WHY DID THE US GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO COMMIT AMERICAN TROOPS TO EUROPE? WHAT PROBLEMS WERE THERE IN GETTING THAT THROUGH CONGRESS?

Originally the NATO alliance was based on a political promise, uh, that the United States would come to the defense of Europe, and in 1949 this was thought to be sufficient to be a deterrent, by making it clear that any aggressor would face an American participation from the beginning. Then, after: the Korean War, there was a great deal of concern about the actual possibility of, uh, an aggression by the Soviet Union, and, uh, the, uh, European allies, in 1950, uh, began to urge the United States to send forces to Europe, to make more manifest its commitment to the defense of Europe. And there was a NATO meeting in September, 1950, at which the various issues were considered, including the question of American for, additional American forces in Europe, an American commander for the NATO forces, and finally the Americans raised at that time German participation in defense.

WHAT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST ESSENTIAL REASON FOR THIS US POLICY?

The basic reason that the Europeans wanted to have American forces in Europe in 1950 was the feeling that the promise in the NATO alliance was no longer sufficient to act as a deterrent, and there was gonna be need for actual forces in being, on, in NATO. And, and the Europeans wanted them headed by an American commander, and reinforced, and they wanted the American troops there, so that, in the event of any aggression, the Americans would be involved from the very beginning physically.

WHAT PROBLEMS WERE THERE IN GETTING THAT THROUGH CONGRESS?

Well, naturally, this was a considerable break with American, uh, history, and, uh, a number of Congressional people questioned whether or not the Uni, the President should send such forces; uh, and there was a considerable debate about the whole question of American forces being sent to Europe. Uh, finally, however, uh, there was, uh, the, the President succeeded in convincing Congress that this should be done.

WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR DEAN ACHESON PROPOSING GERMAN REARMAMENT?

Well once the idea was, uh, uh…let me start again. Once the, uh, question of actual defense of Europe arose, in 1950, after the Korean, uh, uh, Korean invasion, then the question of how to compose, or create, an adequate force, immediately arose, well, Germany was naturally gonna be the front line of any attack, in the case of any attack, and therefore, to have the, any adequate force in, in almost inevitably involved... having some German contribution, and obviously the Germans were thought of as a very major possible source of manpower and of military strength. So... the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that if the Americans were going to send forces to Europe, and if an American commander was gonna take charge of the NATO forces, then Germany simply had to participate in the defense.

WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE IN THE EARLY '50S TOWARDS THE BRITISH ATOMIC BOMB PROGRAM?

The, at the very beginning of the '50s, uh, there was probably very little actual attention to the, uh, German, to the British, uh, problem, British bomb program they, they had participated, as you know... in the, uh, original development of the bomb, and it was therefore not unnatural that they should continue the effort, and I don't think much thought was given to the implications of this for the general strategic situation.

COULD YOU GIVE US A GENERAL VIEW OF US POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE IN THE 1950s? WAS THERE AN ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE EUROPEAN UNITY, AND BY WHAT MECHANISMS?

Yes... by 1950, the American policy was pretty well, uh, clarified, uh, towards Europe; uh, it composed really of two... or perhaps three, major components. Originally in the postwar planning it had been assumed that it was important to have economic cooperation between the United States and western Europe in order to have an adequate, uh, economic base for both sides. But then, by 1950, Schumann had proposed, on behalf of the French, the creation of the European community, and this fit very strongly into American views as to what would be the best way to have Europe organize itself, uh, both to deal with its economic problems, but also to act as a partner in the United States, uh, in trying to cope with world problems generally, and the Soviet Union. So the Americans were very positive toward the European community, and strongly favored its creation and growth. And then the third leg, it was of curse NATO, which had been, formed in 1949, but which took on a new character, uh, in 1950 and beyond, uh, because of the desire to, to... decision to create an actual NATO force and, uh, have forces in being in Europe, in which the United States participated. So, Europe was the center, I would say, at that time, of... American policy, and the desire to have a strong, organized, united Europe, uh, was, I think, a very clear policy shared by all parties.

