AT A TURNING POINT OF THE ATOMIC AGE, WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES AND YOUR UNIQUE POINTS OF VIEW ON THE ISSUES. WOULD YOU PLEASE START BY TELLING US ABOUT THE TIME PERIOD WHEN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI… OR RATHER ABOUT WHEN THE WAR WAS ENDING? THE THEORY THAT THE ATOMIC BOMBS WERE DROPPED IN ORDER TO MAKE JAPAN SURRENDER IS STRONGLY PREVALENT IN THE US MAY I ASK YOUR OPINION ON THAT?
Fukuda:
Well… although there are various theories as to why the US used the atomic bombs specifically at that time, there is no clear consensus. But people say that in the end the bombs did hasten Japan’s surrender. Although Japan’s surrender wasn’t sped up by much, I am sure it did have that effect. As you know, we were experiencing air raids everyday at that time. I was at the Ministry of Finance, and even that sturdy building of the Ministry was not safe. If the Ministry of Finance had been destroyed, it would have seriously impacted Japan’s ability to wage war. So, the departments of the Ministry were dispersed to rural areas across the country. Only the top members of the Ministry were moved to the Bank of Japan. The Bank had a safe. Even if we were attacked by air raids and bombings, we could escape and hide in the safe. So, we used an entire floor of the Bank of Japan as the head office of the Ministry. I was working there. So early in the evening of August 6th, Seiji Hasegawa, the manager of public relations from Kyodo News Service—it was called “Domei” then came to us, saying that a massive bomb was dropped. He said it appeared as if a fireball dropped from the sky and an enormous mushroom cloud formed where it fell. He then said it certainly didn’t seem like a normal bomb, but that no one was sure exactly what it was. We didn’t know what it was for about 24 hours. We spent the next day or two not knowing, and then realized that it was not a typical bomb, and that it might have been what was called an atomic bomb. The bomb fell on Nagasaki next. The Supreme Council for the Direction of the War took place on the evening of the 9th with the emperor present. There the decision was made to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial Conference was being held late at night. The Minister of Finance always attended Imperial Conferences since he was a key Cabinet member. We stayed up all night waiting for his return. He returned to the Bank of Japan where we waited. He said to us, “Thank you for your hard work,” and then said, “But it seems that the Potsdam Declaration will be accepted after all”. This meant the end of the war, or rather our surrender. That is what we realized, four days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
Interviewer:
SO, THE JAPANESE LEADERS AT THE TIME HAD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BOMBS USED IN AIR RAIDS SUCH AS THE GREAT TOKYO AIR RAID AND THE BOMBS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI?
Fukuda:
Yes, they had a clear understanding.
Interviewer:
I SEE. I HEAR THAT ANOTHER THEORY OF WHY THE US DROPPED ATOMIC BOMBS ON JAPAN WAS THAT THE US WAS SEEKING TO CONSOLIDATE AND FLAUNT ITS POWER TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THIS?
Fukuda:
Well, only a small minority of people have made this argument. From a historical standpoint I can say that at the time the US and the Soviet Union did not need to flaunt the power of their positions relative to each other since at that point they had a very close-knit relationship. Also, at the time, the US was proud of its absolute dominance relative to the Soviet Union. So, I believe that this kind of power demonstration was not the reason the US used the atomic bombs on Japan. All in all, the US was very much aware that the Japanese military was quite strong. What I believe is that the US had considered the potential loss of officers and soldiers if they were to move forward with a strategy of landing on the mainland. I believe that they wanted to take control of the course of the war quickly.

Japan’s Commitment to Nonproliferation

Interviewer:
NEXT, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE ERA IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) WAS DEVELOPED. JAPAN SIGNED THE NPT IN 1970 AND RATIFIED IT IN 1976. THERE IS A SIX-YEAR PERIOD IN BETWEEN, AND DURING THAT PERIOD IN 1971 YOU WERE APPOINTED TO SERVE AS THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT SEEMS THAT THAT AMOUNT OF TIME—SIX-YEARS—IS QUITE LONG.
Fukuda:
Yes.
Interviewer:
AND PERHAPS THERE MANY VARYING DEBATES REGARDING...
