ASKS WHAT BY EARLY 1970S WAS SEEN AS IDEAL REPLACEMENT FOR MINUTEMAN III MISSILE?

The replacement of the Minuteman III was an issue for many years in the Air Force. And many different configurations of missile were studied. And many different employment schemes. In the late '60s and early '70s...I'm not clear on what was the prevailing thought at that time, but there had been a series of examinations of a rail mobile system, there had been discussions of different kinds of silo basing. Many variants which were being discussed of basing in, in lakes, in different kinds of mobile systems. All trying to address the questions which were foreseen as the Soviet missiles became more and more accurate.

WHAT WAS SEEN AS BEST DIRECTION TO GO IN TO REPLACE MINUTEMAN III?

Well the late '60s and early '70s were a little early for the thought to have been congealed. Now it was really more of the mid-'70s when it was very clear that MIRVing that is multiple independent re-entry vehicles, was the technology which would change the future, in a number of different ways. The principle one of which was that it made the ability to deliver warheads substantially more economical. That is, one could put ten re-entry vehicles on a single missile and pay the costs then for only one missile while achieving ten weapons. And that clearly began to change the thinking very rapidly during the '70s. There were by the mid and latter part of the '70s, one clearly was talking about missiles with a number of warheads on them, and ten was the number that was settling out.

WHY TEN?

I am not sure there is a, a magic reason that ten was the optimum number. Different numbers were discussed at varying times. But ... but ten was a number which would fit on a missile that seemed to optimize in terms of its cost and effectiveness.

WHY WERE MINUTEMEN III NOT ACCURATE ENOUGH? WHAT DID WE WANT THESE TO BE ABLE TO DO?

The Soviets were building harder and harder silos and there is no question that the additional hardness of their deployed missiles and the evidence that they were building other hardened structures for command and control, were causing the Air Force a great deal of concern in the late '70s at least. And therefore accuracy became very much a consideration.

ASKS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCURACY AND HARDNESS OF TARGET? [DISCUSSION]

The most important point about hardness and accuracy really is a conclusion that seems to be, to be true for emplaced missiles. And that is that although we have been surprised by the increased hardness which the Soviets have been able to build into their super-hard silos, the, the technology fact remains that the missile accuracy can improve faster than the hardness can improve. Therefore it is, it has always been clear that even with a great deal of effort at hardening a silo one could design a re-entry vehicle hard enough to give a satisfactory probability of kill.

WE FACED THAT KIND OF THREAT. WHY NOT GIVE UP OUR ICBMS BECAUSE WE'D ALWAYS BE ON THE LOSING END OF THAT RATIO?

The ICBMs have always been an important part of the, the triad. They, each element of the triad has its own strengths and weaknesses and the, the existence of the triad has been a source of great comfort to the United States as the Soviets have made advances in one direction and another. Certainly the submarines are the most invulnerable of the three elements of the triad. The bombers have the advantage that they can be launched in, under cases of warning, and then recalled if one is concerned that the situation didn't develop as you expected. Bombers also have the ability to have their, their striking power increased during periods of tension by increasing the alert status. The great strength of the ballistic missiles has been their accuracy on the one hand. But the more important one these days is the very tight command and control of the missiles, which gives a great assurance of the ability to issue the commands to them properly and promptly.

ASKS IF WHAT WE WANT TO DO WITH LAND-BASED LEG OF TRIAD IS TO PUT SOME TARGETS AT RISK THAT WE CAN'T WITH THE OTHERS?

The ICBMs today provide an accuracy which is only slightly greater than that of the planned D-5 missile on the Trident submarines. Therefore as time has gone on in recent years, the uniqueness of accuracy of the ICBMs has, has been diminished. The ICBMs still though play a unique part in the triad and the United States although it has considered giving up the ICBMs, the land-based missiles a number of times, has always found it a very uneasy thing to do, under circumstances that the Soviets place such a large amount of their reliance on land-based missiles. And even though it's hard to quantify the reasons for it, there is a feeling that too much asymmetry, that is differences in the deployed forces of the two countries, can create some, some circumstances which, which would be unstable. And therefore the United States has even though it's considered giving up the land-based missiles, has always concluded that it was unwilling to do so, unless it could negotiate with the Soviets for a very large reduction in the land-based missiles.

WAS THERE A TURNING POINT IN THE 70S WHEN WE KNEW OUR SILOS WERE BECOMING VULNERABLE?

