OUR REFERENCE IS BACK IN THE EARLY '60S. MCNAMARA CAME IN AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN 1961. BROUGHT IN ALAIN ENTHOVEN AND ALL THE WHIZ KIDS AND THEY STARTED SLASHING ALL KINDS OF FORCES. WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THIS? THESE ARE PLANES THAT HAVE HEROIC RECORDS. DID YOU BUY ALL THIS STUFF?

With the advent of Secretary McNamara there were the — Alain Enthoven and the so-called whiz kids and -- One of the things they did was create considerable turmoil, I must say, in their early days. One of the things that worried some military planners was retirement of B-47s, B-58s. I personally was not as concerned about that as I was a general attitude which they brought in with them and which seemed to grow as they went along about the future role of bombers. And the arguments took several different forms. And sometimes you never knew quite what arguments you were in. Was it that the B-70 as far as a follow on bomber to the B-52 is concerned is the B-70 the right one? Well, there could be a difference of opinion of that. But to me, just because the B-70 might not be the right design or bomber didn't mean that we shouldn't have a follow on bomber. Other times the argument seemed to take the form -- well, eventually we should have a follow on bomber to the B-52 but not now. And in that — You never knew quite what you were arguing against; However, there was a consistent theme by Alain Enthoven to which I disagreed then and have continued to disagree over the years about the role of bombers. And too often I thought Dr. Enthoven passed the role of bombers in the sense of... delivering nuclear weapons against fixed targets and silos. And if that were the sole role of bombers, I think that Alain Enthoven would have a point. My contention was though that while eventually those — that kind of targeting --to hit fixed targets of known status with nuclear weapons could be taken over by missiles; cruise missiles, ballistics, SLBMs -- that is sea launch ballistic missiles. And land based ballistic missiles. There was a role for centrally based long range combat aircraft in other scenarios to help in interdiction against soviet forces aggressing against Europe with conventional weapons. Alain seemed to steadfastly ignore that role. And... and so if I had one argument with Dr. Enthoven in those days it was exactly that argument about the future role of bombers. He seemed to be setting the stage of no follow on as everyone knows. The during that period the Congress appropriated money to start a bomber called AMSA, advanced manned strategic aircraft. Which finally became the B-1 when it was finally put into development and now into production. That argument continued. And as I recall Secretary Brown finally became somewhat inclined that there should be a follow on bomber when he was head of DDR and E. And later on when he became Secretary of the Air Force. Why he then became an advocate that we should proceed alertly to start the development of a follow on bomber to the B-52 simply because the B-52 is wearing out — It wouldn't last forever. Now, it's lasted longer than we anticipated perhaps. But you know on the other hand some of those B-52s have been in the inventory now for what — more than 30 years.

SO CONGRESS WAS ON YOUR SIDE IN THIS DEBATE?

Oh yes. Congress had appropriated — The Congress of the United States had appropriated money for AMSA and in fact that money was both sequestered. Was simply not spent to proceed alertly with the development of a new bomber. To start a new program.

BUT YOU DIDN'T CARE SO MUCH ABOUT SOME OF THE OTHER CANCELLATIONS THAT THEY MADE?

No. The cancellations well the early retirement, I guess you should say, of B-47s, I didn't think was nearly as an important an item as the future of bombers. Of course after all, even with the retirement of the '47s we had a very robust B-52 force.

NOW I WANT TO JUMP AHEAD TO YOUR DAMAGED LIMITATION STUDY. AND IF, BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO BE TALKING TO MCNAMARA AND BROWN, EVEN THOUGH I THINK FRANK TRINKLE WAS INVOLVED IN THIS, IF YOU FEEL COMFORTABLE NO MENTIONING HIM IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR US, BECAUSE WE'RE NOT PLANNING TO TALK TO HIM.

Well Frank Trinkle's contribution to that whole affair was less than productive.

SO LET'S JUST FORGET ABOUT IT. HOW DID YOUR STUDY ON DAMAGE LIMITATION GET STARTED? WAS DAMAGE LIMITATION A CONCEPT THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN USE?

