WE'RE GOING TO BEGIN WHERE WE WERE DISCUSSING BEFORE, AND THAT'S TO ASK YOU WHY IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE WAR THE STOCKPILES WERE SO SMALL.

Immediately following the war, the stockpile was very small for several reasons. One, the war was over. There was no urgency. Why, if the war had continued, why, Los Alamos would have continued to design w— better weapons, and we would have uh continued to fabricate them, make them. But the second reason was that uh, Los Alamos was the one in charge at that time of making weapons, we were trying to convert the whole system to where an industry'd be brought in to manufacture the weapons. And uh, of more importance, however, we did not want to continue to produce what we considered laboratory models. We wanted a better weapon. And we saw no way to get a better weapon until we tested the various theories which uh, were in uh, being considered at Los Alamos. And that was Sandstone Tests... for the better weapons. So we needed an implosion weapon for to use 23— use 235 as a material. And we also wanted to make better more efficient weapons. So uh, we didn't stockpile weapons. In other words, the— probably in the early days there we maybe could have put together nine, seven or nine uh weapons. Whereas during the war we thought we could manufacture at least 15 before the end of 1945. But keep in mind, the war was over. No urgency. I thought the war was over and was perfectly happy to go out to West Point as a professor with the idea I was going to stay there 26 years, when I tangled with Mr. Lilienthal and didn't get the job I was being considered for. Uh, the... figures remained low until '48. And then after Sandstone, why, we started manufacturing improved models plus some of the older models, and uh, the figure that's been released, which is the only one I will discuss, was that uh in the summer of '48, I think it was, that we had about 50 weapons. And it wasn't until uh, '53 that we started getting into reasonable numbers.

OK. THE ONE THING THAT WAS GREAT, BUT TO THE EXTENT THAT YOU CAN STAY IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE AND NOT SHOOT FORWARD THAT WOULD BE THE MOST HELPFUL. THE SECOND QUESTION THEN, WHY DID YOU AND GENERAL GROVES CONSIDER SECRECY ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE ARSENAL TO BE OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE?

Well, we thought secrecy was necessary primarily because we had so few. Now, Japan was willing to surrender after two. But keep in mind that Japan was licked at the time we started to bomb them. All the atomic bomb did was to convince them that uh, that it was time the emperor took over from the military and go for peace. Now, Russia would, uh our only potential enemy at that time, and in '46 we didn't consider that we were alarmed about it, no one was alarmed about it, was Russia. And I'm sure uh, the number of weapons we had would not scare Russia. So, uh, I remember one conference, later, when uh, Senator Symington I believe it was, wanted to announce the number we had. And I know Larry Noretead sent for me in a hurry to come over to his house to talk to the Senator. And we convinced him the number was so small that if we announced it, why, atomic weapons at that time would lose their threat. See, atomic weapons were over-rated as a result of uh, Hiroshima, Nagasaki. They were so big compared to anything else, although more damage was done by fire bombs, in Tokyo, to where they still were not uh, the effective weapon that uh, say, the hydrogen bomb turned out to be. And we needed large numbers, which I'll go into more later.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE, WE TALKED ABOUT THE CUSTODY QUESTION AND THE CONFLICTS WITH LILIENTHAL, THAT'S WHERE WE'RE GOING HERE. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ARGUMENTS THAT YOU MADE IN FAVOR OF MILITARY CUSTODY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, AND HOW YOUR VIEWS DIFFERED FROM THOSE OF DAVID LILIENTHAL.

Well the uh, main reason why the military should have custody is you can't expect an Army, a Navy or an Air Force to use a weapon with which they're not familiar. As I've always said, it takes a sergeant to discover all the bugs in a weapon, not some scientist. In other words, under laboratory conditions, things work. But to find out whether something'll work in wartime, you have to have people handling it, knowing all the idiosyncrasies, knowing what the capabilities are, in other words, what it will do, and that's for the planners, see, to where they start figuring, well how do we use it? And uh, to be able to do, see, at that time, why every weapon had to be assembled just before it was used. So it would take quite a few hours to assemble a weapon. You had to have assembly teams. And unless you could train those teams and uh, maneuvers with the air force as to how you would use them and go through all the process, you couldn't hope to develop a military force with atomic weapons. Same uh, also you needed to distribute them uh, strategically, to where there was a basis where you might, we'd be loading them onto uh airplanes. Those are fundamental reasons why it should be, it was so natural to me, I mean, that custody should be in the hands of the military, why, that's what cost me the job uh, of director of military application.

EXPLAIN TO ME HOW YOUR VIEWS WERE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF DAVID LILIENTHAL, AND IF YOU CAN, CHARACTERIZE DAVID LILIENTHAL'S VIEWS TOWARD THE WEAPON GENERALLY.

Well, the uh, in case of Lilienthal, he was essentially a pacifist, in other words, he didn't believe in war. He didn't believe in the use of atomic weapons. And uh, he felt that uh, if you got international control, you'd never have to use them, even after you didn't have international control as a possibility, he still abhorred the idea of ever using a weapon or ever developing a better one or too, too much better, like the hydrogen bomb. He was essentially against, as he said, it gave him, I don't know whether he used the term "gut" or "visceral" feeling about the idea of using atomic weapons. And he just couldn't understand why, uh, uh, why the military needed to practice with them, I mean the handling them and all that type of thing, and to maintain them, and custody. See, the Army, we had built on our own, although it was authorized uh, eventually Congress appropriated the money, three storage spaces. See, at the period when Lilienthal first took over, why, we continued to build storage spaces in the mountains and uh, when...there at Albuquerque, and we built three bases, and uh, with the idea we'd have assembly teams at each one. So all of the military planning required custody. And we felt we could maintain them. Uh, Lilienthal even said the military is not technically qualified to do it. He'd use all kinds of arguments. But basically his argument, real argument was that he believed in civilian control, and not only uh, civilian control, but he wanted to name which civilian, which was Lilienthal. In other words, I've always felt we always had civilian control in the military, the Secretary of Defense is a civilian, the Secretary of the Army, Navy and air force are civilians and the President of the United States is a civilian. So you have civilian control. You don't need a Mr. Lilienthal in between who is— that type of man should never be in the chain of command if you're considering a weapon for use in war. That's my only objection to his views.

THAT'S GREAT. NOW I'M GOING TO TAKE YOU FORWARD A LITTLE BIT TO SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1948 AND THE WAR SCARE...AND I WANT TO START BY ASKING YOU TO DESCRIBE YOUR RECOLLECTION OF SPRING OF '48 AND THE WAR CRISIS AND BASICALLY TO RECALL THE EFFECT OF GENERAL CLAY'S TELEGRAM.

Well, of course, that involved me personally very much.

COULD I ASK YOU TO START AGAIN AND INSTEAD OF...

