FIRST OF ALL WHAT WAS YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO THE AIR FORCE'S INITIAL REACTION TO THE DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS COMING INTO THE PENTAGON AND ESSENTIALLY TAKING OVER NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE EARLY 1960S?

Well, it was thought that many of them didn't have the experience, didn't have the responsibility really for what would happen in time of conflicts so there was...it was quite a bit of unhappiness within the Air Force. With the so—called "Whiz Kids."

WHY DO YOU CALL THEM WHIZ KIDS?

That wasn't my term, that's what—that's what to a great extent the—the people in the military called them. They were—they were very smart and young and so somebody tapped them with the name Whiz Kids but they were--they was a great deal of tension particularly with with the Air Force and the analysts.

WAS THE ATTENTION DUE TO THE AIR FORCE FELT IT WAS LOSING THE LEADERSHIP ESPECIALLY SAC ON MATTERS OF NUCLEAR POLICY OR DID IT DEVELOP OVER SOME OF THE DECISIONS THAT THESE PEOPLE TOOK.

Well, I think they're interrelated. I think— I think a little bit of both of in--in the way of others were taken over as—as the the real pronouncers of strategy and doctrine and concepts and the rest as well as some of the individual decisions.

WOULD -- WAS THE INITIAL REACTION TO ROBERT MCNAMARA, HOW DID THE AIR FORCE FEEL ABOUT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WHEN HE FIRST CAME IN, WAS THERE... WAS THE INITIAL REACTION TO UH, ROBERT MCNAMARA A NEGATIVE ONE OR AT THE WAS THERE A DIFFERENCE ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THE TIME HE CAME INTO OFFICE AND THE TIME HE LEFT IN TERMS OF HOW THE AIR FORCE FELT ABOUT HIM?

Oh, I don't want to get into comments and personalities....it was Air Force concern that there would be a shift in priorities when Mr. McNamara came in to office and away from the strategic so a large part of the Air Force was concerned about that fundamental shift. But, I don't want to go beyond that.

WHAT WAS -- GETTING AWAY FROM PERSONALITY AND FOCUSING MORE ON THE PARTICULAR DECISIONS, WHAT WOULD YOU SAY WAS THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL OR THE ONE DECISION BY ROBERT MCNAMARA AND HIS PENTAGON THAT UPSET THE AIR FORCE MOST?

Cancellation of the B-70.

COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT A LITTLE BIT FOR ME? YOU WERE INVOLVED DIRECTLY ON THE...?

Yes, I had (?), but...cause experience and the strategic operations in SAC and then at that time I was in the Pentagon and working the strategic programs and was assigned the job of articulating the need for the B-70. And I can recall in March of 1961 briefing Mr. McNamara extensive briefing went on for hours on the B-70 and he took copious notes and at the end he said he was he commented very favorably saying it was the best briefing he had received since he arrived in the Pentagon and Air Force was pretty happy about the—the whole briefing and what went on and about 2 days later, we got word that even shorter time than that I think that he had cancelled the B-1, the B-70. And had cancelled the B-1, maybe on the Freudian slip because we ended up later on with a cancellation of the B-1. But, the I was then asked to brief both houses, committees of both houses of Congress on what we had briefed to Mr. McNamara and after those briefings, there was strong support in the Congress for the B-70, I was just complying with orders to give the same briefing and as an outcome of that uh. President Kennedy took-well, first the House armed services committee put into their authorization legislation that the Air Force was ordered, directed, required, and mandated to spend 491 million dollars on the B-70 in the next fiscal year. That was going to the congress in opposition to the decision by Mr. McNamara and sustained but supported by President Kennedy. And finally it got to—it got to the point that President Kennedy took the-—Mr. Vincent for a walk in the rose garden and a compromise came out of it that the House would delete that language but the Defense Department would continue to look at the need for a strategic bomber and out of that came our initial studies that I was involved in or we called it the advanced man's strategic air craft M-, which ultimately became the B-1. So at least we got a recognition that would have take another look at the bomber for us out of that walk in the rose garden.

