THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHAT WAS THE STATE OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH IN EUROPE AND WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION? I THINK WITH THE EMPHASIS ON EXCHANGE AND CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION?

Well, I think you should go a little bit back from that to get the real understanding. The first basic facts of nuclear physics emerged with the discovery of radioactivity. That happened before World War I. After World War I, immediately artificial sort of nuclear dis -- divisions were discovered by Rutherford. And I expect that is the real... the real beginning of modern nuclear physics. And right from the beginning it was a field in which was much international collaboration. The Cavendish Laboratory was then a center that drew many physicists from all over Europe and other parts of the world to it. You had the (Curie Institute) in France that was founded by Madame Curie that was certainly also a great center of international studies. You had the laboratories in Germany that also began this work. But certainly the center was Cavendish under Rutherford. That was the beginning of nuclear physics as we know it today.

CAN YOU PLACE THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS CONTEXT?

Yes, I think that was a... that's a good remark. Of course the research on these matters really started immediately after the revolution. And here, I think two people were very important in the beginning. The first was the geo-chemist Vernadsky (?) who had a very broad view of these subjects. He founded the Radium Institute in Leningrad, Petersburg in those days. That was, I think in 1922. In fact, he was a real visionary. He understood the importance of this thing, and I would simply like to go back to the quotation that I mentioned. Of course it was in those days that he wrote, three years after the discovery of sort of artificial (?) of atoms by Rutherford, "That the time will soon come when man will become the master of atomic energy, a source of power that will give him an opportunity to give a new life to his own wishes. It may happen in a few years, it may happen in a hundred years. But it is obvious that it will happen. Will may — man be able to handle this force guided to his good and not to self-destruction? Is man sufficiently mature to manage this force that science inevitably will give him?" It's a prophetic statement....days it was more relevant. Than the days... of the early dawn of the nuclear research in the Soviet Union was made.

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PUT THE PREVIOUS ANSWER IN A SINGLE FRAMEWORK, SAYING, YOU KNOW, IN EUROPE THERE WERE SUCH...CENTERS AND ONE OF THEM WAS LENINGRAD.

Well, I think the beginning of nuclear physics really started after World War I, after World War I, and here the decisive fact was the discovery by Rutherford by artificial transmutations of the atom, and people first began to have some command on what was happening with the nucleus. That — these discoveries were made in the early '20s, in 1919 in fact. And at the same time a number of research institutes were established in various parts of the world...the Institute of Radium that was founded by Madame Curie in France. You had the Radium Institute that was founded by Vernardsky in Petersburg, and you had a number of research studies that was started mainly by pupils of Rutherford in Germany, and of course the main center was the Cavendish Laboratory where things were — all the major discoveries were really made right at the beginning of the '30s.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND SORT OF THE NATURE OF THE INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SCIENTISTS WORKING ON THE RESEARCH?

Well, it was the forefront of science, it was really the most exciting thing, rather abstract and rather remote. And it was done on international scale with great understanding and exchange of information --there were absolutely no barriers of any kind that existed. Maybe the only thing that did impair these — this research was the difficulties with the German scientists after World War I. But I think even these things managed after a few years to be ironed out, and was a real great collaboration of scientists in the best possible tradition of European culture.

WHAT STOPPED THIS? CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE...?

Well, things really got bad after the '30s. In the middle of the '30s with the emergence of Hitler in Germany, with the build-up of militarism in Europe. This really led to this collapse of the golden age of culture and science. And the extraordinary thing that it was not only science that flourished in those years, but it was culture in a much broader scale, modern art, music, literature, they all flourished in this atmosphere, and they both perished in the '30s.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Well, it was the emergence of fascism and the growth of militarism that led finally to World War II. That was the ultimate crisis.