Yes. All right. Uh, considering the spring of '48 why, it was one of the most critical periods in my life as far as excitement is concerned and responsibility. Uh, in '47, I was Professor of Mechanics at West Point, although doing such odd jobs 200 days out of 365 in Washington and New York and the United Nations and Military Liaison Committee acting as a consultant. But in January of '48, I received word uh that I was to replace Groves. And I uh, my wife didn't like it, we all enjoyed West Point, we were into 426 years of, of...blood, you might call it. But uh, Groves was leaving the end of February, and I was appointed as chief primarily at the instigation of the Navy and the Air Force, because they couldn't agree on a man of their own: Air Force'd veto any Navy man, Navy vetoed the Air Force. So they selected the Army, and I was it. So I came down to Washington. And uh, then we ran into difficulty of promoting me, see, you have to be promoted to be a Major General, and uh, I think Mr. Lilienthal opposed the idea I should come back to Washington, and so my promotion was held up, and when Groves left in uh, February 28th, uh, General Bradley said, "Can you take over AFSWP, AFSWP, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project without being promoted, I, although you have an admiral and a senior officer in the Air Force plus the senior officer in the Army, Chief of Staff." I said, "Yes, I...no trouble. If you tell them I'm chief, uh, I don't need written orders." So that worked OK. The first incident that came up, uh, see in March, was I believe it was the fifth of March, uh. Secretary Royal had a dinner, where Forestall was invited, Secretary of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and Mr. Car, and Mr. Carpenter, who was to be the uh, Military Liaison Committee chairman, and uh, I was uh, last guest. And the purpose was to encourage uh, cooperation between the AEC and the military. Because Groves had been an irritant to Lilienthal, and he also felt I would be an irritant, so the idea was, how do you get people together? Well, we had the best encouragement for uh, cooperation because Clay's letter came in about that time. So it was a matter of discussion, uh, for the evening. And a necessity for cooperation.

WOULD YOU BEGIN BY DESCRIBING, FOR SOMEONE WHO DOESN'T KNOW IT, WHAT THE CLAY TELEGRAM SAID?

The Clay telegram uh, in essence, as I remember, Clay started out that up until the present time he had felt there was no threat of war with Russia. See, he was commander of the troops in Europe at that time. And uh, but he felt that the Russians were tightening up on Berlin, see...passageway to Berlin; and he also felt other actions were the first ones that ever gave him the feeling that war might be imminent. It wasn't a threat to well, Russia's going to war; but it was a warning letter that things were changing. See, and you'd had the Czechoslovakia crisis before. That was really one of the things that brought me to Washington. And uh, anyway, it stirred things up. That was the first of several things to stir things up.

AROUND THAT TIME, WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANCES OF WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION?

Of course, I had no basis of making an assessment except, uh, Clay.

I'M SORRY, CAN I ASK YOU TO START AGAIN?

Uh, my assessment at the time, uh, of course, that'd be based on Clay's observation. I was not over there, and uh, I was, I knew Clay. He's one of the best officers we had although I had many an argument with him. But uh, that was, I took it at face value.

WHAT EFFECT DID THE EVENTS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN BERLIN—I'M SORRY, ON THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY AND THE SCHEDULING OF THE SANDSTONE TESTS?

Well it had, the, this event of Clay's telegram had several effects uh, in regard to preparation for war; and it also had quite an effect on my personal future. Five days later I got a call from the Secretary of the uh, it was Secretary of War I think it was at that time, it wasn't Army then, Secretary of War, Royal to come over to his office. And when I got there, he just walked toward the elevator, and I followed him, and we went down to ground level and got into a car, and he said to me, "Why are we going?" And I said, "Mr. Secretary, I don't even know where we're going, so I have no basis for knowing why." He said, "Well I thought you would know. Uh, the President Truman wants, uh, wants to see you. Told him— he told me to bring you over to the White House." Well, I got to the White House and uh, Mr. Lilienthal was already there. And we went into the uh, President's office, and uh, Truman motioned to two chairs in front of him, front of his desk, and we sat down, Royal was off to the side. And he looked at the two of us, and he says, "I know you two hate each other's guts." Well, we neither one made a comment at that, but uh, that was true. He then uh, turned to me and looked me straight in the eye, and he said, "Nichols, if, if I direct Mr. Lilienthal that the primary function of the AEC is to produce weapons, would you have any problem cooperating with him?" I said, "No sir, not if that is the directive." Then he turned to Lilienthal and — this is as I recall it all — that, and said, "Dave, you'11 have to forget your idea of a bottle of milk on every doorstep and start producing weapons." And then he said, "I expect you two to cooperate. And I'm going—" he then turned to Dave again, uh, to Lilienthal, he said, "I, I have Nichol's promotion on my desk, I'm about to sign it, and he'll become chief of AFSWP and be on the Military Liaison Committee." He said, "Now you two cooperate." So he dismissed me and, and Lilienthal stayed on. So I went back. I had a job. But uh, so that is one effect. Then of course, the overall effect gradually increased as other incidents occurred on custody and on, uh, producing more weapons, and, and just a readiness. In regard to custody, if you take one issue going through it, uh, that aroused more people in the military. See, of course, I'd been fighting for custody, and others in the Military Liaison Committee had, but it really got to be of interest to Mr. Forestall, Secretary of Defense, and uh, to the various uh, chiefs and, and secretaries. The uh, next incident that stirred things up was uh... The next incident that stirred things up on custody and other of these problems, was an incident that occurred at the end of March, when Clay sent another telegram, that the Russians were opposing trains going to Berlin. And he said unless, I think the wording was, why, that unless instructed otherwise, he would use arms in case they tried to stop him. Well, the decision was uh, not to have a confrontation, so uh, be gentle. But anyway, that uh, was another step in the incidents that were happening. And custody, we tried to resolve it. I know we had meetings out in uh, Los Alamos and uh, with Mr. Carpenter; he thought he had it solved, but he didn't understand just what the opposition was back in uh, headquarters of the AEC But uh, then uh, they finally had a conference that uh I attended, which was the three secretaries and the Commission, and the Secretary of Defense, to try to resolve the issue. And we had another similar a little later to where Lilienthal raised the issues of uh, uh, technical qualification of the military. I knew that was going to be raised, so I asked uh that Van Bush be invited. And Van Bush supported me on the basis that all you need do is train military, they can do anything, they're intelligent people. We had mainly Corps of Engineer Officers on the assembly teams plus the cream of the crop of the Navy and Air Force. And he backed me on the basis there's nothing you can't do if you take the time to do it, and uh, that is not an argument. Then we discovered that Lilienthal 's main argument was civilian control. That was— the next meeting on that was with the President. And I know I rode over with Mr. Forestall, and he said, "Is the issue enough important— is the, is the issue important enough for me to resign on the issue?" I said, "Well, it's important enough, but I hope you won't, because I think we need you for other purposes." Perhaps I should have recommended it, because he was at that time you know, getting a sort of ragged edge. But the President definitely backed Lilienthal. So in '48, the custody issue still remained.

The next, ah, problem that ah, we had during this period...

FIVE SECONDS. OK.

The next problem we had to solve during this critical period was whether or not to plan for the use of atomic weapons in the military. And I remember my first encounter with General Gruenther. I went down to his office to indicate my thoughts on what the... the armed forces should be doing. I thought we ought to be holding maneuvers, and with the use of atomic weapons or dummy weapons and train for how would... how we'd...how we'd go through the logistical problem. That was my job and the... And he said, well first, just I want to inform you that you're violating the orders of the President. We're not supposed to plan on the use of atomic weapons. And I said, well are you ordering me to stop? And he said, oh no, I just want you to know that you're a little bit off base. You can keep on working. So that ah, continued to where we started working on the problem, and ah, it finally was resolved by Mr. Forestal in August... July or August of '48. And he made the decision then we would plan on the use of atomic weapons. And ah, and they had the Newport meeting and that also involved who should be in command of ah... See, I was reporting then to the three chiefs as individuals. Not at the JCS, but the three chiefs as individuals. And it was resolved that for war planning, I would ah, report directly to the Air Force. But for all other purposes continue to report to the Navy and the Army. And I actually received an order in August from the three chiefs signed as individuals that I would ah, be, report directly to the Chief Air Force... report to him immediately in preparation of carrying out war plan, I forget the name of it, because the copy I have that was deleted to make it ah, declassified. And ah, so I know I called ah, my classmate in Vandenburg's office and said, ah, when does he want me to report? I want a date, He says, so he called back, and he said, he doesn't need you to report, you've been doing all right as you've been doing and just continue. But ah, so that... and I understand in September, in President Truman's diary, there's an entry that he approves the idea of planning for atomic weapons.