BOMBERS WERE THOUGHT TO BE AT LEAST AT THE TIME ALAIN ENTHOVEN HAS TOLD US THAT BOMBERS WERE THOUGHT TO BE VULNERABLE, THEY WERE RISKY AT A TIME OF CRISIS BECAUSE THEY CREATED THE PERCEPTION IN THE ENEMY WHEN YOU LAUNCH THE ALERT FORCE THAT YOU WERE GOING TO...STRIKE IN THEM. WHAT WOULD YOU—WHAT THEN WAS THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE BOMBER IN THE SIXTIES AND PERHAPS EVEN TODAY, BUT PARTICULARLY AT THAT TIME WHAT DID YOU ARGUE WAS THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE BOMBER FORCE IN GENERAL?

I think versatility, flexibility all the... really state what the bombers could do. You could use them to increase your your capability in time of conflict. You could use them in strategic operation as well as conventional operations. You could strike targets at that our ballistic missiles couldn't strike, they were more accurate at that time than the ballistic missiles. I think there were a whole range of needs and I found it--you know interesting to see that we ...we operate in cycles. The bombers were dead in the '60s, in the minds of some (?). They couldn't penetrate. They weren't needed. Now people are—that's no longer an argument. We have the B-1 in production and we've got the Stealth Bomber coming right behind it. And there's not an argument whether you need it or not, it's an argument how many and which... which type. Well, the ballistic, and the ICBM, the land-based ballistic missiles are now the ones that are vulnerable. We really don't need them. And they're the ones at risk.

HOW WOULD YOU ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THAT THE B-70 WAS A BAD BOMBER BECAUSE IT WAS — IT COULDN'T DO WHAT IT... WHAT PEOPLE SAID IT COULD DO AND THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY VERY VULNERABLE ON THE GROUND, AND IT WAS VERY SENSITIVE TO RADAR DETECTION AND...HAD A WHOLE LOT OF... OF FAULTS THAT MADE ITS CANCELLATION A NECESSITY IN THE MINDS OF THE SYSTEMS ANALYST, IN PARTICULAR ALAIN ENTHOVEN?

Well, there were a lot of accusations made that in the basic aerodynamic design that the lift...would drag (?) which would provide the proper aerodynamics for long range were not adequate. We were able to demonstrate when we finally flew it that... that that part worked out well. I think you'd never be able to prove as to if we would build it how well it would have penetrated. Ah, I think there was an overestimate at the time as to the Soviet defense capabilities and the projection of those capabilities. Here we are in the mid-'80s and the... and the B-52 still, even though it's... it's been decreased in its penetration capability still has a substantial capability to penetrate. So I think the B-70 would have... would have been able to penetrate the Soviet defenses for quite a few years. But that's an argument we'll never be able to settle.

WERE BOMBERS TRULY VULNERABLE EVEN WITH A 50 MINUTE ALERT IN THE EARLY 1960s?

Well, if you were on your coast, and you... and the( ) and didn't detect it, there was... the bombers that were even on alert there was some question about them, but I think overall the bomber force had reasonable survivability, regardless of what the Soviets did.

OKAY, I'D LIKE TO NOW MOVE ON TO QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY AND MISSILE PROCUREMENT AND THOSE SORTS OF THINGS. IN 1962, MCNAMARA MADE A FAMOUS SPEECH KNOWN AS THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH WHICH HE HAD PRESENTED TO NATO AT ATHENS EARLIER ON THAT YEAR. AND IN THAT SPEECH HE SEEMED TO MAKE A CHANGE IN POLICY IN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE WHEN HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOW HAVE A COUNTERFORCE POLICY AND THAT CITIES WOULD BE AVOIDED. WHAT DID THAT REPRESENT A CHANGE AT ALL IN THE SAC DOCTRINE, STRATEGIC DOCTRINE UP TO THAT TIME?

I don't think it was a dramatic change because things aren't changed really by speeches. I mean there are actions before and there are actions afterwards that people listen to more than to any one speech. I think there was ah, though, out of that another feeling that it generally validated the SAC position and the Air Force position that we ought to concentrate primarily on being able to attack and destroy the Soviet military capability. There was some discussion as to how well you... you could do in avoiding the cities. There are many military targets around the cities and in the cities. There are -- Soviet Union weapons had relatively high yield and in those days they weren't as accurate as they are now. So there was a debate as to how well you could do it. But I think — but, that was much preferred to any discussion of... of the other extreme of mutual assured destruction, which we felt was a very wrong strategy.

