GENERAL ALLISON, TO START OFF WITH, COULD YOU TELL US ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL BACKGROUND IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND HOW YOU HAPPENED TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE SALT I DELEGATION?

In the middle '60s I was assigned to duty under General Wheeler who was Chairman of the JCS. Part of my duties then involved strategic planning and analysis of various strategies. That experience gave me a certain reputation in the area. Subsequently in the middle or rather, later '60s I was stationed in Honolulu specifically in 1968. And President Johnson believed that we were on the verge of initiating strategic arms negotiations with the Russians. General Wheeler called me back from my duties in Honolulu to help prepare for the negotiations which he thought were imminent. The the negotiations did not take place in the Summer of 1968 because of the Russian invasion into Czechoslovakia on the... I believe the 20th of August.

SO WHEN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION CAME IN AND THE SALT PROCESS WAS RESUMED, HOW WAS IT THAT YOU AT THAT TIME BECAME A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATIONS?

From the summer of '68 through the preparations for the negotiations that did not take place, I organized a staff and made preparations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that I should say decided in their view that their negotiations would take place at some point in the future. We had gone to great work, great effort to prepare staff and to develop positions. They felt it was prudent to keep that team together, that group together for a while in the event there were to be negotiations. Accordingly, I for some time performed two duties. One in Honolulu as Plans and Operations for the Pacific Command and a duty in Washington under the Chairman JCS as his assistant for strategic arms negotiations. With that background when the delegation was being formed and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked for a military officer so that the President Nixon, could designate him a member of the delegation, they sent my name forward.

WELL LET'S PICK IT UP FROM WHEN SALT I REALLY BEGINS THEN. WE'RE GOING TO ASK YOU SOME THAT COVERS A LITTLE BIT OF WHAT YOU JUST SAID. BUT CAN YOU TELL US WHO YOU REPRESENTED AS A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION AND WHAT WERE YOUR GOALS, WHAT WERE YOUR HOPES FOR SALT I?

Well in answer to the first question we had a situation in the late '60s which was unusual. There was a group called the Committee of Principles which had been established either under President Kennedy or President Johnson. I can't recollect which. But the Committee of Principles included as a full voting member, not as a... just a representative of the military or a subordinate sitting in along with the Secretary of Defense, but rather as a full... voting member, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That led to his inclusion as a full voting member on international matters such as arms control, strategic arms limitations. When we started to prepare for the SALT negotiations, the Committee of Principles was the mechanism accordingly rather than becoming a military adviser to a Department of Defense representative, I represented the Joint Ch... the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had a seat on the delegation, you might say. For that reason when the delegation was formed, my role was that of a full delegate, not as a military adviser to the representative of the Secretary of Defense As to who I was representing, it's clear. I represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was appointed as the senior military officer on the delegation.

MAYBE YOU COULD JUST START OFF BY TELLING US THAT YOU WERE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE DELEGATION AND GO ON FROM THERE AND TALK ABOUT WHAT YOU HOPED WHAT SALT I WOULD ACCOMPLISH.

I was appointed by President Nixon as the Principal Military Delegate. I was appointed to that position so that I could represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. My immediate superior, in my day... in my day to day business of course was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions that I took were developed with the services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. As to what hoped to achieve...

START OFF SAYING "WHAT I HOPED TO ACHIEVE..."

What I hoped to achieve was... what I hoped to achieve during the negotiations was...

LET'S START AGAIN.

Kind of a...

START AGAIN SO IT'S CLEAN.

What I hoped to achieve was a negotiation in which we could find a way to limit strategic arms while at the same time protecting absolutely the national security of the United States. I believed then that this was possible. I believe so now.

SOME PEOPLE MIGHT SAY THAT IT'S ALMOST A CONTRADICTION. WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THAT?

Those who say that that position is a contradiction do not understand strategy and do not understand the military. It is possible if you can negotiate agreements which provide that both sides take certain actions, it is possible to develop positions which protect the national security while at the same time reducing the most dangerous weaponry. That is, long-range ballistic missiles.

THAT GETS INTO MY NEXT QUESTION. WHAT WAS PERCEIVED, WHAT DID YOU PERCEIVE AT THAT TIME AS THE PRIMARY THREAT STRATEGICALLY TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITY?

As to what was the primary threat to United States security in those days I think one has to have in mind that when the negotiations started, we were in a strong position. We were however, concerned about the future. There were evidences of massive Russian Soviet buildup of strategic weapons. This obviously would re... lead to one more spiral in the upward development of strategic forces. And there were those of us who believe that we had reached the point where more strategic nuclear forces was not the answer to security.

WERE YOU, AS A MILITARY OFFICER, DID YOU ACCEPT THE IDEA OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION? WERE YOU COMFORTABLE WITH THAT?

Never. The idea of mutual assured destruction is... -- let me start it over. You're going to edit all this. -- The term mutual assured destruction did not originate with the military. I believe I am correct in saying that it... that it originated with academicians who study these kinds of things and they in their wisdom said, "Well if one side can do this and the other side can do that, then it... there's a mutuality." I have never accepted the term mutual assured destruction. Our national policy is one of deterrence and if deterrence fails having the, an ability to assure massive destruction of the other side, there's nothing mutual about it. And in my opinion, there is nothing mutual about warfare.

WHAT DOES THAT IMPLY IN A SITUATION WHERE BOTH THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAVE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN STRATEGIC FORCES? WHAT ACTION DOES THAT LEAD TO?

One does not know until a war occurs how reliable the other side's forces are, precisely how capable those forces are nor how precisely how the enemy will use his forces. It is true that in a nuclear war there will be massive destruction or would be massive destruction on both sides. But intellectually speaking, there is something wrong with the expression that the United States has a policy of mutual assured destruction. That's not our policy, was not our policy in the military. Our policy was one of doing our best to deter war by being strong and assuring that we had the capability to inflict massive damage on an enemy were we attacked. I see no merit in adding or putting together the phrase, mutual assured destruction.

BUT IF DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL, THEN WHAT POSITION DO WE, THINKING BACK IN 1969, WHAT IF DETERRENCE FAILS AND IN THINKING ABOUT THAT, DOES THAT INCLINE YOU TO EMBRACE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS?

If deterrence fails, we fight to protect our country. Precisely how we fight, with what weapons, at what point, at what time depends on the developing situation. Now a critic of the military will say, "Well, those are just words." The truth of the matter is war is a rather chancy thing. And to forecast, attempt to forecast how an enemy will attack is difficult. We try. But to know precisely what he will do is difficult. It may be that the forecasts that in the event deterrence fails war will quickly escalate to a massive exchange of all the long-range missiles on both sides, may turn out to be very wrong. I'm not wise enough to know.

