...INITIAL SYMPATHY IN THE US TOWARD KHRUSHCHEV ESPECIALLY IN THE PERIOD YOU DESCRIBED...TRAVEL ACROSS...CAN YOU TELL ME HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE US AT THE TIME?

Well, you know, they say that Americans and Russians are similar. Khrushchev was definitely like a farmer. In a peasant family a peasant son. Maybe his simplicity even sometimes his affect -almost, and he impressed. He was a very live person. Then I think you're talking about very personal things, but that was also a known aspect of him, as a politician, well-known part, premier of a great country in America, you know? In his place I'd have been the same, proud with a feeling of one's self. Americans are like Russians. We don't talk about it much, but it's definitely true. Your nation and our nation are young. Soviet people, American people, we don't have 1,000 year old national practices. I don't mean traditions; your nation isn't as old, but as political entities we're both young. Therefore of course that impressed everyone. But I must say that one day there was a very strange meeting. It seems that in Los Angeles the mayor of Los Angeles, or rather the father of the mayor, fought in the south of Russia, almost against the regiment in which Khrushchev was fighting, and that cooled off the personal relations. Maybe Khrushchev didn’t feel that he was respectful enough. It was a dramatic situation in L.A. Khrushchev, at lunch, very near the hotel where Bobby Kennedy was later killed, said to Polev, the builder of that big plane we came in, "Aloisha, get the plane ready. We're leaving." Now that was maybe extraordinary, impulsive, but they also liked it. Because then we went to San Francisco, and maybe that explosive character made him more interesting, added something to the trip.

DOES HE REMEMBER THE MEETING IN PARIS WITH EISENHOWER, THAT IS THE OPEN SKY PROPOSAL. DOES HE HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF THAT AND WHAT WAS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD IT?

I don't remember. That was in Paris? Between Khrushchev and Eisenhower? But they didn't meet in Paris. You mean Vienna? I don't remember that, but I think that at that time a sort of reconsideration of the steps which should be taken was begun, and already then, at a moment when the situation wasn't so aggravated, it could be. But let's think of another situation, that is when in the Suez Canal, the situation became tense. Eisenhower said that America was opposed, that it hadn't been informed about Britain’s actions the French explosions. Khrushchev proposed sending a joint US-USSR force to Egypt, joint since we were both opposed, to help the Egyptians throw them out. I don’t remember; I wasn’t there, but I think that at that time it would have been a natural step, because it is necessary to protect against the wave of war. But I remember another thing.

HOLD ON A SECOND. WHEN WAS THIS?

Dallison? 1954.

BUT THE OPEN SKY, WHEN WAS THAT?... PLANE...58...

That was later. Maybe '58. I don't know exactly.

IN CONTEXT OF EGYPT HE USED A PHRASE THAT HAS BECOME HISTORICAL. HE SAID THAT IF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WERE NOT WITHDRAWN, ROCKETS WOULD FLY. CAN HE COMMENT ON THAT?

I don't remember such a statement, and I honestly don't think that such talk would come from us because we were always restrained because you used missiles. We understood that they were very formidable weapons, and I don't remember anything about that. I think you're mistaken. I think that that's controlled...

THERE WAS A LETTER FROM RUGANI?

No, no, I think not. Maybe that was some sort of speculation about that existed, but then we rarely talked about missiles, nuclear bombs. It was not yet in the center of politics.

THERE ARE TWO THINGS YOU KEEP USING, HAVE MENTIONED TWICE, THE MEETING WITH NIXON IN THE KITCHEN AND A VISIT TO A FARM WITH PIGS.

Here, in Moscow?

NO, IN THE US.

