AT THE TIME THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT, AT THE END OF THE FORTIES, A TURNING POINT IN HISTORY, A WAR WAS FOUGHT NOT FAR FROM THE BORDER OF THE SOVIET UNION. A WAR FLARED UP THERE WAS A CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. DID THE KOREAN CONFLICT, CAUSE ANY SHIFT IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS WAR?

The main lesson that we drew from the Korean war was the following: not only major wars but also lesser wars and even minor wars show that we must do all we can to make sure that any kind of disagreement in our times is resolved by means of negotiation and not by the clash of arms. The Soviet Union at that time considered, and still considers, that the Korean people wishes to live in a single peaceful, democratic state. As for South Korea, it was turned into a nuclear base against the wishes of the people, without the consent of the people. Such a situation clearly does not accord with modern international law, or with the interests of peace especially in the Far East.

IN THE WEST THEY LIKE TO SAY THAT... SORRY.

We consider that the policy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic was realistic. That's our view. I think that everything that happened subsequently confirms the correctness of this view.

I JUMPED IN WITH THAT QUESTION BECAUSE IN THE WEST PEOPLE LIKE TO MAKE MUCH OF OCCASIONS AT THAT TIME AND LATER, WHEN NIKITA SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV ESPECIALLY IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE EXAGGERATED THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT DO YOU THINK? WAS IT REALLY THE CASE? AND IF SO, FOR WHAT PURPOSE DID NIKITA SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV EXAGGERATE SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITY?

I don't quite see what you mean - which of Khrushchev's statements you have in mind. I was present at the session of the UN General Assembly in New York when Khrushchev said that now nuclear missiles had been brought to such an awesome degree of accuracy that with them we could shoot down flies high above the Earth. It is clear that this was simply an imaginative way of expressing an idea. It is quite possible that such a comparison seemed frivolous to some. That's what I think it was frivolous. Let's not argue. His message was clear to everyone at that time. It is clear now, too. I personally don't know of any statements or remarks made by Khrushchev which exaggerated Soviet nuclear capability. And if he ever let slip any such remarks which could be seen in that light, they were only said in the heat of the moment only to parry the arguments of certain Western politicians. An actual speech may differ from the edited version which is published. Well, this is a well—known fact. Khrushchev was an emotional person. He understood very well that in the heat of discussion even a leading politician can sometimes get carried away. That's why he called for realistic and sober judgments, especially in those cases where nuclear weapons were being discussed.

NOW, ANDREI ANDREEVICH, YOU HAVE SUGGESTED HOW WE SHOULD VIEW DISCUSSIONS OF WHAT KHRUSHCHEV IS ALLEGED TO HAVE SAID ABOUT OUR EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR MIGHT. BUT IN THE 1950S, NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS A REAL AND RAPID BUILD-UP OF AMERICAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONRY IN EUROPE. HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION EVALUATE THIS?

I would like to keep my answer to this question brief. As it turned out later, the United States was thereby implementing directive number 68 of the US National Security Council, of which we have already spoken, where the doctrine of containment [original has "intimidation" which is the Soviet, term for the American doctrine of "containment". The more negative Soviet term was used above] The rapid multiplication of missiles with nuclear warheads, those which are called tactical nuclear weapons, was viewed extremely negatively by the Soviet Union. This was one of the manifestations of the arms race.

THAT'S RIGHT, IT IS JUST OVER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY SINCE THE SO-CALLED NUCLEAR CRISIS, OR THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS THERE ARE VARIOUS NAMES FOR IT. PEOPLE IN THE WEST OFTEN ASK NOWADAYS WHY THE SOVIET UNION AT THAT MOMENT DECIDED TO DEPLOY ITS MISSILES IN CUBA. WAS IT DONE WITH A SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF WHICH YOU KNOW? OR WAS THE POSSIBLE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES MISJUDGED?

The Soviet Union has given explanations of its position more than once. I can only repeat them. It was 1962. A year before that the Cubans had defeated the bands of American mercenaries who had landed at the Bay of Pigs. The United States had tried to prevent the establishment of Socialist system in Cuba and to undermine Soviet-Cuban cooperation. Their aims are documented for all to read. The defeat of these interventionists did not stop certain circles in America and the threat to Cuba was growing. In these circumstances sensing the danger of an attack on the island of freedom [1960s Soviet media cliché] the Cuban government, in the summer of 1962, turned to the Soviet Union for help. That was the moment when the two countries agreed on a number of measures aimed at strengthening Cuba's defensive capability, including the deployment of missiles -exclusively for defensive purposes. What was the United States' reaction to this? What was it? It is well known. It was accompanied by the threat of an immediate assault on Cuba by the American army. At the beginning of September 1962 the Soviet Union called upon the US government to see reason, not to lose self control and to make a sober evaluation the possible consequences of its actions, if it resorted to the use of force. Our country acted responsibly, fully aware of the responsibilities which bind the superpowers as regards the existing situation and the possible consequences of any hasty action. The American government, however, ignored the Soviet appeal and continued to build up the tension. I must say that that American reaction did not come as a surprise to the Soviet Union. The main facts are well known. It is hardly necessary to go through them again.

