AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE MX MISSILE?

My role with respect to the MX really began when I was Assistant Secretary and had charge of the environment. Environmental impact was a very big issue for weapons systems. By 1978 there had already been lawsuits on the B-1 bomber and my very first contact with the missile program was to ensure that the National Environmental Policy Act requirements were met. That was no mean feat. And of course environmental issues turned out to be a trigger for all kinds of opposition to the MX.

WAS CARTER'S BASING MODE A GOOD PLAN?

I think that any mobile basing plan is going to turn out to be a compromise and have flaws. I would say that technically the plan that was dubbed Racetrack, my own view by the way is that any weapons system that is unpopular will get a funny nickname. Racetrack, Sixpack, Densepack, you know, all of these, of these names are pejorative names. But the...the system that involved mobility in an enclosed area of 23 essentially...they were not silos but they were 23 holes, and mobility between them called Racetrack, made a certain amount of sense. It was, there was a great effort to make sure that it, that it was verifiable, there was a great effort to make sure that egress and ingress into the area was not going to be impossible to observe from overhead. It was probably more costly and there are probably better basing modes now.

ASKS HER ROLE.

As Undersecretary it turned out that my role was the political management of the MX missile program. But I had gotten into it earlier as Assistant Secretary when I charge of environmental issues. New, particularly unattractive large weapons systems then to raise environmental concerns. There had been lawsuits about the B-1 bomber. There had been lawsuits about Trident basing in Bangor, Washington. And we anticipated that there would be concerns about MX basing because it was going to be large and sprawled out in order to achieve mobility. That was my first introduction. By the time I became Undersecretary in 1979, we knew we had a very large political set of concerns on our hands from the West and I really managed all of those.

WHY WAS POLITICAL MANAGEMENT SO DIFFICULT ON THIS SYSTEM?

It became clear within a year of the time that we were seeking a mobile basing mode that there was going to be some opposition in the West. The basing mode was necessarily rather sprawled out. It was utilizing public lands and it involved very sensitive issues of ground water. There were other issues, I think, that became apparent as time went on that we were not aware of at the beginning. That is, it was felt to be the largest construction project ever in the United States, and the fear was, particularly in Utah, that hordes of people, perhaps people of minority racial backgrounds, would be pouring into the state, that drug addicts would come, all kinds of undesirables, that a huge infrastructure was going to have to be built. All this, mind you, was...very much exaggerated. That sheep would be starved or poisoned and grazing lands would be destroyed. And as a result, a lot of fear was generated.

HOW COULD YOU BE SURE AT THAT TIME THAT YOU COULD MANAGE THE PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH A PROJECT OF LARGE SIZE, INFLUX OF WORKERS, MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES...?

The military had a great deal of experience, perhaps not on this large a scale. But understand that every project is phased. It doesn't all happen at once, the money doesn't come that way. The experience of building the base in Bangor, Washington, for Trident submarine was a learning experience. The construction of any new base gives some guidelines. Yes, there would have to be infrastructure built. But there is an awful lot that can be done on a temporary basis. I believe the fears were exaggerated. The actual construction would be considerably larger than the Minuteman construction in the 1960s, but it's amazing. The last Titan was recently pulled out, I think in Kansas, and a farmer's wife said she was really going to miss it. We found that there has become great attachment among farmers to the fact of protecting the country through the ICBMs. And that once there the deployments are very welcome. All military bases, we find, when we tried to close bases, are welcomed in the community. Why? Because they bring jobs, the people are stable. The missions are stable. And they fit right in. I think as great a fear was the use of groundwater. It's very hard to tell what happens to the underground aquifer. And these areas in the West are water short. There was a fear that there would be draining off of water in the construction process, mixing cement and so forth, from perhaps hundreds of miles away. And those effects were a little harder to trace, no matter how good the environmental impact analysis was.

DID SHE FEEL SHE KNEW EFFECTS OF DRAWING SO MUCH WATER?

We had the greatest experts working on that subject. I think there is still a fair amount of uncertainty but I think we had a fairly good idea that the harm was not going to be as great as portrayed. I remember one television broadcast. It was a Bill Moyers program that was done in Salt Lake City, in which bus loads of opponents, including farmers, ranchers, pelted us with questions. They even pelted us with tomatoes by the end. And there they were claiming effects that we absolutely knew were unrealistic. They had pictures of dying cattle and the notion was that the entire area for grazing was going to be destroyed. Nothing of that kind was going to happen. As I say the phasing of construction was going to be longer and more gradual I think than people realized. That meant that the strains on the ecology as well as the strains on the social and economic infrastructure were going to be a lot less.