Here in Moscow at the exhibit? That was an amazing meeting. I was there, of course. What is was, the American exhibit really startled us. We weren't embarrassed, because we had just lived through a very difficult war, and such masses of housewares...it startled Muscovites that Americans were proud of it. Khrushchev said, "You think that a kitchen is something to be proud about?" And then the argument about that kitchen got pretty hot. But of course, jokingly, because after that argument, that went on for almost 2 hours, all within the framework of the kitchen. Khrushchev was saying it's a place for women, who needs such a kitchen, women should be free, etc. And Nixon maintained that a woman's place is in the kitchen. After that argument, Khrushchev and Nixon went to Khrushchev's dacha, and there they went boating. The argument continued still, and the boat began to sink because Nixon was gesturing so. It was a benign argument, and also necessary contact. Nixon came and visited Khrushchev when he was in retirement… They were talking like children, Nixon showing electrical contraptions. And Khrushchev said "And what kind of ballet do you have?" And Nixon said, "That's your invention, but we publish more books." And that's the kind of argument it was. Heated argument, people who talk like children, openly, explosive. And I think that at least Khrushchev convinced Nixon that he wasn't so bad. [Not sure if he means things in the USSR not so bad or that he could hold his own arguing, or that he was an ok person].

CAN YOU DESCRIBE MEETING BETWEEN CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV IN NEW YORK, AND WHETHER AT THAT TIME KHRUSHCHEV MADE ANY POLITICAL PROMISES TO CASTRO?

No, of course political promises could only be made in a speech, and such political promises exist, but in the '50s and '60s such unilateral promises weren't given as a rule. It was an important gesture, maybe a characteristic of Khrushchev, when he wanted to emphasize the relationship with a little country, with its young leader, he was older and the leader of a big country is going to Harlem. Maybe it was also his own kind of challenge, sort of to himself. A sort of dare. I tried to talk him out of it, said that it wasn't without danger, that it might make trouble here in America, but he went anyhow. His chauffeur went with him, driving, a very simple peasant, who almost hung Khrushchev on the New Year’s (Christmas) tree. He somehow found out on the map how to get to Harlem. They didn't warn the police, because they’s have thought up a reason why not, and we slipped out and up there. We arrived at the hotel, but I don't know how, somehow it had been discovered, and there were about 1000 people there. We had to fight our way through them, went up in a little elevator. Castro didn't know he was coming, because Khrushchev had decided not to talk to him on the phone (didn't call, or didn't tell him when he phoned). We went into a room that was full of maybe 100 people, among them employees of the hotel, the people accompanying Castro, and us and the chauffeur, the whole political retinue. And we were invited to sit on a little sofa, and they went upstairs, so that I don't know what they said. I didn't hear. What motivated Khrushchev to move the missies to Cuba? What were the pressures, dangers? That's a question that each person answers in his own way. I didn't ask him why he did that. I want for Americans to understand Khrushchev, as we formerly understand them. A little country. Next to America. America causes friction with that little country, and it is natural that the leader of a big country, to which that country turns for help doesn’t want to abandon it, leave it defenseless. If Castro and his roving gang hadn't gained power and been credible...they lived like terrorists, Castro and his friends. It’s strange to say so. It was a long struggle in the mountains against a disgusting dictator, Batista. A telephone boy. Understand, there's a person who professes social political action, social fairness, and how to gain it. And America, you Americans couldn't adjust to it because it bothered you. There is that sort of thinking about us. You didn't consider that Cuba had made progress. You have been spoiled by the course of fate. You didn't loose many of your sons in WWII. No bombs fell on your country. And therefore you remained a very spoiled country, and still are, by fate.

CUT

Kennedy, later. Well, yes, a crises was created by the situation. Let's say that now, already after so many years, you can't truthfully say who's guilty. That's absurd. "If". I don't like that, and what's more you need facts, like a German. Could be this or that, but it isn't. But the business was the point that between Khrushchev and Kennedy, there was only a gentleman’s agreement by radio, and it was all decided. You didn’t give in. We didn’t give in. There weren’t any winners, on either side. But Cuba won. Maybe you didn't like that, and we maybe neither did we. We say now, today: then the questions that were decided between states were simpler, smaller. Now they've gotten very big. I'd like to say one thing about that. I understood, when we had our interview with Kennedy, and we went out with him to the ocean. It was very cold; he'd given me a jacket but we weren't very well dressed, and shivered. I asked him, "You're not cold here (seafront, place name?)?" And he said something I'll always remember. He said, "When Stalin and Churchill and Roosevelt gained that victory, they were already very old men. They were at the height of success. And the world was very mixed up when they found it, and they didn't want to straighten it out. They couldn't; there wasn't time left to untangle the world then." And Kennedy said, "But if there's a chance for us to do it now, we should do it, otherwise in 20 years it'll be a world that we can't undo like a periscope." And that fear of Kennedy's, the world might stop if he didn't straighten it out, it’s still here. With Gorbachev. Imagine a leader of a great, a huge country, a young leader, who understands, whether he found it that way or whatever, the end. There’s no other ending. All the rest of the games, they're simply variations. Believe me, that's what I think.

