IN 1947, THE MCMAHON ACT WAS PASSED, EFFECTIVELY PREVENTING ANY NUCLEAR COLLABORATION WITH GREAT BRITAIN. WHAT WAS EISENHOWER'S VIEW OF THAT?

Well, I first became acquainted with the McMahon Act, and particularly with Eisenhower's views about it in early, the early 1950s, after SHAPE was formed, and when I was a staff officer, serving with him. He was very concerned about it, on a couple of grounds. First that he thought it was a breach of the understanding that we had had with the British and the Canadians during the war, in which this was a collaborative effort in which all shared in the burden of the task and they and all were to share in the results of it. That was the first thing. The second thing was that it was a constraint or restriction that prevented working with our allies on a fully cooperative basis in which they would be able to share with us in providing some of the nuclear capability.... I'd been a... staff officer in the Pentagon, briefly, under Eisenhower as the Chief of Staff, and had worked on a group studying the implications, the possible future implications, of nuclear weapons. So that when I was with him in SHAPE I was acquainted with the kind of thinking that he had done about the role of nuclear weapons as they had been developed up to that time.

WHEN EISENHOWER WAS AT SHAPE, THERE WERE UNITED STATES TROOPS STATIONED IN EUROPE. WHAT WAS THE GENERAL IMPRESSION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THESE TROOPS?

Well, once SHAPE was formed, and the, and work began to create the collective force then a part of that was the... reconstitution, the realignment of those forces which had been a constabulary type force and an occupation-type force to a part of a ready military force, which would join with the forces of the other nations, France in particular, Britain and the Low Countries at that time, to provide a force in being in Western Europe, and particularly... with the forward elements in western Germany, that would be a deterrent, or if the need were ever to arise, a capable of providing a defense, and of course that capability to provide the defense was indeed part of the deterrent. And there was, along with those forces that were built from that time on, there was the idea, the commitment on the part of the alliance, that there would be an effort to bring Germany, western Germany into that association, that they should be part of that defense.

IT WASN'T UNTIL 1954, IN THE PARIS ACCORD, THERE WAS AN OVERT COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN... UNITED STATES TROOPS IN GERMANY. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THAT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE LONG BEFORE 1954?

Well, from the outset of the creation of SHAPE, Eisenhower recognized that there would have to be a substantial American force there, and he took initiative, he, he took a very active part, in obtaining the return of four divisions to Europe to constitute a, a significant part of that defense force. Now Eisenhower always had the idea that they would be there for a limited period; as he said, to cover the time while Europe itself rearms. That was changed, of course, in 1954, at the time of bringing the German forces in as part of the package of agreements made at that time — I think the major European countries, particularly France, but Britain and the Low Countries as well, wanted the assurance that there would be... continued American force participation.

THAT DECISION AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE MARKED A REALLY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. WAS IT SEEN SO AT THE TIME?

Eisenhower did not see that so much as a change in policy and others did not because others, even more than Eisenhower, really saw the American commitment as a commitment of indefinite duration and of long duration. That the, the presence of the American forces there was a kind of guarantee, a kind of assurance that the Americans were, and would continue to be involved, and were a part of the deterrent, and in a sense a very... very major part of the deterrent, because their, the, their sheer presence there met, meant that if there were to be an attack from the east, Americans would be deeply involved in it, from the outset, so that there would be working on...any aggressor, the thought that he, he wasn't going to be able to pick... European countries off one at a time, but he would be taking on the United States as well.

I think you asked there whether the Paris accords were in some sense a fundamental or a major change.

Right... The, the Paris accords were a change in American policy, but perhaps not so drastic a change as they might appear. Uh, Eisenhower, of course, had thought, always thought, in terms of these forces being there for that limited period of time, but I think many other Americans, and, indeed, the American government as a whole, both in the Truman Administration and, I have to say, in the Eisenhower Administration as well, thought that a continued American presence there was going to be a major part of the deterrent, because it conveyed the message that, by their sheer presence there, any aggression from the East would involve and engage American resistance from, from the outset; and that, of course, is a powerful contribution to the deterrent.

THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN ENTRY INTO NATO AND THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY WAS A CONTINUAL PROBLEM FOR EUROPEAN PARTIES. WHEN DID EISENHOWER BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY?

Eisenhower, from the outset understood that part of the American decision to join in creating the collective defense force, and indeed, part of the decision of the United States to ask him to go to Europe to organize it and to command it, was predicated on German rearmament or German association, participation in the collective defense. That, in fact, had been a condition expressed in the fall of 1950 to the American participation in this enterprise, and... he then was quite aware of that, and worked at that to try to find ways of bringing that about, working particularly with the French, because they had the greatest, problem with that really from the outset of his period of command, which began in January of 1951, and extended until May of 1952.

BY THE TIME THE GERMANS ACTUALLY ENTERED NATO, IN 1954, THERE WAS QUITE A RAPID BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. WHAT WAS THE PRIME JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT BUILDUP?

The buildup of nuclear weapons was beginning as early as 1951 and perhaps even before that; my own... participation in SHAPE began at the beginning of 1951, but when we studied, in the fall of 1951, what it would take to provide a defense in which we could be confident in Western Europe, against the estimated Soviet forces of that time... this culminated in the so-called Lisbon force goals that were laid down in early 1952, and those Lisbon force goals appeared to exceed by a considerable margin anything that was likely to be to be provided; those would be conventional forces, as we call it today. As a kind of a make-weight, as a kind of a way of filling that gap account was taken, in very general terms, of the significance of these nuclear weapons, which at that time were the, were the fission-type weapon, not the fusion-type weapon, and it became necessary then, or... over a period of time necessary and desirable, to study how those could be associated with the operations of the of the conventional land, air, and naval forces. And, a lot of planning effort went on along those lines, and in the meantime the... nuclear weapons were indeed being shipped over to Europe to add to the add to the deterrent and, in a sense, to fill that gap.

THERE WAS A FEELING, AMONG SEVERAL PEOPLE, THAT BY 1960 THERE WERE FAR TOO MANY WARHEADS ACTUALLY IN PLACE. WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THAT PROGRAM?

It's really very difficult to say just who was making the key determinations there. The principle of utilizing the nuclear weapons as part of the military capability, that had been accepted, in, from the Lisbon time on. A group of us formed a small planning team at SHAPE, to study how substantial numbers of weapons could be used in conjunction with our forces to, as we put it, "stun and stop any kind of an aggression... against us." But... even that planning which took account of how many weapons were there, and how many were coming along in the, in the near future, even that planning did not attempt to specify how much would be enough. So that the, the providers kept sending the weapons over, and it wasn't until, really until the early '60s that people began to ask, have we now reached a level a sufficient level, and are we about to exceed that, or are we about to have some more than we need?

WAS EISENHOWER AWARE OF THAT PROCESS?

Along with the buildup of the nuclear weapons in Europe, of course, there was a buildup of the strategic weapons, and I th-, I think from my own observation and work with Eisenhower, because... I stayed on at, at SHAPE until mid-'54 and then, in late '54, joined Eisenhower as a staff officer in the White House — by that time, the thermonuclear weapon had come into existence, and also, in 1954 or 1955, the studies were made that showed the military viability of a weapon which combined the thermonuclear weapon with the long-range intercontinental rocket; at that point Eisenhower's views, I think began to change, because he began to grapple... with the import of this weapon, which was tremendously more devastating than anything that we had had before. I think he... continued to feel that the nuclear weapons in Europe filled a, a significant deterrent role; I know that he did, because, we presented the results of our study to him in mid-1954, and it was something that I discussed with him often during the time I was with him in, in the White House; but he, he did not he, he didn't have great concern about the numbers in and of themselves; he began to ask, in the late '50s how many of these things are we building, and what are we building them for? and he didn't get very good answers, and he was increasingly dissatisfied with recommendations to continue to produce and to deploy these when he saw no real logical, or rational kind of calculation on which the, those numbers were based.

FROM 1954 ONWARDS, WAS IT ENVISAGED THAT THEY WOULD BE USED PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYMENT OP SAC'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS, OR WAS IT ENVISAGED THAT THEY WOULD BE USED AT THE SAME TIME?