WAS THERE A WARINESS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET SCIENTISTS AT THE TIME THAT THE GERMAN ADVANCES IN THIS AREA MIGHT HAVE LED TO A WEAPON OF THEIR OWN, A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

No, you see, nothing really happened before the crucial discovery by Hahn in '38, and the beginning of '39, that uranium would be a source of energy, the discovery of the process of fission. Now this was already really when the second world war was happening; it was the, in the early years of -- months of -- 1939, and the most exciting discoveries in the... in rapid succession... were done; the old spirit still was there, but already the world for, to had begun, and this international community of scientists was grumbling. All of the ties that did exist between scientists in Germany, the Soviet Union, in Russia, in England, in America -- they were decisive, in, I think, recognizing the what was the promise and what was the menace, in fact, of nuclear power in those days, and this common understanding on the part of the Allies led to the rapid progress in the field of nuclear energy in the States; and also in other parts of the world.

WAS THERE A FEAR ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

Well, I think there was a recognition that it could be done.

CAN YOU SAY THAT IN A FULL SENTENCE?

I'm sorry?

CAN YOU SAY THAT IN A FULL SENTENCE? YOU ARE — WITHOUT MY ANSWERS...

Ah! Well, in, just before the war, I'm, I mean by the beginning of, not World War II as it is counted in Europe, in '39, but in... beginning with the German invasion of Russia, the Soviet Union, there was a lag of about two years, we had this time... out. In those days, it was recognized that there is a possibility of using the nuclear energy for military purposes, for power. In very general terms, the Soviet government was alerted by Soviet scientists on these matters. I don't know the exact details, but that is, well, no — in fact, Vernadsky (?), who I mentioned, was one of the first who wrote to the Soviet government drawing its attention to the so-called "new uranium problem," as it was termed. And I think there was a general understanding that something could be done. Everything that was determined by the effort that could be put into this field, and, in the Soviet Union, in the initial years of the war, the main point was to fight the Germans with ordinary means, and the resources that we had — the scientific resources — were used for other purposes. In fact, Alexandrov (?) and Kurchatov, they were more in charge of demagnetizing ships rather than pursuing nuclear physics.

BUT WAS THERE A SENSE OF DANGER COMING FROM THE GERMAN SIDE?

Well, the immediate it was obvious that some -- nothing immediately could have been done. I think there was sufficient understanding that Hitler did not have this bomb at that moment. And it was obvious it was not so easy to do, so there was a sense of priorities. The priorities were with ordinary weapons, with the ordi-, with the direct menace that was facing our country, rather than trying to develop these new types of... That came later, I think in '43. Maybe even earlier in '42 -- it doesn't matter the exact date. When on the other hand, the decisive victories have already been made, in the... The Germans had been halted it was obvious that the war would be going on for some time, but resources could be diverted to this new dimension. And it was obvious, also, that great effort would be needed in developing this industry, and it was not a sort of... thing that could be fixed quickly.

TELL ME A LITTLE BIT ABOUT KURCHATOV.

Well, you know, I was a young man in those days, and I expect other people are more qualified to speak about him. But I think I would like to again go slightly back, and remind you of the remarkable figure of Ioffe, who is always considered to be sort of the father of, I should say, Soviet physicists, and, I think 90 percent of those who are responsible for development of physics in this country, including my father, including Hustuvada (?), members of the, now members of the Academy of... Science, and those who really...been connected with the physics, including Kurchatov himself, were students and pupils of Ioffe, and it was he who gave sort of the initial guidance and put two of his very young and very gifted students, Kurchatov and Alexandrov, on to ask... suggested that they should pursue studies in nuclear physics. In those days, when it was well removed from any practical applications — but here, again, we had a man with great imagination, great foresight, and in spite of all the protests, and saying that they are pursuing a very impractical area of physics, such as pure science, in the early '30s he... had the vision that it should be done, and invested the minds of his best pupils in this direction.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THE MINDS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY WHEN THEY LEARNED ABOUT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR EFFORT?

Well, that hap... happened... after the war, after the... V-Day. I well remember how the news of the first nuclear explosion came. It was announced on the radio, it was, immediately excited everyone, and of course everybody started to think about it, discuss it, and the news came of the second bomb; these things I remember well myself. In a few months the Smyth Report appeared; it was very soon translated into Russian, and I remember reading first the English version and the Russian edition; I was then... lying in hospital for some time, then I read all these books and they... very much impressed me.