Fukuda:
Yes, Yes.
Interviewer:
SO WHAT KIND OF THINGS DO YOU REMEMBER THE MOST?
Fukuda:
What I clearly remember is that China had succeeded in nuclear testing. That success produced a great impact, or rather a shock, in our country. Back then, Japan and China had a relationship quite different from what we have now. If anything, Japan held Taiwan and the Republic of China in favorable regard. Given the period in time, we were shaken by China’s attempt—back then we called it Red China—to possess nuclear weapons. And well...Japan wasn’t the only country. This incident was a great shock worldwide. That’s how I feel. So in this context, our awareness about nuclear non-proliferation had been significantly elevated, and that eventually took the form of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Interviewer:
INDIA PERFORMED EXPERIMENTS AS WELL.
Fukuda:
Yes they did. So, Japan had a moment of realization that if nuclear proliferation occurred, we would encounter a serious problem. This is especially true since Japan upholds a national policy of not possessing nuclear weapons. So in the context of the new constitution, this means that we will not possess armaments knowing that they could threaten other countries. The idea was to protect the safety of Japan by depending on the good will of other countries. How should I put it… with this, Japan took the first steps on a path that no other country ever had before. So in regards to nuclear weapons in particular, the position that we take needs to be very different from that of other countries’ since Japan is the only country in the world to have experienced the harsh lessons to be learned from atomic bombs. But, at the same time, a new problem concerning the peaceful use of nuclear power had emerged. The problem arose before the nuclear non-proliferation efforts were taking place. It was around 1955. People in Japan had mixed feelings about the growing inclination to adopt the peaceful use of nuclear power. We have experienced immense suffering caused by atomic bombs. But if nuclear power could be used differently, it could have wonderful and peaceful effects on society. Since it was facing this kind of environment, Japan was in a difficult position. So anyway, since Japan has limited sources of energy, the ability to use nuclear power as energy seemed to have incredible potential. So around 1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Act was passed and the Atomic Energy Commission was developed. Also, a governmental institute called the Atomic Energy Agency was established, and then money was allotted in the budget to move forward with nuclear power generation. All of these things started happening, and they illustrate how Japan jumped at this newly emerging way of peacefully using nuclear energy. While we were following this path, however, problems arose with China and India as we already mentioned. We were faced with a situation where we needed to be repentant… rather we needed to reconsider how we should deal with these matters regarding the peaceful use of nuclear power. That is how the concept of nuclear non-proliferation was adopted, I believe.
Interviewer:
BUT IT SEEMS THAT THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION THAT HELD THAT IF JAPAN SIGNED THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, IT WOULD BE INTENTIONALLY THROWING AWAY—HOW SHOULD I PUT IT—THE NUCLEAR OPTION. MAY I ASK YOUR OPINION ON THIS?
Fukuda:
Yes, there were various opposing opinions. The strongest argument from the opposition was that—as you might imagine from what we discussed earlier—signing the Treaty would undermine Japan’s capability of peacefully utilizing nuclear power to supplement its scarce energy resources. So yes, one argument was that we would face a serious problem if limitations were imposed on the peaceful use of nuclear power purposely used for generating energy. There was another argument. As I have discussed, realistically speaking, Japan is in no position to possess nuclear weapons. Even though the Japanese people believe that possession is absolutely not possible, there was an argument that held that losing our freedom of choice under the Treaty was questionable. But this argument did not become a major topic of debate. There was one issue that did become quite controversial. This argument held that the Treaty itself may be promoting nuclear disarmament, but the problem was how we should go about adjusting the disproportion created between the five nations that possess nuclear weapons and the rest of the nations that do not possess such weapons. This was a persistent debate. I would say that these three arguments were the main subjects of debate. After that the arguments went on and time passed. That’s about it.
Interviewer:
SO, FROM THE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES’ PERSPECTIVES, JAPAN HAS ADVANCED TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH, AND BECAUSE OF THIS, IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF JAPAN POSSESSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I AM NOT SAYING THAT THE ENTIRE US THINK THIS WAY, BUT IT IS ALSO QUITE COMMON FOR PEOPLE IN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HOLD THIS KIND OF OPINION. BUT QUITE CONTRARY TO WHAT PEOPLE WOULD THINK, THERE ARE ONLY A FEW OF SUCH DEBATES IN JAPAN—NAMELY ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT SEEMS AS IF THERE IS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PUBLIC SENTIMENTS IN JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES...