DID YOU HAVE TO EDUCATE THE JOINT CHIEFS HAVING LEARNED THAT ARMS CONTROL WAS GOING TO ACTUALLY INCREASE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY? DID YOU HAVE TO EDUCATE SOME OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ABOUT THAT?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not embrace the idea of strategic arms limitations easily. After all, the role of the military is to assure that there are sufficient forces in being to protect the country in any conceivable circumstance. However, as we reviewed the prospects during 1968 and 1969, each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that there was a need to try to limit long-range strategic nuclear weapons. And that it ought to be possible to do so in a way which maintained, and perhaps even improved our national security. This... this determination that such seemed to be desirable and might be possible did not come easily or overnight. It took a great deal of study and work on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

HOW DID YOU SHOW THE JOINT CHIEFS, OR OTHER PEOPLE SHOW THE JOINT CHIEFS THAT ARMS CONTROL COULD HELP ENHANCE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AT THE STAGE IN THE ARMS RACE THAT WE WERE AT?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to arrive at their judgments on arms limitations engaged in a series of evaluations, studies, analytical works which provided them a... database, if you will, gave them the broadest kind of view of the, what might happen in an exchange of nuclear weapons, what might happen in various circumstances of hostilities in war. And having done that made their own evaluation. Each... each Chief made his own evaluation as to the merits of trying to negotiate certain kinds of conditions regarding long-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers, in other words, the strategic force. I played a continuing role in this process of evaluation and developing of positions which I proposed to the Joint Chiefs for them to accept or modify or reject. I'm pleased to say that in more cases than not, by the time it came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff we had reached a rather reasonable findings...

WHAT I REALLY WANTED TO GET AT IN THAT QUESTION WAS COULD YOU EXPLAIN HOW ARMS CONTROL AT THAT STAGE OF THE ARMS RACE THAT WE WERE AT IN '69, HOW ARMS CONTROL COULD ACTUALLY INCREASE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

Arms limitations by and of themselves do not increase national security. However, our national resources are not unlimited. If we were to continue to devote more and more resources to more and more very expensive long-range nuclear weapons it would likely have an impact on our conventional forces, that is, our non-nuclear tactical forces. Thus laying us open to deficiencies in areas which many of us thought were important. Additionally, it seemed to us then and it seems to me now, that more and more of a single type weapon is not a strategically sound thing to do. I would prefer to have a diversity of weapons. By limiting nuclear long-range nuclear weapons on both sides we have the possibility of arriving at numbers which, I think I'm getting too complicated. I'm running out of...

BASED ON THE ANALYSES THAT WERE DONE BY THE JOINT CHIEFS, WHAT DID THAT POINT TO IN TERMS OF ABM? AND NATIONAL SECURITY?

The anti-ballistic missile defense systems of the United States were in a stage of development at that time. There were those who wanted to see a full safeguard system built. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff after analyzing the offensive forces and defensive forces during their evaluations concluded that we could accept an anti-ballistic system having fewer sites than the safeguard system. Initially the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind a system of perhaps six to eight sites. As the negotiations proceeded, however, it quickly came down to perhaps four sites and we stayed with that figure from a military standpoint for quite some time during the negotiations. My own view was that anti-ballistic missiles are a necessary part of the strategic equation. That is the offensive-defensive force equation and should not be eliminated. Yet it was difficult to justify in an arms limitation environment massive numbers of sites. My own position was that we should go, that is, during the early part of the negotiation, that four sites was preferable, we might go to three, but I was reluctant to see us go below three sites.

SO YOU WERE NEVER IN FAVOR OF GOING TO ZERO OR ONE?

I was adamantly opposed to going to zero. I was opposed to going to zero ABM for the reason that from a military, from a strategic military standpoint, one should never zero out one of the principal elements in the strategic offensive-defensive equation. To go to zero means that you have given an enemy a free ride in one of the areas important to him. Having only one ABM site complicates his planning to strike. Having two complicates it further. There is obviously a limit as to how high you go in numbers of sites simply to complicate the enemy's task. But I believe that a minimum of two, and preferably three ABM sites was the way to go. As we know the agreements finally adopted had two ABM sites. One for the national capital, and one for the defense of a missile site.

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT AGREEMENT ONCE YOU KNEW THAT THAT'S WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN, THERE WAS GOING TO BE A ONE PLUS ONE ON BOTH SIDES.

I accepted it... not joyfully. Or I should say, not enthusiastically.

CAN I ASK YOU TO START AGAIN?

I accepted the limitations in the ABM Treaty as it was finally agreed. That is, a defense of the national capital and defense of a... of a ballistic missile site. Even though I would have pre... preferred to have one additional ABM site at a strategic offensive missile base. I accepted the two site concept because I believed that we would develop fully the defense of the strategic missile base, Grand Forks, and that we would build the defensive, the ABM system for defense of the national capital. That system would have had utility not only for defense of the national capital, but utility as one more system for denying the enemy the free ride I spoke of a moment ago. Denying the enemy freedom to plan his attack as he sees fit. There is no reason why ballistic missile defenses, anti-ballistic missile defenses around the nation's capital could not be constructed so as to shoe in to the threat tubes coming into various parts of the northeastern part of the United States.

WHAT REACTION DID YOU HAVE A YEAR LATER WHEN THE TWO SITES WERE CUT BACK TO JUST THE ONE AT GRAND FORKS?

When the decision was made, and you will understand that by that time I had retired from active military service. When the decision was made to eliminate the national, I'm sorry the defense of the ballistic...

START AGAIN.

When the decision was made to eliminate defense of the strategic ballistic missile site, I was appalled frankly. I think it was a poor decision.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO SAY THAT AGAIN.

When the decision was made to modify the ABM Treaty, so that we gave up the right to a second site, I was appalled. I thought we should have retained the right. I see no benefit in our having given up that right.

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THE FIRST INITIAL ABM PROPOSAL, THAT IT WAS FOR ONE SITE EACH, FOR A SITE THAT WE DIDN'T YET HAVE?

I do not recollect that there was a proposal for one side each for a site we didn't have. We have to remember that there were so many variations talked about as regards ABM and how it's to be done. But I don't recollect that the United States went forward with a one ABM site that we didn't have.

AT THE FIRST SALT SESSION AT HELSINKI, CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT IT WAS LIKE WHEN YOU FIRST CAME THERE AND FOUND YOURSELF FACE TO FACE WITH YOUR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS. WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION?

There was a cold atmosphere. It was cold. It was... the atmosphere that the first ABM... The atmosphere at the... at the first SALT meetings was cold. And it was not cold simply because we were in Helsinki in the late Fall of the year. It was cold because this was the first time in recent history that the, that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union had met to talk about these kinds of matters. And there was a standoff kind of atmosphere. We were unsure as to what they were going to do. They were unsure as to what we were going to do. I think it fair to say that both sides during the first meeting on SALT used the period to try to assess the other side's intentions.