HOW MANY WORKERS WERE TO BE IMPORTED?

I don't remember but I think it was at any given time, there would be numbered well under 100,000 workers. And they would be dispersed. We were talking about a series of areas of 23 modules, 23 holes for the missile and the, and the connecting links and the berms that were to seal the missiles inside for verification purposes. That were very, very widespread. What was said was that we were taking an area that was as large as Connecticut but that was a linking of all of the areas together. In fact, the discrete areas were far smaller.

ON THE MAP IT LOOKS LIKE AN AREA 250 MILES ACROSS, WAS THAT UNEXPECTED IN THE PENTAGON, THAT IT WOULD RAISE PUBLIC IRE OUT THERE?

I don't think the public opposition was fully anticipated. I think that the aspects that I mentioned, for example, the fear of influx of people that would change the lifestyle, of people from the East, of people who were racially different, religiously different. I don't think that was anticipated because in the beginning the Mormon Church had expressed support and that support was very cherished. The Governors of both Nevada and Utah had expressed support for the MX program. And they were strong governors. Governor Matheson backed off very quickly when he saw the fear that was being generated in Utah. I don't think we fully realized the impact of the sagebrush rebellion. We felt that because we were going to build on federal lands, that there was no problem. We were not taking private lands. That's what happened in Minuteman. Private lands were bought. Were actually taken by eminent domain and the owners reimbursed. In this case we were operating on lands that belonged to the federal government. What we didn't realize was that that had been a sore point. That there were strong political factions in the state that wanted those lands returned to the state to private ownership. There was also very strong factions in both of those states that, which by the way, are very strong military supporters, that wanted the freedom, the openness. There was a fear that that openness was going to be taken away. In fact, I think the most realistic fear that people had in Utah and Nevada was that even though the discrete deployment areas were small, that there would be restriction of freedom of movement between them. That there would have to be much more patrolling and that people were going to be stopped and going to be questioned because of fear of espionage. Particularly in troubled times.

MENTIONS SURVEILLANCES WORRIES AT THE TIME. WOULD NOT SURVEILLANCE BE GRADUALLY INCREASED AND RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED?

I think that as time went on, given the large investment in the deployment, there would be greater security than we contemplated. On the other hand we analyzed some of the movements in these large areas, how many cars crossed vast mileage that were contiguous to where the shelters were being planned. And found that the amount of movement was really quite low and therefore I think that restrictions in the end probably would not have been burdensome I do think it makes a lot of sense now in retrospect, to try to confine mobility to actual DOD properties. Land that has been dedicated to military use already. We knew that at the time but we couldn't really think of a system in which the mobility worked well enough that was confined to DOD lands. In fact, my military assistant suggested at one point that a kind of mobile system be developed that ran the missile around the edge of a large base. And that we use army bases. At that time there was a real reluctance to bring in the other services, for fear that whatever support existed within the Pentagon might be eroded... Because so much was at stake on security, my guess is PLU, Preservation of Location Uncertainty, would have caused trouble at the operational stage. And probably there would be some greater restrictiveness. I don't think the restrictiveness in the end would have been terribly burdensome. Roads could still be traveled, cattle could be grazed, and I think that problem was probably exaggerated somewhat. But I think it was a good problem to raise, I think the Air Force dismissed it out of hand a little too quickly.

SINCE THE SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED TO "HIDE THE MISSILE," WHAT WOULD AIR FORCE HAVE TO DO TO ASSURE NO SOVIET AGENTS COULD GET NEAR?

I don't think the issue of Soviet agents and people drawing near, a van, campers being parked, was really the issue. The issue I think that would have been more of a problem was development in surveillance where heat signatures of the missile would be detectable. So that I think the speed of mobility is now a bigger issue than the concealment at any particular time. It isn't so much the concealment at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, a Tuesday, that matters. That the Soviets don't know where the missiles. It's a question of whether the missile can be moved from one silo to another so that if an incoming missile would be targeted to A, the missile would be at C by the time the incoming missile arrived.

WASN'T THE DASH CAPABILITY DROPPED?

It was later dropped. The dash capability became a problem and I had raised this problem. It's harder to run if you're fat. It...MX is a very large missile. There is no question that mobility is hindered by size. The MX can be made mobile, current plans for rail mobility are fine. But if speed is of the essence, a smaller missile is more mobile. At the time, like many weapons systems, MX was doing dual purpose duty. ... Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, wanted a large missile. This was America's answer to the SS-18. In fact, the military, the Air Force had wanted a large missile back in 1967 when they were planning for a new missile after the STRAT-X studies. The issue of vulnerable land-basing was also an issue back in 1967. And mobility at that time was not put in the plans, hardening was put in the plans. And I think the two issues, as being potentially in conflict, never came together. There was a cognitive dissonance.

