Well, yes I had a call in about noon or about shortly afterwards out of Fort Smith, which is in the western part of Arkansas, that a plane would me pick me up at Fort Smith. I wasn't in Fort Smith, but a little village nearby. So I went up to Fort Smith in a... a plane from the government picked me up. They already had a—another man, a senator, I believe from Missouri, and they'd been to St. Louis and from there we flew to Atlanta and picked up uh, Senator Richard Russell and I think Congressman Carl Vinson, he was chairman of the Armed Services Committee at that time of the House. And we flew to Washington. And of course in the conversation on the way up to Washington, we speculated... about what this was about. They hadn't said anything about what it was about, it just simply would we come and—and—and the—the telephone message and we speculated of course it was about Cuba, but we didn't know specifically just what about it. We did know and of course comments and—and Russell knew that there had been a...move...some troops and planes into Florida Air Bases. We thought as they thought preparatory to a strike or ma—a landing or something, with regard to Cuba, it was all about Cuba of course, very much in the news at that time. But we didn't know any specific things in there, we just talked about it and both of them were in the Armed Services Committee and I was Foreign Relations. But when we got to Washington a car picked us up and took us to the White House. We met in the Cabinet Room along with other people, the— fro--from uh what's called the leadership of the House and the Senate, plus uh, some of the—the administration in addition to the President and they—there we were briefed about the conditions situation in Cuba, told about the evidence, you know the photographs taken by our U-2s of the installations in Cuba, and it... perfectly clear that the Russians had installed some missiles, I guess and what you call, intermediate range missiles I guess. And this--it had to be stopped. And the question was how to stop them and they had the—two, you might say, two alternative ways we would discuss. One was the uh, the--air strike, to take them out or possibly together with a landing if necessary. And that uh--we'd get rid of them one way and the other was to--to embargo the shipments of any further ships coming in and—and er—request them to take out...that were already there. And none of them were at that time operational, it was believed. But they felt that they were coming in so, this was discussed at some lengths and uh, they uh.

WAS IT DISCUSSED OR WERE YOU JUST SORT OF BRIEF?

Well, you—

WAS IT A BRIEFING OR WAS IT DEBATE OR A DISCUSSION OR...?

Well, he—he told us about the, you know the background and so on and then he asked about our--our views—which did we think was more appropriate and uh, I remember Russell, whom I was very close to. I thought Russell knew more than anyone. He was in the— in the Senate about Armed Services and I trusted his judgment. He was uh, he thought that a--an air strike, accompanied perhaps by a—a landing would be more uh, more appropriate than to stop Russian ships on the high seas. If the Russian ship didn't--didn't stop and we had to take it in by force or sink it, we'd be very provocative of the Russians and of course, he and I also didn't want to precipitate a war with the Russians. And uh, to--take the missiles out directly in Cuba was, while it would be provocative would be less so because we were acting then again directly against the threat to--our— our—to—to our country. I supported Russell, but the President uh, had already made up his mind of course, because he went directly from there to a public statement that uh—on the embargo. Uh, he had reason to believe which I don't know, that—the Russ—the Russians would abide by it. Anyway the embargo was installed and they did abide by it and no strike was ever made. And they did take out the missiles.

DO YOU THINK IN BEING KIND OF PROVOCATIVE AS YOU SAY WITH THE BLOCKADE THAT KENNEDY WAS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS—CAUSE THERE WERE ELECTIONS COMING UP IN NOVEMBER.

