I WOULD LIKE YOU TO START BY TELLING ME ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL INTRODUCTION TO THE NUCLEAR RECEPTION IN ISRAEL.

This really started in the early fifties. I was then director of the scientific department of the ministry of defense and we had a number of institutions in Israel. And one of them was devoted to atomic energy. It was the only group working in atomic energy in this country. And I should say that at the time that -- in particular after the war of independence in 1948 there was a rather expansive mood in the country and one of hopefulness. That when you learn already that this country had no oil and the question of energy would be labeled the economy in our future to a large extent. And since the nuclear energy seem to promise vast resources of energy for the entire world, and as with every new discovery you pin all your hopes on that. It was decided to look for uranium and to produce heavy water. And in the hope that if this country was denied both oil and water it might not be denied uranium. Well it turned out the country was denied uranium also except in very low-grade combinations for the phosphates near the Dead sea. And under the circumstances then people thought, "Well let us try and find a process for the extraction of uranium from those phosphates." On the other hand, there was a professor...who had been working on something called fractional distillation in England during the war. And he came back to this country and this fractional distillation being essentially meaning boiling water so that the heavy part remains below and the light part evaporates. That there in this fashion you could also make heavy water. And with the rather primitive understanding we had of anything it was thought that if you could produce uranium and heavy water you could both supply your own energy needs, you could export energy to other countries, and you would have solved the problem which seemed so stark and forbidding. Well...

HOW SUCCESSFUL WERE YOU?

Well, I can tell you that the Israelis in fact did succeed in developing a process of extracting the uranium from the phosphates which seemed very expensive but it was not that expensive because it was extracted from phosphates which were quarried as phosphates. So that all you need do is put a little tube past the, past the phosphates through this tube, extract uranium and return the phosphates to the phosphate industry. Uh, with respect to heavy water also, it was not known at the time which was the economic process of producing it as a number of competing processes were being tried. Now at that time, there was a, a big division, a sharp and big division in what was then the Atomic Energy Commission with all the scientists from the universities who said, "Don't waste any money on any engineering enterprises because you're no good at it. And all you should spend your money for is nuclear physics, radio chemistry, radio biology and all those things which can be done in the laboratory," because they thought in science they might be good. They doubted that any...enterprise could succeed. On the other hand, everybody who was stealing was extracting uranium from phosphates and trying to make heavy water was utterly absorbed and enthusiastic about those prospects. It's very interesting what happened ultimately. That was that all the academics resigned because they felt money was being wasted and being sent down the drain. And the government I am quite sure also had its doubts of whether it support their scientists who felt like engaging in these engineering ventures with a promise however of eventually deriving energy from it. And then something happened. And that was in 1953. The French Atomic Energy Commission came along. They said, "You know what? We don't know how long there'll be reserves, rich reserves of uranium in the world. We'd like to buy your process of the extraction of uranium from phosphate and keep this plan in our drawer so that if we are hard put to we might begin extracting uranium say, from the phosphates in Algeria." And six months later, also 1953, the French and the British came along and they said to the Israelis, "None of us know which is the most economical way of producing heavy water."

HOLD ON FOR A SECOND. WHEN YOU SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE YOU IN THE GROUP THAT WERE TALKING TO THESE...?

Yes. Well I was involved.

THEN YOU SHOULD SAY TOWARD US.

Yes. I can tell you, as I said, I was Director at that time to the Department of Ministry of Defense. But at the time already there was independent of that. There was a head of the Atomic Energy Commission, a certain Dr. Bergman. And even though I was very definitely involved, since atomic energy was within this department it was being dealt with separately. It was really, it was no defense issue at all. It just so happened that the enthusiasm of our Professor...and Bergman in trying to do something in atomic energy simply...that administratively it was within that — see, I shouldn't, I should not build up my part in those negotiation with France and Britain, but I was certainly more than in the picture. I had to be involved since ultimately the execution was part of my responsibility too. In any case, the interesting part is that the division between the scientists who said, "Don't waste any money on engineering enterprises," and the government people who said, "Well, you should go on because as prospect not of doing good science but of extracting energy eventually from such enterprises," was decided by the fact or was settled, rather the..., was settled by the fact that the French and the British showed interest in Israeli processes and this served as a sign to the government that apparently the Israelis were also able to do a good engineering job and good development job, and not only good science. And whatever else, whatever happened later on in the nuclear field, which is actually motivated by the confidence the government had in the engineering capabilities, also of their scientists and engineers and not only in those in pure science which were generally conducted in the institutions of higher learning.

WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT--

The government is really Ben-Gurion.

WHAT WAS BEN-GURION'S...THINKING--

Ben-Gurion had, Ben-Gurion had a, had I think two principle ideas and in the history of this country these were very important. He had two principle ideas and those matters which I am addressing now in our conversation, but not of course he had more that especially with respect to other fields. One is he felt that Israeli government was also the oh, had as one of its duties, not only to look after security and well-being of the country, but had to make sure that Israel was a spiritual ear to the Jewish heritage of study and learning and anything he could do in order to promote science learning, and research, here, he would do because he felt that was the image of the Israel he had in mind. And the second thing was that he did believe that nothing else beyond the competence of whatever brains there were in this country, of achieving, there might be wrong in their planning, they might be wrong in their assessments, they might be wrong in their finances, but eventually they'll be able to be able to absolve themselves or acquit themselves successfully of anything they undertook to do. And this...was bullshit really. Uh, by the fact that Israel seemed to be bereft of natural resources. The laugh of the desert, for example, for the naked desert, which was the least the least productive part, the least productive soil which this country had. It was also an expression of the fact that whether as least to expect on the face of it, this is really where your hopes resided.

WHAT ARE OTHER CONSEQUENCES TO THE EARLY...? IS THERE ANY SUCCESSES IN TERMS OF THE HEAVY WATER FOR EXAMPLE?

Well, you can see one thing that the that as it turned out as it turned out that as these processes could be assessed commercially, as it turned out that the Israeli process was not really as good as the other processes which were competing. And this was something nobody could know at the time. Everybody at the time simply interested in sharing and pooling knowledge and information in order to decide what would commercially be most successful. There was no fundamental science involved. And this was simply a question of which would which would be the cheapest.

CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THE COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH IN TERMS OF WORK ON NUCLEAR ENERGY?

Yes, well... while there was not much going on with the French after they had bought the process of the extraction of uranium from phosphates, this tripartite agreement on heavy water was something which lasted throughout many years and in fact was from time to time supplanted with additional scientific agreements where you felt that I think even as far as water desalinization; so that this received really a much wider scope. And at the time when relations between Israel and France were uncommonly good, and that was in the late fifties, the French agreed to help the Israelis also build a reactor. But the Israelis had not given up. They had learnt more. They had become a bit more sophisticated. They knew that the incidence of uranium in heavy water by itself did not at all guarantee, did not at all guarantee, that you could build your own reactors and even sell them profitably. But Israel was encouraged for example, by the fact that Britain introduced its first electricity generating station, Calder Hall, I believe in 1956. And they very much wanted to build their own reactors. And it is on this basis that the French began to help Israel to build their reactor in Dimona.

WHAT ABOUT THE BENEFITS TO THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR SCIENCE FROM THE OTHER SOURCES? WHAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT THE ATOMS FOR PEACE?

Yes. See, the American Atoms for Peace program is something from which Israel benefited also. In fact the swimming pool-reactor in the smaller nuclear center, Naha Soreq, near Rehovot where we are meeting was given to us by the Americans who, at the time under this Atoms for Peace program, distributed this type of reactor to all the countries who wanted to begin, learn about nuclear energy or rather the workings of reactors because it consumes more energy than it produces. But who want to get a feel, a real feel for what it was all about. There were there were many grandiose designs which came to nothing and there was for example, which is not part of the Atoms for Peace program but about that time, the Americans had an idea that by building a big reactor here which would both produce electricity and de-salt seawater, and to have this enterprise, a joint enterprise between Egypt and Israel, they could also promote peace in this region. And the Israelis very quickly fell for that because they wanted peace. But but both the Americans and the Israelis were much too naive in thinking that emotions would take second place and that the commercial or social benefits of such an undertaking would really yield peace in this region. So this is another project, as I say, which was abandoned which at the time, was I believe it was during Eisenhower's time I think. It is associated with names of Admiral Strauss as head of the US Atomic Energy Commission of the time. But what came to...is that since it was during Ben-Gurion's times but later also, it was part of Israeli policy to be known as someone who extends technical and scientific cooperation. There's indeed a lot of assistance given in nuclear matters be it food preservation, be it charting the course of water sources be it be it improving strains, food strains here by irradiation. A lot of assistance was being given by Israel, both in Latin America and in Africa and in this sense, whatever was happening in atomic energy in this country also was part of it; was supposed to serve this purpose of extending the type of cooperation by which Israel wanted to be known, which means good science, good technology and socially useful.