...IF THE SIZE OF THE MISSILE WAS IN CONFLICT WITH THE DESIRE FOR MOBILITY, WHY WAS THE SIZE OF THE MISSILE NEVER, WHY DID THAT MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM GO ALONG UNCHALLENGED?

I think if one assumes there is some inherent conflict between two objectives there would be some moderation. I think there, that a large missile at that time was felt to be absolutely essential. It was felt to be essential because of the way that SALT II, developed. That, under SALT II, a ten warhead land-based ICBM was permitted. And there were a limited number of launchers permitted, therefore to maximize what the US could develop, one had to load as many allowable warheads into a single missile as possible. And that turned out to be the MX. The MX was the largest sized missile that could be created. We used to joke and say, "This was a weapons system created like you would create tax loopholes." It was a loophole in the SALT II agreement. Now a large missile as I said is harder to move than a small one, that doesn't mean it can't be moved. It certainly can. But it had some drawbacks. The current configuration of agreements, where the Soviets and the United States are, have moved away from launchers as the unit of counting, makes greater flexibility possible. That's why people are talking about a single warhead missile, Midgetman.

BUT WAS THERE PROTEST? WHERE PEOPLE IN THE PENTAGON OR IN THE WHITE HOUSE AT THIS TIME SAYING "HEY, THIS MIGHT BE THE LARGEST MISSILE WE GET, BUT MAYBE ITS BETTER TO HAVE A SURVIVABLE MISSILE THAN TO MAKE A MISSILE THAT CAN BE REDESIGNED SO IT IS MORE SURVIVABLE?

The word from the White House was we wanted a large ten-warhead missile. It was not even negotiable at that time. That was made very clear when we went through one of the reviews, what we call DSACOM, Defense System Acquisition Review Committee. When there was a discussion of whether there should be a common missile with the Navy? What size that missile should be? It was very clear that two things were going to happen: (1) the missile was going to be a ten-warhead missile; and (2) It was not going to be a common missile with the Navy. Although theoretically one might think that there might be economies of scale.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE ISSUE OF SURVIVABILITY WAS PERHAPS LESS IMPORTANT TO THE AIR FORCE THAN IT WAS MAYBE TO CONGRESS WHO WAS MANDATING THAT THE MISSILE BE SURVIVABLE?

I think there was enormous analytic ambivalence about survivability everywhere. Survivability was a very strong political note for many people. The notion that there was a window of vulnerability lent urgency to the development of a new missile altogether. There is no urgency in stating that we need a large missile because we have perfectly adequate missiles, guidance systems, as they have been, can be upgraded and substituted, accuracy can be improved on old missiles. What was the argument that made time of the essence, that was the argument that our missiles were vulnerable. Therefore politically and budgetary mobility was terribly strong. I think that analytically there was concern. Certainly Bill Perry, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering had great concerns that it was only a matter of time until the location of submarine missiles might be accomplished. And that we needed to have some lead-time on building ICBMs that were less vulnerable than the ones that we had. I think realistically everybody understood that it would be almost impossible to target all the legs of the triad at once. And we talk about a triad we had, when in fact, we weren't even talking about cruise missiles, which although they are attached to bombers, have a different aspect to them in terms of where they can be located. They can be located all over Europe or elsewhere. We weren't talking about the impact of, ground-launched cruise missiles which were then planned, you know, after '79, were planned for Europe. Or the Pershing IIs. Now all of those share the vulnerability of any land-based, fixed land-based system. Although there was a movement capability on warning of both the Glickums and the Pershing IIs. There was a lot of redundancy. It would be nearly impossible to target the ah- by submarine for example, the bombers on the East Coast without providing sufficient warning for ICBM launch. So everybody knew that vulnerability was not complete. Could never- there could never be complete vulnerability. Nevertheless people wanted each leg of the triad to be perfected to the best extent possible so it could stand on its own.

WAS IT DIFFICULT TO TRY TO SELL TO THE PEOPLE OF UTAH AND NEVADA THIS IDEA- THIS THEORY BEHIND THE SYSTEM THAT THEIR STATES WOULD BE COVERED WITH- AS IT WAS CALLED MULTIPLE AIM POINTS -AT THE BEGINNING WHICH MEANT TO THEM MULTIPLE TARGETS?