AT THE BEGINNING OF 1954, THERE WERE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OVER THE QUESTION OF THE NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY. WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION AND WHAT WAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OPINION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS?

The, uh, United States, Britain, and France, met with the Soviets in January, February, 1954, to, discuss, uh, essentially, the problem of Germany. This was partly provoked by the discus-, debates which were promoted or prompted by the, uh, proposals to... rearm Germany and include it in NATO. And of course this was something that the Soviets wanted to avoid or prevent. Uh, at the negotiations in, uh, Berlin, the Soviets…um, put forward proposals which really were partly designed to delay any action by the West n rearming Germany, and purported to appeal to the German interest in reunification. Uh... I think it was, it would be fair to say that all of the western countries, France, Britain, United States, and West Germany, felt that proposals for any kind of a neutralized Germany were not realistic. Germany was just too big, particularly if it were in fact united; it would be something like 70 million people in the middle of Europe, and it just was bound to be, uh, either, uh, attracted to, uh, one side or the other, or would certainly be wooed by both sides, and would be a source of instability, not stability. Uh, furthermore there was grave doubts or, uh, simply disbelief that the Soviets in fact were gonna prepare, were prepared to liquidate East Germany in any kind of a genuinely unified Europe, uh, unified, uh, Germany.

IN JANUARY, 1954, DULLES MADE A SPEECH WHERE HE SORT OF ENUNCIATED THE POLICY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION. COULD YOU CLARIFY THAT CONCEPT FOR US?

When the Eisenhower Administration came to office, they, uh, undertook a… major review of the strategy, uh, military strategy, uh, with particular attention to nuclear weapons and what role they should play. This produced what was called "the new look" in, uh, the summer of 1953, in which the Joint Chiefs, uh, put forward their proposals for how nuclear weapons should be integrated into the American strategy. In January of '54, Dulles made a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in which he enunciated, uh, what... the main lines of this policy; these were further developed in an article which he published in Foreign Affairs in, a couple of months later. Basically, I think, there were two, uh, thoughts, uh, two conceptions, uh, which were incorporated in this... revised strategy. The experience of Korea, and the... uh, public discontent with the continuance of that war, and the feeling that we had waged it with, uh, on the terms that the Communists had proposed, namely, uh, conventional and with sanctuaries, uh, had, uh, led the Joint Chiefs and political figures to feel that we should modify that, and try to take advantage of the Western capabilities in devising a strategy. And those capabilities were thought to be the…uh, existence of smaller nuclear weapons as well as larger nuclear weapons in other words…nuclear weapons generally, uh, and the fact that the West had the capability, particularly the United States, in the naval and air forces, for mobility...so the underlying idea of the strategy was to rely much more heavily on nuclear weapons, but not merely the thermonuclear weapons but also the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, the whole range of nuclear weapons, small to large, and second, to rely much more on the capacity for mobility and flexibility of the West in responding to any aggression. Now the second of those ideas tended to get lost because of the focus of, on the so-called massive retaliation aspect. And indeed, part of the first idea, namely the existence of a variety of nuclear weapons, tended to get lost because of the focus on massive retaliation. But I think the policy was much more complex than that, much more flexible than that, and really did, uh, the basic idea was that you would not necessarily respond by conventional forces at the place where any aggression took place, as had happened in Korea. It was in other words an effort to escape from what was seen to be the, uh, trap of, uh, the… Soviets having the initiative to start an aggression wherever they chose, and the West being re-qui, forced to respond in the place where the aggression occurred.

THERE ARE SOME STORIES ABOUT THE FACT THAT DULLES OFFERED THE ATOM BOMB TO THE FRENCH TO USE IN VIETNAM.