I don't remember exactly when I became conscious of the...of the fact that Mr. McNamara, Secretary McNamara and was saying very perceptively, contrary to what some people may think today, that we tried to deter the Soviets. Our objective is to deter nuclear attack on the United States and if deterrence fail; to limit damage. Contrary to some people that try to rewrite history of those days...

WE'RE NOT GOING TO GET INTO THAT PART OF IT.

But I was leading up to the damage limiting study.

[CONVERSATION ABOUT ?]

Secretary McNamara was always clear that our goal in those days — and I think those goals remain inviolate today — that our objective is to deter attack on the United States and if deterrence fails, to limit damages to the United States. Obviously we were doing quite well with respect to deterring attack by threat of retaliation. And notice I say threat of retaliation not — that's somewhat different than actual execution.

COULD WE START AGAIN?

Secretary McNamara was always very clear that our objective was to deter attack on the United States through threat of retaliation— if deterrence failed to limit damage to the United States to the extent possible. The concept of threat of retaliation was well understood and we had the forces to do that. We did not have the forces to limit damage in case deterrence failed. Obviously to limit damage in case deterrence failed...fails means a combination of passive defense or civil defense. And active defense. I was in DDR and E and thought about that matter and finally came up with a proposition to Dr. Brown that we should take a serious look on the prospects of limiting damage to the United States. The center players were to be, of course, civil defense, strategic defenses called in those days Nike-X, and counter force to stop what residual capability there was in Soviet land based forces. And also ASW to stop whatever we could from SLBMs that were not yet launched in an initial attack. Dr. Brown thought that proposition was... warranted a large effort. Talked to Mr. McNamara about it, Secretary McNamara. And the outcome of that was that Secretary McNamara dictated that there would be a comprehensive stud y conducted on the prospects limiting damage to the United States. It would have participation by the services and that the finally it was decided that I should run it. Which I did for, I think, a period of 6 months. It did demonstrate how to allocate our resources to best effect to limit damage. Not unsurprisingly though, it showed that the prospects of limiting damage were reather discouraging.

DIDN'T YOU ASK YOURSELF IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE 70 PERCENT POPULATION SURVIVAL?

One of the key plots showed that in order to have 70 percent surviving — to stay on the 70 percent surviving line, if the Soviets chose to, as they could, to increase the threat by spending say a billion dollars, on ...on more offensive weapons, obviously we'd have to have more defense to counter that to still have 70 percent surviving. It showed though that on this exchange, if they spent a billion dollars to create more damage, we would have to spend something like $3 billion on our part to limit damage to stay at 70 percent. Mr. McNamara focused on that particular chart and on that particular statement. And I can remember today that I was there. Actually it was mainly conversations between Secretary McNamara and Dr. Brown. But I was along. Dr. Brown brought me along And the — I can remember to this day that Secretary McNamara said, well, our detractors would say 70 — We may say 70 percent surviving. Our detractors will say, Only 60 million dead. We are prepared, probably, do outspend the Soviets 3-to-1. The public and the Congress would not support that. And at that juncture, I think he started backing off at the idea of undertaking large programs to underwrite the concept of limiting damage. That's not to say that he abandoned the goal. He just abandoned any determined effort and programmatic efforts on his part to acquire the forces necessary to underwrite that goal. And we're still in that position today.

DIDN'T YOU CONVINCE YOURSELF THAT WE COULD ACHIEVE 70 PERCENT POPULATION SURVIVAL?

I was convinced that if we...plied the proper resources in the proper way, we could have — it was feasible to have 70 percent surviving in response to the type of attacks that we postulated in those days. Now today, the tax would be larger, but in those days, I...to my knowledge there was no one that doubted seriously, but what we.. what our -- of considerable effort in that direction we could go as high as perhaps 70 percent surviving in response to a Soviet attack

WEREN'T YOU ENCOURAGED? I MEAN, THIS IS PRETTY GOOD, ISN'T IT? WHAT WAS YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO DETERMINING THAT WE COULD SAVE 70 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION?