Well, this is an on-going it's--it's an important step in the escalation of the arms race. I mean prior to this, the President had, had a—had said there was a missile gap which was not true, I mean he used it as a--a campaign issue in--in the campaign, in--in uh—against uh, ...in '60, Nixon. And uh, this clearly I mean the—the demonstration of our superiority which we--we—we did demonstrate. I mean our insurance that we could--we could take them out and that we—we had the insurance to in a sense to back the Russians down if a Mr. Rusk, who was the Secretary of State, you said very provocative statement about we were, bal--eye ball to eye ball, and they blinked first, which is of course a kind of a demean—demeaning way that y—obviously added to the humiliation of the Russians. I think this whole incident is significant in that it was a—a uh, certainly an important step in the fueling or the exacerbation of the arms race, because the reaction of the Russians clearly was...the next time they're not going to be able to pu--back us down. And they tha--I think that was certainly a—a great and important step towards their escalation of the arms race and of course we had this like tit for tat as soon as they knew it, we'd do it and so on. And that was one of the steps. There were others in it, uh, that followed that the--the--in the well you know, how is—what's happened, I don't have to relate it. I think it's a very tragedy, the—every time you have a confrontation of this kind between two great powers, there is a reaction. I mean whichever one if—feels that it has been uh, laughed or humiliated is going to react by building more. I mean that's—that's been the ef—up to now that's been the—the effect and I think it's a great tragedy.

WHAT WAS HIS REACTION TO YOU AND SENATOR RUSSELL'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE BLOCKADE?

Well, he didn't react, he was just listening then they went, and we left and we went over and he made this statement you know about the blockade, announce--public announcement. He didn't argue about it very much, he just asked for our views, we didn't, uh, it wasn't a prolonged argument at all. I think he'd already, he—he was just paying the senators and the congressmen a courteously of appearing to consult them. He—he wasn't really consulting them, he was telling them… And but it— uh, it's it's good manners to ask their opinion. Eh, it always is. I mean most of these meetings that the President has with congressmen is an opportunity to uh ... well to persuade them to their point of view. I mean then; that's— that's what they're for.

MANY PEOPLE HAVE SAID THAT UH, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE IN THE WHITE HOUSE HAD--I GUESS THEY HAD ABOUT 7 DAYS BEFORE, BET--BETWEEN THEY SAW THOSE U-2 PHOTOGRAPHS AND KNEW THERE WERE MISSILES IN THERE, BETWEEN THE TIME THEY BRIEFED YOU AND MADE THE FINAL DECISION THAT A BLOCKADE WOULD BE A BETTER DECISION THEN AN AIR STRIKE, BECAUSE THEY HAD THAT TIME TO CONSIDER IT AND MULL IT OVER AND DEBATE IT, THEY CAME TO THAT CONCLUSION AND IT, YOU—YOUR SORT FEELING AND SENATOR RUSSELL'S FEELING WAS MUCH MORE IMMEDIATE...GUT REACTION.

That's right. Well that was it—the—the immediate reaction and—and Russell's also made the point that it uh—if they had an air strike it would serve the further purpose— at that time it was thought important to get rid of Cu--of Castro, to change the whole government in Cuba was one of the considerations whereas the other wouldn't, uh, not likely to anyway. But, uh, I don't know uh, I don't know the sequence of events. It turned out of course that the—that the, in effect Kennedy and Khrushchev struck a deal. Whether there was any communications that would give him an indication that could do that, before, I wouldn't know that. I mean, I don't know it to this day. I don't wha--I don't what the—what communications if any there--I think there was a hotline, it was...means of communications. One way or another the— through the ambassadors, or others that he may have had some reason that we didn't know about to believe that uh, they would respect an embargo. The embargo at that time of course we weren't at war, it was clearly a—uh, against uh, international ..., not international law. We had no right, uh legal right certainly to stop uh, when we were not at war, with a country, to stop their ship on the high seas. It was— it was in eff--it could be considered an act of war to do so.

AND YOU WERE CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT REACT IN A WARLIKE...

Well, yes, we didn't know what they'd do. And uh, he may have had reason to believe he knew. I didn't and neither did Russell.

DID THE PRESIDENT SAY ANYTHING, I MEAN WHAT—--WHAT DID--DID YOU SAY ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT AND DID THE PRESIDENT REACT IN ANY—WAS HE UPSET WITH YOUR—WITH YOUR...

He didn't seem to be. Later on I understand, that Bobby Kennedy in his book said that uh, that we uh, were--was very critical of it. I don't recall he was critical at all, he asked our opinion, we gave it and that was that. He didn't argue about it. He'd already had--made up his mind anyway and there was no use arguing about it.

WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT CUBA AND CASTRO AT THE TIME? I MEAN WOULD YOU HAVE BEEN IN FAVOR OF...

Well, I--I have felt this is too bad that we can't get along with this little country. I didn't believe it was a great threat to us. I think that even now, I've felt sore, subsequent to that I advocated that we change our policy, that we have normal relations with them, that we not embargo them. It's a small country and it obviously its interests ... lie with doing business with us. They'd be better off and I think we would if we had normal relations. When we are obsessed with this idea of Communism and we--it's an ideological obsession and the it—it to this day of course we still in that way, we don't--we don't have normal relations. And I think this is—contributes to the difficulties in the Middle—in the—in the Central America. And uh, the President was down and the great ceremony yesterday and the Grenada affair, which seems to me uh, all out of proportion, too insignificant. Here's a small little place of less than a 100,000 people and her--a big country like ours attacking it, somehow or other to me it reminds me of the David and Goliath contest. And the sympathies of the world has always been with David, haven't they. People don't like a big country, a bully, I don't think and I—it always has struck me uh—really out of character for us to be so inclined to push other small people around and uh, I felt that there still do. I think we'd be better off and everybody would if we had normal relations with Cuba. And I don't think it's a threat. I don't think Nicaragua's a great threat to our security. The threat is a war with Russia. And that's a serious one. And a very serious, and anything that contributes to exacerbate the animosity between these two countries, these two rivals is bad. I'm always reminded that the rivalry between England and Germany, that brought on World War I which was the great disaster for the western world, out of which all, you might say major part of our--the world's difficulties, was a similar kind of—of each one sort of doing it to the other, you know, kind of, it's a kind of a game with them. But it's much more serious as nuclear weapons have come on the scene, than there even was then. Although that led to the virtual destruction of western civilization at the time and the--we've been picking up the remnant sever since. But, I just think, it's—it's a bad thing for us to be intervening around in this fashion and we ought to be more conciliator; to these small countries, to everybody. I--I don't believe in, that's why I wrote a book called Arrogance of Power, and I tried to explain, I don't think, it's good psychology or a good in politics to do that.

DO YOU THINK KENNEDY WAS A BIT ARROGANT..?

Well, you see, I think he--he was young and inexperienced at that time, but I liked to believe, whether I can--whether it's true or not that after that experience, uh, he had about six months, I guess, after that, he--he evidently changed his mind, because his speech in June of '63, a little ov--a little over six months later, uh, was quite conciliatory-- the most conciliatory speech of any president I think since really, since, through the Second World War. And was on the right track. And it's a very strange and disconcerting thought that every time anybody makes a--a gesture, it looks as if you're going to move toward conciliation, something happens, in that case, he was assassinated. He made the speech in June, he was assassinated the following November. Of course, we never know, what the motive of the people who assassinated him were, who it was. We know the physical effect, but you know there have been lots of studies of it. But, you know, I've often think of the U-2 incident, just as President Eisenhower was planning to go to Russia, and was going to mee--he did meet with Khrushchev but he broke it up. And uh, that was—that was a great tragedy I think. And uh, then we—we come along to the '72 and you have the—Nixon made a valiant effort I thought to establish a more normal relations with the Russians, then you get the Jackson Amendment to the trade bill, and you unravel the whole process.

THERE'S SOMETHING I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND. YOU WERE VERY CRITICAL OF THE BAY OF PIGS LANDING, YOU WROTE THAT FAMOUS ... MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT. AND YOU SAY WE SHOULD NOT BE A BULLY WITH LITTLE COUNTRIES LIKE CUBA...AND SORT OF HAVE SOME WAY OF DEALING WITH THEM. I MEAN COLLABORATE WITH THEM. YET ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU'RE ONE OF THE PEOPLE WHO THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO TAKE OUT THOSE MISSILES AND...