I realize that there were stories that Dulles, at the time of Dien Bien Phu, did... offer the possible use of the atomic bomb to the French. I've always doubted this there's no question in my mind that Eisenhower was quite clear that he was not gonna use the atomic bomb at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles, in my experience, never took an initiative which he did not... believe would be supported by the President, and under those circumstances I simply find it very hard to, uh, credit this story. Now... it may well be, however, there was a misunderstanding, because I think that Radford, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was a strong proponent of using an atomic, one or two atomic weapons, at Dien Bien Phu, and perhaps had… essentially suggested to the… French Chief of Staff, uh, that... he, that he would at least propo-, he would, uh, support any such request if it were made, and I think there must, may well have been a... misunderstanding on the part of the French to think that this must have been authorized, but I'm pretty su-, I'm sure that it was not.

WHAT WAS YOUR VIEW OF THE DECISION TO RELY ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE?

Well, as I, as, uh.... as is obvious, uh, the Americ-, I'll try it again. Uh... the decision to use, to rely more on, uh, tactical nuclear weapons in the '50s, in the defense of Europe, was based on, I think, two factors. One was the, uh, conclusion, after the decision, or the proposal in Lisbon, to have an enormous conventional capability for the defense of Europe, and the conclusion that this simply couldn't be supported either by the Europeans and wasn't going to be supported by the Americans, uh, led to the necessity to find some other way by which you would create an effective deterrent. Uh, so one part of the pressure was economic, and the costs of… strictly conventional defense. The other was the fact that in…the tactical weapons were coming, emerging, and becoming available, and becoming available very rapidly, and therefore they looked as if they would offer a possible way out of this dilemma with respect to the financing of a conventional defense. Now I think it ought to be stressed that...all during the '50s, the emphasis was on deterring an attack in Europe, not conducting an, a war in Europe. Now, obviously, the two can't be wholly separated, but nobody was interested in Europe in having any war of any kind, conventional or nuclear, and the question was whether or not, uh, the western nuclear advantage, particularly in the, in the nu, in the tactical weapons, couldn't be exploited for the purpose of maintaining an effective deterrent against any attack.

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTUALLY DECIDING HOW MANY WARHEADS SHOULD BE IN PLACE?

Well, theoretically, of course, I'm, this was a decision, I'm sure, of Eisenhower, but, uh, in practice, I, I'm sure that it was largely... a result of the... military planners, and there, I would guess that the major factor was simply the availability of these weapons as they became more and more common.

WERE YOU AWARE OF GROWING DOUBT ABOUT THE LONGTERM CREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN GUARANTEES?

Well, surely this became a major issue, particularly as we –

(INTERRUPTION)

The credibility of the American deterrent became a, an issue, uh, as the '50s wore on, and as the Soviet capabilities became more apparent. It was dramatized at the time of Sputnik in '57, when the...Soviets demonstrated the capacity, essentially, to put ballistic missiles, uh, into to make use of the ballistic missiles, and the Americans were thought to be somewhat behind. And therefore this made very dramatic the question of would the United States put at risk New York for the...security of Paris or Bonn or whatever. And the subject therefore became...a matter of, uh, extensive debate. Also, I think it should be noted that, uh, this was a time at which the civilian-type strategists began to, uh, become… and academic strategists become, became quite an exten, uh, large group in the United States, and so this was a perfectly wonderful subject for discussion and debate…of academics, uh, and others strategists, civilian strategists. But there's no question that there was certainly a growing concern as to whether or not the American deterrent would be effective in continuing to maintain peace in Europe, and it led to, uh, a variety of, uh, proposals and discussions.

YOU WERE APPROACHED BY CHRISTIAN HERTER TO CREATE A LONGTERM PLAN FOR NATO. WHAT WAS THAT?