My reaction to saving 70 percent of the population is that while people will say only 70 percent, I will say that that's much better than 50 percent. Without defenses, the Soviets probably wouldn't — We don't know what their targeting policy would be. Without defenses I would argue strongly that the Soviets would ever try to achieve more than 50 percent damage on the United States. You would prepare to argue, They won't attack our cities as long as their cities are hostage. So you see, that the difference we were making was maybe perhaps elevating it from 50 percent surviving to 70 percent. And while I still subscribe in one sense that that is a worthy goal, I respect Secretary McNamara's position that It would be very difficult to cheat...

MCNAMARA ASKED YOU TO DO THIS COMPREHENSIVE DAMAGE LIMITATION STUDY. DID YOU CONCLUDE THAT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE POPULATION MIGHT BE SAVED?

My conclusion after participating and running this study for 6 months was that there was every prospect that you could indeed have 70 percent of the population in the United States survive a Soviet nuclear attack. However, that was based on the size of the attack that we postulated the Soviets had in those days. Which, incidentally is considerably smaller than the arsenal they have today. So there is always the problem that well, the Soviets would perhaps not sit still. What if the Soviets increased their arsenal, what would we have to do in order to still have 70 percent surviving. That part of it, I must admit, was discouraging, because it showed that on the margin, if the Soviets spend a billion dollars to create more damage to the United States and had a policy to do so that we would have to spend something like $3 billion on our measures to protect the United States in order to say at 70 percent surviving. And when that fact was made known to Secretary McNamara, he made the statement that while saving 70 percent was worthy, still the detractors would say, 70 percent — would not say — they would not say 70 percent surviving but focus on the negative, 60 million dead. And he was not — in his view, he did not believe that the Congress and the American public were prepared to support an expenditure of three times as much as the Soviets over the long haul if we if that's the best we could do. And I think while at the time I may have been discouraged by that statement, I think in the long haul that the Secretary was probably correct.

C'MON GLENN GET YOUR CHARTS AND WE'RE GOING TO GO UP AND SEE SECRETARY MCNAMARA...

As we went along with the study Secretary... Doctor Brown had an uncommon interest in the study and we went up there from time to time to show it to him and in his own way gave very good guidance as to what we should do next and so on. Finally he was satisfied that the study was in good shape and told me... called me one day and said, you know— in fact, Glenn, get your charts and come on up I'm going to have another discussion with Secretary McNamara on that. And as I recall there were the three of us in the room. And the focus of attention was on this 70 percent surviving. And on the fact that we would to stay on that 70 percent surviving we'd probably have to spend three times as much to limit damages as the Soviets would to create damage. And Mr. McNamara, after thinking about that made the prophetic statement that to Dr. Brown that he did not believe the American public or Congress was prepared to support such expenditures in relation to the Soviets particularly if it were only 70 percent surviving, only — the detractors would say 60 million dead. And I think that — along in that time, that had something to do with the gradual backing off of Mr. McNamara ever undertaking any large programs to underwrite the concept of limiting damage. I don't know that... I don't believe that he ever abandoned the goal as a goal itself. But he did abandon any determined effort to underwrite the goal.

LET'S JUST SORT OF TEASE THIS OUT IN TERMS OF ABM. SO WE BUILD AN ABM, AND WHAT THEY MIGHT DO TO COUNTER IT, AND WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO DO. ONE OF THE BIG CONSIDERATIONS AT THIS TIME IN THE EARLY '60S WAS WHETHER TO GO AHEAD WITH A FULL SCALE ABM DEPLOYMENT. WHAT IF WE HAD? WHAT WERE YOUR CONSIDERATIONS IN TERMS OF THE BIG PICTURE OF DAMAGE LIMITATION ABOUT AN ABM DEPLOYMENT?