I think that being a target was used politically to attract opposition. Being a target is not a very realistic fear. This was used in the B-1 environmental suit, namely any weapon is environmentally dirty if it attracts enemy nuclear weapons. I think realistically people understand that if there is a nuclear war, no place in the United States would be safe. Having said that, I think that many people felt that they did not want to be in extra jeopardy, than they would have been for example having Nellis Air Force Base which would be a prime target or Tooele in Utah which holds chemical weapons. They thought that the extra basing would make them extra vulnerable. I don't think that was really a big issue. I think it was kind of on the periphery of opposition based on other things.

THAT'S A QUESTION I HAVE, IF IT'S INDEED THE CASE THAT IF DETERRENCE FAILS THAT ALL OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE DESTROYED PRETTY EQUALLY. WHY WORRY ABOUT MAKING THE MISSILES SURVIVABLE?

It's a long complex doctrinal discussion to understand why it's worthwhile to have weapons that might survive a little longer. It all starts with the theory of escalation dominance. It is all a kind of chess game. It doesn't take account for the "fog of war." The notion is that deterrence has to, in order to be credible, deterrence has to be able to demonstrate, not only a flexible response, a controlled response, but that there is no point for the enemy to increase to another level because they will not succeed at the next level. If a potential attacker, would believe that it could knock out all of our land-based missiles in one fell swoop, in advance, preemptive first-strike, then they might be either tempted to do so under certain occasions, because in order not to do it, they would be making themselves more vulnerable. Or a variety of other reasons. If there is no point to attacking first, because the attacker can't really get at very much, that makes deterrence theoretically stronger.

OK. NOW...HOW DID THE AIR FORCE GO BUT TRYING TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE OF UTAH OR NEVADA OR PUT THEM AT EASE THAT THIS WAS AN OK SYSTEM?

The attempt was made on many, many, levels to reassure the people of Utah and Nevada, as soon as we understood what the concerns were, we tried to explain how those interests would be effective...affected. First, the need for the system was explained. What is the rationale for doing all of this? This is what I mentioned in terms of doctrine. Why does the United States need a mobile land-based system? Why is vulnerability a threat to national security? So the appeal was made to, to patriotism through military necessity. Second, the attempt was made to alleviate the concerns that their lifestyle would be destroyed. That construction would be so unattractive, in so many ways, from forcing up expenditures on infrastructure, to destroying national monuments, to destroying cattle. It was essential to reassure people that those things were not going to happen. That there great, wide-open spaces would not really be destroyed.

BUT A LOT OF PEOPLE DIDN'T BELIEVE YOU, A LOT OF PEOPLE SAID "HERE ARE THESE ARROGANT BUREAUCRATS FROM WASHINGTON COMING HERE AND TELLING US WHAT'S GOOD FOR US, AND THAT ITS ALL GOING TO BE OKAY. AND WE DON'T BELIEVE THEM". HOW DID IT FEEL TO BE UNDER FIRE LIKE THAT?

It really put us on our meddle to get the point across. At one point I managed to get authorized, a million dollars for people in the community, for community groups in both states to develop environmental and socioeconomic impact analysis of their own. I was absolutely convinced in the area of environmental and socioeconomic impact, that the impacts were not so severe that the concerns could not be addressed. And addressed well. And I was willing by proof of earnest, to provide them with funds so they could see for themselves. And we did that. And I think it had a very positive impact.

WELL, YOU KNOW, PEOPLE WERE SAYING, "WHY DON'T YOU PUT THE MISSILE SYSTEM BACK EAST? YOU'RE DESTROYING OUR BEAUTIFUL DESERT OUT HERE, YOU'RE DESTROYING OUR WAY OF LIFE, AND YOU'RE CREATING THIS HUGE INFLUX OF PEOPLE AND YOU ARE MAKING US A TARGET."

There were limited areas in which the MX system could be destroyed. There were geological and water conditions that were necessary. One could not build shelters that would be underwater. That would be the truth in the East and in the Southeast. There had to be sufficient water for construction so that parts of New Mexico and Texas were impossible. The land had to be flat to ensure mobility. And we felt the land had to be public land. So by a process of elimination, there were not too many areas. We added New Mexico, there were areas in New Mexico that were possible, there were parts of Wyoming that were possible. Under the scheme of the MPS, it was necessary to have the areas fairly contiguous. One could have had three sets of twenty-three shelters in one state and two in another, theoretically, and spread it all around. But then the operational and maintenance costs would have been prohibitive. As it is, mobile basing is simply far more expensive to maintain, requires more people, greater expenses in transportation than a fixed system.