ANDRE ANDREEVICH, ON OCTOBER 18TH, 1962 YOU MET THE THEN PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY. COULD YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THAT MEETING?

I am not surprised that you have asked me this question. On that day in October acting on the instructions of the Soviet leadership, I spoke to President Kennedy in the White House. Naturally, we discussed Cuba. I raised the question of Cuba on my own initiative and explained the Soviet position to the President. "I would draw your attention", I said, "to the dangerous developments caused by the American attitude towards Cuba." The President listened attentively. "For a long time," I continued, "America has been conducting an unrestrained campaign against Cuba. It is attempting to cut off Cuba's trade with other countries. It threatens Cuba with aggression. Such a policy could lead to grave consequences, which we believe, no nation, including America, wants." Kennedy replied that the present regime in Cuba did not suit the United States. If there were a different government there, the United States' attitude would be different. I noticed that this was said sharply. "But", I said "on what basis does the American leadership assume that the Cubans ought to order their internal affairs, not according to their own judgment, but as Washington thinks fit? Cuba belongs to the Cuban people. Neither the USA nor any other power has any right to interfere in its internal affairs. Statements that we hear from the President and other spokesmen to the effect that Cuba allegedly threatens the security of the USA, are unfounded. It is enough just to compare the size and resources of the two countries, a giant and a midget. The groundlessness of the accusations against Cuba to become obvious. Then I emphasized the fact that the Cuban leadership, and Fidel Castro personally, had on many occasions announced to the whole world that Cuba had no intention of imposing its system on anyone else, that they are firmly against any interference by states in each other's internal affairs.

It seeks to resolve all points of contention with the United States by means of negotiation. Those declarations, as is known, are reinforced by deeds. Those who call for aggression against Cuba claim that they do not find the Cuban Government's statement sufficient. But this may be said of everything, this way every aggression may be justified. Any aggressive action, against any country. It is enough but to say, "we do not agree to this. "When the United States takes hostile action against Cuba, and at the same time also against the states which maintain good relations with it, respect its independence and assist it in its hour of need, the Soviet Union will not assume the role of a bystander. This was said. Yes. Kennedy asserted that the US Administration had no plans to attack Cuba, and that the Soviet Union could assume that no threat to Cuba existed on the part of the United Spates. At this time, he made an important admission: the Bay of Pigs action was a mistake. He, as President, stated that he was restraining those circles that supported an invasion. That he was restraining those circles. While he himself seeks not to allow actions that might lead to war. The Cuban question became really serious. Nevertheless, Kennedy further interpreted events as if the situation was aggravated by the actions of the Soviet Union, which supplied Cuba with offensive weapons. Then the President read out an official statement - he just held it up and read it out - on the Cuban question, justifying the US decision to impose a blockade around Cuba. I had to say again, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet Union was calling on the US Government, and the President personally, not to allow any steps incompatible with the interests of peace, with the principles of the UN Charter against the interests of peace and against the principles of the UN charter. In the course of our discussions, Kennedy, despite allegations which circulated in the West, never raised the question of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. I repeat, he never mentioned it a direct reply as to whether there were such weapons in Cuba or not. At the same time, I explained to the President that Soviet help was aimed exclusively at strengthening its defense capability and the development of a peaceful economy in this country. The training of Cubans in the use of arms intended for defense by Soviet specialists could not be evaluated as a threat to anybody. The Soviet Union responded to Cuba's request for help because the request was aimed at eliminating the danger hanging over the country. At the conclusion of our meeting I said: "Mr. President, allow me to express the hope that the United States is now fully aware of the position of the Soviet Union as regards Cuba and of our evaluation of US actions towards this country. "The discussion with Kennedy of the Cuban question was full how can I put it more exactly—full of sharp turns, zig-zags, if I may say so. He was clearly nervous, though outwardly, he tried not to betray it. He made contradictory statements. Threats towards Cuba were followed by assertions that Washington didn't have any plans for an assault on Cuba. This last statement, that Washington didn't have any invasion plans, this last statement is certainly significant - and was assessed as such then by me and by the Soviet leadership after my report. Common sense prevailed with the head of the White House. It shows that behind the appearance of a man who slightly lost his balance was a statesman of outstanding intellect. I would like to say this explicitly. He was a man of outstanding intellect and character. Our discussion was a lone one. I only render the gist of what was said by each side on the most critical question, that of Cuba. Otherwise I would go on too long. This was probably the difficult meeting that I ever experienced in all my forty-eight years of meeting Presidents of the United States in various circumstances. Maybe not such a long period of time!