There certainly seemed to be a turning point. The turning point was in...late 73 or 74, I've forgotten just exactly the date. But it was when the, a second team was put together to examine the intelligence estimate of that year. And although that team was put together for a number of different reasons and a number of different varying conclusions came out, one of the things that they assembled was a re-estimate of the progress that the Soviets were making in, in the precision guidance of their ballistic missiles. Now prior to that time there had been a notion that the United States was quite alone and very far ahead of the Soviets in the ability to guide missiles very precisely. And the evidence uncovered during that ... that alternate team's examination of the intelligence of data that was available, indicate very clear that the Soviets were making progress and, in missile accuracy which had not been properly anticipated. And therefore the thinking began to change very, very rapidly following that report as to the accuracy that the incoming new generation of Soviet missiles would have.

UP TO THEN THAT THREAT HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN SERIOUS. THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED WITH DEVELOPING ACCURACY?

Yes. I, I think it's true that in the early '70s the replacement for the Minuteman had accuracy as its foremost objective. But that certainly changed very rapidly by the time we reached the mid-'70s because from that point on the vulnerability of the basing scheme for the replacement missiles of the Minuteman became the dominant consideration.

WAS IT LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS COULD THINK THEY COULD SURPRISE US AND TAKE OUT OUR LAND-BASED FORCE AND NOT SUFFER RETRIBUTION?

Whenever we examine deterrence we have to recognize that the deterrence has many facets. And the United States always relies heavily on all legs of the triad. For example, if the Soviets did consider that a pre-emptive effect against our missile fields...would knock them out, the United States is still able to rely upon the submarine force and the bomber force to provide a very substantial degree of retaliation. But at the same time the reason one has a triad is of course that an unexpected vulnerability in one leg of the triad is compensated by the strengths of the other. And therefore, although one does not foresee it and did not at that time foresee it, it is not impossible that some vulnerability would arise in the submarine force. That is, a breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare would occur. And that one would need to rely on the other legs of the triad besides the submarine. Similarly the bombers have to face a very awesome Soviet air defense system and the progress in developing, improving bomber technology to penetrate those defenses is one that is not without its own share of controversy. So, once again, even though one would consider it quite unlikely that the Soviets would see advantage to a bolt from the blue attack against US land-based missiles, it still is true that to keep our deterrent capability robust and at all times credible, one wishes to have a survivable land—based missile force.

ASKS ROLE OF ACCURACY IN DETERRENCE, BEING ABLE TO THREATEN THEIR TARGETS?

In, as the Soviets examine the equation of whether there could be any advantage in a nuclear war, in order that we can be sure that we can be sure they are deterred. They have to consider what the capabilities of each of the attack, of our retaliation forces are. The Soviets have gone to a great deal of effort to harden many facilities in the Soviet Union, particularly leadership facilities, control bunkers, deep underground facilities of various kinds. As well as their emplaced missile forces. So it is important that the United States have some means of holding these hardened facilities at risk.

WHY DO WE WANT TO BE ABLE TO TARGET THEIR LEADERSHIP BUNKERS AND SO ON?

The rationale is that if the Soviets have worked as hard as they have worked to make these facilities survivable, then they must have some notion in their minds that if there is a nuclear exchange, that the survivability of these leadership functions, and of course of the missiles themselves, will put them in a more favorable situation. In order to ensure that war to them, as it does to them, always looks to be a very unattractive proposition, we wish to hold each of the things they hold dear at risk.

DO WE DO THE SAME THINGS FOR OURSELVES? DO WE PROTECT OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL TOO?

The situation is not entire symmetric. The United States over the years has not invested as much in hardening and it's, it's to me at least, somewhat unclear as to why this difference exists between the two countries. I, I suspect it is that the United States really has accepted a deterrence philosophy and really does believe that there is very little merit in waging a nuclear war and very little opportunity to, to survive effectively. Therefore we've worked a little bit less harder on the survivability of command and control and leadership...elements of the United States. Now the Reagan Administration has attempted to change that to some degree and has directed that a great deal more attention be placed on the survivable elements of the command and control and leadership. And some progress is being made in that, in that area.

DO THE SOVIETS BELIEVE FIGHTING A NUCLEAR WAR IS MORE POSSIBLE THAN WE THINK IT IS?

It may be that the Soviets believe that a nuclear war, that winning a nuclear war, surviving to meet your national objectives after a nuclear war is, is more possible than the United States does. But nevertheless I think that we, that I am convinced that the Soviet leadership does not believe that the results of a nuclear war would be very happily... very happy for the socialist state. And therefore I think that they do share with us, the view that... that one is really at a state of extremis when one resorts to nuclear weapons.