Well, there was a wide range of views from the mid-1950s on we began to be... concerned about the possibility of a so-called "knockout blow," either delivered by long-range bombers or we became increasingly concerned that they might, that that blow might be delivered by the long-range rockets. And... because of that... because of that concern over the over the knockout blow, that became the focus of our of our attention. Eisenhower himself always felt, and was very free to say, that if we ever got into a major war, it would be fought with everything that we had, and at that point I think it was his feeling that you would have to look to the principal commanders to make the most effective use they could of whatever we had across the whole spectrum of weaponry, in order to bring the war to an end, and in order to halt and overcome the aggression.

IT HAD QUITE A TRAUMATIC EFFECT ON FRENCH OPINION, THE UNITED STATES' ATTITUDE TOWARD IT. HOW DID EISENHOWER VIEW THAT OPERATION?

Of course the Suez affair was something completely out of the pattern, within the alliance; Eisenhower felt that this was not the way allies should behave with each other; I think he was, very, he was disappointed that this was done in a way that surprised us deliberately, was designed in order to obtain surprise and, perhaps, to immobilize him at the time of the American election so that we started from a situation in which quite apparently there had been no resolution of a common line of policy; there had been an exchange between Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden prior to this time, in which the two men, in a... in essence, talked past each other; Eisenhower continuing to say, ask how any military intervention could be brought to a successful conclusion, what the ending would be, and Eden taking the stand that, if something was not done the future of Britain would be jeopardized, and it was against that background, then, that the that the operations began, and Eisenhower's, the focus of Eisenhower's disappointment, and his effort to remedy the situation, was very much with Britain, because of his past close association with Britain, primarily, I believe —

TO CONTINUE WITH THE SUEZ AFFAIR, WAS THERE ANY CONCERN AT THE TIME ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS WOULD... THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT WOULD DISRUPT AND CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS FOR FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY?

Well, there was great concern over the damage that this might do in NATO in terms of the association of the French with the alliance. Working through the problems with the French in the early fifties had been extremely difficult. First of all, because of the, residue of attitude growing out of the war and then second because of the difficulties they were facing and involved in in Indochina, in particular in the early fifties, and then the situation in Algeria coming along later than that. So it was seen that there would be considerable stress and even possibly a rupture of the alliance. That was taken into account in deciding what had to be done. And essentially Eisenhower felt it was imperative to take action along the lines that he that he pursued then.

HOW MUCH DID YOU...HOW MUCH WERE YOU AWARE AND HOW MUCH WAS EISENHOWER AWARE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE IN THAT PERIOD. WAS HE CONCERNED ABOUT IT?

We had some knowledge of the development of the French nuclear forces during the fifties. Eisenhower himself had wanted to provide nuclear information and nuclear assistance to the French. And he was frustrated in that because of the McMahon Act and because of the opposition of um, the joint committee of the congress to giving away our secrets in the terms that they viewed the thing. He felt that that was not the proper relationship to have among allies and that our allies who wished to participate in this and were capable of participating in it should do so and should accept part of the burden and part of the responsibility of maintaining a nuclear force. He was...he tried to move that on several occasions and, in essence, got nowhere with the congress and clearly saw that the outcome of this would be that the French would be likely to do it on their own.

IN 1958 THERE WAS PERHAPS EISENHOWER HAD THE POSSIBILITY TO CHANGE THAT POSITION. DE GAULLE WROTE SUGGESTING A TRIPLE ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES ALL EXERCISING A COMMON VETO OVER THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOW DID GENERAL EISENHOWER VIEW THAT? WHAT WAS HIS ATTITUDE?