BEFORE WE MOVE ON... THE STORY OF FLEROV?

Here again, I say, we'd better go a little bit back; Kurchatov was there was... number of things that he did; he started well, sort of directed a well-conceived program in nuclear physics research — it was done in Leningrad, in fact the Radium Institute built the first cyclotron. And Kurchatov was... responsible to get it working. And he started building an even bigger machine, that is still operating at the Physical Technical Institute, the institute that was founded by Ioffe. And among his students he had a very able man Georgii Nikolaevich Flerov, who studied sort of the basic physics of fission, and discovered a very important phenomenon: that uranium can fall to pieces on its own, without the impact of a neutron. It's an important and very basic discovery in neutron nuclear physics; that was done in those days. Much theoretical was, work was also done.... experimental and theoretical work went hand in hand, and here, of course, one of them one of the most remarkable physicists of those days was Frankel, who, in fact, parallel and independent from Bohr... produced the main theoretical idea that described the whole phenomena of fission. And, I think this and the discovery by Flerov was of a sort of important part of the whole phenomena of fission. Well, sort of placed Soviet scientists in the whole field.

THERE IS A STORY THAT FLEROV DURING THE WAR STOPPED RESEARCHING AND HAD TO ENGAGE IN SOME OTHER THING?

Yes, well, he was in the Army, I expect you could get the story better from him...

I WILL TRY.

I know he told me it himself, what I'm telling you now; he went off he became, mmm...

CAN YOU...

...He entered the artillery...

CAN YOU PUT HIS NAME IN THE ANSWER?

Oh, yes. Well, Georgii Nikolaevich Flerov immediately, with the beginning of the war entered the army and, was in the anti-aircraft artillery. And at some period, I think it was in '42, '41... I think it was in '42... he was moved from one part of the country to another, and during this he passed through, it's a small town to the southeast of Moscow... and there he was stationed for a few days, and he went to the university... to the university library, rather, to see the latest news on the field that really excited him, nuclear physics, and then when he started/reading the current editions of Phys... the Physical Review, the magazine where all this research is published,, he suddenly noticed that from a certain time all research on this subject had been cut off. And for... him, who was thinking about these things, who had a really alert mind, was a highly professional scientist in this field, it was his field, he immediately understood that it had been cut off simply because it had become too hot and too important, not because the other physicists had been sent off to pursue other duties — that could be another explanation, but the abruptness with which everything had been stopped, pointed, was a sure pointer to him that the whole field was considered to be highly sensitive. And he sat down and wrote a letter to Stalin to that end. And I think the signal, the letter from Flerov, with other information, because decisions of this matter are taken on the advice of different sources; there were suggestions by other scientists that the whole field should be people should begin working in this field, this triggered off an important step in making a final decision, in the Soviet Union, to start an all-out effort in nuclear physics applied to military and purposes of energy.

WHEN IN FACT DID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT START TO SUPPORT THE RESEARCH, AND WHO WAS TO DO WHAT?

Well, I think the important decision was taken in late '42 or '43 — I don't remember the exact date, and I expect... could tell you much better these details. He's written extensively on this subject. I think that is when things were really taking off, and research efforts, people had to be brought together...

CAN YOU DESCRIBE....

Well, you see, myself, I was not engaged in...

I KNOW, BUT I'M USING YOU NOW AS A SORT OF GENERIC EXPERT ON THE SUBJECT. HOW DID THE NEWS OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT, ESSENTIALLY OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, AFFECT THIS EFFORT?

Well, that was an immediate, of course, signal, for the whole thing to become open. Then it was obvious that the thing should be done; it gave an enormous impetus and kick to all the efforts in this field, and with the deteriorating political position situation, after World War II, after we were allies, Khrushchev, and Churchill's speeches... things began to change, and that.... under the pressure of the nuclear weaponry, and the arms race started as we now know it.

THERE WAS ONE PERSON, PERHAPS MANY, AT THAT TIME WHO WAS ATTEMPTING TO STOP IT, OR AT LEAST TO CONTROL IT....