ASKS ABOUT BASING MODES FOR MX, ASPECTS OF EARLY TUNNELING IDEAS. AL LATTER'S CRITICISM...

During the 1977 and early '78 time period, the Air Force was in the midst of weighing several basing alternatives which included tunnels, that is almost a subway like structure, under the ground through which the missile would move. It included widely spaced...vertical silos in which missiles could be emplaced and removed. And it included horizontal structures. And there were really other variants on these as well which were considered. Many of the strategic thinkers in the area in the technical side were influential in advocating one scheme or another or arguing against one particular scheme or another. I recall in, in late '77 that, that Albert Latter, formerly of RAND Corporation, made a very strong pronouncement to me personally which I think he had done publicly in other arenas, advocating particular aspects. My recollection is that at that time he was a particular advocate of the vertical silo. And had some numbers which led him to believe that that would be much less expensive than, than the tunnel. But in any event there was a very vigorous dialogue during that period of time to try to settle in on what seemed to be the, the most optimum scheme.

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE TUNNEL?

The tunnel had as its major flaw simply expense. That is, it was necessary to design the tunnel to be hard over its length, and to permit the missile to move back and forth in the tunnel rapidly and still be survivable as it went to various locations. As we worked through the details of it, it simply appeared that that was a more expensive solution than was the one which we ultimately settled on which was horizontal silos.

ASKS ABOUT PROPAGATION OF MAGNETIC PULSE ALONG THE RAMPS?

There were concerns about the tunnel simply having to do with the fact that it was, it was connected, that is therefore an effect at one part of the tunnel could be propagated down the tunnel in a manner which wasn't entirely predictable. We thought we had answers to that, but the answers themselves were fairly complicated. And it was part of the reasons for, for ending up choosing the independent horizontal silos, connected by surface roads. As contrasted to, to hardened locations along an underground tunnel.

WHAT DID HE DO WHEN TRENCHES DID NOT GO WELL?

Somewhere in this '77, '78 time period, John Toomay, who was an Air Force Major General, and one of the best of the strategic analysts led a team to examine the various alternatives that existed and to make recommendations as to which of those the Air Force should follow. And the, these choices ran between the, the vertical silo, with an argument being made that with a fairly cheap silo and a smaller missile, one would have a more inexpensive set up than some of the other alternatives that were examined. The, the horizontal basing was also examined, and the tunnel basing was also examined in those studies.

WAS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE OFFICE LOATH TO GIVE UP TUNNEL CONCEPT?

Yes. The Ballistic Missile Office had favored the tunnel for some time. Although the reasoning for it wasn't all that profound. It was just necessary to make choices and they had made a choice which said that the tunnel was the better system. So they had invested a certain amount of their effort in making that one a more well defined concept than the others. However, it was still best described as a period of vigorous debate because there was not all that much to choose between the various choices, that is, each one of them could be varied in such a way that you could make the advantages and disadvantages overlap. But the Ballistic Missile Office chose the tunnel approach. Some of the thinkers outside of the Air Force were advocating smaller missiles and more proliferation of those, of those missiles. And it was a, it was a vigorous debate to settle into the final choice.

ASKS ABOUT THOSE WHO PREFERRED SMALLER MISSILES. WHERE DID PRESSURE COME FROM TO MAKE TEN-WARHEAD MISSILE?

The arguments having to do with the number of warheads on a given missile, have gone back and forth many times. And indeed it is one of the most prominent arguments on the strategic scene today. At...What has happened in each of these analyses is that when one is down to, to the final examination of cost, which in general includes the operational costs, that is to maintain and operate the missile over a long period of time, the larger number of warheads on the missile turns out to be cheaper. And therefore the Air Force and all of these studies initially favored somewhat smaller configurations but in finally working through the costs, would end up settling in on the larger number of re-entry vehicles which is the ten-warhead MX. Now that argument continues today of course because the recognition of the vulnerability questions have led prominent people in the United States and particularly the Scowcroft Commission to recommend major effort on a, on a single warhead ballistic missile. Which has very large advantages in terms of the survivability of the force. But it also has very large operational costs. And that is the debate which is facing the country today.

WHAT ABOUT VERTICAL CHEAP SHELTERS WHICH WERE FAVORED? HOW DID IT CHANGE TO HORIZONTAL?