Fukuda:
Yes.
Interviewer:
WHERE DOES THIS DIFFERENCE COME FROM?
Fukuda:
How should I put this... I believe that our nation was reborn after our defeat in the war. A new Japan got its start. In some sense, this new Japan was something that was imposed by the US But that kind of sentiment hardly remains now. Anyhow, this new Japan would not possess armaments or military force. This is where our nation stood. And from this position, we built relationships of trust with other nations while protecting the safety of our own nation. Behind all of this exists the issue of nuclear weapons. We have experienced the terrifying lesson of what nuclear weapons can do, and I believe that people here feel that that experience must never be repeated in any other country. So the pillar of the new Japan’s national policy is, I would say, the establishment of a security framework that does not depend on military force. This is an ideal of a very lofty nature, but it is what we are trying to do and I believe it is what we should try to achieve.
Interviewer:
WERE THE SO-CALLED THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE EXTENDING THESE ARGUMENTS?
Fukuda:
Well, that resolution has no direct connection with constitutional issues, but both are similar at a basic level. What these principles state is that Japan will not possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons in the country. Simply put, Japan will never possess something as dangerous as nuclear weapons. From the constitutional point of view, doing so might have been acceptable as long as they were to be used for defense only. But that is basically just something that is theoretically arguable from an academic perspective. In reality, I believe that the resolution was founded upon the consciousness shared by the entire Japanese people of not possessing, manufacturing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into our territory. Compared to the prewar period, Japan’s national power today has expanded by 25 times. Back then, we only had one twenty-fifth the economic strength. In that time—ten years back—iron was what symbolized national economic strength. We were preparing for the outbreak of war. With everyone scrambling to increase production of iron, we were able to produce 4.5 million tons of iron. But now, 40 years… well a little more than 30 years after the war ended—we produce 100 million tons of iron. On top of that, Japan’s industrial power in many fields has increased by 25 times on average. With only one twenty-fifth of the strength, Japan was had one of the top three naval forces and one of the top five armies in the world. Japan was a military power. Today, Japan’s economic and industrial power is 25 times stronger and its capabilities are impressive. As we can see in the trade deficit problem between Japan and the U.S., Japan’s technological capabilities have progressed and developed significantly. With that much economic strength as well as scientific and technological capabilities, Japan could be a military superpower if it wanted to. But Japan must not choose that path. Fortunately, we have our constitution. We also have the awful experiences of the past. Having had these experiences, Japan stands where it stands. And with our new start, we must insist on not possessing military force even though we have the capability. We have to stand firm and say that we will not do such things even though we are strong, and we must persuade the people of other nations to create a world where there is no need for military power. With this lofty ideal, Japan aspires to make a contribution to humankind.
[END OF TAPE 9123]
Interviewer:
I’D LIKE TO MOVE ON TO ANOTHER TOPIC, IF THAT IS OK. GOING BACK TO OUR DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AT THE TIME THAT JAPAN SIGNED THIS TREATY IT WAS SHELTERED UNDER THE US NUCLEAR DEFENCE UMBRELLA WITH THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY. DID THAT HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON JAPAN’S DECISION TO SIGN THE TREATY?
Fukuda:
Well… there were some debates on that matter but nothing significant. So, yes, it did.

Japan’s Response to Carter’s Nuclear Policy

Interviewer:
I SEE. THE NEXT QUESTION IS FROM MORE RECENT TIMES. WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER...
Fukuda:
Yes.
Interviewer:
IN THE 1960S, OR WAS IT THE ‘70S...
Fukuda:
He was elected in the 1976 presidential campaign and assumed the presidency from January of 1977.
Interviewer:
THAT IS WHEN YOU WERE APPOINTED TO SERVE AS PRIME MINISTER.
Fukuda:
Yes.