CAN YOU TELL ME VERY BRIEFLY WHY YOU THINK THAT FORESTAL MADE THAT CHANGE?

Ah, Forestal felt there's no other way to counter the threat of Russia on the budget we had without using atomic weapons. And he felt he would just go ahead and plan and then present ah, Truman with a situation and the plans. And that's what happened. When he did, why Truman approved it, reluctantly.

BEFORE WE GET TO PRODUCTION WHICH IS THE NEXT THING I WANT TO GET TO I'M GOING TO BACK YOU UP A LITTLE BIT AND ASK YOU WHETHER OR NOT YOU PERCEIVED THAT THE THREAT OF WAR AT THE TIME OF THE SPRING WAR CRISIS WAS ENOUGH TO WARRANT THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. IT WAS THE TIME THAT WE HAD THE MONOPOLY.

I don't think you ever decide ahead of time ah, does the situation warrants the use of atomic weapons until that situation arrives. But you should plan for being ready to use atomic weapons if the situation demands it. And I also believe that ah, the threat of the use of atomic weapons should come first before you use them.

CAN I ASK WHETHER YOU FELT, WHETHER IN SPRING OF 1948 THE TIME DEMANDED EITHER THE THREAT OR THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS?

Not until, not with any situation that arose at that time. Although there was one meeting, see, this was June. And I was hastily summoned. I had a luncheon date with somebody else, and I was called to come over to Forestal's Office, and when I got there I found quite an array of people. There were the three chiefs, the three secretaries, Mr. Lovett, the Secretary of State, as I recall, although I can't find this in the records, J. Edgar Hoover was there. I don't know why he was there. And I sat at the end of the luncheon table, not knowing for sure why I was there, but it looked like something important. It was another crisis in Berlin, and ah, during the course of the meal General Eisenhower came in. And I know he was then President of Columbia University. But he was called down to attend this meeting by Forestal. And it was during the sandstone tests. And ah, they were looking what we, they could do in regard to ah, the Berlin action that was occurring at that time, or I think it was around March 30th. Ah, with what we had. In other words could you use atomic weapons? In other words, I was specifically asked, how soon could you hang a bomb on the hook so that air, a B-29 and ah, if we wanted to use it in Europe. And I had to give a very discouraging answer. I said, well, the only ah, assembly team that is capable of assembling the weapons is a civilian team now out at Sandstone. Now whether they would be willing to assemble a... a weapon for this purpose, why each individual's acting on his own. We do not yet have a certification that ah, the teams we have that we're training are qualified. I know I sorted out a very rough answer from General Eisenhower and I'd better get on the ball and get them trained. But ah, that's just another indication of how this thing went step by step. See as the situation got more serious, as they're getting ready for the use of atomic weapons.

CAN YOU DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE MOVEMENT OF ATOMIC CAPABLE B-29S TO BERLIN? BE AS PRECISE AS YOU CAN.

Well, I... I didn't know at that time was was when they sent the B-29s over to England or not. I think it was a little later wasn't it?

OK, WELL DISCUSS IT EVEN IF IT'S...

Well, I don't... I don't know the exact date of that. But ah, we had ah, equipment in England, this was handled back in '46. General Groves and I had authorized a shipment of assembly equipment and building ah, assembly house rooms, in other words properly, the type of rooms we needed to use, ah, the buildings at two bases in England on an informal agreement with Sherman, ah, Lord Tetter, Marshall of the Air Force. And with the full knowledge of ah, Chief of Staff Eisenhower and Secretary of War Patterson. And ah, we set that up to where if we ever needed, needed to go to England with planes we'd at least have the assembly equipment there and a place to assemble weapons. That was done without you might say, any agreement with England and the United States at a formal level. But it was known by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

SHOOT AHEAD A LITTLE BIT IF YOU CAN TO THE ACTUAL BERLIN CRISIS WHEN THE B-29S WERE MOVED.

Well, all I know is they moved some over but ah, we didn't do anything about assembly equipment or moving weapons at that time.

CAN YOU BRIEFLY ASSESS THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SANDSTONE TESTS?[QUESTION REPEATED]

The Sandstone tests were very important in early '48, because that removed the obstacle of producing obsolete weapons. In other words, we learned enough from the Sandstone tests to develop better weapons and ah, as a result by the summer of '48, or later we had some 50 weapons in stockpile, useable. So it really had a very significant ah, influence, plus it ah, the weapons were so much more efficient that for a given quantity of fissionable material, Utra 35 and plutonium, we had more weapons.

OK, I WANT TO SHIFT A LITTLE BIT AND ASK YOU BRING YOU BACK TO WASHINGTON NOW, AND ASK IN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE HOW YOU WOULD CHARACTERIZE YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE JCAE, THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY DURING THIS EARLY PERIOD, THE '48 - '49 PERIOD.

In '48, '49, ah, my...of course I had relations with the Joint Congressional Committee, because in many cases the ah, military liaison committee would appear before them for presenting our views on certain matters. And in general I was treated fairly well, although ah, I never mind appearing before them because ah, although Senator McMahon and I generally were not on the same side, of particularly the custody issue, I think he respected me, and if he did ask two embarrassing questions which he did occasionally, why Hickenlooper who was Republican who I had been a personal consultant to when he was chairman would always defend, ah, defend me, or sometimes say that's not...not a proper question. But ah, so I never had any real unhappy relationships with the ah, Joint Congressional Committee.

DID YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY THAT THEY, THE INFORMATION THAT THEY WANTED FROM YOU?

No, I don't think we had as much trouble as the AEC. See they were attacking the ah, the military on the base of information. Ah, see you have to keep in mind that the Republicans continued to attack Lillianthal after the confirmation hearings, And ah, oh I think at one time they had an investigation of gross mismanagement, see and they had loss of a little bit of 235. Well, that I wasn't involved in.

WE'RE GOING TO SHOOT AHEAD A LITTLE BIT TO EARLY '49, AND PICKS UP IN FRONT OF THE THINGS YOU WERE SAYING BEFORE. AND THAT'S WHY DID YOU SUPPORT THE INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN EARLY '49? AND I WANT TO TIE INTO THIS... WELL, WE'LL LEAVE IT THERE FOR THAT. WHY DID YOU SUPPORT INCREASED PRODUCTION IN EARLY '49?