The final selection of horizontal over vertical is lost a bit in the arcane analyses and cost estimates but was, was finally made in my recollection of the key arguments on the basis of cost. That is, it appeared simply easier to construct the roads and the transport vehicles and the shelters if they were horizontal. And the ease in being able to make the deception effective, which involved putting a heavyweight dummy into a silo as you removed the missile seemed also to be somewhat easier in the horizontal structure.

WAS IT TOUGH TO COMPETE WITH SOVIETS IN TERMS OF DECEPTION--WHEN IT'S EASIER FOR THEM TO DO DECEPTION IN THEIR SOCIETY?

The United States in examining these questions of survivability has always been at a relative disadvantage with the Soviets. First of all, for, for true mobile missiles the United States has, has not found it really possible to move missiles freely around the countryside. The concern of the citizenry and the lack of very large spaces which are completely under government control, have made that approach rejected whenever it's been considered. The Soviets on the other hand have had true mobiles, moving about on roads, and they don't seem to have to worry so much about the public reaction to truly mobile missiles. So the United States has always been forced into some kind of system of, of looking for mobility, in order to provide survivability. But having to have that mobility constrained in some manner which would make it acceptable to the public as it, as it moves about. The...when one does that, then one needs to include some deceptive techniques, that is some way of insuring that within the restricted space that you now have confined the movement of the missiles, that you can keep the actual location of the missile uncertain to Soviet espionage, satellite observational techniques. And that's proven to be a challenge, a challenge that the Soviets don't have to face in the same way.

COULD WE HAVE DONE THAT IN THE UTAH SYSTEM?

Yes, I became confident that the basing system that we worked out, in which there had been a great deal of attention given to the methods for preserving uncertainty about the location of the missile within the various bases. It would work. It was going to be difficult and require care over years that the system would operate. But I believe that it could have been made to work.

CITES RIDICULE-—A RUBE GOLDBERG SCHEME DESIGNED FOR ARMS CONTROL, ETC. WHAT WAS HE RESPONSE?

I was very disappointed that the particular scheme that we had worked out, very, with a great deal of difficulty with the Carter Administration, President Carter had his own particular ideas about the features that the system should have. That it was difficult to accommodate those. We had gone to many, many different design variations in order to obtain the acceptance of the Carter Administration, and the system that we, that we did finally obtain, I believed was a reasonable design compromise to meet the objectives which the United States had. Some of the features that President Carter wanted were abandoned as the system evolved. For example, he was concerned about a circumstance that might arise if we lost our secrecy, where the missile was. And therefore he continuously asked us questions, "But what happens if you wake up one day and find that a spy or someone has revealed to the Soviets where each of the missiles are? And therefore he encouraged us to, to include in the system a rapid movement capability. Unfortunately that came to be known as "The Racetrack," and we never quite were able to lose that, that name for the system. Even when we abandoned that particular idea, and it added a bit to the, to the Rube Goldberg character which people ascribed to this particular approach. As we would have implemented and I think the Rube Goldberg character was not correct, I think that the provisions that we had put in to both make it compatible with arms control were useful and set a good precedent for mobile systems that could be verified and the pains that we went to to preserve the location uncertainty I think were both needed and would have been successful. When the Reagan Administration came in, unfortunately it had been a part of Mr. Reagan's campaign that this was a, a very bad approach. And therefore he clearly was not very enthusiastic about this particular, particular basing scheme and established several studies very early in his Administration to look at it. Those studies were very much prejudiced against the acceptability of this because they did not allow the consideration of an arms control environment, and part of the assumption was that the Soviets would likely proliferate their accurate warheads to very large numbers. In which case any system that depended upon having multiple locations would not look good under those, under those assumptions. That was unfortunate because it caused us then to, to abandon the multiple basing mode, but without having an acceptable alternative. As it's turned out now I think it's a bit ironical that, a bit ironic, that at the end of the Reagan Administration where arms control is now back in vogue and that one no longer finds it necessary to imagine these very large proliferated number of accurate warheads on the Soviet side, a multiple basing scheme could have been successful.

DID CARTER'S SYSTEM DEPEND ON ARMS CONTROL?

The system that we designed in the Carter Administration because of clear limitations on cost, would end up having a finite number of locations in which the missile would be, missiles would be hidden. I think the one that about the end of the Carter Administration would have had 2300 missile horizontal silos to be stored. And the...