There's always a very central question about exactly what good would an ABM deployment do in protecting the United States. There are two factors that are not under our control on that. One of them is the size of the Soviet arsenal and his targeting policy. Because if he has a targeting policy determined to create as much damage to our population as possible, then you get...you would get one out. And if on the other hand, his targeting policy is a military attack — an attack against our military assets in the United States and perhaps Minuteman and that the population is only affected by fallout and collateral damage, why you've got a totally different outcome. So you can see, you start out from a fairly uncertain base. Both with respect to the Soviet arsenal and its targeting policy. The studies that I did were generally focused on the idea of an enforceable solution. In other words, given the Soviet's arsenal, which we would have to postulate in the out years, what could we enforce so that the outcome was not dependent upon the restraint and forbearance of the Soviets on a.... with respect to targeting policy. So in that sense, perhaps the calculations showed a pessimistic case because they assumed that the Soviet's targeting policy was directed at maximizing the amount of urban industrial damage that they could create.

BUT WHAT IF WE WENT AHEAD AND BUILT AN ABM SYSTEM, WHAT COULD WE EXPECT?

If we had gone... If we had deployed an ABM system this... one charge the Soviets could have had if their policy was create as much damage as possible which I doubt would be their policy — but if that were their policy, what they can do is saturate local areas. Because in those days, the ABM system we were talking about was really, by present standards, a terminal defense. The interceptor reached out ten miles or fifteen miles, So in effect, we are just defending a small area in the United States. Well, since he -- we had to assume the Soviets would know how many interceptors we had at every one of those places that we were defending he would orchestrate his attack accordingly. So you'd have to defend every place otherwise he attacks the undefended. And then if he attacks he saturates and exhausts the interceptors at any particular location. So you can see if I'm trying for a very high percent surviving and he on the other hand is trying to only gain 20 percent kill, he only has to attack 20 percent of my targets. In effect, much of my defenses are never get in the act. And that's why this leverage at high levels of utility — and by that I mean high levels of survivability — the leverage is on the attacker. And that's... So if we had deployed an ABM there would have been still considerable doubt as to what it meant simply because we didn't know the Soviet's attack policy. As time went on, I have every reason to believe that he would have increased his arsenal and the reason for that is he increased his arsenal anyhow. So.

SO IF HE INCREASES HIS ARSENAL, HE CAN OVERCOME IT?

Well, if he increases his arsenal, some people would say that he overcomes it. What he does is he just reduces it from 70 percent surviving to 65 to 60 unless we react in turn. So it's an act...an action/reaction affair. Whether we would have ever stayed the course I...we don't know. The history...

HOW COULD WE REACT?

We could react by simply putting in more interceptors.

AND WHAT MIGHT HE DO?

He...if he still wanted to up the ante to a higher percent killed, he's going to increase his number of RVs and throwaway. Decoys and all that. And it would have been, undoubtedly — It could have been an arms race with us deploying defenses and him deploying more offensive forces. It's a... I dare say it would have been because it seemed to have been an arms race even if we didn't put in those defenses.

ONCE WE GAVE UP ON LARGE SCALE EXPENDITURES FOR DAMAGE LIMITATIONS, WHAT DID THAT MEAN. DOES THAT LEAVE US ESSENTIALLY DEFENSELESS AND HELPLESS?

We di...we did give up, as I said on large scale expenditure to underwrite the concept of limiting damage. To me, that does not quote, leave us defenseless because we deter attack on the United States by threat of retaliation. That is the strategy of deterrence. It's been with us and it has worked for all these years. You know, whether it continues to work or not is a question much debated today. We had no other choice then — really then to rely upon deterrence and that is the stone situation today. The strategy of deterrence Some people have talked about McNamara's MAD strategy, mutual assured destruction. I think that is not fair. It...it stems from the fact that it's very dangerous indeed to pick one word to describe the whole strategy. And they picked the word assured destruction because to me, the strategy was not assured destruction, it was assured retaliation or assured deterrence. Our goal was always deterrence, not destruction. And I always remind people of that. If you want to characterize the whole debate, it's a matter of mutual assured deterrence. Mutual assured restraint.

