CAN YOU JUST SUMMARIZE FOR ME YOUR MILITARY CAREER...

Well, that's well my military career started a long time ago. I have served in army for 40 years since 1932. And I went through all stages of the military. Went from soldier to general—lieutenant general and I of course, I served at the front during the Second World War and I retired in 1972, being a retired lieutenant general. My last service was in the Academy of Generals staff. I was there at head of a chair or head of faculty, what they were doing.

TELL ME WHERE DID YOU SERVE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR?

I didn't get your question?

WHERE DID YOU SERVE?

Well, I served the Central Front, the Moscow Front. I started in June 27th, of 1941 as a staff officer of the staff of the western front there was a name of such front. And then I served on this direction too, I was from the end of the war I was sent to general staff to work there and then I was sent to the Academy of General Staff as a student. I was graduated from the Academy of General Staff in 1948, and since then I stayed in the Academy of General staff till 1972.

TELL ME HOW THIS YOU BECOME FIRST CONSCIOUS THAT WE ENTERED NUCLEAR AGE?

Well if the entrance of the nuclear or start of the nuclear age we count from August, 8 August of 1944, or 1945, of course all of humankind entered the nuclear age at that time. But speaking frankly at that time. I doubt very much that many people really--I mean assessed the comprehensive significance of the nuclear weapon. Well if we judge at that time of course we understood that the main purpose of the nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not against the Japanese were to—even to end the nuclear—to end the Second World War, but is to show the Soviet Union how strong became the United States in order to persuade them that United States became a nuclear country the first one, and it could dictate at that time maybe not whatever it wishes or it wished at that time, but what that we have to take that seriously into consideration. Because there was a nuclear threat and the country that possessed this nuclear weapon was the United States. It is from the political assessment. From the military point of view at that time, I would say neither in the United States, I am speaking on my behalf of course and I am expressing my personal opinion and maybe in some somehow here well they really not comprehensively I would say, evaluated the real significance of the current nuclear age. What will come with it? Nor, what we came today to the conclusion that there cannot be nuclear war of—I mean nuclear war and there cannot be a winner in the nuclear war.

BUT AT THAT TIME?

Well

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR?

No, you know what I wanted to make additional remark saying about the evaluation of the appearance of the nuclear weapon. At the same time of course, it was well known at that time that the United States possess a very few nuclear bombs at that time. And there was no idea that it was possible to win a war with the nuclear weapon. First of all there were very few nuclear bombs and second there were not many what do you call it, not launches but delivery vehicles I would say, like strategic bombers which could reach territory without special equipment and so on and so on. So, but at the same time at the at that time, we were of the opinion that the very terrible I would say weapon appeared on the scene of the world history and humanity should get rid of it somehow at the beginning because if we start to develop it would be late to get rid of it. But, and there was our Soviet proposition on our side. There was so called Baruch plan on the American side which we considered very one sided...

CAN YOU TALK TO IT...

Because you know the Baruch plan was based on the supposition that the only country and the monopoly is of the United States, so everything that is going to be developed or was going to be developed at that time should be out of the control of the United States. They have to be world inspector and no countries must confide in them that they will take into consideration the interest of all country. We, history show they didn't represent our interest. So our plan was based on the as far as we understand it was based on the supposition that not only the United States is interested in, but to the world, the rest of the world also is interested and nobody will be dominant in the inspection, in the control and so on and so on. So we had to reject Baruch plan. But there were some ideas how to get rid of nuclear weapon. But do you see there were something that the United States at that time came to the conclusion of the possibility of the atomic monopoly, atomic strategy of the starting to somehow to keep out communist movement and so on and so on. And it didn't help them to come to rational decision. And the nuclear weapon started to develop till today

HOW DID YOU FEEL FIRST TIME, I DON'T KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT YOU WERE PARTY TO THE DEVELOPMENT BUT WHEN THE FIRST SOVIET BOMB WENT OFF, WHAT WAS YOUR FIRST IMPRESSION?