THE OTHER EXTREME BECAME MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION EVENTUALLY, BUT AT THE TIME WHAT WAS IT KNOWN AS? WAS THAT THE STRATEGY OF MINIMUM DETERRENCE?

I think that probably, that generally came the closest to articulating it at that time, minimum assured... assured destruction or... type thing, and it got then into mutual assured destruction. There were a lot of code words that didn't mean all that much internally.

THAT... IT'S ALSO SAID THAT YOU KNOW, YOU MENTIONED THAT THE ENTIRE ANN ARBOR, WELL NOT THE SPEECH, BUT THE POLICY PUT FORTH BY MCNAMARA AT THE TIME VALIDATED THIS STRATEGY OF SAC.

Not totally.

BUT PARTIALLY VALIDATED THE STRATEGY OF SAC. SOME PEOPLE HAVE ALSO SAID THAT IT ALSO VALIDATED IN MANY WAYS THE DEMANDS THAT THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AND THE AIR FORCE IN GENERAL WERE MAKING FOR MORE MISSILES AT THAT TIME. IS THAT SO? DID THE AIR FORCE SEE THE SHIFT IN PUBLIC POLICY AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMAND MORE FROM THE PENTAGON IN TERMS OF MISSILES?

I'm not sure it validated... or it prompted a demand for more missiles, you know, the Ann Arbor speech. But I think it gave substantiation to what the Air Force was already saying, because the Air Force was already recommending for that speech, substantially greater strategic forces than the Department of Defense was willing to support.

WHY WAS THAT? WHAT WAS THE FUNCTION THE AIR FORCE SAW IN HAVING 3,000... BEING SAID 3,000 AND SAC WANTED 10,000? WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF THESE MISSILES THAT A THOUSAND MISSILES COULDN'T PERFORM?

Well, I think that goes back to our basic guidance that we have had for years. It's been consistent. And that is that we are to have a strategic offensive capability that can destroy the Soviet military capability with first priority on their nuclear forces. And also to have a capability for urban and industrial destruction which takes a small number of weapons. And to destroy their military targets, many of them very hard, it requires a very substantial force. And the Air Force was convinced that... that it required at least 3,000 Minutemen to... to come close to meeting that requirement. SAC was... was saying 3,000 would help but wouldn't meet the total requirement. I...I think from a pure requirement standpoint, SAC had an argument when he brought in the practical constraints, the priorities and other ah, requirements. Then I think the Air Force probably was right in its recommendation for the 3,000.

WHAT WAS THE REACTION BY THE AIR FORCE WHEN THE NUMBER WAS CUT BACK TO 1,000 AND A LIMIT WAS PLACED ON FUTURE PROCUREMENT OF ANY... OF ANY MORE WEAPONS IN 1963 WITH ASSURED DESTRUCTION?

Well, when a decision was made to cut back from 3,000 Minutemen to 1,000 and not to deploy anymore it was... it was felt by the Air Force that it was a mistake, but it wasn't as fundamental a mistake as cancellation of the bomber, the strategic bomber, somewhat earlier.

SO THE AIR FORCE FELT STRONGLY, BUT NOT AS STRONGLY ABOUT THE CANCELLATION ABOUT THE LIMITS SET ON NUMBERS THAN THE CANCELLATION?

Well, it means the emotions weren't as high ah, ah, at the time of the Minuteman cancellation and... and also as long as Minutemen were in production, and we were deploying them, we always had a an opportunity to revisit the decision. Once you just flat cancelled the B-70, that was it. Ah, it was not to build anymore aircraft. It was sort of the death knell of the B-70. While with the Minuteman there was always an opportunity to... to live and fight another day.

IS THEN THE.., YOU MENTIONED SOMETHING HOW HOW THE AIR FORCE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WAS IT NOT BECAUSE IT SET THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBERS, BUT BECAUSE OF THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS BEHIND THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SHIFTING ITS POLICY FROM ONE OF COUNTERFORCE TO ONE OF COUNTERVALUE? OF NOT HITTING CITIES VERSUS ONE OF SETTING UP THE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT OF THE BASIS OF CITIES AND URBAN TARGETS?

