WHEN YOU TOOK OVER AS FOREIGN MINISTER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD REALLY JUST EMBARKED ON THIS PROCESS OF DÉTENTE. WHAT WAS THE FRENCH REACTION TO THAT DEVELOPMENT?

The, the French president -- this was Pompidou -- Pompidou was very suspicious. He felt that the Americans did not take us into account, and one of his instructions were, "Never forget that on those circumstances, whatever, will our own atomic force be taken into account in their negotiations." But Mr. President said, no, they had, we've told us, we've told them repeatedly. "You won't ever repeat it enough." That's quite typical of Pompidou's way. Later, when about Vietnam we had frequent conversations with the Americans; as you probably know, Kissinger came over secretly. Uh from, not far between seven times, four or five times a year, then each time I saw him on Vietnam...I used to weigh at that point, but I can't say that we were regularly informed.

TO WHAT EXTENT DID YOU FEEL PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS?

We were informed, but not properly informed. In other words, it was always a problem to know, without being inquisitive and without asking. After all, it was their business, and Pompidou's contention was, that in the long run, they would always agree or, at any rate, would never go beyond a certain point in their parlance. And I think he was right. And Europe had to rejoice about that, and to accept it. But the restoration of Europe's rank was always an issue.

DO YOU THINK THAT KISSINGER HIMSELF PERHAPS WAS PULLING ALL OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS MORE AND MORE INTO HIS OWN PRIVATE BACK CHANNELS, AS IT WERE? DID THAT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON?

I have the best reasons to know that Kissinger was very good agent, a first-class agent, but that the leader of American foreign policy was Nixon. I'm one of the very few who had conversations the two men, and no other, and I can tell you that much. The decisions were taken at the highest rank. Kissinger, again, was the best possible agent, and then Secretary of State, that Nixon could have. But the top man was, and remained Nixon. And Nixon undoubtedly had a much more open mind towards Europe than Kissinger, and each time Pompidou met Nixon, and even each time I, who was not, who was only number two, each time I met Nixon, I knew far more about the, those kinds of negotiations, than that Nixon had that men Kissinger had said.

SO YOU FELT THAT NIXON WAS MUCH BETTER AT INFORMING YOU THAN KISSINGER?

Yes.

DID EUROPEANS FEEL THAT KISSINGER, WITH HIS EUROPEAN BACKGROUND, UNDERSTOOD EUROPEAN CONCERNS BETTER THAN PREVIOUS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE?

I wouldn't go that far, because I think that Kissinger had a deep knowledge of European past, but that his background, as you said, could easily lead him astray. His great man was Metternich and since Metternich days, Europe has changed out of all recognition.

UH ...

Nixon Kissinger was a great expert on America affairs; I wouldn't say he was a great expert on European past.

HE ANNOUNCED THAT 1973 WAS GOING TO BE "THE YEAR OF EUROPE." WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

1973, yes; that's the year when I got out of office -- I left office in March, 1973.

DO YOU REMEMBER HIS ANNOUNCEMENT, THOUGH?

I must say I've forgotten all about that, and the vary fact that I have forgotten it just shows how important it was.

ONE OTHER QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU THINK, LOOKING BACK, ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS? DO YOU THINK THAT WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD?

It was not a major step forward, but it was a step forward, as we very well we see now. You, you're referring to 1972 agreement. Well! The best of SALT, 1972, on IDS just shows that it was an important step forward. On yes.

COULD YOU SPELL THAT OUT?

There is a link between the SALT Agreement, as you very well know, and IDS.

I NEED YOU TO SPELL THAT OUT.

The Russians' contention is that the Americans can't build up, a shield against a nuclear attack, because of the 1970, '72 agreement. And the American answer is, on the one hand, that they are perfectly free to go ahead with previous studies of the problem, and in the second place, that the 1972 agreement forbids the building of nuclear shield from the sea, or from the sky, or from any mobile bases. But not from stable, fixed bases on earth. And I think that on the two points, the Americans are perfectly right. But that reference just shows how the 1972 agreements why the 1972 agreement was a good thing. Because it provides the Americans with a very good basis of negotiation on the new problem on the new problem which is now being raised.

FROM A EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW, THE OUTCOME OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WAS LOOKED ON FAVORABLY.

Yes. It was certainly an asset, and it's especially an asset for those who in Western Europe and in France, those who, as I do, believe that IDS is a positive contribution to western defense, and not a liability.

IDS BEING SDI, IN AMERICAN ...

I ought to say SDI, yes, that's correct.