IT IS A PERIOD LONG ENOUGH FOR YOU TO KNOW THIS TOPIC. THOROUGHLY. BUT YOU KNEW WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN WASHINGTON, THEIR MOODS ETC. AND WHAT WAS THE MOOD IN MOSCOW AS THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS DEVELOPED?

Mood? This is not exactly a suitable word. Sometimes it suits and sometimes it doesn't when you want to describe the attitude of the leaders of the country and of a whole in that situation towards the Cuban question. No doubt the situation was highly tense. I must admit this. It was. People watched with great interest and listened attentively to what was taking place. All rumors [original has "doubts"] and news concerning the Caribbean crisis were weighed on invisible scales. Of course, the leaders of the country had much more solid information. Everybody wished the situation were more relaxed as regards this question. It was widely known that both in Washington and in Moscow serious consideration was being given to the question of how to get out of this situation. Both capitals, no doubt knew what it meant to resort to extreme measures over Cuba. Though there were hotheads in the United States and emotions prevailed over common sense in the case of some politicians. But as a whole, the American public was aware of the consequences that would follow if extreme measures were taken, i.e. if nuclear weapons were used. I must say that that was true of the general public. When President Kennedy announced that the United States was not going to invade Cuba, as I've already mentioned, the possibility of an agreement opened up. And it became even more definite when the United States let it be known that it intended to lift its blockade from Cuba, and besides that, that it was prepared to remove its own missiles from the territory of Turkey. When people talk about the Caribbean Sea and about the Cuban question of those days this point about Turkey is sometimes forgotten. But in the agreement that was reached, this undertaking was included. The United States committed itself to the removal of its missiles from the territory of Turkey. On many occasions the Soviet representatives in those days and in following years have been asked by politicians of various countries whether at that moment there was a threat of nuclear war. Today I would say this, the situation a certain degree of risk, but there was no real threat the unleashing of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. I have solid grounds for this statement. President Kennedy and his Administration kept their promise not to invade Cuba. The development of Cuba took its own course - the course of an independent, sovereign state, where people decide for themselves what regime should rule-their country. This a peaceful state, friendship with which we value highly. And not only our country but many other states in the world.

ANDREI ANDREEVICH, WITH ALL YOUR EXPERIENCE TO LOOK BACK ON, WHAT DO YOU THINK? WHICH LESSONS CAN WE LEARN TODAY FROM THE CUBAN CRISIS?

We should learn one lesson. Nobody, no state, should impose on any country, regardless of its size and population, a regime, which is not acceptable to its people. In other words there should be no interference in any country's internal affairs. The Soviet Union in its policy towards other countries is strictly guided by the Leninist principle. Both sides at that moment did the right thing - they exercised restraint. The whole confrontation between the USA and the USSR over the Cuban question, in my opinion, even today demonstrates to the great powers the necessity to seek for mutually acceptable peaceful solutions in all situations, however, complicated and critical these situations may seem. I would like to point out with some satisfaction that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has referred to this principle many tames when he has had meetings with the US President and leaders of other states. This constitutes a new principle in international affairs.

ANDREI ANDREEVICH, WHILE PRESSING FORWARD WITH OUR PEACEFUL POLICY YOU HAVE MET MANY OF THE LEADERS WHO HAVE SHAPED THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. ONE OF THEM, HENRY KISSINGER, BELIEVED AND STILL BELIEVES THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE LINKED TO OTHER ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY. WHAT IS THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS MATTER?

It is true that the problem of arms control and the problem of disarmament are connected with other areas of foreign policy. We can't deny this. But how can we understand this connection? It can be understood in the following way: that the problem of arms control and the problem of disarmament have to be solved independently, with no attempt to link with negotiations on other questions of foreign policy. It also could be interpreted in this way - that you can't make progress on disarmament without, at the same time, resolving the other foreign policy problems. The latter view is contrived. More than once Henry Kissinger in the course of our meetings asserted that it is difficult and even impossible to pursue any consistent line in foreign policy if there is no agreement on other important issues. He referred to the policy of Metternich as a good model for the conduct, of foreign affairs - he went as fair as that - to the Foreign Minister, later the Chancellor, of the Austrian Empire. However, Kissinger, although a man of great abilities, I have already had occasion to comment on this, lost sight of an essential fact: Metternich, by his policy rather assisted the collapse of the bloated Austrian Empire than its consolidation. In our opinion this fact can't be disputed. This is an objective historical fact. It can't be denied.

YOU KNOW, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY NEGOTIATIONS, MANY ASPECTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS ONE, WELL, PARTICULAR CASE -WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION, AS MANY PEOPLE NOW WRITE IN THE WEST, OBJECT TO THE BAN ON MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS WHICH WAS PROPOSED AT THE SALT I TALKS?

The Soviet Union objected to this for one simple reason. The USA already had these missiles but we didn't have them. The United States was trying to consolidate its monopoly and they proposed banning the production of these missiles. While still having the existing missiles in their possession. The situation in connection with this problem turned out to be similar to that when the United States tried in actual fact to retain its monopoly in nuclear weapons. I've already talked about this.