ONE VERSION IS THAT KENNEDY WAS UNDER DIVERSE PRESSURES FROM HIS GOVERNMENT, HAWKS PUSHING FOR MILITARY ACTION. OTHERS TRYING TO SOLVE IT DIPLOMATICALLY. WERE THERE SIMILAR PRESSURES HERE?

I don't know, it's hard to say it was like that, because X wasn't a person close to those people, not in those circles. That's not even...I know that because Bobby Kennedy said so himself, the President said that the military said to put pressure on the Russians, and then when that was done and no one was left, go ask someone else what to do. Understand, when you use the word "pressure", you Americans, that looks like something else to us. To us it looks like "self-pressure", you understand, you're under pressure from yourselves. But also there was pressure from other sides, because you think a lot about your own doubt...and there are the circumstances. A person doesn't live without circumstances - political, social personal. They're important.

...at that time the military, who also...military, that's what they're for, it's not a secret game.

WHERE WERE YOU AT THE TIME?

I was in both places (Cuba and Washington). I was in America for a few days during the very time when it (Cuban Crisis) ended. I'll give you a state secret. At that time Maya Pletetskaya and her husband were in Washington, and that extraordinarily clever ambassador, Dobrinyin, and we were under quite a lot of pressure. And Robert Kennedy came to the Embassy alone, and when he came...

HOLD ON A MINUTE. THAT'S JUST THE STORY I'M COMING TO. THAT WAS DURING THE CRISIS WHEN R. KENNEDY MADE THE CONTACT TO THE EMBASSY?

Yes, he came to the embassy. I felt, I knew him, he was somewhat relieved. We drank a glass of champagne. He didn't even say anything special, but the simple fact that he came meant that the tense situation had already changed.

WHAT WAS SAID?

To good health.

NO. WHAT WAS THE CONVERSATION.

I don’t remember. I was also a guest. And then, don’t be confused. For us it like you: the cobbler should stick to his last (mind our own business). I wasn't a government official who could ask Dobrinyin about it. Maybe your journalists ask the President what he did, but for us, it's not done.

THERE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A TELEX FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO KENNEDY THAT APPARENTLY SUGGESTED A GREAT DEAL OF TENSION AND A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE. IT USED A TERM, "BOTH OF US ARE PUTTING ON A ROLE WHICH IS TIGHTENING THE KNOT, AND WE ARE BEING PUT IN A POSITION WHERE WE WON'T BE ABLE TO UNTIE IT." DO YOU REMEMBER THIS ATMOSPHERE? WHAT WAS BEING FELT HERE AT THE TIME?

It was a various times, I think not only at the time of the Caribbean crisis. Berlin was a very acute situation. I and say what I understand from what was written about it. There's a very interesting phrase about it that I'll tell you in a minute. Certainly it was like that. I don't know about the private sense, but as a journalist at that time, already in a definite position I know what it's like when 2 people push like that, each insisting he's right. Tanks stood facing each other on Fredrichsstrasse, and both our tanks were positioning their guns, and they weren’t joking. At 30 meters. You army knew how to give the order, and so did ours. One second and phtttttt. But that was only tanks. Ten tanks, twenty tanks, and then it all calmed down. And now? What's the difference? Political pressure, political games. Then it was all easier. The Americans say that now, and very sincerely. It's not a ball, not billiards. Present day political affairs are not a game of billiards, and not even a whip.