Well it's you know it looks like a very simple question but at the same time it's a very complicated question. Because still at that time there were some opinions that humanity should get rid of the nuclear weapon. At the same time, there were some threats from the United States as we understood it. Let me think. I think I am expressing my personal opinion, how it looked to me at that time. And the third reflection it showed and we were of the opinion of the pride of our country that in a short period, not to the prediction of the American specialists even like at the time or even like Kissinger at the time or like some other people who predicted that the Soviet Union will get, will possess nuclear weapon in like ten or 15 years in a very small quantity. All this prediction were, you know, undermined by our test. It was a certain pride. And, at the same time, for the military people, it was the task that we had to somehow to think about the strategy, about the tactic in the new condition when there was the appearance of the Soviet nuclear weapon and the United States couldn't just threaten with its nuclear weapon. It had to take into consideration the possibility of the somehow retaliatory blow from the Soviet Union.

WHAT WAS IT THAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THINKING ABOUT THE UTILITIES YOU WANT...IN THE PERIOD AFTER STALIN, I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS SOME CHANGE IN THINGS, WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE?

Well, speaking frankly you know I wouldn't connect it with the name of Stalin because it is connected with the de, more connected with the development of the nuclear weapon. It happened to the Soviet Union the same as it happened to the United States, there were very few man, very few nuclear weapon or charges. And very few nuclear capability of delivery of these charges or the weapon. At that time, there was a view that first that still in spite of the appearance of the nuclear weapon from the very beginning of the nuclear in the Soviet Union still there was a view that main weapon it's uh—uh, in the personnel, it's meant in them. Not only convention but generally, it's people in the army and the main force is it's, it's the conventional forces and so on. And at that time you see nuclear weapon, maybe consider to be not in mind even weapon, but for a short period. But we did development of course. It has impact on the military thinking and military theory and military strategy and so on, and so on. But at that time still we were—you know from the way they begin, after the Second World War you have to take into consideration not only the appearance of nuclear weapon but certain thinking, military thinking even civilian thinking of the event that happened in June 1941. Sudden aggression from the, from the German fascism, and we—we've always, we read at that time always take into consideration the possibility that the other side might prepare. Do you understand that the military thinking was under the influence of the possibility of the aggression of the sudden aggression against the Soviet territory, against our allies.

YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT SURPRISE ATTACK?

I'm talking about the surprise attack. At that time we had to take that into consideration because we didn't want to have a repetition of such a tragic event as had happened in 1941. And that it was natural, and it's still natural.

IT'S INTERESTING, BECAUSE I THINK THROUGHOUT THE '50s THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO PREOCCUPIED BY A SURPRISE ATTACK.

Well, you see, when you are saying that somebody is preoccupied with something, you have to say at the same time whether it was realistic, or is realistic, or not. Because for a sudden or surprise attack against the United States, they know for sure at that time in the 1950s that the Soviet Union didn't have any means for the sudden or surprise attack. I mean you may make a surprise attack just with aircraft systems, for instance, but what is after that? You have to have some forces to occupy the country and so on. That's from the purely militaristic point of view, because from the political point of view of that time after the Second World War the Soviet Union was occupied not with the idea of sudden attack, but how to reconstruct our industry, how to give people some food, how to reconstruct our agriculture. So there was no thinking whatsoever about any surprise attack, because we were occupied with our domestic problems, and it was natural due to the results of the Second World War.

I THINK THAT POSSIBLY SOME OF THE REASON THE AMERICANS WERE WORRIED ABOUT IT WERE THAT THERE WERE SOME STATEMENTS, I THINK A COUPLE OR SEVERAL BY KHRUSHCHEV, WHICH MAYBE WERE MEANT VERY DIFFERENT, BUT WERE READ AS A THREAT TO MANY AMERICANS. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN, WAS HE TRYING TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING SPECIFIC... WHEN KHRUSHCHEV WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT LIKE "ROCKETS WILL FLY," "WE WILL BURY YOU"? HE HAD SEVERAL RATHER POWERFUL STATEMENTS.

Well, I think that there were some misinterpretation of the statements. Some statements were used purposely, maybe they were not very strictly expressed, very concretely expressed, ambiguous expressions maybe. But some of them were used on purpose to justify some military spending, or some military programs. Because at that time there was the idea of the bomber gap, you see the appearance of the bomber gap. At that time there was the appearance of the idea of the missile gap. They all were not true. Not because I am saying this, but because real American facts are saying the same thing. But the people who were proposing this idea were, be and so on and so on, even that Paul Nitze who is today is a very important figure in the arms control at that time he was a very also, at that time he was very important person, and to all this teams who prepared documents about all these ideas, the first strike from the Soviet Union bomber gap and missile gap, they were, they fed to you some for propaganda purpose. So they use what Khrushchev said. For instance he said, "We will bury you." By this, as he's said, he meant that due to the economic, social, political competition, finally we'll win. Not by burying in the pure meaning of this word, but it was used in such a way. I'm not saying that it was very exact words, or they were necessary to say, but it is was said. But from my point of view, speaking frankly, if these words were not said, some other pretext would be used. You see with such exaggeration as bomber gap and missile gap will in 20 or 10 or 15 times well, it was not due to this statement. It was due to some other ideas in order to a real superiority because some circles in the United States were afraid of the development in nuclear field in the Soviet Union, because they were afraid that they'll lose superiority at that time.