When he received the proposal of General de Gaulle, he gave it very careful attention because he knew de Gaulle well and he knew that those things were not done lightly and de Gaulle was very serious. Um, this came to be called the directorate of proposal, and Eisenhower felt that it would be fatally disruptive to the conduct of affairs within the alliance. Now Britain and France and the United States had provided through the standing group of NATO on the military side...they had provided the day to day policy direction within the alliance insofar as alliance activities were concerned. But to enlarge that to the scope suggested in de Gaulle's proposal, Eisenhower felt would be unwise and, in fact, unworkable in the alliance. And the second thing that there should be a three party control over nuclear weapons. That was seen as wholly impractical insofar as United States' law and the role of the congress... the position of the congress was concerned. So in his reply to de Gaulle and contrary to much of what has... was then said and later said that he failed to reply to de Gaulle. He did reply. He replied at length... made a counterproposal for the meetings of ambassadors for consultation in London. And that was, in fact, done but that was not a full substitute for what President de Gaulle had in mind of course.

IN 1957 THERE WAS AN AMENDMENT TO THE MCMAHON ACT, WHICH REESTABLISHED THE COLLABORATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. WHAT WERE THE REASONS FOR THAT CHANGE?

Well, Eisenhower had been desirous of making a change in the McMahon Act to permit collaboration with our allies. The most... my, I'm now speaking from memory, but my memory is that the most he was able to get was an agreement for collaboration in nuclear weapons with, but...he was able to get also, and I think it was at this time and in this connection, authority to enter into peaceful...into collaboration or cooperation on peaceful applications of the atom which was again one of his major interests. He was anxious to find anything., any way that he could to shift the utilization of the atom from military applications into peaceful uses. And I think he got that at the same time... ability to introduce cooperation in research reactors and also in power reactor applications. And, and we did go forward with memoranda of agreement with a large number of countries following ab... beginning and about that period.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE REASONS WHY IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET THAT MEASURE THROUGH CONGRESS TO ENHANCE COLLABORATION WITH THE BRITISH WERE PERHAPS FIRST OF ALL THE LAUNCHING OF SPUTNIK AND SECONDLY THE ...DETONATED ITS OWN H-BOMB.

I don't recall what all entered into the getting those changes. But I think that it began to become apparent that they...to the congress that they were protecting secrets that were no longer secrets that were no longer in effect denied to our allies. And the notion of our allies being put to the expense of duplicating the whole, research and development process increasingly began to seem rather foolish and wasteful. And I think in retrospect... looking back on it I think that that entered into it. My mem... I can't remember that that argument was used at the time but it could well have been.

FURTHER TO THAT POINT, DO YOU RECALL THE FACT THAT THE...APPLIED TO COLLABORATION WITH THE BRITISH. WAS THERE ANY CONCERN THAT THAT MIGHT FURTHER ENHANCE FRENCH FEARS OF BEING DISCRIMINATED AGAINST?

Oh yes, I think that there was a--I started to answer that wrong so I'll start again. There was considerable concern that if we were able to do this only with the British this would certainly not help relations with France nor with the Netherlands. ...And we've engaged in the discussion of the possibility of assisting them in building nuclear submarines. They, of course, had a great interest in, in naval applications. And Eisenhower simply could not understand why he was denied... being denied the opportunity to share that kind of technology with the Netherlands. But he thought that this would add strains and stresses within the alliance, and indeed it did.

IN '57 THE DECISION WAS TAKEN THAT THERE WOULD BE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE US ALLIES IN NATO WITH THE UNITED STATES STILL CONTROLLING THE WARHEADS. THAT IN A SENSE REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT OVER THE WAY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED IN NATO. WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR THAT?

It was in late 1957, I believe, that the decisions were taken to deploy... to enter into agreements with our allies where they would have the means of delivery, artillery, aircraft and so on. And we would position nuclear weapons to be available to them in case of need and in case of a decision by the President. I think that followed Sputnik, and I think that it was one of those majors taken to enhance the feeling of security among our allies among our allies after the Sputnik shock. I don't know whether the Sputnik shock was as great in Europe as it was in the United States but for a short period there was something approaching panic in the United States -- an awareness really for the first time that we had moved into the era of the long range rocket and associated with the thermonuclear weapon and that everybody was now in, under the under the shadow of this kind of nuclear threat. But and I think there was some concern of that kind in Europe. But this was seen as a means of strengthening the ties adding the ties...to the ties within the alliance and adding to the confidence of our European allies through drawing them into participation in the nuclear role. It was limited participation, but still it was a step in that direction.