DID YOU GO TO THAT MEETING IN DELTA? ONE OF THE PUBLIC HEARINGS THAT WAS HELD IN DELTA AT THE TIME?

I went to several meetings in Delta. But the funniest thing that happened was that before one meeting, we flew in helicopters from Salt Lake City and there was a snowstorm, it was a whiteout. And finally, I remember the drama of it all, flying very low, so the sergeant said, "Oh my god, we just missed a telephone wire." The co-pilot reading a road map saying "I'm not sure town what we're in, let's look and see what the names of the street are." And General Hecker saying "put her down." And we went right down on a road. And I said, "You people can go on, I think you're insane and I'm going to hitch hike back to Salt Lake City." And I did. Only my military assistant came with me, the rest were game for going on. They almost hit a farm on the way. And I hitchhiked in a truck as far as Tooele, were the Army commander was so delighted to have somebody whom he could brief about chemical warfare that in the shivering snowstorm, I had to hear all about chemical warfare before I got a ride back to Salt Lake City. It was an incredible experience. It also made me totally unsurprised when the Iran hostage rescue attempt failed because I then knew about helicopters and whiteouts.

WHAT HAPPENED AT THE DELTA MEETING THAT YOU DID ATTEND?

I think the meeting, there, as many other meetings, showed me that there were layers and layers of issues. That there were real concerns about groundwater. That were serious concerns. That there were real concerns from farmers and ranchers that I think were more easily answered. That environmental issues were a point to gather in a coalition of people who were opposed to MX because they thought it was a first-strike weapon. And I think the very great, some of the great, opposition was on theoretical grounds not on environmental grounds. But it made, you know, an opportunity for a fairly powerful coalition.

I SAW AN INTERVIEW WITH SUE DUTSON WERE SHE WAS UPSET BECAUSE GENERAL HECKER HAD COME IN AND WAS SAYING THAT THE MORMON CHURCH WAS IN FAVOR THE SYSTEM AND SHE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT WAS TRUE AND THEY FELT LIKE THEY WERE BEING TALKED DOWN TO AND THEY COULD NOT TRUST...WAS IT A SORT OF AN ANGRY SESSION THERE?

Almost every community session we had, was angry. I think there appeared to be a fair amount of slickness in the briefing and a claim for support that had existed initially. There was very strong initial support. Remember these are areas that are very much in favor of a strong military. Senator Garn was one of the strongest supporters, Senator Laxalt likewise, of, of, the military. Try to close a base in Utah, Nevada, and you would find out just how strong the support is. Nevertheless that support was eroding and the politicians realized that. They realized it more quickly than we did. And therefore it appeared that some of our briefers were disingenuous about the support. For example, the Mormon Church, which had been there, but had really gone.

DID YOU GO TO VISIT THE ELDERS AT THE MORMON CHURCH?

No, I didn't. I never visited church people-

ASKS IMPACT OF MORMON CHURCH.

I think that the Mormon Church coming out against the system was devastating to the system. I don't think there was really a chance to recover after that.

WAS IT UNANTICIPATED?

I think it was unanticipated. I think that Gen. Hecker really felt that he had made connections in the Mormon Church that were stronger than they in fact were. I think the system could have been recovered because I think a great part of it could have been taken out of Utah and put into Nevada. But I think that it made it extremely difficult when combined with other issues of groundwater and socioeconomic infrastructure.

ASKS ABOUT LAXALT'S INFLUENCE.

It was clear that the Senators were concerned and had their fingers on the pulse of the constituencies. They were clearly going to go along with the governors and it, it, there the support was eroding day by day. The two governors changed completely. Governor List, Governor Matheson, had been enormously strong supporters. They had sent telegrams to President Carter at the very beginning. In fact there were choices, though perhaps not as good choices in moving a system into a different state or splitting the system off so part of it could be in a different state. And it was the governor's enthusiasm that really made it a go proposition to go into Nevada and Utah. I think that the senators were terribly important but I think they were following the lead of the governors who were much closer to the opposition at that point. Senator Laxalt who then became President Reagan's chief political adviser I think made it very clear that that system of basing should be abandoned and a different one be sought early in the campaign. So that by, you know, by the campaign the MX basing was certainly dead. But I think it was dead at the time of Afghanistan when President Carter decided he would not try for ratification of SALT II, that it was untimely. I think then the opposition to base an MX when there was no arms control treaty, essentially dictated the configuration of that missile. Made many of the liberal supporters or people who had kept quiet like Paul Warnke, the Director of ACDA, of ACDA, I think that the support within the Administration was eroding just as fast as the opposition was building.