Well you see the way it's presented to you as...these are missiles that almost ready to be aimed at you and could drop a nuclear weapon on you,...this is direct. The way it's presented you are always subject to what ever they tell you in the briefing. You had no--no background and no, nothing else. Eh--and you come in and they brief you and your immediate reaction, you've already referred to that, the--the immediate is well, if it's that bad, you have to take their word for it. I--no—nobody was in the position to say well, that's not their purpose, those weapons are not intended to—to-- to destroy us and so on but obviously, the way they presented it, they were. And they were an immediate threat. There was no such threat as that in the Bay of Pigs, or any of the other cases.

SO YOU FELT THAT THE THREAT WAS SO...

Well that's the way they put it...The--these are missiles, they're building them, here's pictures of them, they'll be ready to fire off anytime now. They would blackmail into doing whatever they want to do. And together with the kind of uh, picture that has been created in the minds of all Americans to some extent, uh--uh is that these are dangerous people who would stop at nothing. And in the days of Stalin, that was true I think.... Stalin contributed a great deal to the idea that there was no limit to his ruthlessness.

BUT KHRUSHCHEV WAS A DIFFERENT UH...?

I'd say, well you know he denounced Stalinism and...in his so-called '56 speech and I think he came over here in '59 and all in an effort to try to change that whole relationship as he did, and he took a great risk when he denounced Stalin uh-- Stalinism if you like, in that so-called secret speech at the 20th Congress.

DO YOU HAVE ANY INKLING AS TO WHY HE TOOK SUCH A GREAT RISK IN PUTTING THESE MISSILES IN CUBA? CLEARLY IT WAS A--A MISTAKE, UH…

Well, I—I think that uh, he—he had—he was trying to compensate I guess for our missiles on his bases. I mean I'm sure he has people in his government just like we have, who—who are egging you on to that. We have people now who don't want any kind of an agreement, independent ..., who don't want any agreement with Russia, they don't want any acceptance of ..., see the government a very rotten government of Russia. And if she had the same thing, and he--I'm sure he did it to a great extent to conciliate his own hawks. To show he wasn't a--a softy, he wasn't soft on capitalism. He wasn't soft on uh, on the Americans. I imagine that's it, but I--I'm not professional psychologist uh, leave that to better-informed people. But that's the way people often react.

IT'S SAD THAT IN BOTH COUNTRIES, YOU HAD LEADERS WHO WERE PERHAPS TRYING TO BE CONCIL— TRYING TO YOU KNOW GET TOGETHER AND YET YOU HAD THESE FORCES WITHIN THESE...

You had that with Eisenhower, you had it with Nixon, and I think--I think Kennedy in uh—in the—his reaction I think in the following, I said, in the American University was he thought it over and thought that well, it would be better to uh, to go the other route,...with conciliation and he signed within a few weeks, uh, he signed the uh, Test Ban Treaty which was the most significant step toward uh, relaxation or in normal relations, it occurred. And uh, we like to think that uh, that was what he—that was a conversion on his part. It's a little short and—uh time between that and the time, of his assassination, we don't know too much about that. But I—I think it's been that you just said, that--several leaders but, they are there, on very powerful interests in this country, of course devoted to militarism and to force. There's nothing new in the world, this is a traditional way. The thing that's new in the world is the danger of nuclear war! And that's what the—these people don't take into consideration. Warfare has been pretty bad with conventional weapons, in World War I and Two. But nuclear weapons as demonstrated in Japan is just intolerable. I mean it ought to--to give rise to a--a new approach [to these relationships.]

DO YOU THINK--DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES PUSHED CASTRO INTO THE SOVIET CAMP?