Well, Niels Bohr was one of the Deans of all the physicists of the world; his theory... physics in Copenhagen was the center... the center, I should say, of physicists; he was a great friend of Rutherford, my father knew Bohr very well; in fact, last year, all physicists of the world paid homage to Bohr on his centenary. Bohr had been a number of times in the Soviet Union, and then... Soviet physicists visited the famous Institute of Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen. Landau was one of them, in fact. Well, Bohr did two things. First, he was responsible — since I've already mentioned his name --- simultaneously with Frankel; they developed a theoretical understanding of the process of fission. The Bohr-Wheeler Theory. When fission was discovered, Bohr went off to America and there he developed this theory that still is the best phenomenological way of explaining how it all really happens. And from this immediately followed that you can also use the, even more... it will be better, even, to use the 235 isotope of uranium for making a bomb, and all the ideas that were sort of instrumental to the technical part of building a bomb, began to develop. But in those days, the world war had started, and Bohr returned back from America. This research that was going on in this field, was mainly pursued in the States; everybody was very much excited; Fermi was there, who had left Italy; every-... body got sort of the news that this is the thing that should be done; but Bohr returned to Denmark, because he thought that in the years of the occupation his place is with his country. And he stayed in Denmark for quite a while. But then because of... persecutions of the Jews, and general worsening of conditions in occupied Denmark, he left Denmark under very dramatic conditions; he went over to Sweden, and there, from Sweden, he was taken to England, all in great secrecy, not only because of, sort of the general conditions of the war... The telephone...

(INTERVIEWER INTERRUPTS. TAPE CUT)

...it happened during the war.

OH, IT HAPPENED DURING THE WAR. GIVE ME THE LINE.

Yes, certainly! It all happened during the war...

Just the, just the dates... It was forty... three. He left Bohr left Denmark in '43. The September of '43-

WHEN WAS HE DOING RESEARCH?

That was in the... I think, in May, '44. Yes, I must... I can check that.

... DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT.

Yes, in May, '44. ...

OKAY, START WITH BOHR.......

Yes, well, no. We must go back, I think slightly. I can... you're taping me?

YOU CAN START FROM HIS ARRIVAL TO EUROPE.

Yes. Well, in September, '43, Bohr arrived in Sweden, immediately went over to England, in the rather dramatic circumstances, and then he went over to America, and became fully informed on all of the sort of consequences and magnitude of the atomic energy project in America, the Manhattan Project. He was fully informed of all, everything that was happened, and even, it seemed, contributed in some way, to the... on some technical questions concerning the bomb, at Los Alamos. He traveled there with his son, Aage Bohr, whom I know, and who later became the director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics, in Denmark, and got a Nobel Prize for nuclear physics. And but very soon, Bohr started thinking about what it really all means, what is the new dimension that, the atomic energy, atomic bomb, will give to the human condition, to our ways of life, and how it will affect both military and the civilian sort of life of mankind, in very general terms. He had the vision, the understanding, he was a very broadly educated person with a great sort of, I should say, a person who had this general understanding of these things; and he was not bothered with the technical details, he was sure that the bomb would work, and it would meet all the expectations, and what he was thinking about, what would, what it would really mean. And here he worked these things out; he discussed these things with the statesmen of America, with the Secretary of State in America; with... people in the Roosevelt administration, with Roosevelt himself; and in fact I think on the investigation of the Americans, in '44, he was advised to go and discuss these matters with Churchill. And there was a very unfortunate meeting between Bohr and Churchill. If Roosevelt was keen and interesting too, Bohr genuinely listened to him, and there were a number of lengthy discussions that they had, Churchill when Bohr, as far as I know, came to England, he had to wait at least three weeks until he was granted half an hour to discuss these matters; and, I think, a week before he met Churchill, he got a letter... that was written to Bohr by my father, that was sent to him through the diplomatic channels, inviting Bohr to come to the Soviet Union. This letter was written on the news that Bohr had went over to Sweden, and had come somewhat belatedly... been sent to Bohr through one of our diplomats stationed in London. The letter, with full knowledge of the British, was given to Bohr, just at the time when Bohr was suggesting that the whole idea of the atomic bomb should be explained to the Soviet side. And that was... the last thing Churchill wanted to do. He did not listen to Bohr, it seems, at all, to all his ideas, very sound and important ideas about the impact of nuclear weapons on the, sort of the future of the world; and the only thing he saw, that Bohr would be a security leak, it would be a leak of all this information that was withheld, in fact, also from the other allies, from the French, and I think this is one of the reasons of the independent attitude of the French, since those days, to the whole issue of nuclear armaments... but the whole interview with Churchill was an absolutely flop, not to say worse; he was and only the protection of very influential friends, protect— sort of led to the, that he was not detained, put under arrest in one form or the other.