SO PICKING UP ON THAT, WHAT DID THE FIRST SESSIONS ACCOMPLISH BEFORE YOU ADJOURNED AND WENT BACK TO THE STATES?

The first sessions in Helsinki gave us an impression of what the Soviets were after and an impression as to whether or not they were indeed serious about negotiating strategic arms limitations. Our conclusion was that they were serious.

WHAT WAS IT THAT MADE YOU REALIZE THAT THEY WERE SERIOUS?

It's difficult to put your finger precisely on what led us to the conclusion that the Soviets were serious. But it was the general atmosphere that developed during that three and a half to four week period of the first negotiations. A combination of things. The the manner in which Minister Semyonov, the head of the Soviet delegation responded to Ambassador Gerard Smith. Discussions which I had with, then Colonel, General Nikolai Ogarkov who was the Senior Officer, military officer on the Soviet delegation -- later Marshal Ogarkov Chief of the Soviet General Staff. From our various discussions at each level, we came away with an impression that this was not in the Soviet mind simply an exercise in either public relations or propaganda. That indeed they wanted to know if we were serious about negotiating limitations.

CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT OGARKOV AND WHAT WAS IT LIKE TALKING TO YOUR COUNTERPART AND IN WHAT WAYS DID YOU FIND THAT HIS WAY OF THINKING WAS DIFFERENT FROM YOURS?

In dealing with my counterpart General and Marshal Ogarkov, I found it not easy to develop a feeling of rapport, yet there was between us I think kind of mutual respect. It was clear to me from the outset that Marshal Ogarkov was a highly intelligent, extremely capable military officer. It was also clear to me that he was one of the powerful figures on the Soviet delegation. It soon became clear to us that he represented both the Soviet General Staff and the Minister of Defense, Grechko. I would view, I do view, Marshal Ogarkov as a kind of man who likely would have been a flag or general officer in anybody's army.

YOU MENTIONED LAST TIME WE WERE HERE ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARIES, THAT MANY OF THEM HAD NOT BEEN OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION IF POSSIBLE, EXCEPT IN DUTY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THEY WERE NOT VERY WORLDLY AS YOU WERE AT THAT TIME. COULD YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT?

It was interesting to me to learn that Marshal Ogarkov, a very senior officer at that time had spent practically no time outside the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II, he was wounded in the vicinity of Budapest and was hospitalized, returned to the Soviet Union. I believe I'm correct that after World War II and until the advent of the strategic arms negotiations, Marshal Ogarkov had been out of the Soviet Union only once or twice. I'm aware that he was once in Egypt accompanying the Minister of Defense and that was for a one or two or three day visit. I also found quickly that when he had an opportunity, Marshal Ogarkov wanted to talk to me about the world around us. What is it like in Japan? What is it like in America? What is it like in South America? He had an inquiring mind, he's inquisitive by nature intellectually and he wanted to learn from me more about the world that he had not seen.

YOU MENTIONED ANOTHER THING THAT WAS INTERESTING IN THAT YOU SAID THAT ARMS NEGOTIATORS TODAY HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IT WAS LIKE THEN TO BE INVOLVED IN GETTING A DIALOGUE STARTED FOR THE FIRST TIME. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THAT?

Those who followed us in arms negotiations that is, negotiations subsequent to SALT I, I don't really appreciate what it was like to start the negotiations with the Soviets. We had to develop a language that both sides understood. We had to understand their terminology, they had to understand our terminology. We had to develop some kind of a... of a rapport so we could discuss things. And yet here were people who for years had been not only denied discussions with their opposite numbers in each country, but to have discussed the kinds of things we were about to discuss would have been in the Soviet Union tantamount to treason. So, clearly, discussion of these matters was approached in a most circumspect manner, very carefully, step by step and it took time to build an atmosphere in which serious and meaningful discussion... could take place.

...ABOUT THE NAMES OF MISSILES. MAYBE YOU CAN TELL US THAT STORY...

Some interesting and amusing things developed as we were trying to reach meetings of the minds regarding terminology. I had on my staff a young Air Force captain who was intensely interested in international affairs and specifically in arms negotiations. He was a very good man. At one of our post plenary session meetings, this young officer had a discussion with his opposite number that is, the more junior officers of the Soviet delegation, probably in the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or Colonel. I don't think they had anyone as junior as my young friend. However, this young Air Force captain asked the Soviet officer if he could please tell them what they call their missiles, that is, each type of the missiles, the heavy missiles, the medium missiles and the lighter missiles. And the Soviet fellow was reluctant to give him an answer. So my young colleague said, "Well, now you know that we designate our strategic missiles the Minuteman missile and the Titan missile, and the submarines are Polaris missiles. Don't you have a name for yours?" And the fellow said, "Well...uh, no." My young captain said to him out of frustration, he said well, "When you're talking to your friends, how do you know what you're talking about? How do your friends know what you mean?" And the Russian officer looked up at the sky and he said, "They know."

LET'S TALK FOR A MINUTE ABOUT THE SECOND SESSION, THE LONG SESSION AT VIENNA. WHAT WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT TO COME OUT OF THAT SESSION IN YOUR RECOLLECTION?

Um. You... you may know the answer. I don't.

OK. LET ME ASK YOU THIS. THERE WERE FOUR OPTIONS THAT WERE BROUGHT TO THAT SESSION, A, B, C AND D OPTIONS. ONE HAD THE FULL SAFEGUARD RANGE, THE OTHER HAD THE LOW OR LOW ABMs WITH VARIOUS OFFENSIVE PACKAGES. WHICH OF THOSE PROPOSALS WERE YOU AND THE JOINT CHIEFS IN FAVOR OF WANTING TO PUT ON THE TABLE? COULD YOU DESCRIBE?

Well, it... when we went to Vienna, we did have a series of options. Frankly, some of them were passed over rather quickly. And I think rightfully so because they were unrealistic. The Joint Chiefs of Staff position without trying to describe in precise detail what the options contained, the Joint Chiefs' of Staff position was that we could arrive at limits on strategic offensive forces and they had certain numbers in mind and limits on anti-ballistic missiles down to something in the vicinity of four sites.

ONE OF THE OPTIONS THAT WAS BROUGHT UP THEN INCLUDED VARIOUS OFFENSIVE LIMITS INCLUDING A BAN ON MIRV TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT WITH AN ON-SITE INSPECTION CLAUSE. WERE YOU AND THE JOINT CHIEFS IN FAVOR OF ANY KIND OF A MIRV BAN OR LIMITATION?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1969, '70, '71, were opposed to limitations on MIRVs. And they were opposed for several reasons, which in our judgment were valid. First and foremost we did not believe that there was a way to verify with acceptable cer... certainty that limitations were being adhered to. Secondly, our military had put a good many eggs in the basket of MIRVs as a way to improve our force structure without a new massive building program. We needed those additional weapons in order to have the target coverage we needed, as military strategists.