INTERRUPTS HIMSELF/DISCUSS

At the end of the Carter Administration, we were looking at a configuration which would involve 200 missiles, deceptively located in some 4600 horizontal silos. Now 4600 is a finite number and of course it becomes expensive to add more although we went through the cost exchange numbers if we had to increase that number of silos. But, the 4600 is already a very respectable number, that is, it negates, for instance, the entire capabilities of the Soviet SS-18 force, which contains some 3000 very accurate warheads. Therefore it was our view that under any condition where there would be some kind arms control, SALT II for example, even with all of its limitations of only providing caps, still provided an upper limit of the number of accurate RVs which the Soviets would have. And that particular basing of MX would have been an effective deterrent under conditions of adhering to SALT II. Therefore, when the Reagan Administration didn't wish to, to assume those limits, it was disappointing that it became less evident that that would be an acceptable system.

DID HE GO TO UTAH/NEVADA TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC REACTION?

During the period of time that we were examining the environmental impact of placing these missiles and their, and their road structure in silos, in the deserts, we examined actually a number of different. We examined sites in Texas and New Mexico, in the Sonoran Desert, Colorado and Arizona, and in the deserts of Utah and Nevada. As it turned out, after examining all of these, the … the deployment areas in Utah and Nevada turned out to have the least environmental impact, and had other advantages in terms of cost that we felt were important. So we settled in pretty well on Utah and Nevada. We anticipated concern of the citizenry, obviously, spent a great deal of time anticipating those concerns and trying to deal with them. I made visits into, into the area, made visits to talk with the leadership in the state of Nevada, and with the leadership in the state of Utah. And I flew over every one of those valleys and looked at them to try and get a feel for myself for the kind of terrain that we were going to be altering. The concern about all of this matter was such that the then undersecretary of the Air Force, Antonia Chayes, devoted almost full time to addressing the questions of the environmental impact of the, of the MX basing system. And although it was difficult and certainly not everyone in those states was enthusiastic about, about the basing systems, I, I believe that we would have prevailed, and that it would have, it could have been done in a manner which would have been acceptable to the, to the principal people involved, and done with minimal environmental impact.

IT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE "IF" WHAT HAD HAPPENED?

If in the Reagan Administration there had been continuing support of the MX deceptive basing scheme, I believe that we would have been able to handle the situations in Nevada and Utah. Clearly not everyone was enthusiastic and there would have been difficulties, and there had been certainly opposition mustered, but the need was great and with a president as strong as President Reagan, and with as much public support as he had, had he chosen to endorse that scheme, I think we would have been able to base it in those areas.

ASKS ABOUT HIS USE OF PHRASE "RV SPONGE," OR "WARHEAD SPONGE"?

In describing how deterrence works and what the advantages of one system or another are, it's difficult to find the right words. That is, one is talking about building a system which has characteristics such that it will not be attacked. That one never imagines that anything is successful if the war actually occurs and the missiles have to be attacked. So one is describing a system which when the Soviets view it, will be viewed as being, being unsuitable for attack. In one of the early speeches, in describing this particular element of strategy, and describing how this, this deceptive basing system would negate the effectiveness of the Soviet accurate RVs, I made a grave semantic error, that is, I chose to describe this as a sponge which would, which could absorb the accurate RVs of both the Soviet SS-18s and indeed many of their SS-19s as well. That was not intended to be a picture of how war would be fought, but would be a picture of how the Soviets would view the system and therefore be deterred and, and not attack. But unfortunately the people in whose backyards these systems were going to be in place did not much like the word sponge, and it was one that I had a hard time living down.

ASKS HIM TO REPEAT ANSWER.

Whenever one is describing publicly deterrent forces, it's a concept which is awkward to describe, because one is talking about forces and their survivability, in terms which are seen by the, by the Soviets such that they will not attack. So one imagines that the, the having forces which are truly survivable will have the effect of the Soviets not wishing to attack them. For example, in the MX, and the deceptive basing mode, one of the strengths of that system is with the number of, of proliferated shelters, that if the Soviets were having to view an attack on the United States, they would have to employ all of the warheads from their SS-18s, a major portion of their land-based force, and many of the warheads from their other systems as well, if they were to contemplate knocking out these MX missiles. And it would be hard for them to attack and not contemplate knocking them out. Therefore we believe that that ability to survive such a massive attack was a real contribution to deterrence. Unfortunately, in describing all of that very early in these debates, I used the word "sponge" and as indicating something that could soak up the Soviet attack but still having the capability of retaliating. Well the sponge was an unfortunate word to use because it gave the connotation for the people in whose backyards we used to employ these missiles as being something that would attract an attack rather than deter one. So I regretted ever having used that term.