I was, during the period of '48 and '49, I recognized that we were not thinking in big enough numbers for atomic weapons. I've never been one to overrate the atomic weapons that we had in those days. And ah, my first opportunity to push on this was ah, in January of 1949, I was called by Al Grunter, he notified me that General Eisenhower probably was returning in some form to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he wanted me to brief him on atomic weapons, the availability and readiness and whatnot. So I briefed General Eisenhower on the problem that we had, and ah...ah, it also involved ah, a letter that ah, we had to sign jointly, or rather Secretary Forestal and Lillianthal had to sign — sign jointly each year under the provision of the Atomic Energy Act to how many... how much material you should produce each year. And the Military Liaison Committee had been ah, working on this with Lillianthal and the AEC without much luck about any increase or what-not. So I briefed General Eisenhower and also briefed General Eisen... ah, Bradley the next day. I briefed General Eisenhower on the problem, and ah, took the opportunity to express my views in regard to numbers. As I stated at that time, that ah, I felt we should be thinking in thousands rather than hundreds of weapons. And I stressed that the, what the, that atomic weapons were the cheapest form of security against the Russians that we could devise. And of course, everybody was suffering under the budget limitation of Mr. Truman which as I recall was ah, what would now be considered a ridiculously low figure of 13.5 billion dollars. And that the only way we could do it, Mr. Forestal was backing this, was ah, with more weapons. And I know I've had more, apparently had more influence than I thought, because that was on a Saturday and on Monday why the paper came up to JCS, I'd also, also had briefed General Bradley on it and stressed the same thing, we ought to be looking for more numbers, but I was talking about working in the future. But about 10:00 that morning I got a call from Al Grunter, come down to JCS meeting room immediately. And I again faced General Eisenhower to where he didn't seem to be in the usual friendly mood. He said, this letter that you and... and MLC are recommending that I forward to Mr. Forestal and approve it, recommending approval, it's not at all in accord with what you told me Saturday. Why... why aren't we recommending an increased weapons? I said because this is the best compromise we could make with the AEC. Well, he stated at that time, "Well, you go back and write that letter the way it should be written." He says, "I won't have anything go to the President of the United States that ah, I've passed on that indicates I'm at all satisfied with the number of weapons we're now producing." Well, I didn't mind that. I went back to my office and wrote a letter, I can't find a copy of it, but at least it started the ball to, ah, rolling, on increasing production. Because we had to go through all the rigmarole of the Pentagon, and the President's Office to where he had to set up a special committee of the security council and finally got to the President I think late in '49 and was approved. That was the first extension.

OK, IF YOU CAN JUST BRIEFLY DO THE END OF THAT STORY, WHICH IS GOING BACK TO EISENHOWER. IF YOU CAN MAKE THAT AS SHORT AS YOU CAN AND JUST CONFINE IT TO EISENHOWER IF YOU CAN.

Now wait a minute, how far?

WHEN YOU WENT BACK TO EISENHOWER AND THAT 10:00 IN THE MORNING MEETING. JUST DESCRIBE THAT MEETING AS BRIEFLY AS YOU CAN.

Well, I went back to the well, I was called early, relatively early in the morning on Monday by Al Grunter to come down to the JCS meeting room. And there I found General Eisenhower very unhappy with the letter that he had been briefed on Saturday. And ah, he chided me on the basis that I had sold him ah... on the idea that we needed increased weapons and there was nothing in the letter that indicated that. And I told him that that was the best compromise we could get with the AEC, and was not a single Department of Defense letter, but it was a joint letter. And ah, he said well he would never have any letter appear before the President... President Truman that indicated in any way that he was satisfied with the present rate of production. And I should go back to my office and write it the way it should be written.

OK, CAN YOU EXPLAIN BRIEFLY THE GROWING ROLE, I THINK, THAT ATOMIC WEAPONS WERE PLAYING IN MILITARY PLANNING, AMONG ALL THE SERVICES AT THIS TIME?

Well, initially the ah, planning was primarily Air Force. They were the only ones who had the capability to deliver a weapon. And ah, that ah, of course, stirred up ah, desires on the part of the Navy to ah, get into the act. Of course I was working for the Navy as well as the Air Force. So I supported the ah, Navy's views on the thing as far as... was concerned, to encourage the design of smaller weapons, because a carrier plane could not be large enough to carry ah, the size weapons that the Air Force could.

CAN I ASK YOU TO CHARACTERIZE VERY BRIEFLY THE AIR FORCE POSITION?

The Air Force position at that time was that they wanted to be the exclusive agent for delivering atomic weapons. They had, I would say, three reasons for that. One they wanted to dominate the situation, because they felt if they could win a war with, solely with atomic weapons, Second they felt they were best qualified to deliver the weapons and third they felt there were not enough weapons that you could spread them around to where you would involve the Navy as well as the Air Force.

AND THE NAVY POSITION?

The Navy position was that they should be a part of delivering, ah, atomic weapons, because they had capabilities, carrier capabilities, they were designing the super carrier, and I think it was under construction, I'm not sure. And it was, they were designing planes that could take off from it, that would be capable of carrying atomic weapons. And they felt with their capability of the ah, the four, whatever number of oceans you have, ah, that they would increase the readiness of the United States. That they should be a part of this program.

Considering the position of the Air Force and the Navy at that time, it's understandable that there should be a conflict. The Air Force wanted to dominate the situation. They felt they could win a war by strategic bombing and they needed no help and that they ah, could do the job by themselves. And that, and they also felt that there was a shortage of weapons, and that ah, they could do the job so much better in the Navy that ah, there was no sense of wasting any weapons with the Navy. The Navy however felt that they ah, had things to offer in the matter of...of security to where they were very, could be in various parts of the ocean and they were designing the super carrier, the United States. See the whole basis of the super carrier depended on being an atomic weapon carrier, that they felt that they could be a party to it. That that would add to our defense, give more flexibility. But the Air Force countered that that a single atomic bomb would eliminate the carrier. So it was definitely a... a... problem of reconciling the two views.

I THINK I'M GOING TO SHOOT FORWARD TO THE B-36S THEN WE'LL GO BACK TO THE FORESTAL QUESTION. SO A BRIEF CHARACTERIZATION OF WHAT THE B-36 CONTROVERSY WAS ALL ABOUT.

The B-36 controversy resulted from this struggle with, between the Navy and the Air Force, although Admiral Towers and Tuey Spots had come to an agreement that ah, there was a place for the Navy. Ah, when Secretary Johnson came in, he not only cut the budget, but he eliminated the super carrier, and that would knock the Navy completely out of the ah, well, really the strategic bombing or any other type of bombing using atomic weapons. They countered with ah, against the Air Force by stating that the Air Force was overemphasizing the nuclear possibilities and relying solely on ah, nuclear capabilities, and in particular ah, attacked the B-36 as a monstrosity, and a failure. And the argument got so heated that the Navy even came out that, on the moral issue, that you shouldn't use atomic weapons, ah, it was morally wrong. And that ah, controversy resulted in the resignation of Admiral Dunfeld and the appointment of Admiral Sherman who was a naval aviator and ah, a very cooperative individual. I know I enjoyed meeting him. Of course he was then my new boss. One of them.

THAT WAS GREAT. I'M GOING TO ASK YOU JUST TO DO THE MORAL ARGUMENT AGAIN. AND I THINK, CORRECT ME IF I'M WRONG, BUT I THINK THAT THE NAVY'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT IT WAS IMMORAL TO USE THE BOMB AGAINST CIVILIANS, NOT JUST TO USE THE BOMB.

Ah, primarily yeah,

OK, SO MAYBE YOU COULD BRING UP THE MORAL ARGUMENT AND CIVILIANS. JUST CHARACTERIZE THE MORAL ARGUMENT THAT THE NAVY USED AGAINST THE AIR FORCE.