I THINK THE FEAR OF SECURITY LEAKS AND SO ON REPRESENTED A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF THESE KINDS OF FEELINGS...

What sort of feelings?

THAT SOVIET SCIENCE WASN'T ADEQUATE TO THE TASK AND NEEDED INFORMATION FROM OUTSIDE.

Well, I think there was really only one secret. That the secret of the bomb would work. So that was no great secret, really! ...And when it had gone off that stopped to be a secret. It was absolutely obvious that it could be done, and the basic ideas and all the basic sort of... even details of this thing, were not that special. And I think secrecy was much more a way of controlling the scientists, rather than controlling scientific information.

SO YOUR SENSE IS THAT THE SPY MANIA THAT SWEPT THROUGH THE UNITED STATES AT THE TIME HAD NO VALIDITY?

I think it reflects sort of the general well, attitude and mentality of people who think that they can control ideas and control people. You can control people, but ideas are beyond that. In all circumstances.

THE UNITED STATES ESTIMATE WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD DELIVER A WEAPON IN BETWEEN 5 AND 20 YEARS.

As well, these are sort of, you can find guesses of this sort, I expect, can go any way. These guesses are rather... poor; I can mention to you that, when the first design of the bomb, that was very close to what the thing really looked like, and that was written in a report sent to the British government by Professor Peierls and his assistant, Klaus Fuchs, who had calculated this thing for the first time. That was, I think, in 1940. The estimate of the cost of the project was a few million pounds. And this was the sum of money that they demanded and they thought would be necessary to build the whole thing. They were off by at least a thousand, as you know. So... these guesses are often rather poor. And I think the same thing happened with estimates of Russian... cap... capacity in this field. Demanded an effort, I should say a great effort, but... the main thing that determined your capacity in this field, it's not the technology, it's the people and the ideas that they are responsible for. And the determination of these people. That they were dedicated. Just as the people in the United States were dedicated to build the bomb, they were, they were scared that the Germans could do it... and then you can have a group of people who think that it should be done and... they can do it. After that they have different ideas about this whole thing. And Bohr was the first who had a deep understanding of the full consequences - that the bomb is not an instrument of war, it's only an instrument of deterrence, and it cannot be, in any circumstances, used in a, as a military in a, as a military device. And this is the change in mentality that is very slowly happening.

DO YOU THINK THAT IN RETROSPECT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE THAT BOHR'S PROPOSITION WOULD COME TO THE FOREFRONT?

Well, history has no alternatives, you know; it's nice to ask these questions, but you can never give an answer to them. They're only imaginative answers. But what, I think, is important, that you can read the statements by Bohr — the most remarkable document that he produced was this was a series of memorandum; this, these, they were highly secret memorandum that he sent mainly to the American administration, developing his ideas, and later, I think that was in '52 or '51, he published them as a very well-worded and very interesting statement, his open letter to the United Nations, which is really sort of the testament of Bohr on these matters. It gives a remarkable sort of, I should say, demonstrates his remarkable insight into these matters, both as a, sort of... as a history of political ideas and the influence of technology on these ideas. From my point of view it is, it is the statement on these matters.

WHAT IS ITS ESSENCE? CAN YOU SUMMARIZE IT?