The Reagan Commission, the Reagan Administrastion, was very wise in appointing the Scowcroft Commission to re-examine all aspects of the, of the MX missile and the nuclear principles of deterrence. This was a commission that was put together of people with such high credibility that their report achieved a very large degree of acceptance. And in their report they re-examined these principles of deterrence, tried to find grounds on which there would be a political compromise that people could accept, and although they were faced with a moderately unsolvable situation, nevertheless did make first a report which clarified the thinking of people in the country, I think, a great deal, and then made some recommendations which I think were very, very sensible. The main one of these I think was the movement to a single warhead missile.

DID HE TRY TO SEE REAGAN OR WEINBERGER, TO TALK THEM OUT OF REJECTING THIS BASING MODE?

I personally had had no contact with the Reagan Administration during the time of the election or really in any particular detail during the time of transition. But very soon after President Reagan came into office and Mr. Weinberger became Secretary, these issues associated with the missile basing came to the fore. And it was very clear that because of the statements that Mr. Reagan had made during the candidacy that there was a great lack of enthusiasm for the deceptive basing mode which we had established. One of the early actions then of the Reagan Administration was to pull together a commission under Charles Townes of the University of California to review the situation and to make varying recommendations. That particular commission which was composed of very competent people examined under a set of ground rules which they were provided, which were basically a no arms control circumstance. That is, even the limits of SALT II were not to be employed but instead they were to examine circumstances in which the Soviets were presumed to have increased the number of, of weapons on their very accurate missiles considerably. As a matter of fact, almost without bound. Under those circumstances a system of deceptive basing does not look attractive and indeed the Townes Commission ended up recommending that since the system could be overwhelmed by very large numbers of weapons on the Soviet side, that it was inappropriate to continue it. And then they made a set of recommendations which were really a list of alternatives, of other kinds of basing schemes. They included the idea of a very large airplane which would carry missiles around and stay in the air for very long periods of time. And they included super hard silos. It, it turned out that these were in my view not very good ideas, that is, they, they rejected the scheme that we had for reasons that dealt with their views of arms control. But the alternatives picked were not very attractive alternatives. And so as a result the issue has continued to, to be examined somewhat unsatisfactorily ever since.

DID HE SEE WEINBERGER OR REAGAN TO TRY TO SHOW THEM THE ADVANTAGES OF THE BASING SYSTEM HE HAD WORKED OUT?

I had the opportunity to explain to both Secretary Weinberger and at least on one or two occasions to President Reagan the arguments which I felt were in favor of the basing system that the Air Force advocated. These meetings were not successful.

ASKS ABOUT NSC MEETING IN AUGUST '81.

The meeting that I recall during that time frame was a meeting that was held in Los Angeles. There was one particular point in the dialogue where we were discussing the pros and cons of the MX basing system in which I was called to Los Angeles because the President was here on one of his trips. And he convened a meeting at the Century Towers where a number of his advisers appeared, including Secretary Weinberger, and Secretary Haig and others, others of the Cabinet, and at which Charles Townes was present. And I was present and General Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were present. And we made our arguments as to why we thought the MX basing system was the preferred system and, and Charles Townes presented the results of his commission which led to a different commission. The President didn't indicate his decision at that time but it was, it was rather clear that the predominance of advice that he was listening to was unfavorable to our particular approach.

HOW DID HE TRY TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE AIR FORCE APPROACH WAS THE BETTER WAY?

I think at that particular meeting that I can't recall the, the actual way in which General Jones and I framed our arguments. But they, they did, I am sure, include a rebuttal to the very large Soviet... weapon assumptions of Charles Townes. That under a SALT II cap, and hopefully further progress in arms control, that those arguments were not the ones that would really drive. And that if one allowed the Soviets, or was in a situation where the Soviets would increase the numbers of warheads targeted against the Soviet Union almost without bound, that the United States had many other problems besides the survivability of the MX basing system. And that we pointed out to him that that really wasn't the conditions one wished to encourage. That it was really acceptable to go the way we were saying, couple it with arms control, and obtain deterrence in that fashion. But the President at that particular time in the early parts of his Administration clearly wanted to establish a, a principle that he would not rely upon arms control to provide the security for the United States and therefore he simply wouldn't accept that line of reasoning.