The Navy's moral issue in this particular argument with the Air Force was primarily based on the ah, plan to bomb cities as well as just military objectives, and they in particular, considered that to be immoral in the use of weapons in warfare.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO DO THAT ONE MORE TIME. JUST THE MORAL ARGUMENT.

OK, the... the moral... the moral argument the Navy was using was restricted primarily to the ah, bombing of civilians by Air Force planes. They considered that bombing of cities and eliminating cities, blotting them out was immoral.

THANK YOU. NOW WE'RE GOING TO GO AHEAD A FEW MONTHS, WELL, I GUESS IT'S RIGHT AROUND THE RIGHT TIME TO THE SOVIET BOMBING, AND ASK YOU YOUR PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS AND REACTION TO THE SOVIET BOMB. AND THEN WE'RE GOING TO MOVE TO THE FIRST YEAR RECOLLECTIONS, WHERE YOU WERE AND WHAT IT FELT LIKE.

The impact of the Soviet ah, explosion of atomic weapons was tremendous on the whole set-up in the Pentagon. I first heard about it because ah, the Air Force was patrolling the air at all times with filters, and finally picked up radiation. And when that report came in why it was quite startling. And it was soon obvious it was an atomic weapon or an atomic explosion and that we were in a new era. Now it was a little shorter than what I had thought it would take a little shorter period than I had thought it would, take the Russians to accomplish the atomic bomb. But we probably should have been ah, a little bit more alert to it, ah, because of the obstreperous, how obstreperous the Russians were becoming. In other words we should have realized that they were approaching the time when we no longer had a...an atomic bomb by ourselves. Now if credit is given in good part to Admiral Strauss who suggested and insisted on this method of detection. Ah, we used similar methods to just analyze results, and it was fortunate that we did have the ah, Air Force set up to patrol the air around Russia to pick up radiation.

OK, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO CHARACTERIZE HOW THE SOVIET EXPLOSION AFFECTED YOUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES-

Well, the Soviet ah, explosion of course, put us in a new era. That ah, we no longer could just threaten to use atomic weapons and not expect a counter-proposal. Of course, we knew that we would have several years where we would ah, have a...more weapons than the, ah, Soviets would have. And it also lead to greater, another expansion program. So it ah, really, you might say, increased the tension between US and Russia and it increased our preparedness. Many issues came along that were resolved more rapidly than they had been resolved before. Now ah, it's rather interesting that ah, Louis Johnson did not take this opportunity to change his economy policy. I always thought he should have. I remember meeting with him with Bill Webster who was ah, Military Lia... Liaison Committee Chairman, and we went up to inform ah, Louis Johnson that ah, what the results were before they were official, before we went to see the President's office, ah... Security Council. And I know ah, we outlined to him as to how a special committee had been set up and analyzed the whole problem and, it was obviously an atomic explosion, and that ah, would require a lot of change in thinking. Well Louis Johnson said, I don't believe that type of intelligence, and I know I perhaps blurted out a little too suddenly, well Mr. Secretary you better be... be prepared to understand and accept this type of intelligence. This is not cloak and dagger stuff, it's ah, we have positive information that they exploded the... exploded an atomic weapon. But ah, he never changed his stance, he still kept on with the economy program until he finally left.

OK, DO YOU THINK WE NEED ANY MORE OF THE SOVIET BOMB OR SHOULD WE MOVE ON TO... OK, WE'RE GOING TO MOVE TO THE HYDROGEN BOMB NOW WHICH IS RIGHT ON THE HEELS OF...

There's one other thing before that, wait a minute. No, there isn't. It's OK.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE POLICY DEBATE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPER — SPECIFICALLY WE'LL BEGIN BY ASKING WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON THE H-BOMB?

Ah, one of the results of the Russian explosion was to enhance the possibility of developing a hydrogen bomb. There had always been the possibility, in fact some people like Teller wanted to develop it during the war. And he always had a current plan as to how to develop the hydrogen bomb. And immediately after ah, the Russian explosion, I know I attended a meeting at the AEC with Jim McCormick, Director of Military Application, and Bradbury was in ah, from Los Alamos and the Military Liaison Committee was there, and he went over a program for developing the hydrogen bomb which we thought was adequate response to ah, the Russian explosion. So ah, then the next thing that occurred, ah, I got an invitation from Senator McMahon to come over to his house for breakfast on Sunday morning, this was in October. And it was rather peculiar because ah, I didn't expect it but I, you respond to a Senator's invitation to breakfast. But there people from the State Department, the AEC there, I was the only military, and it amused me because I was sitting back in the corner, and I saw one of his staff go up to the rostrum there and hand him a note. And he said, Yes I know Senator...ah, General Nichols is here, I invited him. And on this issue I think we probably will be on the same side, at least I hope so. And ah, I thought that was rather interesting because it showed Senator McMahon was on the side for developing the nuclear...the hydrogen bomb.

AND EXPLAIN TO US WHY YOU WERE ON THE SIDE OF DEVELOPING THE HYDROGEN BOMB?

I looked at it the same as many other individuals that have been in the development of weapons. That when it's possible to develop a new weapon, you're derelict if you don't do it. Somebody else is going to do it whether you do it or not. And ah, in this regard, I know I went over to see Van Bush, when it got into a controversy-reaching the President's office. Bill Webster and I went over. And ah, we went to Van Bush with the idea he would... he had influence with Truman. He said he didn't have. And then he said, Nichols, when will you learn to be patient? Ah, well this was after I knew the AEC was against it. But he said, "When will you learn to be patient." He said, "You finally have your friend Mr. Lillianthal out on a limb. They'll all be gone by June. No... no government agency can afford to oppose a logical, a technical development which enhances our security when it's reached a stage it can be developed."

HOW DID YOU RESPOND TO THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEVELOPMENT THAT WERE PUT FORWARD BY THE AEC, PARTICULARLY BY THE GAC SCIENTISTS

Well, of course in regard to the arguments against the ah, hydrogen bomb, in October I didn't expect any opposition. Everything looked to be in good shape to go ahead. Well, I went over to England on another extraneous matter of trying to ah, negotiate a new agreement with England, which would ah, be permissible under the atomic energy act. When I came back I found a wall of silence. I couldn't find any information of what... about what had happened at the Commission. Ah, my good friend McCormick ah, clammed up, although he did tell me he had absolute orders not to discuss it with me. So that was our problem. So we had to find out what the opposition was through people like Teller, Ernest Lawrence, Alvarez, Milliken, who had inside sources plus, ah, I had a few, including Lewis Straws ah, that there was a fight going on. And then we, of course, we had to find out well what is the opposition in which we actually found... But basically the GAC was opposing it, some on moral grounds, some on the basis we didn't need it, some on the basis, technically impossible, and I know they, the arguments that we didn't need it were based on fallacy. Manley I think was one of the chief, he was Secretary, was one of the chief ones that ah, advocated that, that atomic bombs, just use ten of them instead of one, you get the same results. But you do not get the same results. Because if you say you want to take out a ah, submarine pen it's a harder target. And it's particularly illustrated today when Russia has finally developed bombs big enough to where it jeopardizes our ah, retaliation force. In other words, ah, to where they'll soon have enough of them that they can hit hard targets. So you do need something besides just a... a small bang for certain missions. Plus the other big things –

"PLUS THE OTHER THING..." GO AHEAD.