ASKS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT II AND BASING SYSTEM.

The relationship between SALT II and the basing system was as I mentioned the constraints of counting launchers and counting total numbers. And having a limit on how many warheads could be on land-based missiles.

ASKS ABOUT WHETHER SYSTEM MADE SENSE WITHOUT SALT II AGREEMENT.

I think the system was not optimal without SALT II agreement. That there are better mobile systems if an arms control agreement counts warheads. I think then all the obstacles to a smaller missile are removed, once warheads are being counted rather than launchers. I think there was an inherent legal technical problem with the basing mode anyway that I think we never fully faced. And in fact the Russians raised it but they didn't press it. And that issue was whether each of the 23 shelters should be counted as a launcher and whether we were proliferating launchers. We maintained that the launcher was the missile plus its outer layer, which had all of the launch equipment, and not the essentially cold launch hole which had practically nothing in it. That was a funny technical argument that we might have prevailed upon, but it's not an argument that we would particularly like to have made back at us. So I think yes. The system was designed to meet the requirements of SALT II. As we shifted to the ground rules in START that we now have, it becomes much easier to think about mobility in terms of small missiles which made sense as I said in the first place. It's harder for a fat person to move quickly.

ASKS ROLE OF STANSFIELD TURNER.

He was not... Admiral Turner was not a vocal opponent of MX basing during the time that we were working on it. He may have become an opponent later. The CIA was working very closely with us to develop verification measures and to assure that the signature of the missile would not be available so that the concealment would be defeated by the Soviets. They worked with us on technical matters.

ASKS ABOUT GARN'S SUPPORT.

Senator Garn was a cool supporter of the system. I think that if everything else had gone well, he might have supported it. I think people are very...they're, in hindsight all of their doubts come out to be much stronger than they were at the time. That's understandable.

ASKS ABOUT BILL MOYERS SHOW.

I had an absolutely wonderful time doing the Bill Moyers show. I was frightened because I knew that I had to have at my fingertips enormous detail, numbers of cattle, numbers of schools. Just lots of information in order to show people that in fact we were doing our homework. We were spending $25 million on environmental impact studies and you can imagine that it isn't easy to master $25 million worth of information and to make it understandable to a hostile audience. But I regarded it as any lawyer does, as a real challenge. I was an advocate. I was trying to do a job. But at the same time I was trying to assess the mood of the people that would be coming to a public meeting in order to feel what kind of obstacles there were. By the time of the Bill Movers show I knew that we had a position that was going to be very difficult to maintain politically. That we were probably not going to succeed.

ASKS FOR HIGH OR TURNING POINTS OF DEBATE.

What I loved about the debate was that the issues turned out not to be military issues but very bread and butter human issues. And I think that there was a farmer, forget his name, with red suspenders, who came across as a great character. I loved the show. Even though it was difficult for me because I felt the people were very human. And they were very funny. I thought it was good entertainment and I was really privileged to be a part of it.

ASKS ABOUT WATER PROBLEM IN DEBATE.

The hardest issue to deal with was the water issue but we did feel that by paying enormous millions to do studies of aquifers and groundwater we were in fact telling people what they didn't know about their water tables. And in fact we knew we were doing that. There had never been any studies. Had there been studies we wouldn't have had to expend the kind of monies that we did. Of course, they didn't like to hear that we knew more scientifically than they did. And so the, some of the information that I was giving them came across like a lead balloon. I knew that was the case. But I had to get the information across.

WHO WON THE DEBATE?

I think in the end the system did not win. I think in terms of, you know, putting on a good performance, I think we did rather well. But I think that the fact of the opposition, the fact that bus loads of people came to oppose a weapons system deployment was, before the debate even started, stated who was the winner and who was the loser.

ASKS ABOUT REAGAN'S CAMPAIGN AND VAN CLEAVE IN GIVING PEOPLE HOPE THE SYSTEM WOULD BE CANCELLED.

I think it was very clear from the beginning of the Reagan campaign that the MX basing system was probably doomed. I remember an early conversation after election with Caspar Weinberger at the Kennedy School in which I said, "You're going to spend your entire time as Secretary of Defense worrying about finding a mobile basing system for ICBMs." And I was absolutely right. There were no easy alternative and in part that goes back to the dilemma of trying to make a very large weapon mobile. It can be done but it's not optimal. And they were not in a mood, of course, to start R and D on a new system. My own belief now, as of this moment and perhaps I'll change it, is that the most sensible thing is to take a two or, maximally, three warhead missile and try to find a system of mobility on Defense Department land that can work. Any mobility can be overcome to a certain extent. But it is harder and I think it is probably worthwhile but I think there probably isn't any real urgency in it.