WASN'T ANY REGARD GIVEN TO THE IMPACT THAT WHAT LOOKED LIKE THE NUCLEAR ARMING OF GERMANY WOULD HAVE ON THE SOVIET VIEWS...THE VIEWS TOWARDS THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET UNION.

There was careful differentiation at the time between the actions that were taken cooperation between the United States retaining possession and control of the nuclear weapon and the allies having means of delivery for those weapons. Of course it was realized that the Soviets' would be very attentive to this, and of course, they were then and subsequently very concerned over the status of Germany and insistent that Germany should not be armed with nuclear weapons. But I think that they saw that this was not arming Germany with nuclear weapons. And I think others in the western countries saw the same thing because there was still at that time concern over the... over the role of Germany and, and what weapons would be in their possession In 1954, when those agreements were reached and the German forces were brought into NATO, part of the package of agreements... included a listing of certain types of weapons that would not be part of the German forces. And of course, atomic weapons were a major part of that.

WHY WAS IT THAT THE WAY THESE WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED WAS ACTUALLY VIA BILATERAL TREATIES AND NOT THROUGH SOME NATO MECHANISM. WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR THAT?

I can't really recall why this was done bilaterally and not through a NATO mechanism. There was consideration in NATO and the planning in NATO for their utilization was, of course, on a NATO basis. But it... I... looking back I can only think that it was part of that of that basic principle or shibboleth if one wants to call it that logistics were would be a national responsibility, And this was part of the provisioning of the forces. The employment... the issue of employment... all of that was handled on the NATO side... Planning for employment, I would say.

IN '57 NORSTAD MADE A SPEECH WHERE HE TALKED ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF A PAUSE. DID YOU SEE THAT AS BEING SIGNIFICANT AT ANY TIME IN TERMS OF THE FURTHER DEBATE ABOUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

Beginning even in 1957 and extending back into the earlier fifties... even back to the time when I had been involved in the planning group for the utilization of nuclear weapons, there was some disagreement as to whether they became primary and the conventional forces had an ancillary role... And that was unresolved and, and perhaps unresolvable. But the 'issue continued to exist and cause a certain amount of tension. And various formulae were developed over the years of which General Norstad's pause was one that would at least accommodate the idea that you would use your conventional forces, and for some range of purposes whether simply to characterize the attack as the French were... want to say or to deal with the attack if, indeed, you're able to do so as others might feel was desirable…That was a part of it. You would use your conventional forces and then subsequently if necessary, use the nuclear forces…And General Norstad came up with the rather ingenious idea of a pause in which... and this was welcomed by the NATO authorities who certainly did not want to see the use of nuclear weapons as automatic or uncontrolled.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID TO US--ACTUALLY GENERAL RICHARDSON SAID THIS MORNING--THE REAL PROBLEM, ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS THE FAILURE OF MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES TO ACTUALLY RECOGNIZE HOW FUNDAMENTAL A REVOLUTION HAS OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THAT CRITICISM?

I think that two major changes occurred. One occurred as atomic weapons began to become available and you thought of how those might be employed in Europe. And that certainly changed the character of any confrontation, and it...any possible confrontation. And it raised the possibility that nuclear weapons would, in fact come to dominate any future battlefield and that they should be viewed as the primary deterrent. That's the first revolutionary change. The second one which I eluded to earlier is the, is the introduction of the thermonuclear weapon... vastly more devastating... And as Eisenhower said it made conventional ideas about...the traditional ideas about warfare, absurd...ridiculous that you do not use weapons of such destruction to accomplish political ends. They are too destructive for that purpose. So you have to think in, in both of those terms. Now, it turns out that because of the timing of the thing that had the thermonuclear weapon not come along then I think you would've had a urn, a, a conceivable combination of conventional forces and atomic forces that would be militarily would make military sense in Europe for deterrent purposes but because the deterrent finally has to rest on a capability for defense. That would be part... that would be really then the basis for your deterrence and defense. But when the thermonuclear weapon came along I think it changed the it changed the whole picture in quite a fundamental way. And you had then to reassess. And it was at that point then that... and I think rightly interest began to arise in the so called flexible response insofar as operations in Europe were concerned with the idea that that then would be backed by the strategic capability primarily of the United States.