I READ SOMEWHERE THAT THERE WAS A TIME WHEN THE OTHER DELEGATES WANTED TO CABLE WASHINGTON TO ADD TO A BAN ON PRODUCTION TO THE MIRV PROPOSAL TO TABLE A BAN THAT INCLUDED TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT AND THAT YOU WERE OPPOSED TO THAT. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

I believe there was a proposal to ban production. I was opposed to it. I don't know how we would have verified a ban on production my position however was related to the position I've just expressed. That is, we were opposed to elimination of MIRVs.

WAS IT PART OF THE THINKING AT THAT TIME THAT IF WE DIDN'T LIMIT MIRVs THEN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DEVELOP MIRVs AT WHICH POINT WITH THEIR HEAVY MISSILES, THEY WOULD HAVE AN ADVANTAGE?

Well there was a... line of thinking that said that the Soviets with their heavy missiles could have an advantage in the future if we did not eliminate MIRVs They would have an advantage because their heavy missiles would carry more MIRVs. That kind of strategic thinking I put in the category of bean-counter thinking. People are analyzing only how many weapons a side has, or literally, counting the beans in the jar. I don't hold to that kind of strategic thinking.

DO YOU THINK THAT WAS LOOKING TOO FAR INTO THE FUTURE, THAT WE HAD TO ACT ON THE SITUATION AT THE PRESENT? WAS THAT PART OF THE REASONING?

It was looking too far in the future. It was trying to guess what kind of a path the Soviets would follow. And it was trying to, it had the effect of our trying during a... strategic arms limitations negotiation to tailor the other side's forces.

WELL WE WERE TRYING TO LIMIT THE OTHER SIDE'S NUMBERS OF THE OFFENSIVE SYSTEM THAT THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING. AND YET WE WEREN'T PREPARED TO STIFLE IN ANY WAY THE MAIN OFFENSIVE PROGRAM THAT WE HAD.

The... the idea of limiting MIRVs brought us face to face with one of the big issues in SALT I. That is, qualitative limitations versus quantitative limitations. Now there's a... there's a line of distinction between qualitative and quantitative and there's also some overlap. One can say that limitation or elimination of MIRVs eliminates numbers. I take a different view. To eliminate MIRVs meant that we were denying ourselves a use of very advanced technology which the United States had. Yes, one can say that out in the future, the other side will develop such technology, but by the time they develop that technology, we will have developed something else. It's a constantly changing situation.

A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE SAID THAT MIRVs CAUSED A BIG PROBLEM AFTER SALT I, THAT NOT STOPPING THEM DURING SALT I MADE SALT II VERY DIFFICULT AND THAT THE PROFUSION OF WARHEADS CAUSED MAJOR ACCELERATION OF OTHER ARMS PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE MIRV WARHEADS. DID YOU AT ANY POINT THINK THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILE TO, BECAUSE PRODUCTION COULDN'T BE VERIFIED, TO ACTUALLY HAVE A MORATORIUM ON TESTING SO THAT THAT STAGE AT LEAST COULD BE — AN AGREEMENT COULD BE MADE ABOUT STOPPING TESTING BECAUSE TESTING COULD BE VERIFIED?

There were proposals about stopping the testing of MIRVs or a moratorium. There were various proposals made by responsible people who were seeking a way to further limit strategic arms and further limit the development of new strategic arms. I can sum my position up by saying I was opposed and I am now opposed to doing things which limit our technology. The greatest thing the United States has going for it is its tremendous inventiveness and its marvelous technology. Those who would put chains on those abilities of ours would make a mistake.

I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIMITING LAUNCHERS AND LIMITING THROW WEIGHT. THAT APPARENTLY WAS A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BETWEEN YOU AND AMBASSADOR NITZE. COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY YOU WERE IN FAVOR OF JUST DEALING WITH LAUNCHERS?

Among the issues that we debated within our own councils during SALT I was this matter, was the matter of limiting throw weight as compared simply to limiting launchers. There were those who felt that we should have a combination. And limit numbers of launchers and limit throw weight and so forth. Our evaluations, by "our" I mean the military, told us that limiting throw weight, that is, the volume of a... of a missile for example an SS-9 permitting only so many of them... could so easily be circumvented that it was not a useful measurement and was not a desirable one from the United States standpoint of the United States. Just one example. The Soviets are, were far behind us in propellants. But our scientists told me that we could increase the throw weight in our own missile systems tremendously simply by improving the propellants that we use. There are certain additives that can be put into solid fuel missiles which gave them...give them a substantially larger boost. Now I ask anyone listening, "How could we verify that the Soviets are or are not improving their throw weight by improving the propellants in the missiles that are sitting on the launchers?" We could not. Secondly, there was this... was I believe on the part of some that a Soviet strategist would pile on to a large missile all the warheads he could possibly get on. I find that not realistic. I think there's a limit to what a side will put on a single weapon. I was not concerned and I am not now concerned with the idea that the Soviets will absolutely maximize the number of warheads they can put on a single missile.

SO YOU THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO COUNT LAUNCHERS, NOT PAYLOAD?

In evaluating this matter of throw weight and evaluating strategic forces, the important... the important thing is to do an evaluation of the total force, of the structure. Its capabilities, not just evaluate how many weapons they have of certain types.

DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LINK AN ABM TREATY WITH SOME KIND OF OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT AND WHY?

As we... as the negotiations proceeded, there were proposals put forward which, particularly by the Soviets which had some appeal to some of our people. And one of them was that we should have an ABM Treaty only and defer negotiations on strategic offensive arms until a later negotiation. I opposed that rather forcefully. I believe that there is an interrelationship between offensive and defensive forces. It is a sound military doctrine and one should not eliminate one of those systems without severe limitations on the other. In fact, I believe it is not prudent to completely eliminate either offensive forces or defensive forces. They must be developed hand in glove.

WHAT DID YOU FEEL WERE THE MAIN OBJECTIVES FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW? WHAT WERE THEY TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH IN SALT I?

The Soviet objectives in SALT I were manifold really. One would think that that their principal objective had to do with reducing our force capability more severely than their own would be reduced. That may have been one of their objectives but I believe that one of their principal objectives in SALT I was to demonstrate to the world that the Soviet Union had come of age. That it was a great super power and it was now able to negotiate on an even-steven basis with the United States of America. That was a tremendous achievement for the Soviet Union; a country which had dragged itself up by the bootstraps since the end of World War I.

WERE THEY TRYING TO HOLD BACK ANY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE US SIDE? DO YOU THINK THEY HAD A GOAL OF LIMITING OUR ABMs OR LIMITING OUR MIRVs OR...?