IN THE STATES IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THE CASE OF BERLIN IT WAS KHRUSHCHEV WHO INITIATED THE CHALLENGE...THAT HE WAS CHALLENGING A YOUNG PRESIDENT.

I don't think so. Khrushchev was very sympathetic to Kennedy. He was a much older person in age, but it was evident that he felt that Kennedy was a person with whom one could talk, and it was so. And I must tell you that when Kennedy was assassinated, I remember what a personal tragedy it was for Khrushchev. I remember that. He was simply disheartened. He didn't know the history of America, of course, because he was not very well educated, but he knew that in the US that had happened, that it wasn't the first time. It was a shock. There was the humiliation (sullying) of Jacqueline; he received her when she came to Moscow later, then Mikoyan went there. I don’t think so. I think that there was a relationship, they developed a relationship of mutual understanding. And it's not without reason that I say that, because Mr. Gorbachev recently said so to your journalists. Now - the situation was very tense during the Caribbean crisis, but in 1963, one of the best agreements between the USA and USSR was signed, a ban on nuclear tests for 3 years. There was a certain political courage involved in taking such a step. And later, you know, I was the editor of the government newspaper [Izvestia], and Khrushchev was Prime Minister, and he wouldn't have allowed me to interview Kennedy if he didn't want to deal with him.

OK. HOW DID KHRUSHCHEV FEEL ABOUT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

He also felt welcomed relief.

PLEASE REPEAT AS A FULL SENTENCE.

Yes, of course. When the Cuban Missile crisis was over, everyone breathed a sigh of relief. Everyone. You think that no one here was afraid. No, of course, we were afraid too. We understood America. We knew what it meant to deal with America. And we believed that it would take time to recover from our wounds. That game went to the limits. Including Khrushchev. When that happened, he was a man of few words and emotionally impulsive with people. He was personally withdrawn, but I think that he slept very peacefully that night. Of course, peacefully. I must say that he personally took a lot on himself. But understand what it's a question of. I want to come back to this, well, but missiles, but one, two, five, ten, but they tell us know that your and own arsenals, yours and ours, nuclear arsenals, 1 million Hiroshimas. 1 Million Hiroshimas. And Chernobyl was only a few Hiroshimas. Only a few, and between us a million. There's no way out of this situation. Then the political chess board was simpler, much simpler. In the first place, then we had fewer missiles turned on each other, they hadn't gotten into such sophisticated political use of them. Maybe they had more sense then. I don't know. Maybe.

CAN YOU EXPRESS THE SAME IDEA NOW BUT IN THE SENSE OF WHAT DO YOU THINK WERE THE KIND OF LESSONS THAT KHRUSHCHEV LEARNED FROM THE CRISES. WHAT SHOULD WE LEARN? BE CONCISE.

I don't know, in a personal sense, but for one thing, since then there haven’t been any such serious crises with America. In the history of US-USSR relations after WWII, that was the most serious crisis. The Berlin crisis came on faster. And it was simpler. Berlin is far from America, and there the situation was faster, but still, during Khrushchev's life, and Kennedy's, they didn't resolve it. They never signed the 4 party agreement which would have normalized the situation in Berlin. That was part of the tension. Well, I think that it taught us. If, then, it taught us it can still teach us. Lets say this. Let's safe it taught us something. Did it teach you too? I'll ask you a question. Did it teach you something?

YOU KNOW WHAT BUNDY SAYS, WHAT HIS LESSON WAS? DID YOU MEET BUNDY?

No. I met Rostow, knew Salinger well. Where is he now? London? Not long ago he was in Moscow.

WE INTERVIEWED HIM FOR THIS PROGRAM.

Bundy I also know, of course.

HE SAID DON'T CREATE CRISES, IF YOU DON'T KNOW HOW TO SOLVE THEM.