ASKS BIGGEST MISTAKES OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN THIS PROGRAM.

I think we made many political mistakes. I hate to say that our openness and our willingness to work with community was a mistake, but perhaps it was. Nevertheless it's a mistake that I would make again. I think it's very important to negotiate with communities that have to have the impact of the weapons system that we plan to deploy. I think in the end the outcome perhaps was not so bad although it was very costly. I think that communities have to be accepting and therefore they need to know what is in store. We tried to be very honest and very open and meet with them. Perhaps we had many, many too many meetings. And those very forums under NETVA provided an opportunity to coalesce an opposition. We could have been much cagier about that, I'm not sure that's good public policy in any case. I think it, the biggest mistake was no single incident but rather the fact that we didn't think through what the opposition was likely to be in advance. I think the leadership in the Pentagon delegated far too much to too many different people. It took me an enormous effort to try to pull together the support into, into a group that really worked together. I had to fight my way and I was not in the right position as Undersecretary of the Air Force to take on the political management. The Air Force military wanted to do it on its own, it thought it could do it in the way that it had always worked with weapons system, that it knew more and better and could cajole political officials as has been the case in the past, and it was much too big an impact for that to work. So perhaps the biggest mistake was that the Secretary, the Undersecretary of Defense didn't sit down and really think through what the opposition was likely to be and how they could best serve the President in getting it done expeditiously.

IS IT REALLY WORTHWHILE TO TAKE SO MUCH LAND AND TURN IT INTO SHELTERS, FOR MISSILES THAT WOULD NEVER BE USED?

It's probably, was not a sensible scheme to be sprawled out over so many thousands of acres. I think mobility can be achieved in a much smaller compass. And I think that the alternative are much better. I guess I still am a believer, that if we're going to have ICBMs at all, we ought to have them mobile. I think that whether there's any military reason to have ICBMs at all, or to even modernize our systems, is another discussion. But politically I can say now that with the Soviets having two mobile systems, the SS-24s and the SS-25s, we will find a reason to have a mobile system. Because there's a certain amount of impetus that parity requires. And that's a political impetus. I don't think it makes sense to have a ten-warhead missile in silos. I think that if there ever was any reason at any stage in an escalating conflict to try and pre-empt that is an ideal target for pre-emption. I think the solution of putting MX in silos was a mistake. I think the Scowcroft Commission report really doesn't make a great deal of sense. But that is history. I don't think there are likely to be more than 50 MX in silos and my guess is that the ones in silos will be put in some form of mobility, rail or otherwise, in the next 15 years.

WHAT DOES SHE THINK OF RAIL GARRISON?

I think the rail garrison proposal is a reasonable proposal. My preference would be to stop the MX production at this point and move to a smaller missile. I think that in terms of stability, a single warhead missile is ideal. I think in terms of cost effectiveness, it is not going to happen. It is much too expensive per warhead. The cost of building and the cost of maintaining the missiles. So my own view is that a 2 or 3 warhead missile will make a great deal more sense and that can be made mobile over a larger area, still on DOD land.... I think rail garrison is a viable system. My own view is that we should not build any more MX missiles. Perhaps we should think about mobility for 50 that we have built or perhaps we just leave them at 50 and hope that is not too tempting a target. I think we have to begin to think about mobility. As I said it's a political necessity, will become a political necessity, but it makes sense militarily. If there's any reason to worry about pre-emption at any stage of a war that began inadvertently, it is important not to have lucrative targets. I think that ideally from the point of view of stability, Midgetman single-warhead missile does make sense, but from the point of view of cost effectiveness, it is not viable. It is not just the cost, the per warhead cost of building it. It is the operational cost of keeping it going and maintaining it. Therefore I think it makes a lot of sense to be thinking about a two or three warhead missile, with penetration aids that can be placed on DOD lands. But I want to say that I don't think there is enormous urgency in doing this. I think we need to modernize, we need to do it gradually. But we talked about initial operating capability, IOC, of 1986 as if the day after that the Soviets were going to start to...launch missiles. Well we are now in 1988 almost and we are looking at a period in which the reductions of strategic offensive forces under a new agreement might be so drastic that the...not perhaps the initial 50 percent cuts, but a second agreement, that there may be no need for mobility. So I think we need to continue to keep programs like the Midgetman program in R and D, but I think to go ahead and modernize before we see the shape of future arms control agreements would be very foolish.