HERE IS ONE MORE OF THOSE QUESTIONS OFTEN ASKED IN THE WEST. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO CHINA INFLUENCE THE SOVIET UNION TO SIGN THE SALT TREATY?

As far as I know Nixon's visit to China didn't have any immediate effect on the signing of the USSR USA treaty on the limitation of strategic arms. I can't say anything else on this matter.

THESE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH TEND TO BE TAKEN OVER-SERIOUSLY AND ARE OFTEN ASKED IN THE WEST. AMONG THEM THERE IS ANOTHER ONE: TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE BOMBING OF HANOI AND THE MINING OF THE PORT OF HAIPHONG AFFECT OR THREATEN THE SALT TREATY?

Of course, the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the port of Haiphong, which were carried out by the armed forces of the USA, to a certain degree created difficulties in the process of signing the agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. These American actions complicated the drafting of the SALT treaty? But nevertheless, in the course of the Soviet-American Summit meetings in May 1972 the SALT I treaty was signed.

IN THE WEST THERE IS A VAST NUMBER OF PUBLISHED MEMOIRS AND ARTICLES ON THE DETAILS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR YOU HEAR QUITE OFTEN THAT IN MOSCOW ON THE EVE OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY YOU WERE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH HENRY KISSINGER UNTIL MIDNIGHT. WHAT WERE THESE PROBLEMS, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE SO DIFFICULT TO SOLVE?

It is not nice to be engaged in negotiations at night. You should get some rest at night - not at some other time. The question contains a hint that there must have been some unresolved problems as regards the agreement itself, and that they had to be resolved on the very last day, even in the very last hours. No, that was not the case. The treaty had been finalized and was presented for signing. I myself and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Leonid Vasilievich Smirnov, were engaged in talks with Kissinger and his advisers about the interpretation of certain clauses of the treaty. I emphasize that, about the interpretation of certain clauses of the treaty. I repeat, there was no disagreement on the main issues then. We reached mutual understanding as regards the interpretation of the articles of the treaty. And the loose ends were tied up...And the next day it was signed.

AS YOU CAN SEE, ANDREI ANDREEVICH, A LOT OF THIS DERIVES FROM THE EXISTING MEMOIRS OF STATESMEN AND CERTAIN INTERPRETATIONS OF WELL-KNOWN SITUATIONS, HENRY KISSINGER, IN PARTICULAR, CLAIMS THAT BOTH OF YOU DREW UP IDENTICAL DIRECTIVES FOR YOUR DELEGATIONS IN HELSINKI. COULD YOU ALSO TELL US ABOUT THAT?

I gather that you are referring to the directives to the delegations in connection with the completion of the General European Conference on Security and Collaboration in Europe and the signing of its main document, the Declaration which took place in Helsinki. We then were working on our own directives and the United States of America, Kissinger, its own. The main objectives of both countries were similar at that stage. It was necessary to make the maximum effort so as to complete the Helsinki meeting and to sign the documents. But it doesn't mean that our positions coincided completely on all matters. Differences of opinion on some questions remained. In particular, this was the case over human rights. But in principle our directives were similar. The final Helsinki document was then and is today of great importance. One can say without exaggeration that this document is one of the major pages in the post-war History of Europe. It was designed to confirm the outcome of the Second World War -first of all with regard to the political map of Europe [original has "territorial order of Europe"]. I would like to underline this point.

IN ANY CASE, THERE IS AN OPINION IN THE WEST THAT, CONCESSIONS MADE BY ONE SIDE ARE, AS A RULE, REQUESTS FOR CONCESSIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE. AND THAT'S WHY NOWADAYS MANY PEOPLE IN THE WEST ASK WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE WHEN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DIDN'T USE THE CANCELLATION OF THE WELL-PUBLICIZED B-L BOMBER AS A BARGAINING COUNTER IN THE ARMS REDUCTION TALKS THAT WERE HELD AT THAT TIME. THIS IS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, SO WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A TIME WHICH IS NEARER TO US.

Nearer to us. No. The Soviet Union wasn't at all surprised by this. Though we knew that production of the B-1 bomber in the United States had been halted. And why should the Carter Administration use its own unilateral decision as a bargaining point in international negotiations?

SO, SOMETIMES WE RECOGNIZE DECENCY IN OTHERS - QUITE RIGHTLY. BUT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS THE FACT THAT PEOPLE QUITE OFTEN ASSESS OUR REACTIONS WITHOUT CONSULTING US. WE WERE TALKING HERE ABOUT NIKITA SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS... NOWADAYS IN THE WEST YOU CAN HEAR QUITE OFTEN THAT LEONID ILYICH BREZHNEV WAS NOT REALLY COMMITTED TO THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENTS. IS IT REALLY THE CASE?