In uh... December, 1959, uh, Secretary Herter, who was then the American Secretary of State, uh, proposed to NATO that they should have a ten-year plan of, uh, strategy for NATO across the board, not merely military. Uh, then, uh, when he came back, I was out of the government, but Secretary Herter asked me to prepare for him a study during the spring and summer of... of '60, of the various aspects of... such a possible strategy, and I did prepare that study. In the course of it, one aspect was, west-, uh, western or NATO military strategy, and on that, uh, it seemed to me that we needed to develop two branches: one was to improve the conventional capability so as to fill in that gap as a result of the growing worry about the... ex-, excessive dependence on nuclear weapons, and the other was to try to con-, face the political problem resulting from the dependence of the Europeans on American weapons, which were under American control, for the nuclear component of the deterrent. For that latter, the proposal was to create a multilateral force, which would be m-, mixed, manned by mixed, uh, crews, and which would be under the joint control of the NATO participants, uh, in the force, Uh, so it was, um…the multinational force was a part of the effort to, uh, meet the concern of the, uh, Europeans, about their lack of control, or lack of participation, in the weapon on which their de-, security depended so heavily.

WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF AN EVENTUAL GERMAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT?

The motives for the, uh, multilateral force were not really the worry about the... Germans creating a national nuclear force; those, the concerns it was addressed to were really political. The British and the French were each developing national nuclear forces, and in justifying those, uh, they essentially stressed very much the question of whether or not the United States would be willing to put at risk New York for the defense of European cities. That inevitably, uh, was bound to raise doubts or worried in the minds of the Germans, uh, because they were really on the front line, and in the event of any aggression, they would be the first to suffer, and if they were, if, if it, they really were, led to believe that the French and British national forces were essential for the national security, then where were the… Germans? Now we did not think that the Germans would then start building national capabilities, because the inhibitions on that were very severe, political at home, in Germany, and also on the part of allies, and also the worries that would have been created on the part of the Soviets, So that was not the concern; it was rather that the... political, uh, problem, which would arise if the Germans felt they were second class and not necessarily able to defend, depend on the American capability. And the multinational force, uh, was really not a military answer; it was an answer to this political problem by giving the Germans the feeling that, with others, they would, have a participation in deciding when and under what circumstances... the nuclear capability, which would be represented by the, multilateral force, would be used.

WHAT WAS THE REACTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO GENERAL NORSTAD'S SUGGESTION OF HAVING A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE UNDER HIS DIRECTION?

General Norstad, who was very sensitive to the, European concerns, particularly about the question of whether or not the American deterrent could be, nuclear deterrent could be relied on, uh, as the Soviet capability grew, uh, proposed an...such, proposing a NATO nuclear force. But, uh, while this was, uh, also a response to this political problem, uh, the, he did not really define just what this would consist of, or who would control it, or how it might be put to use, uh, or how it would actually be...constituted. So that, uh, the, uh, Norstad idea of a na-, of a NATO force, was recognized by the State Department as being, uh... a genuine effort to, uh, face a real problem, in terms of the European concern. But it was felt to be, uh, too, uh, unclear as to what it was or how it was to be... developed, uh, to be very useful as a practical proposal.

ACTUALLY, YOU COULD MAKE THAT CRITICISM ABOUT THE MLF PROPOSAL.

I think the... the, uh, multilateral well, strike that. The multilateral force was criticized as being impractical... or not really a, uh, an effective, uh, military capability, uh, because it was under the joint control, uh, would have been under the joint control of all of the participants, and therefore each would have had a possible veto. Uh, that's, uh, perfectly, uh… true, uh, and if the whole of the western deterrent had been a com-, uh, devoted... strike that.

(DISCUSSION)

One criticism of the multinational force, multilateral force, was that it was not a practical solution to the military problem. The reason was that each of the members would have had a veto over the use, and therefore complete consensus would have been necessary for its use. Uh, that is obviously a correct analysis of its politi, of its military, uh, limitations. Uh, nevertheless, it, the assumption was that in the event of an actual attack on western Europe, each of the members would in fact have been prepared to see a retaliatory use of the force, that was one thing, but the other was that politically, even aside from that, each member had a participation in the nuclear deterrent, and therefore would have been participating in the nuclear planning, the strategic analysis, and all that, so that they would not have felt so remote from the, uh, nuclear defense of Europe, as they did when the entire control was in SAC, the American, uh, strategic command. And where, therefore it was three thousand miles away, as sensed by the Europeans, So that a... very considerable part of the purpose of the multilateral force was not primarily military, but primarily political.