ASSURED DESTRUCTION -- IS THIS A...CRITERION OR IS IT A STRATEGY, POLICY?

The word, assured destruction, was used by Mc... by Secretary McNamara. I think that he used it in the sense of force sizing. In other words, to give some sense of force sizing that says, you know, what does it take to have . retaliatory capability that assures destruction of assets that the Soviets value. So it's more a procurement criteria rather than a strategy that I indeed think my goal is to destroy the Soviet Union. And unfortunately, some people have turned that around qui...in my view, quite unconsciously. The real goal was always mutual deterrence. Or I shouldn't even say it that way. The goal was deter the soldiers attacking United States. And Mr. McNamara made the observation which was true. That we also are deterred by their threat of retaliation and therefore we have a situation of mutual assure deterrence. That was more a statement of a situation than a goal. But it should be mutual.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID THAT MCNAMARA BECAME DISCOURAGED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DIDN'T PUT THE MONEY INTO R AND D FOR NEW CUTTING EDGE SYSTEMS AND SORT OF PRESIDED OVER A DECADE OF DECLINE. SO WE DIDN'T HAVE MANY OPTIONS IF DETERRENCE FAILED. AND THAT WE WERE YOU KNOW, MAD MIGHT HAVE BECOME OR ASSURED DESTRUCTION MAY HAVE BECOME THE STRATEGY RATHER THAN JUST A PROCUREMENT CRITERION. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT?

Well, some people have offered the suggestion that Mr. McNamara finally in his later tenure as Secretary of Defense was discouraged about the use of nuclear weapons and he may have been. But I don't think that that ever translated to the fact, nor does the record show it, that during his tenure important programs were not undertaken. Certainly, the Minuteman III was undertaken by Mr. McNamara. The Poseidon C3 the SRAM which is the short range attack missile that is now the mainstay on our B-52s. I do not think it's a fair characterization at all that he started the decade of neglect or whatever people want to call it. Because he did initiate important programs and with a minimum of turmoil saw them through to execution or started them on their way to execution.

SO WE BUILD A DEFENSE PROGRAM THAT GIVES US CONFIDENCE OF 70 PERCENT POPULATION SURVIVAL. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT?

There's always the question that if we put in defenses that we in good conscience could believe would protect us to the level of 70 percent surviving regardless of the Soviet's targeting policy -- There's always the question of what would be the Soviet reaction. Well, the Soviet's reaction could have been one of...well I...my goal is not to punish the United States any how. And they might have left it there. However, the — I think that the consensus was that the Soviets would react. If they reacted and increased the size of their nuclear arsenal, obviously I'm going to go offer 70 percent back down to 65 percent or 60 percent to remind you that most of the calculation would show that if we had no defenses at all, depending to have somewhat on target policy, 50 percent of the United States would survive in any event. But that would depend on Soviet targeting policy. But now, if the Soviets increase their arsenal, well, we can build more defenses. The trouble with that was that it would cost us more to build back up to the 70 percent surviving than it costs the Soviets to try and take it off of it. As a matter of fact the exchange rate was at first to the United States or to the defender and....by about a 3-to-1 margin. By that I mean, if the Soviets spend a billion dollars to create more damage, to push us below the 70 percent, in order to get back to the 70 percent, we're going to have to spend something like $3 billion to get back to where we started from, the 70 percent. Now it was that kind of consideration I think that puts a negative pall on the prospects of ABM. Some people would then argue that what we're setting is the stage for an arms race. Then they could have well been correct, because the Soviets greatly increased their arsenal even if we didn't put in those defenses from those times. The arsenals we were talking about then are considerably smaller than what the Soviets have today.

WOULDN'T ABM HAVE HAD THE ADVANTAGE OR CONFUSING THE SOVIETS? THEY WOULDN'T HAVE KNOWN HOW EFFECTIVE OUR SYSTEM WAS GOING TO BE. HOW MANY OF THEIR WEAPONS MIGHT HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH.