...THAT THE NOTIONS OF THE BOMBER GAP, AND THE NOTION LATER OF THE MISSILE GAP, WERE ALL BASED ON VERY LITTLE INFORMATION WHICH THEN WERE EXPLOITED OPPORTUNISTICALLY, BUT THAT THE WORRIES WERE GENUINE?

Well, you see I can't agree with you. I am of a different opinion, and as far as I understand it was not only a problem of data, it was a problem of mood. It was a problem of ideas. And it was a problem to have some basis to go to the Congress, ask for money. And there was nothing of the...of the interest to check it out. This figures were invented, but they were invented not because of a mistake with a group will or wishful thinking. They were invented on purpose, because they want to accelerate their program in, to force the program, to accelerate the program of the missile. You know at that time there were program in Navy about the submarine forces, the program of the Polaris system. Program of Minuteman program of Atlas, and so on and so on. And they have to they wanted to accelerate it. So you said if I understood you correctly that the people who were saying about the bomber gap and missile gap, they didn't have enough information. Well, I think that's not correct. The people I mean, responsible people in the Administration at that time, people in the intelligence sources, they knew the real picture. They knew. But they didn't want to tell it. Maybe I am wrong.

MY IMPRESSION IS THAT IN THE ENVIRONMENT WHEN THERE IS VERY LITTLE INFORMATION THE TENDENCY WAS TO EXAGGERATE THE DANGER, WHICH IS A MILITARY STRATEGY.

Yes, but you see there a serious evaluation of any data it is based not only on the intelligence data that would be guarded from some sources, I mean like today from national means of verification or from some other national means of some other sorts. But it is based only on analysis. And analyzed based on the possible prediction of the situation. They knew the possibility of our industry. They knew. They knew the possibility of our economy. They knew the possibility of our material and so on and so forth. They could make a... they could make a scenario and they could count maybe, not to exaggerate in five, ten or fifteen times, maybe twice. But they exaggerated and it was on purpose, and ten, fifteen times. Well that's not because they were ignorant or negligent in data. They knew the data from my point of view, or they were near to real facts, but they didn't want to publish it. Like they correct many data about our military project. Like they correct about window of vulnerability as you mentioned before. They said it. No there was even at that time there was no...

THAT'S... OK. OK. WAS THERE — IN UNITED STATES THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROVERSY WHETHER TO DEVELOP A THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON. AND THE CONTROVERSY WAS BOTH — THE ARGUMENTS WERE BOTH OF A SCIENTIFIC AND POLITICAL. AND THERE WAS ARGUMENTS WHICH WERE MILITARY. WAS ANY OF THIS KIND OF DIALECTICS TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION?

Well, that's speaking frankly I can't tell you because I was not in the witness of any controversy here. And I can't tell you. And I doubt very much there was a big controversy according to godfather of the thermonuclear American weapon. I'm speaking about the physicist Edward Teller, was very great supporter of the — and he was at that time my man who helped to make decision. And he was of just one-sided opinion, that the United States must have a thermonuclear weapon.

WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT DOES —

Well, see, I can't tell you, but as far as I know, I don't know anything about the controversy or not controversy. I just don't know. Excuse me.

TELL ME ABOUT THE HOW DID IT HAPPEN THAT IN THE SOVIET...DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET TECHNOLOGY, ROCKETS TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER BOMBS?

Did not get your question.

WHAT IS...WHAT IS THE REASON THAT IN THE SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ROCKETS RATHER THAN BOMBERS BECAME THE DOMINATING MEANS OF DELIVERY?