DID SHE FEEL BESIEGED ON LEFT AND RIGHT?

It only made my job more fascinating to be attacked by the left and the right. To know that we had really no supporters on the arms control side and very strong opponents.

REPEATS QUESTION.

It was a fascinating experience to be attacked both from the left and the right. The arms control supporters either vociferously opposed MX or they barely tolerated it in order to get through the SALT discussions. I had many fascinating times with Dick Garwin and Sid Drell who have later become very good friends of mine. Their logic I think was extremely interesting. They felt that we should be moving to small submarines. In fact, I think they were right but I don't think that was the alternative to a mobile land-based system. Of course we were attacked not from the right so much but from people in the West who didn't want the system. The right was not opposed to MX, probably would have been delighted to put MX in silos. It's just that nobody wanted the MX in his backyard.

WAS MX THE PRICE CARTER HAD TO PAY FOR THE SALT II AGREEMENT?

MX was certainly a price that had to be paid for a SALT II agreement. In fact, I believe we would have gotten the SALT II agreement. We would have gotten the SALT II agreement if it had been pushed to ratification. I think there was sufficient support despite Afghanistan. I think in fact, a commitment to mobile basing would have been enough and some solution would have been found to the MX that would have been acceptable or a subsequent missile devised as is likely to be the case.

ASKS HER COMMENT AFTER OCTOBER SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT.

I had, I had met Secretary Weinberger in the beginning of the Reagan Administration at a meeting at the Kennedy School. And I told him that if he didn't go with MPS he was going to spend his entire tenure as Secretary of Defense trying to find a viable basing mode for MX. It turned out to be quite prophetic.

ASKS HER OPINION OF CECIL GARLAND.

I think that, I don't remember any individuals as being decisive in the debate in Utah, but there were some wonderful characters and Cecil Garland was one. Colorful, rich in vocabulary, and quite persuasive. I enjoyed not only the Moyers broadcast but many of the community meetings because the people were so colorful.

ASKS ABOUT SUE DUTSON, FRANCES FARLEY.

I remember Frances Farley. She was another character. And I remember all the people, the lawyers, whom our lawyers dealt with. They were also colorful and full of imaginative ideas to defeat the MX system.

ASKS FOR STORIES ABOUT THEM ASKS IF SHE HAS SYMPATHY WITH THEIR POINT OF VIEW.

I believe very strongly in airing community views in the kind of openness of the policy that we pursued. It was difficult to deal with and it wasn't always fun to face the opposition and hostility that we faced. On the other hand, I think that our honesty in many instances got through to people and particularly when we began to provide them with resources, to develop their own analyses. People saw that we were not afraid to let the chips fall where they might with respect to groundwater, cattle. We were very sure of our ground on that. One of the things that turned out to be an issue later was basing around Indian burial mounds. We never anticipated that to be an issue. We were amused by the endangered species argument because they were, they were arguments that we had anticipated might be important to ecologists. But in fact there was never any opposition. Nobody cared about the three-eyed toad or whatever it was that might be made extinct.

DID YOU REALLY FEEL THE ENVIRONMENT WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED?

There were many aspects to the environmental impact statement. Although we were working under enormous pressure, we had armies of environmental experts in every conceivable area that were working with us. I felt that the job was far too expensive but that was, you know, the cost of doing it fast. I think it was extremely professionally competent and I think there were real flaws in it nevertheless. I think one of the problems was a full analysis of ground water—That's an extremely elusive issue and would be anytime that's an issue. It has become an issue with toxic contamination. People really don't know what seepage does and those issues are going to be litigated long beyond our lifetime. I felt that with respect to endangered species we were very sound and because there was so little opposition we probably spent too much time and money on it. I think we were beginning to do a very good job on socioeconomic impact but the consulting firms were not really interested in those issues. Those are not strictly speaking environmental issues, but if there are big effects they are triggered by NEPA. Legally we were required to deal with those issues.

RECALLS FARLEY'S EXPERIENCE WITH AIR FORCE BRIEFINGS.

I think we made a mistake any time we failed to disclose what the facts were, that we absolutely did not have to keep secret for military purposes. In fact, the MX was a system in which there was not a great deal of classified information. Much of the information was open and therefore anytime that anything was withheld, in a community that was as jittery as the ones we faced. It was a mistake.