IN TERMS OF DEALING WITH THOSE POLITICAL REASONS FOR PROPOSING IT, COULD YOU JUST TELL US WHAT WAS THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF IT?

...By 19, uh, uh, 49... '59, '60, uh, the Eu-, the United States had become concerned about the consequences of national forces, uh, being created by Britain and by Prance. Uh, the danger was that these would be divisive within the alliance, and they would create two different, uh...

(INTERRUPTION) (QUESTION REPEATED)

The multilateral force was a, uh, an effort to deal with several problems within the alliance, uh, by the end of... which... had arisen by the end of, uh, 1959, '60. One was this problem of, uh, the national forces of Britain and France. These were being created, and were being justified with the, each country, uh, by the assertion that the United States could not any longer be relied on to come, to use its, uh, nuclear forces for the benefit of Europe, because of the growing Soviet capability. Well, naturally, for countries, members of the alliance who were not nuclear, this is a very damaging and, uh, divisive point. Uh, and therefore... the United States came to see these national forces as a threat to the cohesion of NATO. Second, the concern, uh, which I mentioned, namely whether or not the United States, uh, forces would be available, uh, was itself beginning to be discussed as the Soviets' capability grew, and parity was approached, and therefore the question of whether or not there was some way by which the Europeans could have a greater role with respect to the nuclear deterrent, inevitably arose. The multinational force was...partial-, was an effort to deal with both these problems. Uh, one hope was that if the Europeans could be involved more directly in some degree of control of the nuclear deterrent, that that would, uh, create more reality, more sense of a conviction, about the availability of nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe. Now that was…that was, uh, partly, uh, uh, in a, a… Can I cut?

(DISCUSSION)

Uh, the fact that, uh, the plan for the multilateral force –The fact that the multilateral force would have been usable only with the, uh, joint consent of all the members inevitably meant that it would not by itself be wholly effective, although probably if there had been an attack on Europe, all of the members would have agreed to retaliate, but still, the participation in the force, and the feeling that they had some role, and in particular, had some participation in the debates about the strategy for nuclear weapons, was thought to be politically useful, uh, in helping to calm some of this, the fears of the Europeans. Second, the hope was that by some pressure on the French and the British, uh, they might be caused to join... the multilateral force, and perhaps merge their forces with the multilateral force, uh, by, uh, public pressure or other, uh, means, uh, which would therefore... remove this as a divisive element within the alliance.

HOW REALISTIC A POLICY WAS THAT, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO FRANCE?

I don't think that it was assumed that the French would probably in the first phase, uh, drop their mul-, national force by reason of the multinational for-, multilateral force. Uh, the hope there was that over time, as the costs of it, uh, grew, uh, if all the other members of NATO were participating in the multilateral force, uh, the French might gradually be led, uh, perhaps after DeGaulle, to, uh, combine theirs with the multilateral force. That was particularly the case when... it was as-, it was, uh, subtract that. You should remember that at this point the European community was, uh, growing and developing and, uh, had considerable momentum, and the assumption was that if there was a multilateral force in which all the key Europeans were taking part, that if Europe emerged as a political entity, then it might very well be prepared to negotiate with the United States for the exclusive control by the Europeans, jointly, of this force, and under those circumstances it was assumed that the French would be under very considerable pressure to merge theirs, but that lay in the future. In the, immediately, it was assumed that the British might not be able to resist participation, and that this would take care of the British national force.

WHY DID YOU ASSUME THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RESIST PARTICIPATING?