Plus the other big thing is that the nuc --hydrogen bomb does what most people thought the atomic bomb would do, and that is take out an entire city.

ARGUMENT?

The moral argument? Well, ah, it comes down to the same thing as the atomic bomb. When... when does killing become immoral. Does it become immoral just because you have a bigger weapon? Now we've been bombing civilians which ah, at one point was frowned upon, all through World War II. In other words, we disregarded that moral argument that you ah, don't bomb civilians. Well, if you're going to bomb civilians you might just as well do it efficiently. And plus the main., the other item of course, is you need the hydrogen bomb to ah, hit certain targets that can't be taken out with an ordinary atomic bomb or ordinary bombing.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU A SORT OF GENERAL QUESTION THAT I'D LIKE YOU TO RESPOND TO BRIEFLY AND THIS BRINGS UP LILLIENTHAL AGAIN. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO LILLIENTHAL'S CONCERN THAT THE US IS RELYING TOO MUCH ON ATOMIC WEAPONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY?

I think correct. In other words I can see that there's an argument there.

CAN YOU REPHRASE MY QUESTION SO THAT...

Oh yes, ah, ah, Lillianthal brought up the ah, argument that we were real, ah, relying too much on atomic weapons in our foreign ah, ah, policy both militarily and diplomatically. And ah, there's some merit in that. It ah, but the problem is ah, ah, we were solving a problem, how do you contain Russia with a given amount of money. And see, we were at the same time in '49 starting NATO, and the question was how do you defend Europe? And ah, Europeans were only willing to spend so much money. The cheapest way to give a defense at that time was the threat of using atomic weapons. And I think that threat has given us 40 years of peace.

TO ANOTHER SUBJECT NOW, AND THAT'S KLAUS FUCHS, AND I WANT TO ASK WHAT YOUR EVALUATION AT THE TIME WAS OF THE IMPACT OF THE ESPIONAGE OF KLAUS FUCHS?

Well, of course it was a surprise to ah, ah, ah I first heard of the ah, of the espionage of Karl Fuchs —

SORRY, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO BEGIN AGAIN, KLAUS FUCHS

The espionage of Klaus Fuchs had several significant influences. I don't think it influenced the hydrogen bomb decision because that was essentially made by the time that was known generally in Washington. But it did hasten the ah, second step. In other words, I was on a working committee to after the President had made the decision that we would develop the atomic ah, the hydrogen bomb, to then ah, expand our production facilities, particularly at Savannah River,...to start Savannah River, to produce more plutonium and more antridium. Now that went through just as easily as can be, because ah, everybody seemed to be for it, and ah, so it... that you can say, credit to the espionage of Karl... of Klaus Fuchs. Another factor, ah, ah, that was influenced, see, I had been over in England in November ah, negotiating for a better arrangement with England for cooperation, and various Senators were opposing it. My friend Senator Hickenlooper among others. But when Klaus Fuchs' case came up, boy that killed any cooperation with Britain.

CAN YOU TELL US BRIEFLY WHAT YOUR EVALUATION OF THE DAMAGE WAS FROM KLAUS FUCHS?

I wrote a report at that ah, let me start over. Ah, certainly Klaus Fuchs had a lot of information that was damaging to the United States position. Ah, General Roper and I wrote a report shortly after it was announced which in effect outlined where Russia might be on the hydrogen bomb, as a result of Klaus Fuchs' knowledge, and we based it on all the knowledge that Klaus Fuchs was exposed to. Not, we didn't know how much the Russians would... would accept, see that's always a problem with espionage. But if they'd accepted everything and taken action, they could very well be ahead of us in the development of the hydrogen bomb. And as it turned out they were certainly much closer to it than what we ever expected.

The beginning of the ah, Korean War had a tremendous effect on the custody issue and the location of weapons, and the testing of weapons. In regard to custody, it resolved the issue. See, ah, Lillianthal was gone, and shortly after the war started the whole issue of custody was resolved on the basis of calling it availability. In other words, the AEC and the military liaison committee sat down and amicably decided that the situation was such that ah, we should make steps, take steps to increase our preparedness. In other words, to relocate first the non-fissionable material part of weapons,...to where they would be in the position same as I had worked with Groves in getting assembly equipment in place. But the first move was to ah, move components to England to where they would be there with the assembly equipment and ah, we even moved assembly team in from Aswap. And ah, then the, with the Korean War why it was they were moved to Pacific bases. But all this was done with very little controversy. Of course in each case it was recommended by the combination of the Military Liaison Committee and the AEC and the President approved it.

HOW DID YOU PERSONALLY ASSESS THE USEFULNESS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN KOREA?

Well, during that period, ah, in 1951, I became Deputy Director of Guided Missiles in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and...and continued through '53 in that job. And also Chief of Research and Development with the US Army. And as Chief of Research and Development, when I heard that there were no so-called targets in Korea I set upon the business of finding some. In other words, I had people over in Korea and they would outline, study the situation, and I, what I told them to find was in regard to tactical use, a situation which they knew about long enough ahead of time where we could prepare and bomb it with atomic weapons. See for tactical use. I also advocated we should be using it against the Chinese, on China, not just tactically. However ah, I got a very deaf ear from most people. I complained to General Ridgeway who was in my chain of command then as Chief R and D, and he said, "Well go see the Chiefs. You know them all." And I know Vandenburg had the most valid argument. He said he didn't want to debunk atomic weapons. That if we used too many of them tactically it wouldn't win the war for us, and even if we just bombed a few places in China it probably wouldn't. He... he felt we should save all the weapons we had for a potential war with Russia. The Navy of course was not enthusiastic and the Army ah, ah, would just as soon continue to fight with ah. So I didn't get very far. However, in Korea, it finally was resolved by Eisenhower. We, they started the Armistice Negotiations in...well, I don't know just when they started them, but in '53 when Eisenhower came in as President he was ah, he felt something had to be done. He'd promised he'd end the Korean War. And in his book he cites MacArthur first talked to him about the necessity to use atomic weapons in Korea, or to threaten to use them. And in Eisenhower's book why he cites that he allowed it to be leaked out to where it would reach through India to the North Koreans and the Chinese that he was no longer going to observe a gentleman's agreement not to use all weapons. And that he was ready to use whatever was necessary to end the endless controversy with North Korea and come to a... a peace. And he had the credibility. Now that's another thing, if you threaten to use atomic weapons, you have to be credible. In other words, to where the other side believes you. Well, the believed Eisenhower, and I believed him. And the result was that you finally in July of 19, I think it was July of 1953, you had an agreement for a peace. I don't call it much of a peace, but nevertheless you stop fighting.

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO REPEAT, TO GO BACK TO VANDENBURG'S ARGUMENT ABOUT WHY THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS WASN'T A GOOD THING IN KOREA, AND ASK YOU TO CHARACTERIZE JUST THAT ARGUMENT BRIEFLY.

OK, I visited several of the Chiefs, and I always felt that General Vandenburg had the soundest argument for not using atomic weapons in Korea. His argument was that we had so few that ah, it would debunk the use, the threat of atomic weapons. It probably would not win the war for us ah, if we used them just tactically, and he wasn't sure it would win against the Chinese strategically, because their value of ah, life and so forth. So he felt that we should reserve all the weapons we had for use against a potential enemy, Russia.