The...some people may have supported defenses on the basis of creating uncertainty. And that may be appropriate when the Soviets feel that it's an absolute must to knock out a small set of targets. Then defenses make them uncertain. And the defenses have leverage. When it...to the population it's an expected value calculation and there the So...Soviets don't have to be certain which particular piece of the united States they're damaging. All they have to be certain is that they're damaging a lot and therefore this uncertain argument does not apply when the Soviets don't care what part of a large set they destroy.

WHEN MCNAMARA CHANGED HIS RHETORIC FROM COUNTERFORCE GIVING UP ON DAMAGED LIMITATION AND STRESSED ASSURED DESTRUCTION, FROM YOUR KNOWLEDGE, DID THE WAR PLAN CHANGE. WAS THIS ACCOMPANIED BY ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO OMAHA?

When McNamara started backing off of the...any idea that he would go to Congress of the United States and support or request large expenditures for limiting damage there's a natural question — Did that...what changed? What changed at Omaha? Well, really not much. Why? Because the mob at Omaha or in the JSTPS was to make best use of the forces allocated and the forces didn't change. It's just that Secretary did not see fit to undertake a large ABM program and civil defense program to protect the population. So that the targeting at Omaha which is the other part of the equation to deter attack by threat of retaliation did not change. And it shouldn't have because of simply the goal of assured retaliation was still there and the JSTPS was to make best use of the forces allocated and those forces didn't change. So that it's not at all surprising there was no change or no significant change according to my recollection in our targeting.

SO THE...

Mr. McNamara had not given up on the threat...on the idea of assured retaliation. It's just that he gave up on a center piece called ABM and civil defense to limit damage to the United States population.

DID HE GIVE UP ON COUNTERFORCE?

I'm not certain exactly how Secretary McNamara thought about counterforce . Counterforce generally has a meaning, our attack of Soviet retaliatory forces or Soviet strategic forces, his ICBMs in their silos. There are two reasons to do that. One of them is to limit damage to the United States. In other words, in a retaliatorous attack if I can get back over there before all of his forces are lodged, at least I avoid his residual forces, his withheld forces forever impacting on the United States. And it takes the burden off of my active defense by ballistic missile defense and my civil defense. The other reason for counterforce is so that the United States can look somewhat threatening in a crisis. It is my view, but I'm not certain of that, that Secretary McNamara generally thought about counterforce in terms of limiting damage to the United States. So if he's backing off of the whole concept of limiting damage to the United States, it follows then that he's going to minimize his emphasis on counter force in terms of limiting damage. Because, while I can perhaps with troop counterforce stop the withheld forces, if I have no active defense to stop those that are already launched I It isn't all that meaningful. I would point out that the result of the damage limiting study, they've come out with some guidelines. And these guidelines were approved by Secretary McNamara for a time at least in the sense that he approved this...some of the conclusions of the study. And one of those conclusions was that we as a matter of guidance should apply one effective RV to every Soviet silo. Now the key to that is it was not zero and it was not two or more. It was one. This was... judgment was made on the basis that we don't know the occupancies of those silos. If it's in a retaliatory attack, you know, to limit damage, and since we don't know that occupancy we shouldn't get carried away that we want 90 percent damage expectancies and to fly several RVs because the uncertainty factor of how many of those silos would be occupied. But it was shown that on the margin it was effective to fly — that we should in allocating our resources apply one effective RV in each silo. And Mr. McNamara agreed with that.

DID SECRETARY MCNAMARA GIVE UP ON COUNTERFORCE, CITY AVOIDANCE?