DID HE SUGGEST THAT CONGRESS HAD ACCEPTED HIS SCHEME, THAT CHANGES TO BASING MODE MIGHT RUIN CHANCES TO DEPLOY MX AT ALL…?[DISCUSSION}

It was of course disconcerting to me, and to the Air Force in general, to General Jones as the Chairman as well, that the efforts we had undertaken with such difficulty during the Carter Administration since he was no big enthusiast of land-based missiles in the first place, were being discarded. We felt that we had forged a fragile but still workable consensus in the Congress and among the people in the states that were affected and among all of the strategic thinkers who had gone through all of the agonizing list of alternatives which we had examined. Therefore it was disappointing and disconcerting to have all of that unravel so quickly.

DID HE WARN REAGAN THAT HE MIGHT LOSE CONSENSUS AND SUSPEND THE MX FOREVER TRYING TO FIND ANOTHER BASING MODE?

I don't recall doing that...so...

ASKS ABOUT TOWNE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE COST OF ADDING A NEW SHELTER WOULD BE GREATER THAN FOR SOVIETS TO BUILD NEW WARHEAD?

In the Townes Commission report one of the arguments which he made was that it was cheaper for the Soviets to add weapons to their missile systems by, by proliferation. That is, by increasing the, the number of multiple, independently targeted warheads on each missile. That it was for us to build additional shelters to compensate for that. And that argument of course is true. That is, if there are no other restrictions, the advantage goes to the offense in very high degrees of proliferation. We mustered the best arguments we could against that, but in the final analysis, if the ground rules were that there were to be no arms control environment at all, that is no restriction on the amount of proliferation which the Soviets would be assumed to follow, then it was very difficult to have a, an acceptable deceptive basing mode.

WERE YOU NOT AFRAID TO DELAY OR LOSE THE 200 MX MISSILES YOU HAD PLANNED FOR DEPLOYMENT?

The deepest concern of course that the Air Force had was that in the absence of a basing mode we felt that the Congress, well, or any, many thinking people, would simply not be in favor of the MX system at all. That is, an MX missile, without an acceptable, survivable basing system is simply not the best investment for the country to make. Therefore, since the results of the Town...Townes Commission had not, in our opinion, not resulted in an accepted alternative basing mode, the rejection of the basing mode in which we had worked so hard put the entire program in severe jeopardy. Now at this particular time the Reagan Administration had not decided to reinstate the B-1. So our concerns were really quite deep that, that an Administration was coming into office whose pronouncements in favor of strengthened national security were very positive, but whose actions were putting the strategic retaliatory capability of the United States in substantial jeopardy. And therefore we were deeply concerned.

WHY WAS NOT AIR FORCE IN FAVOR OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIR MOBILE MX?

The...One of the schemes that has been examined over the years is to place the missiles in aircraft, and then to fly the aircraft in order to provide invulnerability. This has been examined many times and has almost always failed in several tests that one would like to provide for it. Cost being one of those. But also, the particular scheme that the Townes Commission examined was the idea that one could construct a new kind of airplane, and airplane that would be very inexpensive to fly for very long periods of time. And that therefore they might overcome these serious cost objections that had been raised in the past. The...There were several problems with that particular scheme that caused it to go the way of all of the air mobile schemes. The first one was that the cost numbers did not seem to stand up under close examination. It involved some fairly radical technology which just didn't really seem to be there. And the second one was that the difficulty of flying nuclear-armed missiles in a manner which is safe and fully acceptable to the public, is a matter which has just simply not been resolved. One imagined airports on the West Coast of the United States that would be located away from people and where the flying would be done in such a way that there would be no hazard to crashes on the ground and where the deployment area would be selected areas of the ocean over which the aircraft would fly and no others, in order to limit the circumstances of the aircraft being in places where it's, where its crash could cause harm. But as one looked more and more at the details of that, it began to look, look less and less attractive. And therefore that particular air mobile scheme, like others, seemed to fail the real test that we wanted to apply to it.

WHY DID WE NEED THE 200 MX MISSILES SO BADLY?