Well ..., nobody knows that well, he came if you remember in uh, '59, I think before before he was considered a communist, he came to Committee on Foreign Relations and he came here, he went to New York and we treated him very casually as I remember. I don't think he was received uh, in any good fashion as we did Khrushchev. I don't really know and I don't know uh, maybe somebody does, whether or not at that time, he was committed to communism, he se—seemed like a revolutionary. Obviously conditions in Cuba, like they have been in—in Salvador in--in Nicaragua are very in satisfactory, people live there. They have a highly extraordinary old feudal system in which a few families own all of the wealth, in Cuba, of course, a few American corporations own much of the wealth, the big Cuban sugar companies and people uh, just get uh--get fed up with absentee ownership. We had that in Arkansas you know after the uh--the Civil War and—and especially after the depression. Much of the--much of the valuable resources of Arkansas were—were taken by Eastern capitalists. I mean all the Bauxite was Aluminum Company of America, you know, and some of the biggest plantations are owned by the big insurance companies. There's a sense of exploitation be foreign owners. And that happens right within our own country. I mean we had the ar—the uh, freight uh, discriminatory freight rate issue was a major one in Arkansas. And it's over it now, to a great extent, but I can see how they feel, that they're being exploited uh...

YOU CAN SEE HOW WHO FEELS?

The cap--the Cubans, the people. I mean they were ripe for a revolution, just as I think Salvador was, and I think the same way with Somoza. We had a Dominican Republic, in all these countries. They are going through the revolutionary period in which they're trying to modernize their society and to get rid of the old uh, domination of either a few families, all foreign, a foreign uh ownership. The decolonization of the whole world going on. I mean the same thing in the British Empire. Uh, what's happened to it? There's nothing unusual about that movement in the Ger—the Russians—the Cubans had their revolution. Now, uh—we— it wasn't necessarily a ki--you don't have to be a communist but when the uh, the uh, major capitalist come,...is very negative about it. Of course we were negative because much of the property that was taken was American property and naturally we were negative. They always--it always happens that way, we didn't like the idea, especially our sugar company then others didn't like the idea of our property being expropriated. Th—we set up a whole commission and—for the uh--evaluation of those properties in the hopes that someday we get paid for them. You know it's an old story. Now, the only place he could look to—to help, was—was not here, it was, we weren't still preventing it, it was the communist. I think that's it more than some ideological fixation, it was just a practical matter, he got aid from them.

HOW DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT HE WAS LIKE WHEN HE CAME TO NEW YORK?

Oh, he was a rough.... He came to the committee in... here.

COULD YOU REFER TO HIM AS--AS CASTRO, FIDEL CASTRO?

Castro, yeah he came to the committee and not after he threw out Batista. And at that time, he was uh, by many people, was considered sort of a revolutionary hero. Of course, we—we, our businesses didn't realize at that time, that maybe he was going to expropriate those businesses of course he did. And immediately we assumed he was a communist. Now, maybe, I don't whether he was con—devoted at that time or not. He later became because, as a practical matter, Castro got aid from Russia, not from us.

WHAT DID HE LOOK LIKE, WHAT WERE HIS PEOPLE LIKE...?

Oh, well you know, he had a...beard, he's a rough looking Castro, he got a customer, and he had those fatigues, you know and he was—he had with him a couple of goons with uh—as I recall they had guns in their hands, I think, I don't why. Those days we weren't so security conscious. I don't suppose you'd let him in now, but I think— I think they had him then. His bodyguards of course, he's a revolutionary and he--he felt he had to have one. And he was a rough customer and uh, you know it was—of course he, he looks he he's matured now and he's even gotten gray beard but he was tough looking customer. He wasn't in—exactly an ingratiating character.

TALK JUST A LITTLE MORE, BECAUSE RAN OUT THERE THE END OF THE LAST TAPE ABOUT THE MILITARY CONTROL, NOT JUST IN THE UNITED STATES BUT ALSO, CLEARLY IN THE SOVIET UNION TOO. AND THE PROBLEMS THAT THAT CREATES FOR ARMS CONTROL.

Now, I don't know...you know the Soviet Union doesn't have our system, they're not responsive to—to elections and so on. But in this country with the development of this huge and dev--the huge uh, appropriations 3 hundred billion dollar program for arms, to with the biggest business in the country involved in it and the development of our electoral system with PACS, gives them almost an irresistible control of our elections. And they can con--they--they control or they buy the elections by putting in so much money, nobody can compete with them.