NOW I'M GOING TO ASK YOU THE OFFENSE VERSUS DEFENSE QUESTION. WHEN YOU WERE AT THE, IN YOUR JOB WHERE YOU HAD CHARGE OF GUIDED MISSILES. WELL, YOU CAN ALMOST ASK THE QUESTION BETTER THAN I CAN BECAUSE YOU KNOW WHAT YOU WANT TO SAY ABOUT IT.

In..in 1951 to '53, I was assigned as the Deputy Director of Guided Missiles in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And then one... one year later I had the additional duty as being Chief of Research and Development of the Army. And at the time the idea came up to develop an intercontinental missile by the Air Force which was just in the study stage in '53. I felt the logical thing would be to start at the same time a defense. So in my position as ah, Chief of R and D, I called in the ordinates and suggested they spend $50,000 dollars with Bell Telephone Labs on studying the possibility of a missile hitting a missile. In other word, a defense against a ballis, an intercontinental ballistic missile. Everybody said, it can't be done. It, you can't hit a bullet with a bullet. Well, I just took the view, you have to study it to find out whether you can or not. Well, Bell Telephone Labs came up with a study and it eventually grew to where we finally developed an anti-ballistic missile. And then our intelligentsia came in and decided that in dealing with Russia you shouldn't have a defense. That that would indicate to them that we were planning a first strike. Well, I can't imagine anything so unsound as that is. That if you have a defense, at least it puts more doubt in Russia's mind as to whether or not they can knock us... us out in one blow. Well, people say you have to have a defense that's perfect. You don't have. You just have to have enough of a threat to where they can't evaluate whether or not they can knock you out with one blow. And so it...if it's 60, 80 percent effective, they don't know how effective it is, and it's the only way you eventually can reduce weapons. In other words, the ideal thing on control is to reduce to zero, weapons. But then you have to worry about some damn fool like Kadafi, who may have, say 10 or 12. Do it...do it in secret. It can be done. Then you need a defense just to counter that. So ah, I'm very happy with ah, President Reagan's proposal to have a strategic defense initiative. It's the most logical thing in the world, and I can't understand for the life of me why people oppose it. Now how, how long it takes to do it, I don't know. But I know there have been tremendous advances made. For example, we have been able to hit at, take off at Kwajalein with a missile and actually hit an intercontinental missile fired from California. So it's no longer a case where you need an atomic warhead to ah, destroy incoming missiles. There are ways and means ah, of doing it directly, and with the improvement in laser and all the computer systems, you certainly should be working on a defense.

NOW I'M GOING TO SEND YOU BACK 40 YEARS NOW AGAIN.

I feel very strongly about that. OK, good.

WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF YOUR ROLE IN THE ROBERT OPPENHEIMER SECURITY CLEARANCE CASE. YOU ALREADY TOLD US ON TAPE BEFORE ABOUT THE — SO WE REALLY WANT TO CONFINE OURSELVES TO THE STORY IN THE '50S.

The Oppenheimer case has always been ah, subject to more questions than any other topic ah, whenever I talk to people. They always ask me about the Oppenheimer Case. I probably know more about it than any other individual, having been in on the beginning of it and then happened to be General Manager at the time that ah, the hearing was precipitated. All during the period after the war I was called from time to time by various Secretaries whether to ask whether or not I knew about Oppenheimer's record. See, the security people, every time he came up for clearance, it would always raise Oppenheimer's record. I had a consistent answer. By any reasonable evaluation on whether or not he was a security risk he could be considered a security risk. However, I believe he's loyal, and it's up to you to decide is he essential for the project or are you willing to assume the, whatever security risk may be. That was a consistent answer I gave every time I was asked. When Eisenhower was elected, he campaigned on the issue of getting communists out of government, and he particularly chided Truman on the basis that ah, White in the Treasury Department. Ah, J. Edgar Hoover had sent a warning about him, and all that happened was that Truman promoted him or somebody promoted him. That was a campaign issue. The result was when ah, Eisenhower came in, he issued a new regulation. Changed the regulations on ah, the basis of distinguishing between a security risk and a loyalty question. You didn't have to be disloyal to be a security risk. Now most people don't understand that. Now, and he also ordered that everybody should review all their questionable cases. The AEC had not done this, and I doubt if they would have ah, raised the issue in regard to Oppenheimer. Now Oppenheimer at that time was losing his influence because of his ah, decision on the hydrogen bomb. So he no longer was being used to the extent he had been previously. He'd ah, he'd resigned from the, as GAC chairman and most of his contracts he had with the military had been cancelled or just terminated. So he no longer had the influence that he had previously. And probably, I doubt a, I didn't even know about this order of the President, so when I came in as General Manager, so I'm sure I would not have raised it. I don't know if, I doubt if Straws would have. But it was precipitated by what later turned out to be a good friend of mine. I just knew him at that time. Bill Borden, who had been Secretary of the Joint Congressional Committee staff. And he worried about Oppenheimer. He'd made quite a study of it. And in urn, let's see, I forget when he exactly wrote the letter, but anyway, he wrote a letter outlining all that he felt about Oppenheimer and how he was a security risk and he not only thought he was a security risk he, that more probably than not, he had been disloyal, in other words a spy, and felt that he should be terminated. Well that hit J. Edgar Hoover, and J. Edgar Hoover always protects himself. I think he sent about ten copies out or ten letters out to various Secretaries and to the President of the United States. Well, when it hit, and also about the same time he wrote that letter, Brownell was ah, Attorney General, was ah, giving a speech reminding the public of ah, this ah, event with Truman, in other words the need to eliminate communists from government. That's your background. So Ike had very little recourse except to say, ah, set up a wall of security around him, and where no more information could go to Oppenheimer until he's cleared. And see the obvious thing was to do, go ahead with the provision of the...Presidential order and have a hearing. And ah, we in it, normally the General Manager was the final authority in a thing like this. And ah, but the Commission thought it was so important that they ah, said everything I did could only be a recommendation and they would finally resolve it. Well, the first thing was to pick a committee, a panel for a Security Hearing. And I felt we had in the Chairman Gordon Gray, probably as good a man as you possibly could to weigh a thing fairly. He had been Secretary of the Army. He ah, had been President of one of the University in one of the Carolinas, I forget which one, and he was an outstanding citizen. So he was the Chairman. And then they had two others, a scientist and ah, Mr. Morgan from ah, industry. Well, ah, the whole thing was precipitated ah, where we set up the business of having a... a hearing. I tried to get a man I knew to be counsel, but he couldn't ah, get away from his work, and finally ah, Brownell was the security... ah, Attorney General, I guess, Brownell, recommended ah, a counsel. So we drew up the charges, not charges, but ah, a statement of allegations. Everything that was practically, it was in ah, Borden's letter plus a few other things that we knew about that he didn't have. And I know we called Oppenheimer in, he was overseas at the time, and it didn't help any to where the FBI reports that one of his visits over there was to visit our old friend Chevalier again. That can...that worried a lot of people. And before going over he had just gone out to Los Alamos to be briefed on the situation and he hadn't been there much the previous year. So that it was a little alarming and ah, but ah, I always had the idea that ah, we might learn the truth about the Chevalier case. Now during the course of the hearing, General Groves, I think, put it most specifically that ah, to where if you consider the present rules that were in existence under Eisenhower, that if he were Commissioner he would not be able to clear Oppenheimer if you complied with the rules. Well the ah, vote of the hearing board, long hearing, was two to one. The man we thought most adamant against Oppenheimer, the scientist voted to clear him. In fact our counsel reported to me during the course of the hearing he was afraid he was going to disqualify himself by the statements he was making and the questions he was asking Oppenheimer. It looked like he was prejudiced. But he shifted — the other two, so it was a two to one vote. I recommended ah, no clearance on the basis that the story Oppenheimer told back in 1943 was one story. He told another story after the war at the FBI, and he repeated that same story essentially at the hearing. One story must be a lie. And of course, Oppenheimer said the story during the war was the lie. And ah, he used the term, "I must have been an idiot to tell that story, to cook up a cock and bull story." He tried to claim that he told Groves that. I'm sure he never did, because Groves would have told me. I was in on the business. And ah, what always amazed me was that Groves told me that when he was called by the counsel for Oppenheimer, that he'd warned ah, the counsel of the two different stories. In other words, that his story that Groves was telling was different than the story that ah, Oppenheimer was now telling it. So they should have known that that ah, was going to come up. But he just fell into the trap of ah, of ah, trying to repeat the same story after the war, and of course we had a tape of what he had said during... during the war. And the two stories were in... in contradiction. So the hearing board of course called it a not complete frank, or something like that. But the — I passed my recommendation on to the Commission and they voted four to one, see, not to clear Oppenheimer. Now people often ask, what is the difference? Well there are several differences. One, the regulations had changed. On the first place, under Groves, myself, we had no regulations. But we went on the basis, he was essential. Now there's nothing in the present reg — regulations, or the regulations at that time that gave any basis for considering whether or not a man is essential. If he was a risk, he was out. The ah, next factor is, at the time of the '43 hearing or not hearing, but our consideration of it why Russia supposedly was an ally. In ah, '53 why Russia was a potential enemy. The other thing ah, in '43, ah, Oppenheimer was absolutely essential. In '53, why nobody considered him essential. So there are many reasons as to why, now I regret very much, I mean that the incident ever came up. It ruined a damn good man. But part, I don't think he's completely blameless though. He brought a lot of it on himself.