Interviewer:
DURING CARTER’S PRESIDENCY, VARIOUS POLICIES REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SUCH AS THE REGULATION OF PLUTONIUM EXPORTS, WERE IMPLEMENTED. I’M SURE THEY HAD VARIOUS IMPACTS ON JAPAN. HOW WOULD YOU EVALUATE THESE US POLICIES? AND WHAT KIND OF INFLUENCE DID THEY HAVE ON JAPAN?
Fukuda:
Okay. ... Are you rolling? Ah, you are. Okay. Um... it doesn’t seem like it. Then, please repeat your question.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS JAPAN’S REACTION WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER ESTABLISHED HIS NUCLEAR POLICY?
Fukuda:
President Carter’s administration came to power when I became the Prime Minister. Right before this time, China’s nuclear testing occurred. I had already been informed that President Carter was unduly tense and uneasy about nuclear proliferation issues, and incidents like this just added to his reservations about the problem. With a series of domestic and international events highlighting non-proliferation issues, people wondered if he could do it, but then President Carter released his policy statements concerning nuclear proliferation issues. This policy affected many nations. Basically, these policy statements were intended to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which was wonderful. We were happy to raise our hands in agreement, and the countries of Europe agreed as well. But the effects of this zealous approach to non-proliferation were significant limitations on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Countries like Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, where there were efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the past 10 years, could not accept this. In 1977 during the first year of President Carter’s administration and my first year as Prime Minister, a summit was held in London. President Carter emphasized that nuclear non–proliferation was imperative. But during the next year’s summit held in Bonn, participants from other countries assailed Carter’s decisions and opinions. Heated debates were heard at the plenary session as well. In some cases, participants gathered in small groups and discussed how they should handle President Carter’s policies. During the summit, it turned out that participants mutually acknowledged each other’s opinions, so appropriate measures were considered accordingly. So negotiation between these officials took place with that mutual understanding of each other’s standpoints. Compromise was also reached in regards to the problem surrounding the nuclear Tokaimura fuel reprocessing plant. To this date, we have been working to reach our objectives with that program while paying respect to President Carter’s stern non-proliferation measures.
Interviewer:
WITHIN JAPAN, WERE THERE THOSE THAT VIEWED PRESIDENT CARTER’S POLICIES AS SELF-SERVING ONLY FOR THE U.S.?
Fukuda:
Not to that extent. People understood what President Carter wanted to do. In particular, since this happened right after the nuclear problems in China and India occurred, I did not see much criticism for President Carter’s stern approach because, at that time, everyone was uneasy and anxious about nuclear proliferation issues. Still, Japan would face a difficult situation if we were forced to give up our standpoint. Of course other countries had similar hopes to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. And their standpoint should not be undermined either. It is safe to say that, to this date, officials have been working to take into consideration and incorporate objectives and claims from both sides of the spectrum.

Threat of Nuclear Weapons into the 21st Century

Interviewer:
SO, AS YOU HAVE JUST DISCUSSED, TIME HAS PASSED, BUT I SUPPOSE THAT THE NUCLEAR ERA IS STILL UNDER WAY. FROM A NATIONAL DEFENCE PERSPECTIVE, WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON OUR COUNTRY BEING UNDER THE US NUCLEAR DEFENCE UMBRELLA?