I think, ah, the concern with the mutual assured destruction and an articulation of that policy was that it was the wrong way to go. That it... it weakened deterrence, that the Soviets could — give them greater freedom of action, because the only thing we would have was the capability to attack their cities. And ah, that would deter us a great deal from using our forces, because we knew -- we would know that if we attacked their cities, they would attack ours. And we were concerned about de-linkage with Europe, that it wouldn't be the linkage between our conventional forces and strategic forces. And ah, it was a short-lived strategy. Ah, and most people came to... to believe that mutual assured destruction is not a good strategy.

YOU TOLD JONATHAN A VERY INTERESTING STORY ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. YOU TOLD JONATHAN A VERY INTERESTING STORY ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND HOW DIFFERENT IT WAS IN TERMS OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDST OF THAT CRISIS, WHETHER THERE WAS A CITY OR A MILITARY TARGETING POLICY. COULD YOU REPEAT THAT STORY FOR ME, AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

Well, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, if we had had only a minimum assured or mutual assured destruction capability, just a few weapons to hit the Soviet cities, it would not have been a credible threat by President Kennedy when he said that if one soviet missile impacts on our soil that we would consider that to be a major attack on the United States and that we would fully respond and retaliate. A mutual assured destruction would have been a hollow, hollow threat. But a capability for options to destroy their military capability with some degree of discrimination I think validated this threat.

WAS THE AIR FORCE OPPOSED TO CUTTING BACK THE B-47s?

Yeah.

WHY?

Well, when you... when you looked at the force requirements...guidance, the Air Force maintained that the B-47s were necessary. Ah, but it... it wasn't one — it wasn't — it was fought in terms of timing as opposed to questions of whether or not they ultimately would be phased out.

WHAT ABOUT THE SNARC MISSILE?

I don't think there was any great heartburn about the SNARC. The cancellation of it.

THE B-58?

The B-58 was, from the beginning was a very controversial program within the Air Force. Ah, there were a lot of advocates for it, but there were a lot of strong advocates ah, for, ah, a larger more capable bomber. So it was... it's termination or limitation was greeted with mixed emotions within the Air Force.

KENNEDY CAMPAIGNED ON THE BASIS OF A MISSILE GAP THAT YOU'VE DISCUSSED RATHER EXTENSIVELY WITH JONATHAN. AND ESSENTIALLY THE EARLY DECISIONS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, I KNOW THAT IN TERMS OF THE AIR FORCE REQUIREMENT THEY BUILT VERY LITTLE, BUT IN TERMS OF OTHER PEOPLE THEY ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN A MASSIVE BUILD-UP ON THAT BASIS. MY QUESTION IS WOULD... WERE THEY, WERE THE PREDICTIONS OF SAC AND THE EARLY ESTIMATES OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION WHICH LED TO INCREASES FROM THE EISENHOWER REQUESTS, WERE THEY ESSENTIALLY WRONG, OR WERE THEY ESSENTIALLY CORRECT?

I think the Air Force estimates, and... and often the... the SAC estimates were higher than the Air Force. But I think the Air Force estimates were ultimately validated and were correct in... in the numbers of ...that the Soviets built... would build. They were wrong in timing. Ah, projection that they would be ah, built earlier. Ah, but SAC had even... even greater numbers and... and thought it would come earlier. But the build-up came. It just didn't come as soon.

SO THE INCREASES IN MILITARY SPENDING... ESPECIALLY FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN THE EYES OF THE AIR FORCE AND THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WERE MORE THAN JUSTIFIED IN THE 1960s?

I think so...

COULD YOU JUST GIVE ME ONE STATEMENT ON THAT AND I'LL LEAVE.

I think it was... it was clear that the... that the Air Force foresaw correctly that there would be a very large build-up in the Soviet strategic forces. And there's no question -- and they were right in that the Soviets ultimately did build a — and are continuing to build a very large strategic force. They were somewhat wrong in timing. And if you're not exactly right in this then your credibility goes down. They were... they were closer to being right, ah, than the national intelligence estimates with regard to the long haul. Somewhat wrong in... in timing as to when that build-up would take place.