The question frequently comes up as to what — how much a factor Op... Oppenheimer's opposition to the hydrogen bomb had in the security clearance. That is an issue which is quite confused. I know it was in ah, Borden's letter. At the time, I... my instructions to the young ah, counsel that was preparing the list of allegations, I said we don't want to put too much stress on that, because I don't think we should try a man for his opinions. And there's danger of being accused of that. However, Green argued that he was putting it in not because of the... what the opposition meant, but because of his veracity. In other words, was he telling the truth about his position. And I said, well, people will still misunderstand. He finally convinced me that ah, the way it was paragraphed, why that issue would not come up. The Commission approved it, I finally approved it reluctantly, because I just didn't feel that we should use that as any basis for security clearance. However the matter was compounded by the leak to the New York Times on the whole, where they released my letter, the General Manager's letter. And they changed the paragraphing. See, which Green said, the paragraphing is such now that that won't come up. Well, they just changed it, to where it was clearly then an issue, or more clearly an issue. And that, in hindsight indicated to me they were planning to go public, and which they did, although ah, we were trying to keep the thing secret, and we thought we had Oppenheimer's agreement to that. We gave him the choice. But anyway, that had ah, now Gray was warned about that and how to handle it. And I thought he did a fair job as how he handled the thing as not being a basis for clearance, but he did cite the veracity part. And see that coupled along with the Chevalier case on veracity was one of the main questions about... Now Groves in his opinion, see cited primarily associations in the past.

NOW WHEN YOU DESCRIBE THE DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY THAT DR. OPPENHEIMER TOLD THE CHEVALIER STORY. CAN YOU CHARACTERIZE VERY BRIEFLY WHAT THE MAIN DIFFERENCES WERE?

There were several differences, and probably if I hadn't been General Manager they never would have arisen, because when they started reading the transcript of our... our case, I mean what our counsel was presenting, I called them in and said, you don't have the case. I want to know about Chevalier case, in other words, what's the truth about that. You're not asking any questions. You don't seem to be handling that. And he said, we have nothing on ah, see I cited that in the Chevalier case, as I knew it, that there was a tape recording, we'd made it, that Oppenheimer had cited two or three contacts. He cited photocopying material, and ah, well, I think that... were the basic things. And so the counsel finally checked with the FBI and they had the stuff in a book box. General Groves and I had sent it over when we went out of office on the basis that these were our six hottest cases, the custody should be with the FBI. And that's how it happened, now some people say that's double jeopardy. I checked with the judge and he said, not if it's newly found as... But ah, now Groves but Groves had warned him that we had a different story.

NOW I'M GOING TO BACK YOU UP TO THE VERY BEGINNING OF WHEN I STARTED TO SPEAK AND THAT'S TO CLARIFY SOMETHING ABOUT WHO KNEW ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE STOCKPILE VERY EARLY ON, WE'RE BACK IN '47. I WANT TO HEAR SPECIFICALLY ABOUT WHAT PRESIDENT TRUMAN KNEW ABOUT THE STOCKPILE.

You raise the question about who knew about the size of the stockpile.

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION]

The question has been repeatedly raised as to how many people knew about the size of the stockpile after the war. And the answer is, very few. Of course I... Groves and I knew about it. It was reported to me what the status was each time. The AEC... or not the AEC people, but our people at Los Alamos that had responsibility for storing the weapons and...would report monthly on ah, what was the status of all the equipment, and also we got reports from our production division on plutonium and 235 available. I would say there were probably not more than ten people in our organization in that chain of command that knew the... Periodically it usually fell to my lot, I would go over to brief General Eisenhower. What General Eisenhower did with the information I don't know. But we felt at that time our... our man to report to was General Eisenhower. Whether he fully informed Patterson, I don't know. I've never been able to find anything that indicated that ah, Truman was informed. I have found a couple of cases, some indication he didn't want to be. Now Lillianthal makes a big issue of it that everybody was shocked when they discovered the size of the ah, stockpile, which ah, I think I've explained earlier.

CAN YOU DO THE LILLIENTHAL, JUST AT THE END AND ASSUME THAT NO ONE HAS HEARD ANYTHING EARLIER. "LILLIENTHAL WAS SHOCKED AT THE SIZE OF THE STOCKPILE..."

After the AEC took over, Lillianthal was quite shocked at the size of the stockpile. He had ah, he had assumed from all conversations that he'd heard from various people that it should have been much bigger than it was. But ah, and I think he then informed Truman. And now what Truman's reaction was, I don't know for sure. But Truman could have had the information at any time he asked for it. But I think in, during that period, he felt he was not about to use atomic weapons for any purpose whatsoever. So he probably felt it better not to know it. He should have known it.

WE'RE BOUNCING ALL AROUND. THIS IS THE FINAL, FINAL, FINAL. AND THAT'S WHERE DID YOU FIND YOURSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH MR. BORDEN WHEN HE BROUGHT UP THE... THE BORDEN LETTER, DID YOU FIND YOURSELF PRIMARILY AGREEING WITH IT, OR HOW WOULD YOU PLACE YOURSELF IN THAT...?

In regard to Borden's letter, when I read it there... I found nothing new in it. In other words, it was essentially information, which I had, and I probably could have added more to it. I agreed with ah, his facts as reported by various Security agencies that were in his letter. I did not agree with his conclusions. And I, never, I believed and had always believed and still believe that Oppenheimer was loyal. He was as security risk, but I have no doubt in my mind that he was loyal.