Partly because the British-- well. The British, uh, would have been under pressure, it seemed to us, uh, to participate, uh, partly by reason of the expense, the growing expense, of the national capability, and partly because they were much more committed to NATO in a, a genuine sense, uh, than were the... French. And the assumption was that there were already considerable criticisms in, uh, Britain, about the necessity and the expense of having a national capability; it was, that was a much more debatable issue in those days than perhaps it is now.

THEN THERE WAS THE FAILURE OF SKYBOLT, THE FAMOUS MEETING BETWEEN MACMILLAN AND KENNEDY AT NASSAU. WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THAT AGREEMENT ON THE PLANS FOR THE MLF?

The Skybolt episode, uh, seemed to me, uh, pretty well, uh, derailed any possibility for having a multilateral force, if there was any possibility before. Uh... Skybolt, uh, was cancelled, was, was a missile, uh, which, uh, was being jointly, uh, developed by the British and the United States. Uh, this was, uh, cancelled by McNamara as being superfluous, uh, in, uh, uh, shortly after the Kennedy Administration took office. Then, uh, the British raised the question of what was to be, uh, substituted; uh... they, this, uh, subject was a major issue at the Nassau meeting, which was held, I believe, in 1950, 1962... uh, in the spring, and, uh, the... Macmillan and Thornycroft, uh, raised very strongly the idea that the British'd be given a Polaris mis-, uh, submarine, in place, to replace the Skybolt missile. Uh, finally, despite objections by the State Department, uh, President Kennedy gave in on that and did agree to provide the uh, British with Polaris system. The British agree, uh, to, uh, that, uh, the…su-. Their submarines would be available to NATO, with a...horrendous exception, namely, in any, case of any major crisis, or national need, that obviously, uh, the weapons would be... useful or used only under such circumstances, so that made the whole original commitment rather hollow. Uh, it seemed to me that when, uh, Kennedy had made this concession, essentially bolstering the national British deterrent, that it pretty well gutted the likelihood that the M-[, mu-, multilateral force, uh, could possibly be brought into being.]

...How would you think I made another try at that answer… answering the previous question?

SURE, FINE. OKAY, YOU WANT TO DO THAT NOW?

Well, I would if I'm gonna do it now.

DO IT NOW, FINE.

The, uh, prospects for the, uh, multilateral force were uncertain by 1962 or '63. Uh,...first place the Kennedy administration had endorsed it but was ambivalent in actually pursuing it. But then came the Skybolt episode when, uh, Secretary McNamara cancelled a missile which was being jointly developed by the United States and Britain. Thornycroft and McNamara....Macmillan, who uh, were then the....in charge of defense, uh, for Britain, uh, saw this, I believe, as an opportunity for getting the Polaris' submarine to replace the, um, missile. The State Department objected to this because it would then reinforce the British...the continuation of the British national deterrent which ran completely contrary to the policy which the United States was then espousing…especially being espoused by McNamara. However, at Nassau, um, Macmillan and Thornycroft were able to persuade Kennedy to go ahead and give them the Polaris and in return they made the promise that the Polaris would be dedicated or assigned to NATO with the exception that it would be available for British national use in the events of crisis. Uh, naturally that last exception took the heart out of the commitment but nevertheless it gave the British what they wanted which was the reinforcement of their national capability. To my mind that really put the spike in the future of the MLF, although it actually...the supposed effort went on for, uh, a couple of years after that into the Johnson administration.

WHY DO YOU THINK THAT DEAL WAS DONE? WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR IT?

I think the basic reason that, uh, Kennedy at Nassau gave the Polaris to Macmillan was that Macmillan made the plea that as a politician he was in a bind at home and appealed to Kennedy's feelings as a poli....as a fellow politician and that Kennedy simply gave in to this appeal. I do not think it was really based on any strategic analysis and it was contrary to the political analysis and it was contrary to the political analysis which was being supplied by the state department.

DID YOU EVER TRY TO PUT PRESSURE ON ROBERT MCNAMARA NOT TO CANCEL SKYBOLT?