You are talking, as I understand, about the Vladivostok agreements, which were the result of the Summit meeting of 23rd-24th November 1974. The way to them turned out to be complicated. The negotiations before the meeting in Vladivostok went on for several years at various levels, in various capitals and on various continents. I myself took part, in the negotiations on dozens of occasions. Many questions were discussed. But I would like to emphasize the importance of one question the agreement on which actually led to agreements on many other questions. The main obstacle in the process of our meeting was the US demand that we should get rid of our heavy intercontinental missiles or cut their numbers drastically. Drastically. The Soviet side firmly announced that it couldn't comply with this demand in view of the fact that the United States had the so-called "forward bases", in other words bases with nuclear weaponry scattered all around the world including Europe, and in the first instance along the borders of the USSR. This was a well-known fact - in Moscow, in Washington and in the other capitals of the world. After heated discussion, we at last came to a compromise. Both sides gave up their demands (which I have referred to) and thereby reached agreement. The essence of the Vladivostok accord was that agreement had been reached on the need to complete the drafting of a new treaty to limit strategic offensive weapons. The result of the discussions - there were several of them - was an agreed ceiling for the total number of strategic delivery vehicles on each side and certain qualitative restrictions, such as the limits on the strength of strategic offensive systems equipped with multiple, independently targetable warheads. As you can see the progress towards agreement in Vladivostok looked impressive. Naturally Brezhnev, who was the head of the Soviet leaders and in whose term these agreements were achieved did his best to confirm them with official American-Soviet documents. But it must be said - the process of getting them confirmed in a written agreement took five years. At that time President Carter arrived in the White House. He announced that he approved the concept of détente and expressed his wish to broaden Soviet-American accords. In particular, he wanted in a short period of time to complete the preparation of the SALT II Treaty. Only on June 18th 1979 did it become possible for the SALT II Treaty to be signed. It took place in the capital of Austria, in Vienna. It was signed by Mr. Brezhnev for the USSR and by Mr. Carter for the USA. So, Brezhnev had reason to be anxious. For the conclusion of this agreement was prolonged for a very long time. And the way to it was mainly opened up by the Vladivostok Accord.

THE THING IS THAT EVERY NEW ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS BEEN FORMED BY EVERY NEW PRESIDENT YOU HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH MANY PRESIDENTS, AND IT USED TO HAPPEN THAT A NEW PRESIDENT PERCEIVED HIS COUNTRY'S POLICY IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WAY OR SOMETIMES IN A VERY DIFFERENT WAY FROM HIS PREDECESSORS? WHAT KIND OF DIFFICULTIES DID THE SOVIET UNION FACE IN CONNECTION WITH THE CHANGE OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION?

I wouldn't say that Carter's approach to this question was essentially different from these of his predecessors. The thing is that there were no essential differences. Each of the American administrations, starting from the time of Truman, based its policy on the assumption that the United States must have military superiority. I underline this-it must have military superiority over the Soviet Union. In this respect, the American administration didn't differ much, as if they had al conspired. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union wouldn't accept this US position. Whatever Administration was, the USSR always tried to achieve a reduction in levels of nuclear arms and the prevention of the superiority of our country over the other. At the same time I would like to emphasize that we were always one step behind the USA. This is very important -this is a very significant point. We have always followed the USA as regards armaments and have never been ahead of them. Never.

YOU HAVE MADE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POINT THAT WE HAVE FOLLOWED THE UNITED STATES. NEVERTHELESS, NOWADAYS IT HAS BECOME A COMMONPLACE OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY CONSTANTLY DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUED PRODUCTION OF HUGE STRATEGIC MISSILES EVEN AFTER MILITARY AND STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN REACHED. WAS THIS THE CASE? AND IF SO, WHY WAS IT?