I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE THAT THOUGHT WE WERE HAVING EARLIER... THE DISCUSSION. IN A SENSE IT'S ALWAYS SEEMED TO ME THAT WHEN PEOPLE LIKE GENERAL GALWELL(?) OR GENERAL RICHARDSON ACTUALLY TAKE A VERY HARD LINE AGAINST FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THEY HAVE THE KERNEL OF A VERY GOOD ARGUMENT THERE IN A SENSE SURELY WHAT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOES TRY TO DO IS TRY TO HAVE BOTH OPTIONS… OPEN BOTH A CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE AND A NUCLEAR RESPONSE. AND THE ARGUMENT IS THAT YOU CAN'T HAVE THAT 'CAUSE YOU JUST GET CONFUSED... IT DOESN'T WORK IN THE END. HOW WOULD YOU REALLY ANSWER THOSE CRITICISMS TO THAT?

I don't think that you have to made a hard and fast choice between flexible response on the one hand and eh, an immediate and certain use of nuclear weapons on the other… And I think it... you are foreclosing options and foreclose a part of the deterrent if you do that. And I believe the price that you pay is too high. And what I mean by that is that when you think about the deterrent you want to be sure that you don't offer to an analyst on the other side or a decision maker on the other side a notion even though it's a mistaken notion that he can somehow crowd you into a decision between all or nothing. In other words, that unless you're prepared to bring on the holocaust there's nothing you can do about it. I think that having a lesser option is a very useful contribution. Now I don't say there's no weight to the argument, and my friends Galwell(?) and Richardson have explained this to me and I've discussed it with them. They incidentally participated with me in that study group that I mentioned was operated in the early period of shape. And I respect their views but I do believe that the idea of immediate and automatic reliance on the nuclear weapon with the idea that that somehow gives added validity to the nuclear deterrent. I believe that you, you pay too high a price. You lose part of your option in presenting to the other side a clear idea that he would not be able to take action by threat or by limited military action that would through keeping you, um forcing you to the choice of all or nothing and, and finding you reluctant to resort to all.

IF YOU LOOK AT SOME OF THE... IF YOU TALK TO SOME OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN THE BRITISH FORCES VERY EARLY ON… BY 1954 IT BECAME QUITE... THERE WAS ALREADY THE FEELING THAT IT WOULD BE NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO RELY ON THE UMBRELLA THE SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. AND THIS WAS ONE OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUING WITH AN INDEPENDENT ATOMIC FORCE FOR THE BRITISH, HOW MUCH WERE THOSE INCREASING CONCERNS ABOUT THE US RELIABILITY IN EUROPE ON EISENHOWER'S MIND, AND DO YOU THINK THAT HE ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THOSE PROBLEMS?

Eisenhower really had no doubt that if there were to be an aggression from the East, the United States would have no choice but to be fully involved. And his view that this would automatically be full scale...large scale conflict. And that meant that you would put into use everything that you had. Those were his views and as a result I don't think he had any notion that the United States could stand aside or that its weapons could be withheld. So that was not significantly on his mind. I would say that that became...you began to hear that from theoreticians and analysts in Europe and from people who try to look at every worse case and see that they were not likely to be abandoned in a moment of threat. But so far as Eisenhower was concerned that was a non-issue

YOU MENTIONED A LITTLE BIT ABOUT HOW EISENHOWER FELT ABOUT GENERAL DE GAULLE. BUT COULD YOU TELL US HOW HE DEALT WITH MACMILLAN? WHAT WAS HIS VIEWS OF... HOW... CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY ANECDOTES ABOUT THEIR RELATIONSHIP?