…I'm sorry…

DID YOU EVER....ONE OF THE REASONS YOU SAY MACMILLAN AND THORNYCROFT COULD MAKE THIS PITCH FOR POLARIS WAS BECAUSE SKYBOLT HAD BEEN CANCELLED. AND I WONDERED WHETHER YOU OR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TALKED TO MCNAMARA AND SAID DON'T CANCEL SKYBOLT.... IT'S NOT WORTH IT.

Let me just ask you…excuse me just one second…I'm trying to get my dates straight…Nassau was '62, wasn't it?

YES.

So it's like it was normally, uh,...called for, uh, submission by the defense people by December, as I remember, maybe it was earlier...November. And...said I must know whether I am going to continue on with this or whether I'm going to stop it. ...And he thought it was unneedless…unnecessary given that all the other systems and the fact that the Skybolt wasn't proven to be all that wonderful. Uh, but I thought...I guess I'm wrong...it must be December. ...Uh, that would be, that would be then the fall of '62...it was...all right.

CAN YOU JUST TELL US...IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO YOU IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT EVER PUT PRESSURE ON ROBERT MCNAMARA TO SORT OF NOT DELAY, NOT CANCEL SKYBOLT?

When the state department heard that, uh, McNamara was considering cancelling Skybolt, the issue was discussed in the staff levels of the state department with, uh, some of the defense people. The state department people urged strongly that the decision be postponed, uh, because of the impact that this would have, uh, within NATO if it was suddenly announced or without any adequate discussion. Uh, nevertheless, um, the defense people, uh, said that they had to make a decision I the fall of 1962, uh, in anticipation of the budget cycle. They were required to submit their proposed budget to the President in time for him to make the proposal in January of the following year. So they insisted that the budget cycle forced them to make a decision and that therefore they would have to do so. Uh, the state department urged that the British be consulted promptly but I believe McNamara was anxious to have a personal conversation with Thornycroft and, therefore, put off somewhat for several weeks before...until he was going to Europe in, I believe, in December, uh, to discuss it with Thornycroft. Uh, to my mind this gave Thornycroft and Macmillan a wonderful opportunity to claim that it had been sprung on them without any advanced warning and, therefore, strengthened there case as to why the United States ought to provide some alternative...And the alternative in their mind, I think, from the beginning was the Polaris system.

THERE'S SOMETHING THAT YOU SAID THAT THERE WAS A FEELING, IN A WAYS...A JUSTIFICATION FOR...MAKING THE SPEECH ABOUT MASSIVE RETALIATION. IT WAS…NOBODY REALY WANTED THE REPETITION OF THE KOREAN WAR WHREE YOU WEREE FIGHTING THE SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET...OR ALLIES, IF YOU WANT TO LOOK AT THEM THAT WAY, ON THEIR OWN TERRAIN, ON THEIR OWN TERMS WITH SANCTUISMAND SO ON AND SO FORTH. NOW IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED...INCREASING THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM. WHYWAS THATIT SEEMED TO ME THAT NOTHINGHAD CHANGED AND THE WHOLE POLICY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION IS NOT FUNDAMENTALLY PREVENTED ....BEING DRAGGED INTO CONFLICTS LIKE KOREA. COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY THAT WAS,...WHAT YOU THINK WAS THE REASON FOR WHAT LOOKED LIKE AN INABILITY TO CHANGE THE WAY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD TO RESPOND?

Eisenhower, as a result of Korea, was very firm in his determination not to allow the United States once more to become engaged in a land war in Asia. Uh, that was one of the reasons why he was so firm that he would not put any American forces into Vietnam. In that sense it was, of course, uh, in keeping with the new look...conception that the United States would not try to fight ground wars where the Soviets' or their proxies were conducting ground operations. However, the other side of, uh, massive retaliation or the new look, uh, didn't fit either. The United States was not prepared to go into Korea.... into Vietnam with any nuclear capabilities. Eisenhower saw that that would be, not be effective and also not...would be very damaging once more to use, uh, nuclear weapons in Asia, uh, and therefore, the new strategy didn't really fit the Korean case... Uh…sorry, let's back off… Consequently the new look strategy didn't provide a solution for the Vietnam case in '53-' 54. Uh, and the result was that, uh, Eisenhower, uh, would not intervene, and uh, had to work out a solution at the Geneva Conference in 1954 for the partition of Vietnam.