Strictly speaking, there was no military-strategic parity. Speaking of this, when we spoke about parity we have always added the word "virtual". We used the phrase "virtual parity". This addendum has no lexical meaning. Politicians know this very well. It has a certain specific meaning. Tell me, what could the Soviet Union do when the United States was arming itself to the teeth? Lay down our arms? The situation was such that the interests of our state didn't allow us to do this. Our aim was to get both sides to do this. But we were not listened to. Even when missiles were first introduced we pressed for cuts of nuclear weapons of all kinds. Taking into account the fact that concrete agreements would eventually be reached on parameters and types of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union couldn't afford and didn't wish to be left behind as regards nuclear armament. This was dictated by our security and in the interests of our security. Of course nowadays we are in a better position to be able to see everything that took place and in a better position to give a more objective evaluation of the positive aspects and of, the whole situation in which we were then. Round about, the end of Khrushchev's term and in the initial stages when Brezhnev came to power, nuclear armaments had reached such levels, all this is very important, that even the country which had fewer weapons also was capable of striking a devastating blow. The country which had fewer weapons could have struck a devastating blow. To use some other words came to be used by politicians and in military circles it was possible to "inflict unacceptable damage" on the enemy. And here the question arises as to why, then, a country which has a smaller nuclear arsenal should build it up even more? A man can't be killed twice. The conclusion which naturally follows from this is that it would have been possible to stop. Even the country which was left behind in the stockpiling of a nuclear arsenal could have stopped. In other words that country could have cut its expenditure on nuclear arms. I am not alone in thinking so. The politicians of those days would have been justified in reaching such a conclusion. But this was not done. I would also add that in that situation no one even dared to mention the necessity of cutting down expenditure on nuclear armaments. The situation in which both parties in the Soviet-American relationship found themselves did not help them to assess the situation more objectively. None of the people involved - neither politicians, nor military specialists, nor scientists, nor the specialists carrying out research on nuclear weapons. Nobody spoke up in favor of a cut in their own production of nuclear weapons. It would have been possible, if this conclusion had been drawn, it would have been possible, at least, to direct a few billion rubles towards the peaceful needs of the country. Today we have the right to act more intelligently and more boldly. So, we, the Soviet Union, have now set an example in the field of disarmament. Any unilateral action of ours in this direction influences public opinion, influences whole nations. If one country takes this line then it is bound to be noticed by others, if these other countries conduct a serious and (fully) responsible policy. In this matter we follow the principle of rational sufficiency. In his speech at the UN General Assembly on December 7th 1988 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev announced that a decision had been taken in the Soviet Union to make substantial reductions in our conventional weapons. This is an important, I would say, an epoch—making, decision. This reduction means first of all that the Soviet Union has not only continually proposed disarmament, not only talks about, disarmament, but actually carries it out. At the same time, the security of, the country is safeguarded. Our country's aim is to take effective steps towards the abolition of nuclear arms from the surface of our planet and to make sure that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes.

YOU KNOW, WHEN I WAS IN NEW YORK, I WAS AMAZED AT YOUR CAPACITY FOR WORK, AND TODAY...

What do you suggest?

THERE IS A TINY BIT LEFT.

A young organism, not yet grown to its full strength.

WELL, I NEED A SPECIAL REINFORCED DIET, VITAMINS...I'LL MANAGE...

DÉTENTE WAS A TREMENDOUS JOY FOR EVERYBODY. DÉTENTE WAS AN ENORMOUS VICTORY NOT ONLY FOR US - THOUGH IN THE SOVIET UNION WE FELT IT, EACH OF US, AS A PERSONAL HAPPINESS. NEVERTHELESS, TOWARDS THE END OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. THAT IS BASICALLY HOW IT IS PERCEIVED IN THE WEST AND PROBABLY THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR THIS, DÉTENTE TURNED OUT TO BE DEFUNCT. DON'T YOU THINK THAT WE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THIS? WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THAT, IN YOUR OPINION?

No, I don't see it that way that we are partly to blame. The Soviet Union couldn't have assisted in the undermining, so to speak, of the policy of détente. Simply because it was constantly pressing hard for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional armaments. It made efforts to achieve general and full disarmament. We have always based our policy on the known Leninist formula, "Disarmament is the ideal of Socialism". No, I repeat. It wasn't the Soviet Union, or its policy that caused the collapse of détente at the beginning of the '80s. During détente quite a lot was achieved. All the good that was done in those days has left its mark. No one can wipe it out. Actually the concept of détente should not be analyzed in isolation from its own time and place like some kind of abstraction. And today, are we not witnessing the beginning of a détente? Hasn't it taken place? Admit it. You probably will agree that there is no precision instrument with the scale and figures which could be used to measure the degree of détente. And at the same time especially since the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium and short-range weapons has come into force, we can confidently say that this détente is a fact and that the role in détente of the present Soviet foreign policy is well—known. The whole process taking place in today's international affairs is seldom called détente. The words you'll hear more often used for this process are: the process of deepening mutual understanding and trust, based on the contemporary philosophy of peace, the cornerstone of which is the belief that general humanitarian values are of the utmost importance and take first priority. This is a profound idea. This is a kind of yardstick for the assessment of any state's foreign policy. The task of any Government, any leader is to assist in the broadening of this process, whatever name is given to it détente or any other term, the essential meaning is the same, the movement towards a stable peace on our Earth.

YOU HAVE JUST GIVEN AN ANSWER CONCERNING ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND CRUCIAL STRATEGIC QUESTIONS, AND NOW I HAVE A QUESTION OF A MORE SPECIFIC NATURE. YOU PROBABLY REMEMBER THE DECISION TO DEPLOY THE SS-20 MISSILES, AS THEY WERE CALLED IN THE WEST. DID THE SOVIET LEADER AT THAT MOMENT, LEONID ILYICH BREZHNEV, UNDERSTAND WHAT THE REACTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS TO THAT DECISION MIGHT BE? WHAT DO YOU THINK?

I don't undertake to answer this precise question, as to whether he understood or not the reaction to the deployment of the Soviet Missiles. I don't think he did fully understand this. I don't think he understood it completely, I have grounds for my statement.