Well I think that they were somewhat pragmatic. There were some things that certainly they had in mind that were musts for them. They would not take...

START AGAIN, SAYING "THE SOVIETS" INSTEAD OF "THEM".

Um. The Soviets had I'm afraid I've forgotten what the question was. I know generally what...

WHAT THEIR AIMS WERE.

The Soviets wanted certainly to see our strategic forces limited in ways which made clear that they were equal. I suppose they would have liked to have been superior. But they had other objectives. I've just mentioned one and that is bringing the Soviet Union to the position in the world where it could negotiate on an equal basis with the United States. In the eyes of the world. Secondly, I have always felt that one of the objectives of the Soviet Union during SALT I was to create conditions which rocked the stability of NATO. I had an expression which I used in telegrams to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of them was, "I think the Soviets intend to do their best to shake the NATO tree. What plums fall out they don't know. They just want to shake the NATO tree." I think they were pragmatic in these things. But that is one of the reasons that they placed so much stress on the forward based nuclear systems. To stir up trouble between ourselves and NATO.

WERE THEY CONCERNED ABOUT GERMANY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY?

The Soviets clearly were always concerned about Germany, particularly about a resurgent Germany. We have to bear in mind that members of the Soviet delegation had lived, most of them had lived through World War II. Many of them had fought most actively in the Soviet army against the Germans. Ogarkov was wounded in Hungary and spent the latter days of the war in a hospital in Budapest. General Alexseev was at Stalingrad. He was wounded in Stalingrad. He was in a hospital in Stalingrad. The hospital was bombed and strafed by the Luftwaffe. He was taken out of the hospital and while being transported in carts or wagons or trucks to a new location was again bombed and strafed. He never recovered fully from his wounds. He had a decided limp.

The Soviets experiences in World War II were still very fresh in their minds. As we know the Soviets are determined never again to permit their country to be subjected to the kind of devastation that was caused by their war with Germany. They are, in my opinion, virtually paranoid about a resurgent, revanchist Germany. As a matter fact during many of our discussions, that is, the informal discussions after a SALT meeting or at social occasions, Soviet officers said to me, "How can the United States lend support to Germany? You see what Germany has done in the past. They've attacked your friends, France. They attacked the Soviet Union. They are unreliable. If they gain a sufficient strength, they'll attack again. We do not understand how you can give support to Germany." This was evidence of the feeling of the Soviet officers who lived through World War II.

HOW DID THAT INFLUENCE THEIR THINKING ABOUT FORWARD BASES? WAS THERE A RELATIONSHIP?

No, I don't think so.

ABOUT FORWARD BASES, AS A MILITARY MAN, COULD YOU EMPATHIZE A LITTLE BIT WITH THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THEIR VULNERABILITY?

People refer to forward bases and how we treated forward bases in the negotiation. Actually, it was not the bases themselves. It was what we finally began to call forward based systems. That is, nuclear capable systems that could launch from bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union and strike the Soviet Union. Not the satellite areas, not the buffer zone, if you will, but actually strike the Soviet Union. The Soviets did their best to insist that strategic weapons include any weapon from any location that could reach the Soviet Union. Of course, this was clearly a thrust at our forward based systems and our anti... and our aircraft carriers and our submarine-launched missile systems. We denied that the so-called forward based systems, that is, aircraft based in France or Germany or England were any part of the strategic force.

BUT IF YOU WERE OGARKOV, IT WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT TO YOU, WOULDN'T IT?

Difficult for me to put myself in Ogarkov's position so I don't really know it would look the same to me or not.

I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE NEGOTIATION THAT WENT ON IN THE SO-CALLED BACK CHANNEL, THE KISSINGER-DOBRYNIN NEGOTIATIONS. HOW DID YOU REACT WHEN YOU FOUND OUT THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN GOING ON AND IN FACT SLBM LEVELS WERE NOT PART OF THIS INITIAL AGREEMENT?

During the period 1971, I think the Spring of '71 on through the end of the negotiations, the delegation was aware that Henry Kissinger was conducting a parallel kind of negotiation with Dobrynin, into the top levels of the Soviet hierarchy. This seemed to those of us in the delegation as a very dangerous way to do business and certainly it was...

SO YOU THOUGHT IT WAS A DANGEROUS WAY OF DOING BUSINESS AND WHAT ELSE WAS...

COMPROMISING?

Pardon? No, emotionally, I mean it was...

DEMORALIZING.

Well that's not bad, but that's not what I wanted to say. Irritating is not... is not strong enough. I can't think of the word I want. At any rate we felt that it was dangerous to have this parallel channel of communication operating. And we were offended.

COULD YOU START AGAIN AND LOOK AT ME?

We thought it was dangerous to have this parallel channel of negotiation going on because it undercut...higher work on the delegation. The Soviets, on the other hand, had full knowledge of it. We had to assume. While we were ignorant. Of course, it also offended us, as professionals charged by the President to conduct this negotiation. It offended us that we... did not have the full confidence of the administration in Washington. As evidenced by their acceptance of a perceived need to go through other channels.

WHEN YOU DID REALIZE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KISSINGER AND DOBRYNIN HAD IGNORED THE SLBM QUESTION, HOW DID YOU REACT TO THAT? DID YOU FEEL IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH SLBM LEVELS AND THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE?

When it became clear to us that the discussions between Dobrynin and Kissinger had not included SLBM levels we took exception. From a military standpoint, it was absolutely the wrong way to go. Our position in the military was that strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles have to be included along with the other strategic forces.

AND WHEN THE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT WAS FINALLY SIGNED, AND THE LEVELS WERE UNEQUAL, HOW DID YOU REACT TO THAT?

Our reaction, my reaction was one of incredulity. The idea that such a complex kind of formulation could have been agreed, so complex that it was not possible to describe with absolute certainty what each meant, so complex that it required then a further clarification in the days immediately following the negot... the conclusion of the negotiation. It seemed incredible that that could take place.

DID YOU FEEL IT WAS INEQUITABLE, THAT SOVIETS WERE GIVEN MORE SLBMs IN THE AGREEMENT? OR THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO EVEN HAVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT?

It gets a little awkward to repeat your question. You know I...

I THINK WE'RE ALREADY INTO THE TOPIC.

The idea that certain of the Soviet systems were not included in the totals and then that result of the formula seemed to give the Soviets an edge. Did not distress me because of the view I've expressed earlier in this discussion. I think one has to look at the total package of strategic forces to understand the balance. I was not upset... to the point of thinking that the agreement was not sound. I think the agreement was sound. I just think it should have been done in a more professional workmanlike manner.

OK.

It should not have been done on the... in the manner that the principals did it.