Better not to. Wait. You said we shouldn't create crises, but one is developing again. Now in Nicaragua. That's right next to you again. And the same thing is happening. Kennedy told me that the hand of Moscow is everywhere. He was intellectual, well educated. But how can contemporary people related to an intelligent person who doesn’t demonstrate action for the public good. It's not possible. For example, this new, complicated nationalist movement in Iran has sprung up, and around Iran in the whole Muslim world. You can't not be accusing. I was never in Nicaragua but President Kennedy said, "If the election is carried out properly, if Marxists come into power, so be it." The same as happened with...Asia. There a communist got into power, Bishop. He said OK, recognized him and that happened through the process of election. You like the choice, don't like it, but again, it's not a serious game. "I don't like your choice, I like your choice." It's interminable. And he very much wanted to know that he had created another puppet. That's a state friendly to us. So that we hope that the Americans behave sensibly, as in the past.

THERE IS A QUOTE BY A SOVIET DIPLOMAT, DON'T REMEMBER HIS NAME, THAT IT WAS STATED TO AMERICANS AS A RESULT OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS "YOU WILL NOT DO IT TO US AGAIN." THAT THERE WAS AN UNDERSTANDING MAYBE THAT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOVIET DRIVE TO PARITY. DOES HE HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THAT? THE RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISES PUSHED THE USSR TO THE MILITARY NUCLEAR PARITY.

Maybe it was said, maybe in diplomatic circles (affairs), I don't know. Maybe so. But we strive for a military parity, as we always did, but we always have been behind you. And that's natural. Two superpowers, as they say, and they are opposite, different class systems. Therefore we are always moving at a distance, parity. And we can't not secure ourselves. I'd be talking nonsense if I said that tomorrow by lunch we'll be a great neutral country. That's not possible. It's been that way for a long time. Because they wanted it that way. You can look at it from a neutral side and say, "OK, that's enough", but how officially? It's not possible. And therefore, such a fate we talked about, before I began your question, it's a historical time, and we don't need to stop testing, but test at the lowest levels. It's logical. It's less dangerous. And now with the strike time of the missiles...Your Pershing II and our Kasis 20. Six minutes. Six minutes. It means no government that receives news, even Gorbachev...here are 2 governments. They receive news, the missiles have been fired, no time to know why, mistake or not, there won’t be. Just push the button. Delay, and your destroyed. What a reality! You can’t sit on your hands when you now that they’ve gone off. Don't let them go. That's what I wanted to say. And here's what's interesting, I want to throw in. We aren't insulting the Americans with tricks; America, which we respect very much, a nation with technology, industry, science. I was there many times, and it's necessary not to make enemies of America. In general, it's not good to be at enmity with a country. It's terrible. We have different patriotic roots, religious roots, and that's an uncorrectable thing. OK. We never, nowhere, when I'm with my soviet friends, my colleagues, we never say anything in our country that would make anyone feel hatred for the American people. Now lets say, just for argument's sake. No, that's not necessary. And that's the most important thing, more than more contacts, exchanges, than better understanding of what is ...Now I'll tell you an interesting story. I was once at the Kennedy's, late in the evening. We were walking down the corridor, Jacqueline, Kennedy, my wife and I. Little Caroline ran toward us. She'd waken up, a little girl. Now she's grown up, and she was crying. Jacqueline took her in her arms, took her to her bedroom and put her to bed. And John Kennedy remarked on something. Beside the bed was a Matryoshka, a sort of Russian doll, and a crucifix with Christ. And he said, "Mr. Abzhube, your brother-in-law said that our children should live under Communism." That statement was sort of a blunder on Khrushchev's part. He didn't mean that they should be forced, but in the sense that it might happen. But it was offensive to American society, such an authoritarian statement. "But I prefer to put these two objects in front of her bed for her to choose - present from Khrushchev or present from John XXIII. Let her decide.

DID THE RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS HAVE ANY AFFECT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S STANDING WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE?

At the time it wasn't noticeable. You mean from the point of view of his position don't you? It wasn't noticeable. Then no one made it out to be a heroic act; nor did they deem it a big mistake. There were different opinions, but it was a normal process. You need a full statement about. Here, of course, there were private conversations, and public cursing. There were people who considered that it was right, and those who thought it was not right. But the commotion quieted down fairly quickly, because the situation quieted down.

THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS CHANGE OF THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE TIME OF STALIN TO THE TIME OF KHRUSHCHEV. CAN YOU CHARACTERIZE THE CHANGE? IN WHAT WAS WAS THE THINKING DIFFERENT BETWEEN THOSE TWO PEOPLE?

Yes, of course, he was there at the turning point in armament, doctrines, etc. It was created by the tenseness of his personality. Obviously, I think that under the stress of such a situation, on our part the discussions about missiles really started up. Then we sent up Sputnik in 1957. Beep, beep...We scared the Americans. Then dogs went into space. By the way, Kennedy wanted one of those dogs, and Khrushchev sent him one as a gift, "Belok". A dog that flew in space. And then when Khrushchev met with Eisenhower, he gave him "Lunnik". You remember? Naturally, certainly when a person is in a position to give a present, he's in a good mood. And such presents were symbols of military ability as well. And I think that he took on the challenge, because then we relatively quickly caught up with the Americans, were even with them. We were still struggling then, and you, in a great coup of history, were the first to the Moon. Until then we were on a seesaw. It seemed like it, you know. But I want to tell you something, absolutely confidential. When there was a conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, Eisenhower asked, Mr. Khrushchev, how can you spend money on the military?" And Khrushchev said, "And how do you, Mr. Pres. How can I not, when I'm sitting there and my generals come running up to me and say, "The Russians have that Sukhoi; it's no good. Give us money. How can I not give them money?" They say, "The Americans have such and such a missile. Give us money." And they both laughed.

HE WAS REMEMBERED FOR SEVERAL STATEMENTS LIKE, "WE MAKE ROCKETS LIKE SAUSAGES" AND SO ON. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT WAS HIS THINKING ABOUT IT? WHY DID HE TALK LIKE THAT?

That's not a simple question. Probably that was part of personality, his "genetic code." Undoubtedly there was something undiplomatic about him. You know, he said whatever he thought. Maybe it wasn't always smart, but better to say honestly, from the heart what you think, than to be diplomatic. I should tell you that we also discussed several of this statements, not only those said abroad, but also here. But he, how it say it, could "clatter", and sometimes it even grated on one as silly. For example, he didn't like jazz at all. The considered it an invention of uncultured people who...although he was a Marxist, and although he understood that black and white are equal, he could still say that. He was an old-fashioned person in that sense. But in that regard, it wasn't good when he said that we will "bury capitalism in a grave." People thought we should take shovels and start digging. There were other such situations. We who were closest to him felt some discomfort. The people didn’t like him. And they talked about him. At home, you know, nasty jokes. But you have to know how to joke. But you need to know Khrushchev's biography. He was the sort of person who never received a lot of formal education, he didn't manage to. I call those people of the '20s "great idealists". They thought that they could get a lot done with loud words, angry talk. There were a lot of them. That's the type our nation produced. Not just him, but that type of people, our old men...Benny Goodman was in Moscow.

I DON’T REMEMBER WHO TOLD US, BUT IN ONE OF THE INTERVIEWS ABOUT THE CRISIS HE SAID THAT THEY DERIVED SOME COMFORT FROM KNOWING THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS A GREGARIOUS AND FUN-LOVING AND LIFE-LOVING PERSON.

Some people like that and some don't.

CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT HIS TRIP TO THE US DURING THE CRISIS. IS THAT SOMETHING YOU CAN TALK ABOUT? IS THAT A PROBLEM? [NOT CLEAR HERE WHETHER "HE" IS KHRUSHCHEV OR ABZHUBE]

You mean the trip during the Cuban Crisis? I was there only by accident for one day. Well I wanted to say, I was in the street one time then. I remember very well, and I was not happy. We didn’t go out on the streets much because there wasn’t time. I was there just for a short time. There were big television sets in the stores, the way it is there. And I remember that I went into a store and saw a crowd of people who were watching the broadcast. It was unpleasant for me. It was a crowd of people who were very discouraged, very anxious. No fooling around. And when I went back to the Embassy and told them about it, they weren't happy. It wouldn't have been right. They were afraid too. We knew who we were doing business with. I personally can't remain philosophical when two big bears are all the time pseudo-growling at each other. That's crazy. Crazy business.