WHO DO MEAN BY THEY?

The--the uh, the PACS. I mean there have been article after article recently in the papers. The PACS are the organizations created by businesses to give money to elections, There, you know, our election laws allow us the organization about industries are PACs and they--they by proliferating these they can ...they can syphon enormous amounts of money into—into the, their friends if you want to call them that, their supporters in the Congress that appropriate the money. And they get uh, their commitments and they become well, almost dominant I would say, in our congress and it, this is the reason why the—this almost hopeless to ever cut the defense program.

THESE ARE PEOPLE WHO--CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE OF...

Well you know that you have to understand the political system here too. Recently money has become the dominant factor with the U.--development of television. Television is so expensive that it's believed hardly can run for office now. And when I ran 50 years ago, it didn't take much money. It was mostly effort, go out and speak. Today, you've got to do it by television. In one of the recent Senate races, if you know it,... this is all public knowledge and uh, the amounts run into one Senate, I think North Carolina, one Senator spent as much as 15 million in the neighborhood, the other one ten. That's--that's outrageous, you know. Where's that money coming from? It comes from these businesses indirectly it comes out of the public treasury because the businesses get paid for these vast uh, armaments contracts out of the public purse. And obviously they can afford to make unlimited contributions almost to these organizations that give money to candidates.

IS THIS WHAT EISENHOWER CALLED THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX?

Exactly, he—-he foresaw it. And he warned us against it, but we—we've paid no attention to good advice.

SINCE THE CUBAN MISSILE, THAT'S 23 YEARS NOW, DO YOU THINK THE SO-CALLED MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IS MORE POWERFUL THAN IT WAS?

Oh there's no question, look at the size of the defense budget. I get—-... In the first year, Lyndon Johnson came into uh, well what was that '64, that's 20 years ago, roughly, 20—21 years. The total budget of the United States government was a hundred billion dollars. Today, the defense alone is three hundred billion dollars, that gives you some proportion.

BUT IN TERMS OF THE POWER AND THE PERSUASION AND THE—OF ALL OF THIS, BY WHAT YOU'RE CALLING THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX REALLY, HOW HAS THAT CHANGED OVER THE YEAR...OVER THE LAST…?

Well, they're much more powerful then they used to be, they got much more money, relative to use in ways that require it in the election process, television is the main thing. And the--that it's so costly. One--there was a piece in the paper about one man from California didn't like Charles Percy in Illinois, he gave, I think it's a million three for negative advertising. All it did was just uh—uh—g—uh--uh it drowned the population of Illinois in negative advertising about Charles Percy, day after day, well, then he spent a million, one man. There was other-- a lot of money besides that spent too. You get those cases where you--you uh, in our election where there's so many little elections and we have so many of them and they're relatively small constituencies uh, a lot of money like that can determine it. And you're beginning to get uh, largely millionaires selected to the Senate.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE LEGACY OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

I think the legacy, I've already indicated. I think it added considerably to the development of the arms race.

MANY PEOPLE THINK--WHEN YOU TALK TO KIDS WHO HAVE JUST LEARNED ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN SCHOOL OR WHATEVER, THEY—THE IMPRESSION IS WELL THE UNITED STATES WAS STRONG AND THE UNITED STATES WON AND...

That's right.

WHAT DO YOU THINK…?

Well, that's right and the--then that created a reaction that Russians are--they—they took an oath to see that it didn't happen again. So they started big arms build-up. And they do build it. And then we hear about it. So we re—re—we retaliate and we build another big army. That's what's going on now. Each one says the other one is more powerful than it is and it's got to have more arms. I read a story in the paper two days ago by Mr. McFarland which I can't believe is accurate in which he—ss-said that they're building in oh, 20 times as many bombers and 40 times as many tanks and so on as we are. If that's true what in the devil did we do with this 300 billion dollars that we're spending. But, I can't believe it's true, with that—with the—you know who's going to contest with that.