GENERAL, DID YOU HAVE TO JUSTIFY THE UNEQUAL NUMBERS TO THE JOINT CHIEFS AND HOW DID YOU DO SO?

When the Joint Chiefs, while I was en route home were examining the unequal numbers they tried to understand precisely what they meant. And it was not easy. When I arrived in Washington, shortly after my arrival in Washington I met with them and we concluded that what I have said earlier was the case. On balance, this was not the right to do it, but in total, the strategic offensive force package is acceptable.

BUT THIS INEQUALITY LED TO MORE DIFFICULTIES FURTHER DOWN THE LINE TO JACKSON AMENDMENT. WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION ON THE JACKSON AMENDMENT? DID YOU FEEL HE WAS BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE BASED ON WHAT YOU JUST SAID?

The Jackson amendment was an effort on the part of Senator Jackson to recoup... Let's just scrub that.

DO YOU WANT TO START OVER?

Senator Jackson...scrub that long statement also.

TELL ME ABOUT YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT THE JACKSON AMENDMENT.

The Jackson Amendment was proposed by Senator Jackson as a means I'll start over. That's not quite what I want to say.

SURE.

Senator Jackson was not pleased with the outcome of the SALT negotiations. He felt that we had not come home with a kind of agreement which he had expected, particularly in the area of the anti-ballistic missile defenses. We must recall that Senator Jackson cast the deciding vote which retained the safeguard system for the Nixon administration. Now he was faced after having put his political credit on the line to do that for the administration, now he was faced with a situation in which virtually no or at least a very limited ABM system would be in place. This distressed him very much. We must remember that President Senator Jackson was running for President. In my view, the Jackson Amendment was politically motivated and did not have real worth as far as future negotiations for SALT is concerned or future structures for forces for the United States.

HOW WAS IT THAT SENATOR JACKSON WAS ABLE TO PULL THIS AMENDMENT OFF? WHY DID HE CARRY SO MUCH WEIGHT IN THE SENATE AT THAT TIME?

Senator Jackson was a powerful figure in the Senate in the area of military matters and arms limitations. From the military standpoint, Senator Jackson was a key figure. He was a strong supporter of an adequate military force. So senior military officers had to take account of what Senator Jackson's views were. Within the administration, Senator Jackson had assisted in important matters and the administration felt that it owed him certain considerations. So for a variety of reasons, Jackson was able to gather sufficient support to pass what has become known as the Jackson Amendment.

WHAT ELSE WAS THERE THAT HE ESSENTIALLY DEMANDED IN ORDER THAT HE GO ALONG WITH THE RATIFICATION OF SALT I, BESIDES THE AMENDMENT WHICH HE TACKED ON TO IT. THERE WERE OTHER FACTORS AS WELL.

I'm going to ask you a separate question. You... you want to get at his tearing up the delegation and...

TEARING UP THE DELEGATION AND THE TRIDENTS. DIDN'T HE HAVE THE TRIDENT MOVED TO WASHINGTON?

Well it's not clear that he had it moved to Washington. He made sure that(45(...)54)that Trident was based in Washington. Um. Senator Jackson had received consideration that's not the way to put it. In order to avoid, alienating Senator Jackson, the administration gave him more consideration than might otherwise have been given. This in recognition to be a strong position in the Senate. The Trident, the new Trident system a part of it was to be based in his home area, Puget Sound. Um. Also, as the months wore on after the ratification of the SALT Treaty, it became clear that Senator Jackson had demanded certain other things. He had expressed to the administration his displeasure with the SALT delegation or more specifically, with the performance of certain members of the SALT delegation. And it became clear that the delegation would be restructured so that Senator Jackson's dislikes were taken into account. I was one of those that Senator Jackson wished to have removed from the SALT delegation. Indeed, I was removed from the SALT delegation. And in the Spring of 1973, I retired.

HOW DID YOU FIRST HEAR THAT YOU WERE NO LONGER WANTED ON THE SALT DELEGATION THAT WAS ABOUT TO GO TO GENEVA?

I had I had heard some disquieting things about organization of the... of the new delegation for the continuation of the negotiations in Geneva. Ambassador Alexis Johnson had been appointed head of the delegation. I had heard that he was discussing the upcoming SALT negotiations with each member of the delegation and yet he had not called upon me to discuss matters. An old friend of mine in the State Department asked me if I had discussed matters with Alexis Johnson and I said no. He said to me, "Well I can't say a great deal about this, but I suggest you ask Admiral Moorer what your status is." With that, I asked Admiral Moorer and learned that indeed I was being removed from the delegation at the... at the insistence of Senator Jackson, and that Senator Jackson held very strong views about my future; specifically, that I should have no future. Subsequently, I discussed these matters with Senator Jackson and it became clear that indeed he had acted in a way which limited my possibilities, my career possibilities in the future. And we closed a rather heated discussion with my telling him, "Senator, you have ruined my career."

When I visited Senator Jackson in his office for a face to face discussion of why he had taken this extraordinary view of my actions, he said to me that it had become clear to him -- and why he had this view, I do not know -- that I had become one of those disarmers and he used the term in the most pejorative sense. That riled me a bit and I spoke rather directly with him on the matter. I told him that not only was he wrong, but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could demonstrate to him that he was wrong. Senator Jackson said that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff or I would provide specific information as to the positions I had taken in support of the strong national defense he would change his view. I told him that he knew that it would be difficult if not impossible to present such data. And it was then that I told him that no matter what happens, "You've ruined my career."

I WANT TO GET TO WHERE YOU WERE IN CONGRESS TESTIFYING AT THE RATIFICATION HEARINGS AND APPARENTLY AT THAT POINT HE SAID THAT YOU HAD NOT REPRESENTED THE MILITARY INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY AND IT WAS TO DO WITH THE ISSUE, AS I UNDERSTAND, OF MINUTEMAN VULNERABILITY. AND THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET YOU TO SAY THAT YOU HAD GIVEN BAD MILITARY ADVICE SOMEHOW AND THAT THE MINUTEMEN WERE GOING TO BE VULNERABLE WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. AND I GUESS LATER YOU WERE PROVED RIGHT BECAUSE THEY'RE STILL TRYING TO PUT MXs IN THOSE HOLES, BUT COULD YOU SORT OF RECOUNT THAT EXCHANGE?

There... One of the principal reasons for Jackson's animosity...