Well again I am expressing my own opinion, because you know each side has its own history of the development of nuclear delivery vehicles. The United States if you are speaking about intercontinental means of delivery, from the very beginning, because if you take Hiroshima and Nagasaki they were based -- I mean the idea based on the bombers. Then the United States they....developed bombers as B-52 as the main force of delivery. Then came the competition between sea-based, and land-based missiles and of course sea-based, at that time in the United States were victor at that, between sea-based and land-based. As far as the Soviet Union, is concerned, the historical events helped to develop land-based weapons. And from the very beginning we had a great success in land-based missiles and while it's just ideal the construction, the ideal of the bra...of the human brain and so on, and so on. There were no special ideas of it. Besides of course, you have to take into consideration that our territory in comparison with the United States, that's my personal opinion, that we may based...land-based missiles at our...on our territory much better than bombers. Besides of course we at that time we didn't start developing bombers with intercontinental radius or range. So that's — there are technical, political and economical reasons for this. But as far as I understand the United States is now very much wishes that the Soviet Union would restructure its forces and to pay much attention — more attention to the sea-based. Well, I think that's a wrong idea.

IT BELONGS TO A LATER PROGRAM BUT I AM CURIOUS, WHY DO YOU THINK IT'S THE WRONG IDEA?

OK. Well, we can't we can't miss, I mean leave without touching the present situation because it is really closely connected. Because you know the problem of parity, it isn't a problem that to have a mirror, what do you call a mirror image, forces — it is measured by different measures, but not by this. The United States well approximately has about 60 percent of its nuclear might in the sea-based nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear forces. And the Soviet Union has it in land-based. To reconstruct it is quite expensive. It will take them much more time, then to make a drastic and radical reduction. So our proposition, let's have 50 percent reduction, and to have only 6,000 in the first stage, 6,000 warheads. I think it's a rational proposition.

LET ME SWITCH TO WE ARE DEVOTING ONE PROGRAM TO ESSENTIALLY TO MCNAMARA WHO PRESUMABLY BROUGHT SOME INTELLECTUAL RIGOR TO THINKING ABOUT IT. INITIALLY I THINK WHEN HE JOINED THE ADMINISTRATION HE WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED OF HOW TO MAKE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE LATER I THINK DEVELOPED. AND HE WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED WITH NOTION OF COUNTERFORCE VERSUS COUNTER VALUE TARGETING. I KNOW WHAT AMERICANS THINKS ABOUT THIS. WAS THERE, AT THAT TIME, THE TIME WHEN WERE THESE A KIND OF CONSIDERATION EXPLORED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY, AND IF SO WHAT KIND OF EXPLORATION?

Well you know, first of all I must say that McNamara is a very interesting figure. Not only in the American military thinking I would say, but in general, in western military thinking I would say in general. Because still his idea of flexible response still lives and very strongly among NATO strategic people or command and so on and so on. And it's a pity –

FIRST OF ALL THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE, THE SOVIET ATTITUDE, THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STRATEGY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION.

Well, as I said before, I think McNamara — it's my opinion, is very interesting figure in western military thinking in general, among many Secretary of Defenses of the United States and even in the western countries or allies of the United States, he's standing as a very unique figure in this. First of all I am thinking very often what would happen with him if he would be appointed again as a Secretary of Defense? What would become with his strategy of, what would he invent in the present condition? Because as you know, he has now different opinions, which are very interesting and they reflect the ideology. At that time I would say with all his mental ability and his brain trust, I would say, because he was surrounded by whiz kids, like Enthoven and Ivan Selin, and other people I don't want to name them, not to make them publicity. But if even he would take these people and he would therefore, I think he would come to some very interesting views which will not be accepted by the present administration. But I am returning to your question about the massive retaliation counterforce strategy, because it was in his very famous speech in Ann Arbor, you are meaning this one. Well, you know, we have a different strategy, because we never have had, and I think will not have a strategy, against population. Against civil targets. Against people who are against us. It doesn't mean that it has any connection with massive retaliation or counterforce strategy, because our strategy is a strategy of retaliatory blow. Once he invented massive retaliation he even counted how many, what is the percentage should be destroyed...

HOLD ON FOR A SECOND. BECAUSE WE NEED TO START -- MASSIVE RETALIATION IS NOT MCNAMARA. IT CAME BEFORE HIM. HE, I THINK HE TRIED TO CHANGE MASSIVE RETALIATION TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

No, no, I don't agree with you. McNamara himself, in his speeches said that if you--that's his opinion, that's not his predecessors--that if you destroy about 60 percent of the economy and about one-third of the population it means what -- he was asked, what do you mean by the massive retaliation, and he said, I mean about 60 percent dead. Even Harold Brown said about the necessity of the destroying 250 big cities in the Soviet Union in order to win. But it was McNamara, not his predecessors, about the assured destruction, I mean by the massive retaliation.