There was always a very warm feeling on Eisenhower's part toward Macmillan, and I think on Macmillan's part toward Eisenhower. And I recall, for example, when Eisenhower went out to Checkers that was some time after the Suez Affair and he and Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd, as I recall, each took a golf club and a golf ball and played themselves kind of an impromptu game of golf down the lane that leads into Checkers. And each of them would hit a ball and then go look for it and then work their way on down the on down the lane and back. He enjoyed that tremendously... remembered with warm regard... affectionate regard he would often say, his service with Macmillan in Algiers during the War… And that was a very difficult period for Eisenhower, and he was very appreciative of the advice, the insight, the experience and ability, and the assistance that he got from Macmillan during that period. When it became apparent that the Suez thing had failed, and when it became apparent that Eden would not be able to stay in office, I think Eisenhower was very happy with the British choice of Macmillan because he knew there could be a, a very full communication and, and an effort to work out the difficulties. So he welcomed that.

HOW WOULD YOU SUM UP EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH ATOMIC FORCES. WOULD YOU SAY THAT HE WAS IN BALANCE IN FAVOR OF SEEING THEM DEVELOP?

I think it was very clear that Eisenhower welcomed the development of the British Atomic Forces. He wanted to support that long before the change in the McMahon Act came about. He thought that Britain, in effect in Eisenhower's terms should shoulder part of the responsibility. And to shoulder that part of the responsibility implied and required that Britain also move into the era of nuclear arms and nuclear capability. So he thought it was inherent in the operations of the alliance and, in fact, wanted to extend the cooperation beyond Britain. But if he couldn't do it with others he was very intent on doing it with Britain. He thought we had an obligation to Britain going back to British participation in the nuclear development during the war.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY DEBATES IN... IT MAY BE OUT OF... YOU MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AROUND AT THE TIME... CERTAINLY THERE WAS A VISIT FROM SIR JOHN SLESSOR AND VARIOUS OTHER AIR VICE MARSHALS WHO BROUGHT WHAT THEY HAD FORMULATED... SOMETHING CALLED THE GLOBAL STRATEGY PAPER. AND THEY VISITED THE PEOPLE IN STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. WERE YOU AWARE OF THAT VISIT AT ALL?

I recall some visits by Sir John Slessor and others. I think he came up with the idea of the so-called broken back war. And that was talked about that you would have a nuclear exchange and then whatever the situation was after that time military operations would be continued to some kind of conclusion. I think there was a lot of discussion at the military level on those ideas. Eisenhower himself thought that this was so far beyond the experience of mankind and it, it, was so far beyond anything that could have a net value to either side that it was almost it was a distraction.... it was almost a flight of imagination to think of the sensible conduct of war if I can use that term in involving exchanges of thermo-nuclear weapons. And that we should instead focus our attention on seeing that this war did not happen, strengthening the deterrent, strengthening the means of avoiding surprise or the fear of surprise on both sides.

ONE FINAL QUESTION. YOU MAY HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED IT BUT LET'S SEE IF YOU CAN ANSWER IT DIFFERENTLY. WHEN THE GERMAN... EVENTUALLY WAS FORMED AND GERMANY BECAME PART OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WITHIN NATO, DO YOU REMEMBER IF THAT CAUSED ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN NATO'S ORGANIZATION OVER TARGETING AND OVER THE GERMAN'S DESIRE TO SEE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON A FORWARD DETERRENT STRATEGY?

We knew always that for the German's to come in and participate in NATO a new meaning would have to be given to the term "forward strategy". In some of the initial planning we thought that the most forward that we could see ourselves defending would be the Rhine. But we knew that that would simply not be satisfactory to the Germans, and along with the German capability the introduction of the German forces came the possibility then of establishing a defense a good deal further forward. Now parallel to this and course many things were going on at the same time, as the, as the years went along more and more the NATO headquarters... military headquarters were engaged in the nuclear planning. And that gave the German that made possible German participation and German understanding of just what was involved. I can tell you that not all problems have been resolved even today but we're a long way down the road of resolving common ideas and agreeing on preparations and what the capability should be that we present to any would be aggressor. And in that a very large measure of agreement has been reached. And that's one of the great achievements of the alliance, in my, in my view, that you could bring separate nations together to do something like this where they each get reassurance and confidence from the participation of the others and from their own role in working out the agreed arrangements. I think that's one of the great achievements of the alliance — its tremendous value on the part of the alliance.