WAS THE MISSILE CRISIS PERHAPS AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED, YOU KNOW A CHANCE TO HELP? I MEAN AT THAT TIME, THE SOVIET UNION ONLY HAD SOMETHING LIKE 20 ICBMS.

They had very few. Well, anytime along there was a good time. The time we missed, when we had a good time, was '72 and Nixon made his, move you know with the first SALT Treaty and ABM Treaty and the—the whole mixture of uh, agreements for joint ventures, headed by the trade bill which was a very far-seeing piece of legislation in which included a number of things, you know and in it. That was a great opportunity, it was--it was a great crime that that was--that was aborted by the Jackson Amendment.

MANY PEOPLE FORGET OF COURSE, THAT PART OF THE DEAL WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES, AT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES PROMISED TO REMOVE THEIR MISSILES FROM TURKEY AND THAT IN THE END IT REALLY WASN'T SUCH AN ENORMOUS, GREAT VICTORY FOR THE UNITED STATES, IT WAS A DEAL, IT WAS A TRADE OFF.

It finally got a deal, yeah. I—I—I--I'm not clear about the timing of when the deal either originated or was complete. Of course, it was completed later.

BUT IS THAT PERHAPS ONE OF THE LESSONS WE SHOULD LEARN FROM THIS THAT YOU HAVE TO TRADE OFF, YOU HAVE TO GIVE THE OTHER GUY SOME WAY OF...

Well, I think if there's going to be any--any peace at all, it has to be mutual. I mean both sides have to have a stake in it and they both have to feel secure. One can't be absolutely secure and the other one not. I mean, and you can't be absolutely secure in this. Well, there is no such thing as absolute security but, the best is where you both do make a deal, you do have equal uh, treaties, and I think as I was saying the only way I can see that it'll work is what was begun in '72 and then aborted. I'd like to see revive that same approach.

DO YOU THINK WE NEED TO BE MORE SENSITIVE PERHAPS TO THE SOVIET UNION, TO THEIR ASPIRATIONS.

Well, uh, we most certainly do. I mean they--they are a big power. They are the rival power. They're the one that--in which this extraordinary suspicion and uh, distrust now they way we don't take seriously even reasonable proposals. I thought the reasonable proposal of Gorbachev to--to stop nuclear testing and to proceed to negotiate on a fifty percent reduction was a serious reasonable proposal. We can't bring ourselves and give serious consideration to such a proposal. We've never asked...yet. And out of the months that have gone by, he first made it last August on—on the stopping of nuclear tests. And uh—we—we just can't bring ourselves to—to even negotiate in—in—in seriously on a such—a—such a project. So, I think that uh—we have to—the thing we have to do is to recognize the Russians have a different background form ours, a different history. They've been invaded time and again. They're ultra-sensitive about their—about their borders and about being subjected to invasion. I mean twice in my lifetime, they have. And this is what uh, isn't being soft on Communism or anything else, it's merely a fact of life. You have to recognize they have a different background and you take that into consideration in--in—in negotiating. And uh, we are unable to do that. The trouble is that most Americans have no memory to speak of with a great turnover into higher levels and uh have no— nothing to judge these things by--by experience. We're a very inexperienced country in those sort of thing. We—we've never been invaded by a hostile like the Russians have and most other countries. And therefore the lesson of the—the seriousness of this sort of thing is never...us. It's still almost like a game with us that you play it, you know and you--you—you—you get brownie marks for doing this or that. Well, it's not that kind of a game anymore.

DO YOU REMEMBER DURING THE CRISIS, DID YOU EVER GET CONCERNED THAT WE WERE REALLY ON THE EDGE OF A NUCLEAR WAR, THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE WHO—WHO GOT VERY FRIGHTENED DURING THE CUBAN...