YOU SEE, THERE ARE SEVERAL MORE QUESTIONS RELATED TO THIS QUESTION. IN PARTICULAR THERE IS ONE: WAS NATO'S DECISION TO DEPLOY CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE A THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT DO YOU THINK ON THAT?

Yes of course, it was threat. It was a threat.

AND IN 1983 DID THE SOVIET UNION THINK THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE COULD BE HALTED?

Stop! The machine's run on too far. We need to go back.

LET'S REPEAT IT AGAIN.

I thought you had swallowed...

NO, NO...PROBABLY WE CAN DO IT.

LET'S REPEAT THE QUESTION AGAIN.

Please, do.

I'LL REPEAT THE QUESTION NOW …IF YOU CAN, PLEASE DO IT STRAIGHT OFF. IN 1983, DID THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDER THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE COULD HAVE BEEN HALTED?

Probably they could have been halted, if there had been an agreement between the USA and the USSR on the conditions for non-deployment.

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE SITUATION AS REGARDS THE CALLED SS—20 MISSILES BECAME CLEAR. WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION IN THE END AGREE TO DISMANTLE THESE SS-209S?

The Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the SS-20 missiles on certain conditions, which were written into the agreement. This decision was the result of a sober assessment of all the considerations for and against. And the Soviet leadership unanimously came to the conclusion about the necessity of reaching the agreement on certain conditions. The significance of the treaty is enormous. This was clearly explained by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev both to the Soviet people and to the whole world. There is hardly any need to expand on that.

IN THE WEST PEOPLE LIKE TO TALK ABOUT WHO WINS IN PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT. AND THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST THE PROCESS OF CUTTING STRATEGIC ARMS IN THE UNITED STATES THINK THAT THE PROCESS IS NOT EQUITABLE, THAT IT BENEFITS THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT COULD YOU SAY TO COUNTER SUCH ASSERTIONS?

These critics are not objective. Their conclusions are not serious. This process is equitable. Both countries, the Soviet Union and the United States, benefit in the same way from this process of strategic arms reduction. How could this process possibly be inequitable? Because in this process each side has the opportunity to demonstrate the validity of its own position, to weigh all the pros and cons of each proposal made by its opponent, of each clause of this or that agreement, of any agreement, which they have already centered into, and which is already in force. This side has the opportunity at every step to stand up for it's legitimate interests. And if necessary it can clarify practical points in the implementation of the agreement. This being so, can we actually say that the process is unfair? Certainly not! The results of a particular phase of the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are taken into account when the next agreement is being signed. Isn't this shown by this very treaty on the elimination of medium- and short-range weapons? It was thoroughly discussed by both sides, not only before it was signed but also in the process of its ratification by the Senate and Congress of the United States and by the Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I don't see in this matter any room for unfair advantage. The benefit is mutual.

ANDREI ANDREEVICH, YOU ARE ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST EXPERIENCED AND RESPECTED POLITICIANS. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR ENORMOUS EXPERIENCE, WHAT ARE THE ISSUES - IN YOUR OPINION -THAT ARE DECISIVE AT THE MOMENT, IN THESE TIMES WHICH WE CALL THE AGE OF NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY?