HOW MUCH WAS THE INTRODUCTION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IN MCNAMARA'S POLICY A RECOGNITION OF THE NECESSITY TO INTERVENE AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL IN WARS LIKE THE VIETNAMESE WAR OR THE KOREAN WAR?

I think the doctrine of flexible response, uh, which was espoused by the, by McNamara was basically focused on the European defense. Uh, I do not think this was really, uh, intended to solve the problem of local wars like Korea or Vietnam. Uh, the, uh, hope there apparently on the part of the Kennedy administration at the beginning was developing of counter insurgency capabilities, uh, which also turned out not to be very effective.

NOW I WANT TO GO OVER SOME OF THSES QUESTIONS AND GET SLIGHTLY SHORTER ANSWERS TO SOME OF THEM. TWO QUITE KEY ONES, I THINK: FIRST OF ALL…

...Let me...let's follow the policy. You state the question that you want clarified, give me about thirty seconds to collect my thoughts to see if I can't...Start by saying the question and then can you pause ten seconds or fifteen seconds and then I answer or do you...do you want me to indicate or just...you let it go.

SO THE FIRST ONE -- COULD YOU JUST BRIEFLY SUM UP WHY THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE MUTUAL GERMANY CONSIDERED TO BE IMPOSSIBLE.

At the Geneva Conference in, uh, February...January and February of 1954 all of the western powers, the United States, France, uh, Britain and also Germany, uh, were opposed to any idea of neutralizing Germany as the Soviets' had proposed. The reason was fundamentally...belief that a large Germany, particularly if united, uh, could not possibly really be a stable factor if nominally neutralized. The point was that it was just too big. It would be cultivated either by the west or by the east and would probably, uh, in the end give way to the temptation of playing off one against the other…or in any event would be an unstable factor in the situation in Europe.

COULD YOU JUST BRIEFLY SAY WHY YOU THINK THAT THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE GREW TO SUCH A SIZE OVER THE PERIOD FROM '54 TO 1960. WHAT WAS THE MAIN REASON IT GOT TO THOSE LEVELS?

The, uh, stockpile in, uh, of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe grew rather rapidly during the 1950s. I don't think that the actual numbers was so much a result of a systematic analysis of exactly what would be required. It was rather, I think, due to the fact that these weapons became more and more rapidly available. They uh, it just seemed as if putting more in would be better. And so large numbers were in fact deployed.

WHAT DID DULLES REALLY MEAN BY MASSIVE RETALIATION IN HIS SPEECH?

...I've got to really summarize the main point. The uh, uhhhhh, when Dulles outlined the new Eisenhower strategy for, uh, use of military force at the Council of Foreign Relations in 19...January, 1954. He used the term...having a capacity... massive... a capacity of massive retaliation. This was, however, only part of the conception which he tried to put forward, though it was fastened on as if it were the whole. Actually his...as much stress was laid on the fact that the west should retain the right to respond to any aggression at times and places of its own choosing. This was to avoid the problems of sanctuaries and of, a strictly conventional force which was used in Korea and which caused such, uh, turmoil in terms of public debate as the, the Korean War wore on. The result was that, uh, he felt that the west should retain the option of making its own choice of weapons, of place, and of time, uh, in this...aggression. But this did not mean that you would bomb Peking or Moscow for any limited aggression. It meant rather that you might be free to use more nuclear weapons and to attack some other place in order to put pressure on the Soviets' in case of any aggression in a particular location. But this much more nuanced conception was lost in much of the public debate. I'm not sure that's an adequate answer still, is it?

YES, THAT'S FINE.