During the hearings for ratification of the ABM Treaty Senator Jackson pressed me for answers which would indicate that indeed the ABM Treaty and the accompanying agreement on strategic offensive arms did not improve or protect fully the security of the United States. Senator Jackson had been given some figures on missile vulnerability which were, based on rather elementary high school sophomore arithmetic assuming certain things about the Soviet forces and our forces. That simplified arithmetic demonstrated that in a Soviet first-strike, 96 percent of our Minutemen force would be knocked out. He asked me to verify that that would be the case. I told him that that was not the case and that I knew of no credible study which produced such figures as he was using. This incensed him. As it turned out later, those figures were among the figures given him at the time of the vote on the ABM system and were the product not of a competent military analysis, but on... but on-the-back-of-an-envelope kind of calculation done by someone. Nonetheless, Jackson had expected me to support him. He was incensed that I did not support him and gave me a very difficult time during the hearing. So difficult that Senator Stennis, a wonderful gentleman, turned to Jackson and said, "Senator, I think the General has answered your questions fully and I suggest that we not pursue it further." Or words to that effect. With that, Jackson asked that I provide for the record complete and detailed information giving my own evaluation of the results of a Soviet strike against our forces. I told him I would. However, as it turned out, I was unable to get my calculations and my answer to Jackson released from the Pentagon.

SO THE CENTRAL PROBLEM HERE WAS THE MINUTEMEN VULNERABILITY QUESTION?

Yeah.

DID RICHARD PERLE HAVE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THIS WHOLE EPISODE?

Jackson had only staffed two people on whom he relied for advice on strategic weaponry. Richard Perle and Dorothy Fosdick. Richard Perle during hearings or during any kind of discussion with Jackson, sat behind his chair and whispered in his ear incessantly. Richard Perle at that time was probably all of twenty-eight years old and his experience in these matters was solely that he had gained while sitting in Jackson's office. Nonetheless, Richard Perle had developed a position regarding arms limitations which seems to be the sort of position he has today. Arms limitations are bad. Also he found early on that one of the ways, to treat with these very complex strategic matters and international matters --

CAN WE START THIS OVER WITH YOU SAYING "RICHARD PERLE"?

Perle also learned early on that one of the ways to treat with these important international matters and matters related to arms limitations in the Soviet Union was to be anti-arms limitations and anti-everything to do with improving relations with the Soviet Union.

HE JUST THOUGHT THAT WAS A WAY TO GET TO ADVANCE IN GOVERNMENT, TO HAVE THAT KIND OF ATTITUDE? I'M NOT SURE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING. WHY HAD HE LEARNED TO DO THAT?

The simplest kind of position to take is always to be way over here on the right, against everything. It doesn't require any great ability to stand on those kinds of views. Just you're staunch and virtually un-attackable... by those that you wish to deal with. If you're always anti-Soviet Union, anti-arms control, anti-, anti-, anti-...

AND WHAT ABOUT THE DELEGATION THAT WAS THEN CHOSEN BY JACKSON TO REPLACE MOST OF YOUR DELEGATION? AND IN PARTICULAR YOUR REPLACEMENT. WHAT DID THAT BODE FOR THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL WHEN YOU SAW THESE PARTICULAR GROUP OF PEOPLE COMING IN TO THOSE POSITIONS?

When Jackson caused the delegation to be, restructured, it was restructured in a way which made it an entirely different operation. There were no longer five principal delegates. There was one delegate, Alexis Johnson. The others... the other members of the delegation staff were advisers only. My replacement, General Rowny was a... was handpicked by Jackson. In fact he was handpicked by Jackson over the protest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had intended to assign this duty to a Navy admiral. Jackson and Rowny had a long association. Rowny was well known to Fosdick and Perle, and Rowny's inclinations on these kinds of matters were similar to the positions taken by Jackson, Perle and Fosdick.

SO DID THAT LEAD YOU TO BELIEVE THAT SALT II WOULD NOT ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS YOU WOULD HAVE HOPED IT WOULD?

We must understand that Rowny is a... is a professional. He's a man of... ability and I'm sure he is ethical in his approaches. He does what he believes in. My concern was that Rowny was not prepared for this kind of a role. He was not well versed in strategic weaponry. He had not been involved in these kinds of evaluations. His background did not suit him to carry on the negotiations that I thought were so important.

YOU SAID AT ONE POINT THAT HE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN ARMS CONTROL AND HAD COME TO THE ROLE WITH RATHER FIXED POSITIONS.

Didn't I just say that? I mean...

NOT SORT OF SUCCINCTLY. IF YOU COULD TRY IT ONCE MORE.

Well I don't want to do Rowny an injustice you see. I'm he's a... he's an experienced, well trained, well qualified officer but he did not know this subject.

WHAT ABOUT ADMIRAL MOORER? DID HE HAVE ANY INFLUENCE AT THIS TIME IN CHOOSING WHO WOULD REPRESENT THE JCS OR BE THE ADVISER ON BEHALF OF JCS?

In the normal sequence of events the Joint Chiefs of Staff would propose to the President first of all to the head of delegation. We have to see that everyone is acceptable, that there are no concerns of non-acceptability, but the normal thing is the Joint Chiefs of Staff would propose a senior military officer and the would take their advice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had intended to appoint a well qualified naval officer. That man didn't happen to be the man that Jackson wanted. Admiral Moorer decided evidently that discretion was a better part of valor and instead of pushing the naval officer, he acceded to Jackson's demands. Now we must remember that Senator Jackson is a powerful figure, was a powerful figure on the Senate Arms Services Committee and in the Senate of the United States. And if Senator Jackson determined that certain naval programs would go one way or the other better to have him on your side.

WHAT WAS ADMIRAL MOORER'S ATTITUDE IN GENERAL FROM THE BEGINNING OF SALT BACK IN '69, ABOUT ARMS CONTROL? WHAT WAS HIS VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL?

Do we have to go through that? I mean...

YOU DON'T WANT TO?

It's these things get complicated.

LET ME ASK YOU SOMETHING THAT'S A LITTLE MORE UPBEAT. I READ IN AMBASSADOR SMITH'S BOOK ABOUT THE PLANE TRIP AT THE END OF THE LAST HELSINKI SESSION WHEN YOU ALL WENT TO MOSCOW TOGETHER. COULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT TRIP AND HOW IT FELT FOR YOU TO BE FINALLY COMING TO THE END OF THE LONG AND GRUELING SESSION?

When we finally concluded our work in Helsinki, and launched ourselves toward Moscow and after all, that was the afternoon of the day we were supposed to be in Moscow for the signing of the treaties. It was an exciting time. I had arranged for an Air Force aircraft to be standing by on the ramp that the airport in Helsinki to take us to Moscow the minute that documents were ready. The President had specified who on the delegation should come to Moscow, and he had asked that I be included. Although not all of the principal delegates were. When we arrived at the... at the airport in Helsinki, it developed that the Soviet delegation had engaged in an arrangement with Finnair for a different aircraft to haul them or to carry them to Moscow even though we had invited them to travel with us. Interestingly, the aircraft that we had standing by was a four engine propeller aircraft well fitted for this kind of a mission. Yet they had intended in a newer jet aircraft of Finnair. It became a matter of principle with us and of course we would not go on the Finnair aircraft. Minister Semyonov decided that he would travel with us on... our aircraft as had been agreed earlier. On the airplane, en route to Moscow, we were in fact concluding certain final details. Not the substance of the negotiation but final details of the papers. We also circulated among the principal delegates a book which the aircraft commander maintained as a log to be signed by all distinguished guests carried aboard the aircraft. So I circulated that to the principal delegates, asking that they make a brief statement of their reflections at this rather momentous point in history. Each did and it's interesting to read them. After the flight, I had the book taken off the airplane. The statements of each reproduced on parchment paper and bound in leather and sent a copy to each of the principal delegates who had been involved in the negotiation. It's a rather interesting piece.