All the nuclear nations, and other countries, all the nations, all the statesmen and each person on Earth must understand that nuclear weapons must be abolished. The security of the world cannot be guaranteed, guaranteed if they continue to exist. The Soviet Union is fighting for their abolition, as are the other Socialist states, our friends and allies. We shall never give up that struggle. And at the same time we shall try to convince other countries that nuclear energy should only be used for the benefit of mankind. We try to convince everybody. Though nowadays all politicians are perfectly aware of this, of the fact that if control over nuclear weapons is lost due to some political misjudgment, intentional or unintentional and they are used, then this will be a cataclysm for the whole world. Here I would like to recall the words which were said to me personally by that famous scientist, at the mention of whom any reasonable man takes his; hat off even today his name was Albert Einstein. He said: "I told President Roosevelt that we could expect the atomic bomb to bring suffering. My opinion today is well known." He made it public. The contents of his letter to the President were published by the American press. "The local lads" that's how he referred to them, as 'lads' the local lads probably haven't got a very clear idea of the fate that awaits the round vessel on which we are all, including the Americans are sailing." The great scientist meant by 'lads' the American politicians of those days, of course, who had to decide the future of nuclear weapons. And by the "round vessel" he of course meant our Earth. He also remarked, that "if everything had depended upon the scientists then in my opinion the overwhelming majority of American scientists would support a ban on this terrifying weapon." I can hear these words even now. Though he uttered them in the course of our discussion in his usual manner, quietly and calmly. By the way, I would like to say something about another scientist, also outstanding, and well-known not only in the United States, but in the world as a whole about Oppenheimer. He was a man whose fate was, so to speak, tragic and dramatic. It is well-known fact that he was the principal scientific Adviser during the creation of the first A-bomb in the United States. Under him and thanks to his efforts, the bomb came into being. He, when it was achieved, was the Adviser, the Senior, Principal Adviser of Baruch, the American Representative at the Atomic Energy Commission. And I must say that his position was then different from that which he had taken before. He took a different stance. He came to a certain honest conclusion about, the situation the conclusion that ways should be found to eliminate nuclear weapons. Otherwise they could cause a catastrophe for the world. So, on one side, he was a senior scientist, an adviser to a politician, the American representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, and thus had to give him support. On the other hand, he took the view that atomic, or as we say nowadays, nuclear weapons should be destroyed. This was the most correct and honest position to adopt. And he never betrayed his views. He remained the same scientist, the same Oppenheimer as he had become then in the second stage, when the A-bomb had appeared. It wasn't easy for him. He was surrounded by an atmosphere of, if I may put it like this, of ostracism in the political sense. And it was created by nobody else but the American Administration. I met him again after that only once-I think this fact would probably be of some interest under rather strange circumstances. I arrived from Geneva together with my colleagues, colleagues from the three powers England, France, USA. We arrived from Geneva, where we had been at conference, to attend the funeral of Dulles. John Foster Dulles. On the way from the Cathedral to the Arlington Cemetery in Washington, I saw a car which drew level with ours. I noticed somebody was vigorously waving his hand. There were two men in the car, one of them was Oppenheimer. He recognized me and I recognized him so we exchanged friendly gestures. We waved to each other. After that I never saw him again. I don't think he was going to the cemetery. He was going in another direction on business of his own, otherwise I would have seen him at the cemetery. But I didn't see him there. Credit is due to the American scientist Oppenheimer for the views of his later years. I can't help mentioning another scientist, Joliot-Curie, the Frenchman, who was a spectacular personality in the scientific world. He was a scientific Adviser on scientific question of the French political representative at the UN Atomic Commission, Mr. Paradis. He also held views that were based on and directed towards a full ban on nuclear weapons, so that Atomic, nuclear energy should be used only for the benefit of mankind. So I just would like to take my hat off in front of these three outstanding representatives of the scientific world who have left such a deep mark on history.

THIS IS VERY INTERESTING. YOU'VE MET GREAT SCIENTISTS, WHO HAD INVENTED … WITH POLITICIANS, ETC. SO TODAY, WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE WAY TOWARDS FURTHER ARMS REDUCTIONS? WHAT ARE THE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IN THE WAY OF MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV, WHICH HAVE TO BE OVERCOME BEFORE THE AIM OF RIDDING THE WORLD OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE ATTAINED?

I have already spoken about what needs to be done as regards arms reductions. The first and ultimate aim of which is the elimination of nuclear weapons. Their total abolition. To accomplish this we must press on with our negotiations. We must show we have the determination and the will on both sides or rather, on all sides - well, you can actually say, realistically speaking, that there are always two sides at any meeting. This is the only way we can achieve the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and bring about a nuclear-free world. Of course, for this Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and indeed all the Soviet leaders and all the people have to overcome enormous obstacles. And parallel to this, we must carry out the process of conventional arms reductions also. The program of action for a nuclear—free world which is not being proposed to the world by the Soviet Union was brilliantly presented by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, in particular at the UN General Assembly. He was speaking on behalf of the whole Soviet people.

My answer is yes, it is possible. It depends upon people, on politicians, on their awareness of the responsibility which they have. The Earth should be free of nuclear weapons. The air should be free of nuclear weapons. Space should be free of nuclear weapons. There shouldn't be any deceit, like that of Ulysses in politics. People who are acquainted with the works of Homer are familiar with the name of the inventor of the Trojan horse. Politics should be honest -this is the guarantee of the security of all states and all nations.

ANDREI ANDREEVICH, DR. KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE LINKED TO OTHER ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY. WHAT IS THE VIEW IN OUR COUNTRY, IN THE SOVIET UNION, ON THIS MATTER?

It is true that the problem of arms control and the problem of disarmament are connected with other areas of foreign policy. But how can we understand this connection? It can be understood in the following way: that the problem of arms control and the problem of disarmament have to be solved independently, with no attempt to link them with negotiations on other questions of foreign policy. It also could be interpreted in this way that you can't make progress on disarmament without at the same time, resolving other foreign policy problems. The latter view is contrived. We can't accept it. More than once Henry Kissinger in the course of our meetings asserted that it is difficult and even impossible to pursue any consistent line in foreign policy if there is no agreement on other important issues. He referred to the policy of Metternich as a good model for the conduct of foreign affairs he went as far as that to the Foreign Minister, later the Chancellor, of the former Austrian Empire. However, Kissinger, although a man of great abilities I commented on this on many occasions in the past lost sight of an essential fact Metternich, by his policy rather assisted the collapse of the bloated Austrian Empire than its consolidation. In our opinion this fact can't be disputed. There was something else.