ALL RIGHT. SO LET'S START AGAIN, BECAUSE WE WILL MAKE THE TERMINOLOGY —

We mixed them. OK. OK.

NO, I THINK MCNAMARA, WHEN HE CAME HE REJECTED MASSIVE RETALIATION.

No, no, I was meaning assured destruction.

OK, START FROM THE BEGINNING. LET'S TALK ABOUT THE SOVIET OPINION OF THE MASSIVE RETALIATION STRUCTURE.

You mean Dulles' strategy. That's another thing, because while you were —

[INAUDIBLE QUESTION]?

In your question there was McNamara's name. That's why I mixed you... I was confused. You see, at that time the main figure in the American policy was John Foster Dulles. And he was one of the authors of I think maybe I am wrong, of the atomic diplomacy. Of the not the retaliation but atomic threat. That he said that we'll use nuclear weapons when we wish to use, and at the time we wish to make this itinerary of the users of the nuclear weapons. From our point of view it was a nuclear threat, it was a real nuclear threat to us. So we had to prepare a retaliatory some reply to this. In the way of retaliatory blow. But even for massive retaliation he thought about the massive destruction of the Soviet Union and we have to have some difference at that time. It was possible and to have some forces to have a reply to this, and to consider it as a real nuclear threat. And it was not accidental as a matter of fact, because at that time all lands in the United States were based on the ideal of making blow — a nuclear blow against the Soviet Union. All documents that are published now show it, I mean plans, SIOP plans that are published now, they show it.

WE COME BACK TO MCNAMARA.

Now about McNamara, I don't want to repeat what I said. I meant assured destruction and assured destruction. His idea, and but you see his idea, here I would say to look, to have a retrospective view of his idea I think he will repudiate now his own views.

I KNOW HE DOES.

Yeah. Because you know, at that time he was a prisoner of the ideas that were existed in Pentagon. And as being a rational man with a mathematical thinking and having all these people around, young people who were very bright and also mathematical there, many of them are now in computer business. Ah, they invented this assured destruction and the other one idea of the to have something different, I mean some ideas of defense.

ABMS?

Even to make a retaliatory to somehow undermine the possibility of the strike. You see —

SECOND-STRIKE PROBABILITY.

Second-strike, retaliatory or whatever it was. So and he was the inventor of the flexible response, the strategy of flexible response. It was still a nuclear strategy based on mainly on the nuclear strategy because the idea of flexible response was to use to be ready to any conflicts, with any scale of conflicts, and to be ready to use nuclear weapons to be first in usage of the nuclear weapon.

WAS THERE SIMILAR STRATEGY, AN UNDERLOOKED STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET FORCES? AT THE TIME, I'M TALKING ABOUT EARLY '60s.

No, you see, even at that time as far as I know and as far as I can judge we were never of the idea to be the first to use the nuclear weapon. It was always the idea as a reply to the first usage of nuclear weapon by the other side. Either by NATO or by the United States. That is the difference.

CAN YOU REPEAT, BECAUSE I WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE THE RIGHT TERMINOLOGY AND THE RIGHT CONTEXT. THAT THE SOVIET VIEW ON THE COUNTER VALUE OR COUNTER CITIES STRATEGIES, HOW DOES, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT'S KNOWN, WHAT IS THE SOVIET THINKING ABOUT ANN ARBOR SPEECH OF MCNAMARA IN WHICH HE WAS I THINK TRYING TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS...?

Yeah, yes. We were not of that...of such a you see dividing the strategy of counter cities, and counterforce strategy. Because you know, our main idea not to use nuclear weapon against people, against population, against cities, against civilians, that's the main idea. As much as possible to listen the consequences for the people. So at the same time, you had to take into consideration the possibilities of the nuclear weapon, the collateral results of the usage of the nuclear weapon. So these ideas or just at that time to have so-called surgical strike, it was just wishful thinking. They were not realistic even in that time. It was just to cheat the people in order to have a nuclear strategy. And it helped to give even more the possibility of the idea of the first strike in general. So we were against these ideas to divide it. Because in general our strategy is not against cities or against population.