Fukuda:
As you know, 13 years from now we will enter the 21st century. And there are many discussions concerning the turn of the century. I’m often invited to these debates. And when I go to them, this is what I say: “Discussing topics such as what the next century should look like is very respectable and important. But do you really believe that the 21st century will come?” That is a bit of an exaggerated expression. But I say this because there are several unlikely but possible scenarios in which we won’t see the next century. The first scenario, as we’ve been discussing, is rooted in the issues surrounding nuclear proliferation. Today, there exists a quantity of nuclear weapons within the Eastern and Western blocs with the potential to wipe out the entire population of the world 60 times over. The world possesses weapons with that much power. If they were to be used, the Earth would come to an end. I acknowledge the fact that world peace is maintained because people don’t want this to happen. But these weapons do actually exist. It is possible for them to be used at any time. There’s no guarantee that they will never be used. If by any chance they were used, we would be in no place to talk about the next century. That’s one problem. Another less extreme scenario is rooted in the fact that after the oil shock, order in the world—namely the order created by the Bretton Woods system—completely crumbled. As we can see in the fluctuation of exchange rates, the world economy is in a very unstable and tumultuous state. If we fail to resolve problems that might arise, it is possible for us to encounter a devastating situation like that of the 1929 Great Depression. World War II itself was an extension of what happened in 1929. I don’t know how it might take place, but the decline in the economy might well create problems that could destroy our chances in the 21st century. Let me continue to the third scenario. The population reached five billion this year. When we take a holistic look at the population, the environment, and our living conditions, we see significant problems. But overall, nuclear proliferation is the most worrisome. It is an issue concerning all human beings. We must make tenacious efforts in order to eradicate such weapons. Fortunately, Japan’s role is unique and important. We do not and will not possess nuclear weapons even if we are capable. I believe that it would be very persuasive if we could encourage other countries in that respect. I believe that our greatest responsibility as an international nation that lies between the Western and Eastern blocs is to fulfil the role of promoting and creating a peaceful world.
Interviewer:
DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT ACHIEVE THAT?
Fukuda:
In order to create one way to fulfill such a role from our current standpoint, four years ago I founded the so-called ex-key-figure summit, or namely the InterAction Council of Former Heads of State and Government. Specifically, I developed its framework, made a proposal, and called for other countries’ contacts. This group has profound concerns about global affairs. Officials currently in power are also worried about such matters. However, current officials are faced with various constraints due to the fact that they are representatives of their nations and leaders who are responsible for their countries’ destinies. And at the same time, these officials are extremely busy with their daily work. In that respect, their time to think about issues that are so extensive as to concern all human beings is seriously limited. Nevertheless, we cannot just watch silently what is happening in the world. The ex-key-figure summit brings together former Presidents and former Prime Ministers who want to use their experience and knowledge to cooperate with the revitalization of the economy and to promote positive action around the globe. The summit includes countries from everywhere in the world, except for the US and the Soviet Union. If these two countries had joined they would have fought from the very start. So the organization has gathered less than 30 former leaders from around the world except for those from the US and the Soviet Union. What is interesting is that many of my colleagues from when I was Prime Minister are in the summit; from developed nations, for example, we have Mr. Callaghan. So with Mr. Callaghan from the United Kingdom, Giscard d’Estaing from France, Andreotti from Italy, Schmidt from Germany, Trudeau from Canada, and Fukuda from Japan, six out of the seven former leaders of the developed nations during my term is Prime Minister have joined. This is because we did not invite Mr. Carter from the U.S., or a representative from the Soviet Union. Anyway, six members have joined us. We have had some earnest discussion and I realized that we all felt the same way. We are all actively engaging in specific initiatives. When we formed this group, summit meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union had collapsed and the idea of starting them back up was inconceivable. So with this in mind, our members started urging these two nations to take specific actions. We sent our messages to them every time we had an assembly and sent letters, urging them at least to meet and maintain communication. Finally, for the first time in seven years, a United States/Soviet Union summit was held in Geneva in November two years ago. Right before the Geneva summit, we held a meeting within the Board of Directors from the ex-key-figure summit and discussed how we should encourage and energize this summit meeting. In the end, we decided to say “your two countries hold the key to the preservation of world peace and to the future. It is great to have this summit and for you to meet with each other. So with a sense of responsibility, make this summit a success.” At the same time, we asked them to not let this meeting be the last one, but to meet again once or twice yearly, for example, and to then institutionalize such meetings. We sent a wire and dispatched an official to Geneva in order to communicate our message as well as to give encouragement to the leaders of these superpowers. During the summit, they issued a Communiqué. And their Communiqué incorporated what we advised in the telegram and our messages to a significant degree. My understanding is that our expectations have seeped into things since the United States-Soviet Union summits are to be resumed. So with this, we are gaining some slight view of the future. For the past year, we have been making the utmost effort and utilizing all our knowledge and intellect to devise policies and plans concerning, for example, how we should improve the U.S.-Soviet relations, especially regarding the issue of nuclear disarmament.
Interviewer:
I SEE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.
[END OF TAPE 9124 AND TRANSCRIPT]