WHEN THE TREATY WAS FINALLY SIGNED IN MOSCOW DID YOU FEEL THAT IT REALLY WAS A SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENT? I KNOW YOU HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE WAY THE TREATY WORKED OUT, BUT ALL IN ALL, HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?

On balance I thought that we had done, we had achieved real progress both in the area of limiting strategic arms, which I believe is desirable, and in improving relations with the Soviet Union, which I think is desirable. I had no difficulty at all in supporting during the hearings for ratifications...

I had no difficulty at all in supporting, during the hearings, of the treaty and the ratification hearing of the treaty and the agreement. No difficulty in supporting these documents. I believe that they were sound... soundly conceived and good for the United States. I also believe that they did not mark a conclusion of SALT negotiations. They were only a first step. We had engaged not in a... in a negotiation to arrive at a conclusion, but started down a path. The SALT process indeed is a process and it should go on, we should hope it does go on.

GRANTED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING OF A PROCESS, DO YOU HAVE ANY RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE TREATY AND THE AGREEMENT? WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MISSION OR THE BIGGEST FAILING OF THE SALT I TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT?

That's an interesting question. And I would have to reflect a bit to answer. I could say some very obvious things of course. Even during the negotiations in SALT I, we gave consideration to reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive force systems. If I were king and could do it over, I would see that some of tho... that those reductions had been a part of, I would like to have seen that reductions were a part of the first SALT negotiation. If I were king, I would not have reduced ABMs to the point they were reduced, nor would I have eliminated one of the two agreed sites.

...OR THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD, LET'S SAY BY THE END OF THE CENTURY, THE NEXT FIFTEEN YEARS OR SO, WHAT DO YOU REALISTICALLY THINK AND HOPE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED?

In the... in the near and... intermediate future, I think the best we can hope for is a gradual reduction of strategic offensive arms, particularly the ballistic missile systems. I don't think it's realistic to expect in the near term or intermediate future an elimination of systems. I do not think it's realistic to expect that we shall see in the intermediate future a total elimination of nuclear weapons.

I JUST WANTED TO GO BACK AGAIN TO THE MAIN ACTIVITY AT THE TIME AND THE MAIN OF THE COUNTRY AT THE TIME WAS THE VIETNAM WAR. AND AS A MILITARY MAN, HOW DID THAT INTERACT WITH ALL OF THIS SALT PLANNING? WAS THE OVERRIDING ISSUE AT TIME, WHAT WAS THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE VIETNAM WAR AND SALT?

Well there were some interesting reactions or interactions. For example, when I went to Helsinki, I had... I had intended to pay a courtesy call on the Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces. He was an old friend of General Wheeler's. General Wheeler and I had talked about it and I asked for an appointment to call on him early on. It took much more time to arrange than I had anticipated. And the reason it took more time to arrange was because of our involvement in Vietnam. The Finns did not believe that we should be doing all that we were doing in Vietnam and it became a political issue for their Chief of Staff if you will, to meet with me. Later in the negotiations of course when President Nixon took some his most severe actions... in Vietnam, there was a feeling on the part of some that the Soviets would refuse to negotiate further with us. There were some of who felt that the Soviets would ignore it because they considered the SALT negotiations much more important and much more a central matter than they did our involvement in Vietnam. It turned out that the latter was the case. The Soviets in effect ignored what we were doing in Vietnam.

AT THE TIME IN THE COUNTRY DUE TO VIETNAM THERE WAS A LOT OF FEELING AGAINST MILITARY BUILDUP AND WAR MONGERING AND ALL OF THOSE SLOGANS AT THE TIME. AND THERE WAS A COMMON FEELING THAT THE MILITARY ALWAYS WANTS MORE WEAPONS AND WANTS TO BUILD UP OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND YOU HAVE IN THE PAST EXPRESSED THAT SOMETIMES YOU THOUGHT THAT THE MILITARY ACTUALLY HAD A GREATER REALISM ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR THAN SOME CIVILIAN DEFENSE PLANNERS. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

Not quite sure what I... what you want me to address.

SOMETHING IN CONTRAST TO THE VIEW OF THE MILITARY AS WANTING MORE WEAPONS. JUST SAY SOMETHING ABOUT HOW THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MILITARY MAKES IT MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS.

When the military -- it's... kind of hard to get that into a good context Carol -- the military for during the SALT negotiations and I believe I'm correct in saying that each step subsequent to SALT I have supported the U.S. position for limitation of strategic arms. The military is realistic in understanding that our national resources are not unlimited. We need certain kinds of forces across the spectrum in order to assure that we have the capability to deal with the variety of situations. So the military have viewed arms limitations as one of the instruments available for assuring that we are not overboard on strategic forces, that we are able to maintain the non-nuclear forces we need for lesser wars. At the same time, military officers are not inclined to want to go to war easily. We have seen enough war. The purpose of the military is to be sure that we are so strong that we're not going to have to go to war again. Now we don't deceive ourselves with the idea that just being strong will prevent these things from happening but it certainly is our belief that such is a step in the right direction.

NORMALLY IN MILITARY, IT SHOWS THAT IT'S SO STRONG THAT WE DON'T HAVE TO GO TO WAR BY TRYING TO BE AS SUPERIOR POSSIBLE THAN OUR ADVERSARY AND OUR MINUTES AND YET, IN THIS NUCLEAR BATTLEFIELD SCENARIO, DURING SALT II, WE WERE GOING TOWARD PARITY. WHY WAS IT NOT PUSHED THAT MAYBE WE SHOULD JUST MAINTAIN STRENGTHS THROUGH SUPERIORITY?

The military does not set out to achieve what is called parity. Nor do the military think that the world will be a safer place if everyone just builds more and more weapons. I shouldn't say everyone. If we build more and more, and the Soviets build more and more, and then we build more and more, we don't see that as a solution. But on the matter of parity, I've often wished someone could define for me how you achieve parity in military forces. When you have different kinds of man, using different kinds of machines to launch different kinds of projectiles, having different kinds of capabilities, how one can put all this into someone's computer and say, "A-ha! Now we have parity." That's a concept I don't subscribe to.