The missile crisis. Well, it did look des--it looked very touchy as you said a moment ago, why I joined the--the view of Russell out of that group, because it looks serious. And uh, they—here, they're putting missiles right up against you see, they've had them up against their borders for a long time and they—you can say they used to. But we're not used to them. We've had our—you know we're really very spoiled. We've had our Monroe Doctrine, nobody had every threatened us, we had two countries on each side of relatively weak countries, militarily very weak, compared that we were never threatened, is a new thing. And we—we reacted very vigorously to that. Well, it's a fact of life in these other countries and Europe. This is what our perspective, you see about these relationship and about another country is--is--is important in making a proper judgment. That's why I like the exchange program. People within after a while will have a perspective if they live in and--and learn about other countries. And we need to know it about the Russians.

DO YOU REMEMBER SORT OF BEING REALLY AFRAID, REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR OWN SAFETY, ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY.

Well, I--I've never quite thought the Russians are foolish enough to uh, to uh, make uh, uh, a move that was provocative. I've always believed and I still do, that we're much stronger than they are and that they'd be very foolish to do it. That's alright, that's one reason I—I—I've never believed the—the that they've that conditions were such, it would give them any valid justifiable reason to believe they could prevail if they did. And I don't think that's—I think that's true now. I don't think they're even contemplating any attack upon us on Western Europe. They are very much concerned about their own security.

...EINSTEIN OR SOMEONE WHO SAID THAT, SINCE THE NUCLEAR AGE, YOU KNOW WE'VE CHANGED--THE TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED BUT OUR MINDS REALLY HAVEN'T CHANGED.

Well, he put it one way. I don't know if— put it exactly. He says that after the dropping of the bombs on Japan, he said, now everything's changed, except our manner of thinking. If we don't--he'd been thinking about war and about such relations, if we don't change our manner of thinking, and he had a new manner of thinking, we are faced with an incalculable catastrophe. He was saying, if you don't change your mind in—your way you think about these things, you're going to be destroyed. And I think he's absolutely right and other people have said similar things. That was a very perceptive statement by him.

DO YOU THINK THAT'S PERHAPS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM NOW IN THE NUCLEAR AGE?

It is...I have felt that. I had two hearings on ... on psychological aspect with...in '66, '69. But the very reason you're saying it, it's in our minds. We cannot bring ourselves to consider the Russians are people like we are, and that, they had aspirations very similar to ours. They have a different background and they've been brought up in a different way and they're more sensitive in certain areas than we are. And uh, they're suspicious, more suspicious and so on. They're very difficult because of that difference in their background and their different experiences. But uh, nevertheless, outside of the—-that—-their own security, the--they're very similar. And but, it's hard for us to believe, believe that. And thes—these are psychological problems.

DO YOU THINK UH--HOW DO YOU FEEL NOW ABOUT THE PROSPECT FOR PEACE? I MEAN THERE'S MORE MISSILES THAN EVER BEFORE AND...

That's what worries me you see, and—and the the--the depletion of resources for other activities and the concentration of our military affairs is a serious matter and uh, if—if a—an incident should happen between Israel and Syria and the—you get drawn and it could happen, both of them feeling whether they've got so many weapons and there are also people who—who can't stand not to try and see if they'll work. They've direc—they've directed, they've developed all these very sophisticated, modern weapons, and the people who do that, want to see if they'll work. I mean there are people who would like to triumph. And there are people in both countries I suppose, certainly are here, that wouldn't feel bad at all, about dropping a bomb on—on the other car, it's alright. There's always such people. I mean-but I don't think the majority in the great mass of people feel that at all.

SO YOU'RE OPTIMISTIC?

Oh, not--I—that's going too far. I don't believe that there's going to be a deliberate uh, action on either side to precipitate a war. But that doesn't mean that it can't happen. I mean wars have happened and I remember...said once in my committee that we never would deliberately get into war, we blunder into war. The way we get in by—by lo--by blundering into it. And so you—you can't uh, you never can uh, dismiss the—the capacity of the human race to make mistakes. And they get in by mistakes. Uh you know the--World War I, Lauren Grace, said you know great nations are always making mistakes because they don't understand each other's psychology and that's exactly what we were saying, just psychology, we don't understand theirs and I'm sure they don't understand ours.