YOU KNOW SORT OF THE STANDARD PROBLEM POSED BY AMERICAN STRATEGIES WAS IF YOU TARGET WEAPONS AND IF YOU THINK ABOUT RETALIATORY STRIKES, YOU WILL BE STRIKING EMPTY SITES.

You know, that's one scenario, what you mentioned. But there is another scenario, because you can't use all of a sudden so many weapons. Then there will be a launch and warning. And you, both sides will use something against empty launches. But the collateral results, I'm repeating this. No matter whether you're trying to destroy silo, or you're trying to destroy air base, the radiation, after four hours will reach, it is now an open cart about the nuclear winter, and everybody agrees that the nuclear war cannot be won. And so on, and it is a scene for your program in 1989 or in 2000 or so on and so on. But you see, it is recognized now, but it took so many time, so much time to come to this conclusion, but still I think there are many people in the United States who don't agree with this, who are, who still think that the nuclear war cannot be waged and cannot be won.

BUT ONE OF THE... I THINK PROBABLY ONE OF THE FIRST PERSONS TO RECOGNIZE THE NOTION OF MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION IS AGAIN MCNAMARA.

Yes, so he mutual assured destruction and damage limitation. That's a... two sides of one matter, I would say. Assured destruction and damaging mutation. It was his idea. And it still lives in the military thinking of the United States, assured destruction. Then came mutually assured destruction. It's...it's philosophy. It's not a doctrine. There cannot be such a doctrine. Mutual assured destruction is a condition. It's some sort of a condition. It's some sort of a... because if each side speaks about parity and parity means equal danger, as it is now formulated, equal danger of equal results of the blow, whether you are making first blow or retaliatory blow, the results will be the same. So there is such a condition, yes. Object.

IS THIS CONDITION OF MAD OR WAS THE CONDITION OF MAD RECOGNIZED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY? I THINK IT'S PHILOSOPHICALLY...IS THIS CONDITION RECOGNIZED BY SOVIET UNION?

Well, why do you ask this question, because do you think it is recognized by political leaders?

WELL, POLITICAL LEADERS AT LEAST IN THE...IN STATEMENTS ALL OF THEM SAY, CANNOT BE WON, SHOULDN'T BE FOUGHT. I THINK IT'S MUCH TRICKIER OR MUCH TOUGHER FOR A MILITARY PERSON.

Now you know in our country, military people or even military leaders are a servant of the political leaders. So this is the reply to your question because they think the same. They think that nuclear war cannot be won. And there cannot be any victory in nuclear war.

BUT IF THE...

If, or as you say, God forbid it, if the war starts and if the other side makes an aggression against the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will reply, it doesn't want, but it will be forced to reply. But the results will be the same for the United States for the western country, the same for the Soviet Union. For the communists, for the capitalists, for everybody, it'll be not only dangerous, not only terrible, there will be annihilation of the civilization as far as I can judge. Nobody can check whether there will be a nuclear winter or not. But I think it's a detail how people will die, due to the nuclear winter or do to lack of blood to make what you call it, you understand, or to due to the radiation, big dose of radiation. It doesn't matter. Because each country possesses according to the specialists, much more than enough to annihilate each other.

LET'S, I KNOW, BUT LET'S COME BACK TO MCNAMARA AND MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION. I'M TALKING ABOUT YOU KNOW, HE RECOGNIZED IT IN '67. AND I WONDER WHETHER IT WAS THE RECOGNITION OF THIS BY THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY THINKING, WAS APPROXIMATELY BORROWED... FOLLOWED

Well, you know at that time in the United States not everybody agreed to... with McNamara, and I think not everybody agreed here. It is natural you know, because some of the opinion, nobody you know, could check at that time whether it is correct or not. It was just theoretical, some scenario. But as a matter of fact, but people here, like in the United States, they came more and more to the conclusion that nuclear weapon is no weapon whatsoever. It cannot be used, neither for political use nor for military. It's not weapon as long as it cannot be used in peacetime or in the...wartime, it cannot be used. No matter, first strike, second strike, preemptive strike, retaliatory, because there is the same danger to your, what do you call it, I don't want to name enemy, but to your, another part, the same to you.