Well, the essence is very simple, and it's these ideas that are... only now... gaining ground, that the emergence of nuclear weapons has changed... many things, but it has not changed the way we still measure them by our old means. But we'll have to change our way of thinking about these things, and the only, and he thought — I think this is a very important idea — that it will lead to a basic change in the m-, I should say, mentality of the politicians. That you must change your attitudes to the whole concept of national security and sovereignty in the way it was considered before. We have to speak, in fact, of what is, we speak about today, we need to speak about common security, based not on military might but on our mutual understanding and respect for these things. And he thought that the way in which it should be this new understanding, a new set of ideas should be established, was through this concept of an open world. That is in fact how he called this remarkable document.

BEFORE WE GO TO THE FUTURE, LET'S GO AGAIN TO THE PAST.

They're all mixed up, you know.

THE DECISION, IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY, TO DEVELOP A "SUPER"...

Yes...

...TOOK A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SOUL-SEARCHING ON THE PART OF THE SCIENTISTS.

Yes...

WAS THERE A SIMILAR PROCESS THAT TOOK PLACE HERE?

Well, you know, I'm not so informed, and I was not engaged in this work; for me it would be very difficult to pass judgment on this subject.

HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STALIN AND KURCHATOV?

Yeah, well, it would be very difficult for me to comment on these things. They were highly complex personalities...

...IN THE STATES, AT LEAST, MOST OF THE SCIENTISTS STARTED TO WORK ON THE MANHATTAN PROJECT BECAUSE OF A FEAR OF THE GERMANS?

Yes.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE HERE?

Well, here, I say, we were faced by the imbalance of nuclear power that existed between our countries in this moment. And as it was obvious that things were the alliance not so happily existed during the war against Hitler, had collapsed and we entered a new phase of this Cold War or whatever you call this period, where the nuclear weapons became a decisive element in the balance of power.

THE SECOND QUESTION IS TO REPEAT THE STORY OF THE LETTERS TO...

Maybe I'll just...through it here and that will give me some...

OK. THAT BOHR TRAVELS TO ENGLAND...

Yes. In the Spring of 1944, Bohr went to England after he had discussed the whole issue of the consequences of the nuclear weapons as he saw them, with some of the highest advisers to Roosevelt. He spoke to Frankfurter, and to Lord Halifax, was the Ambassador of Britain to the United States during the war. And it was suggested that he should discuss the whole matter with Churchill. He came to England, and for three weeks, he waited for an audience. Finally, this audience was granted. It seems that they spoke for a half an hour and the whole thing was a complete flop. Churchill was mainly concerned with matters of security. He wanted to keep the secret of the bomb to the United States and England. He had just managed to get the English back into the game. And here was a professor that could hardly express his thoughts in plain English, that he wants to tell the whole, give all the secrets away to the Russians as their allies. This was something absolutely against the mentality of Churchill, against the whole situation as he saw them, against I think the temperament of these two people, who were quite different. And the whole meeting broke up inconclusively. Moreover, Churchill was eager to put Bohr under arrest because he considered this professor to be a grave security risk. And only the interference of very influential friends, saved Bohr from detention.

THERE WAS A FUNCTION THAT THE LETTER FROM...

Oh, yes. I quite forgot about that.

JUST TELL US ABOUT THE LETTER.

Well, a week before meeting Churchill, Bohr finally got a letter from my father. It was written to him sometime before. And my father got the news that Bohr had left Denmark to come to the Soviet Union, where he would have all possibilities of working and discussing physics. And it was this letter that was transmitted to Bohr by a Soviet diplomat in London, in the presence of British officer of the security, looking after them, was reported to Bohr before their fateful meeting. And of course, that did not help at all in establishing the understanding between one of the greatest scientists and a statesman of our time.

THE LETTER FROM (?). CAN YOU TELL US?

Yes. Well, a week before meeting Churchill, Bohr got a letter from my father that was written some months before that and sent to him to the Soviet Embassy in London. And my father got the news that Bohr had left Denmark. Inviting him to come to the Soviet Union, where he would have a possibility of working and discussing physics. Now, this letter was transmitted to Bohr by a Soviet diplomat in London in the presence of British security officer who was looking after Bohr, and the whole thing was reported to Churchill, and it did not make things easier for establishing an understanding between one of the greatest physicists and statesman of our times.