Following the recognition of the improved accuracy of the Soviet systems, coupled with the recognition that the SS-18 was being deployed under, in a mode in which it had at least ten warheads on it, the United States began to become more and more concerned about the survivability of the Minuteman force. The calculations that we would do under assumptions that the Soviets would put perhaps two of these warheads on each Minuteman silo and they had enough re-entry vehicles to be able to afford to do that, yielded an inability of the Minuteman system to ride out the attack, and to survive with, with acceptable numbers at all. Now we still believe very much that the United States should strive to have a, a triad of forces, so that each leg of that triad can offset the weaknesses which another leg might have. Therefore it was our desire to find some way to restore the capability of that land-based missile force. It was during this period of time, for example, that the term window of vulnerability came to be used, Now, referring to the vulnerability of the Minuteman system, unfortunately that term got to be applied as though the United States itself in its entirety was vulnerable, which of course was incorrect, and the Scowcroft Commission pointed that out very well. That the other legs of the triad provided robustness during a period of time when one was concerned about the land-based leg. But the fact remains that the, that the Minuteman force was both old in terms of the missiles themselves and their technology, and we were looking 15 years downstream. And it would seem as though we needed both to replace that missile and to replace it in some system that would provide survivability.

ASKS ABOUT VAN CLEEVE: DID HE HURT THIS BASING SCHEME IN MANAGING REAGAN'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN?

During President Reagan's campaign, one of the military advisers that he used and I presumed relied to some degree on was William van Cleave of California. Dr. van Cleave did not think very highly of arms control at all, and he certainly didn't think very highly of the particular schemes of basing and weapons choices that the Air Force had made. And therefore he advised President Reagan that we were on the wrong track and then immediately after President Reagan was elected, Dr. van Cleave came to see me and informed me that...my idea were wrong, and that he had clearly informed the President that, that those ideas were incorrect.

The arguements which the Scowcroft Commison formulated, for putting 50 MX in silos were, making the best out of a bad situation. I think that I am never comfortable with putting missiles on which one is spending good money, into a basing system which is not, not survivable. But the Scowcroft Commission arguments were largely that that was an appropriate interim step to do, and that there were a number of other approaches which needed to be examined concurrently. One of those which I personally think is an appropriate response to the very difficult situation that we have found ourselves in, is the single weapon ballistic missile. The reason for that of course is that it then... obtains its own survivability by requiring for the Soviets to attack it properly, to devote a weapon to, to a missile which can be moved about. And that turns out to enable one to have a single RV system in a basing system that will be survivable, much more easily than a missile which has a large number of weapons on it.

IS IT TOO EXPENSIVE? DISCUSS.

The MX missile with its ten warheads represents, if you like, an attractive target to a Soviet weaponeer. Because he can then assign a, a single weapon to that missile and in the process destroy ten of our weapons. The approach which the Scowcroft Commission discussed, we of course had examined it earlier and rejected it for various reasons, was to look very carefully at a single weapon missile. That then would increase the Soviet targeting problem greatly. Now the trouble with that is that that then becomes very expensive. One has lost the advantages of scale that come from ten weapons per missile, by going to only one weapon per missile. And that this, at this present time the Air Force is finding it very difficult to address the very high costs of that system. But I personally think it's the direction in which the country needs to move.

WHY HAD HE REJECTED IT EARLIER? FALSE START.

We had rejected the single weapon missile earlier because of cost arguments, that is, we obtained a higher degree of economy by having ten weapons on a missile, and then having more than ten locations for each missile. So we obtained the same effect of, and even a little bit better, of a single weapon missile, and were able to do so at less cost. So, but when one has lost that, abandoned that particular deceptive basing scheme, then the single weapon missile becomes a much more attractive approach.

ASKS ABOUT RAIL GARRISON NOW?

The Strategic Air Command now, and I presume others in the Air Force as well, are advocating the rail garrison mode of deployment of the MX. This again is a system that has been examined over the years and is another way of obtaining mobility. It will have its own problems because it doesn't afford a very easy way to base them survivably during periods of low alert. But it does provide a way to get them mobile during periods of tension.

IS THERE A LESSON IN THE LONG STRUGGLE TO FIND A BASING MODE FOR THE MX?

The history of trying to find an acceptable home for the land-based missiles has been a very painful one. It's one in which this country has found the, the differences between ourselves and the Soviet Union particularly awkward to accommodate. Their large real estate, their ability to move missiles in amongst the population, are things which we don't share in the same degree. I believe that a land-based missile component of the triad is important. I believe in fact that it's important that it be based on the homeland. I don't believe that you have an acceptable deterrence if your deterrent forces are all located at sea, for example. So, we have faced a very difficult issue, we have not found answers which are fully acceptable. And I believe it is necessary to continue to address that until we find a solution that we can all live with.