THE... I THINK THAT THE PROBLEMATIC ISSUE I THINK IN MY MIND IS WITH THE MILITARY. TO SOME EXTENT. IS THAT ON THE ONE HAND I THINK THE POLITICAL PEOPLE TELL THEM. . . TELL THE REST OF THE POPULATION

AGAIN IN THE CONTEXT OF MCNAMARA, ABOUT THE GLASGOW SUMMIT, IT'S PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ABMs, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET THINKING ABOUT ABMs. OK? THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET THINKING IN THE LATE '60S ABOUT ABMs.

You mean the proposition of Johnson and McNamara to meeting in Glasboro and then the SALT Negotiations? There's...is two stages. One stage that we were against this and well, you see I can't tell you the details I don't know. I...may express my own opinion, so it's just what I think. You know, sometimes, when a proposition made in the wrong time, not well presented, even if it is rational, even if it is a good one, there is a certainology, that it shouldn't be accepted. But when time passes on there was rethinking of it. And when there was not spontaneous discussion, just all of a sudden you made — not you but the President of the United States and McNamara made the proposition to Kosygin who was not briefed and not well prepared for this of course the reaction even to everybody now what Reagan said, that it is so as the allies, just defensive ideas and so on, trying to attract attention of the people, so it was in somewhere, I think maybe it was misrepresented, but it was natural. But when it went to a serious discussion during this preparatory SALT Negotiations, talks in Helsinki and some other places, of course the idea of ABM stood in all its size. And it took — had to be evaluated from the point of view of reduction of strategic offensive forces. And they couldn't be reduced if there is a development and arms race going on in the defensive nuclear weapon. So first of all there should be at that time it was considered first of all there should be solved problem of the ABM. It should be stopped. And both sides agreed to this. And that's why it is not only the, you may call it evolution, but the it is a concrete and rational reply to the probable...to the... to the dangers that are coming with the nuclear arms race. That unless defensive weapons are stopped there is always a threat of the first strike, there is always the idea of the possibility of the first strike. And you have to stop first of all the ABM weapon. That's why, you know, that's my reply to you. And I'm not sure whether you said it's right or not.

IT'S GOOD.

But you know, it's human explanation.

BUT YOU KNOW, I... I THINK THAT IT HAS TO DO PROBABLY MORE WITH THE SORT OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENSE AND OFFENSE.

No, it was recognition that no, that's, I don't agree with you, excuse me for saying this. Because you see in the nuclear war weapons, there is a different approach to the offensive and defensive weapon. Different approach. If you develop a good defense against nuclear strategy, you at the same time wish your volance or not, will or not to will, I don't know how to say it in English. You are getting the possibility of the first strike. You understand? You are getting the possibility, no matter, what is your perception. And no matter how peaceful you are. And no matter how you are against the nuclear war in general. But the other side, immediately will come to a conclusion that you are getting objectively the possibility of the first strike. That's why we're against, now, that's partially why we're against SDI, because it's a road to the first strike.

BUT THAT'S ALL RIGHT. THE SOVIETS WILL BE THE GABOSH...

Yes, and to repudiate it. We get, we got riddled, because we agreed with the Amer... we agreed both of us, mutually agreed that it's dangerous. Let's stop it. Let's have it symbolic only system. It is symbolic, because you can't defend the country with one side. No matter whether one side has it or doesn't have it. It doesn't matter. It's symbolic. The last?

ONE QUESTION WHICH I FORGOT FROM THE PREVIOUS ONE, AND I'M ASKING YOU NOW TO REPEAT. GOING BACK TO THE...

It's the last one?

IT'S THE LAST ONE, UNLESS.... WAS THERE SUPPOSED TO BE IN THE '50s, A CHANGE OF THE MILITARY THINKING, NUCLEAR THINKING, BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA? OR HOW DID THE BREAK UP OF CHINA AFFECT THE SOVIET THINKING?

Well, you have to understand that military thinking in general, they can't be changed all of a sudden, because it's based on nuclear weapon which is...exists now, or will appear in ten years, but you can't even if there is something happened in the world, you can't all of a sudden change your military strategy, because the weapon that you are planning it will come in ten years anyway. So when you are saying something happened to change your military thinking, well, we were...we had to take that into consideration, of course, because at that time in China there was some voices with very expansionist views, to have some territory, to get back some territory, to… to this and that. We had to take this into consideration of course. But to change drastically, radically, not only it was, there was no reason for this but at that time, we couldn't do this.