Some people have said that the Secretary gave up on counter force. I think that's far too simplistic a statement for the following reason. Mr. McNamara, Secretary McNamara did start the Minuteman III program on his watch. And we have the Minuteman III in our force today. That force has a at least a modest if not important counterforce potential. In other words I can direct the 1,500 RVs and the Minuteman IIIs at Soviet silos and attain a substantial number of kills of their ICBMs. That's simply because they have concentrated many of their reentry vehicles are weapons in a few silos. So to say that Mr. McNamara gave up on counterforce, I...find not quite...as conclusive a statement as you might think. You always are apt to be reminded of the fact that the Secretary of Defense is at the cutting edge of future systems. What goes on out there in the...JSTPS is to make the best use of present forces. So if a Secretary decides that in the future he is not going to place the emphasis on acquiring counterforce systems that other people might have bought, that doesn't mean that automatically we quit doing counterforce out there at Omaha which does...to make best use of committed forces. And I think if people would keep those distinctions in mind it would clear up many of these very sweeping statements which I find are not correct without considerable elaboration. [INTERUPTION AND TAPE STOP] Well, I think it's too simplistic to say that as some have said, that Secretary McNamara gave up on counterforce...first he did start the Minuteman III on his watch. It may have been for a somewhat different purpose but at the same time we the planners that conceived the Minuteman III put a quality RV on there called the Mark 12. And later on we have decreased the yield of it to the Mark 12A. That system has an important counterforce capability today. One thing you must always keep clear is that the Secretary of Defense is at the cutting edge of the future. What his decisions have to with what future systems we will have and what he thinks the ...general direction we should go. What they do out at the JSTPS is to make best use of present forces. And so there's a long lag between this decision by the Secretary of Defense to say, Well I would deemphasize counterforce in the future and any change in the targeting structure out there in Omaha. And many people forget this distinction.

ALAIN ENTHOVEN WAS MAKING THE GENERAL CASE FOR MISSILES AND AGAINST BOMBERS THAT BOMBERS ARE VULNERABLE AND MISSILES ARE INVULNERABLE. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS?

Well Alain Enthoven -- one of the things that was consistent in his analyses was to make the case that favored missiles over bombers. Even if you constrain the role of bomber to hit 6 targets of known status in the SIOP which I continually rejected as the sole role of bombers — but even if you did that there were other argument! One analysis that Alain had was to show — and I can remember the figures yet -- to show that to do a certain job the tenure system cost to do it — if you did it with Polaris it would be $2 billion. If you did it with bombers, solely with bombers it would be $3 billion. There's no great difference there. The important part of this chart was the next column which said however, if the Soviets put in $15 billion worth of defense and that defense were directed against -- it was an ABM defense directed against Polaris, that would have raise the price to the United States to accomplish the mission assigned to something like $8 billion. On the other hand, if the Soviets had spent that same $15 billion but on bomber defense, according to this calculation it would have raised the price to the United States, if it had continued to do that mission, to something like $18 billion, $20 billion. Therefore he said, ergo, no bombers. I argued that we should add another line. And that is a line of Polaris and B-52s. Because now you see if I mix the offense and have a combination of Polaris and B-52s, the Soviets, if they spend all their money on bomber defense, then I do the job with Polaris and the answer is two on the other hand, if they spend it the other way, I do it with those bombers and the answer is three. And then there's a complicated game theoretic solution which I worked out and it turned out to be quite elegant that showed that the answer's 6. That if I have the correct mix of Polaris and B-52s, if the Soviets now spend a total of $15 billion on the mix of bomber defense and ballistic missile defense, the answer is $6 billion. Well that is not dramatically less than $8 billion, I will agree. But at least it gives me an arguing point that a mix of both Polaris and B-52s is better than B-52s or Polaris alone. Alain had really no choice but accepting that analysis although he put his fine mind to work for at least two weeks to figure out how his analysis went wrong. He... he finally gave up on finding out what was wrong when Dr. Brown pointed out to him one Monday morning somewhat tersely that he had gone — he had wasted his weekend going over my analysis and you know, and Glenn's logic is correct and the arithmetic is correct. And Alain you better understand it. So... so we gave up on the analytic, but even though I won that slight skirmish, I never won the war. I mean he still argued that there was little role for bombers. (And Alain probably won't remember that.)