THE CURRENT ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY OF NOT INTRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE REGION, .... WHAT DOES IT MEAN IN TERMS OF THE NECESSARY SIGNS AND NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY TO BE ON THE THRESHOLD? WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING ON THE THRESHOLD IN TERMS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY?

I think nowadays the requirements are not the requirements are not very stringent for anyone who has a nuclear industry, who has a — in fact I might quote the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Blix, who I believe said that any country which has a necessary scientific and industrial base can produce, if it wants to, nuclear weapons. And if you take this as a basis, you might say there are tens of countries in the world who are technically in a position to produce nuclear weapons if so they wish.

...unreal about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it has been advocated almost as a... being morally preached by all those countries which have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If I look at Europe, for example, I find that the United Kingdom have British bombs; they have American bombs. At the same time, they've signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so they're good boys also. And fourthly, they are not even responsible for their own security. No European country is responsible for its own security, because they all are tied together in NATO, and they have the American... under American umbrage, which is both nuclear and conventional, It is only in such fashion that the security of Europe, of Western Europe, is assured. So as I look, as I say, and I mention the United Kingdom and I do not mention that in any not in any derogatory sense... but if you look at this, and you see that you have your own bombs, you have other people's bombs, you are, you're a good boy, having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, you are not even responsible for your own defense entirely, and then you preach others, and tell them to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty... you just wonder just how much force there is in this argument.

CAN YOU CONTINUE THAT... AND MAKE THE ISRAELI POINT BY COMPARISON...?

Yes, well, the, I should perhaps add that... what I've mentioned with respect to Britain, of course, it's, it's true with respect to... all the other countries of Europe also, even those who have no nuclear weapons, are of course happy to take shelter under the American protection. Now... if I look at this, then I do, as an Israeli, I notice a few things. One is, I notice that... the Non-Proliferation Treaty really has very little to do with the sense of security which these countries have. They have it not because they have signed the NPT, but they have it because they have their alliances, and there are plenty of nuclear weapons in those alliances. Secondly, I notice that... the non-proliferation regime, in particular, the admitted . limited reliability of...internation-, of the inspection, of the international atomic energy agency, really doesn't bother anyone, particularly... because the you know the international atomic energy agency... they can inspect, but they have, you have to... the inspected country has to agree to the supervisor, they have agreed to the time of the inspection, they agree, have to agree, to the installation being inspected... and the director-general of the atomic, international atomic agency in fact said that... even if you signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this by itself is no guarantee, it's no guarantee at all as to the future intentions a country might have. And I'm not quoting him, but what presumably he meant was also that many countries who signed the NPT just in order to obtain the necessary technologies, and one day opt out of NPT when they feel they can do so, if they want to make nuclear arms. Now... coming back to Israel, on the other hand, must take NPT very seriously. First of all, with respect to other countries... the Israelis do not believe that Iraq, which signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, really meant that it adopted the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty... there's a good way of obtaining whatever you wanted to obtain, and resort to arms.... Not only Israel believed that; I think ever so many people I've spoken to shared the same opinion without saying so, because the Iraqi nuclear program could not otherwise be explained. The Libyans, if I may mention them, they shopped openly around for bombs, and when they were not sue-, unsuccessful, in finding them on the market, they settled for a more arduous route of signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty — not buying bombs, but at least being able to get nuclear technology in the installations. I do not think that their change of stance was really a change of intent. So if we look at countries which are vowed to the destruction of Israel, and we are being told they have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we say, "Well, it really doesn't matter to you whether they take their commitment seriously or not, but it very much matters to us." And secondly, however the Israelis do not... do not contemplate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, any arms race in the Middle East might find Israel eventually the loser. So the Israelis have given this matter thought... and... they've come to the conclusion that...

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Yes, and we, yes, so we've come to the conclusion--

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We Israelis, yes, have come to the conclusion that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed on the part of the Arab countries, or certainly those... which say... mornings and evenings... that they want to destroy the state of Israel, gives us no reassurance at all, no confidence at all... that they really that they have adopted the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the way it is always spelt out in the preambles. But would rather buy technologies and in their own good time, then proceed to make bombs. Now... the second point is that the Israelis, however, in order to obviate an arms race in the Middle East, have thought as to what they might themselves to...there's much pressure on us, to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty... but we thought that... we thought that our first problem is the prevention of ongoing conventional wars, and we were wondering how we could tie in the prevention of conventional wars with the prevention of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and as an alternative recognized by the international community, which is a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and we felt that this alternative would serve the region, not only with respect to cessation of conventional wars, but it would, at the same time, then lead to a denial of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. And... the thing's very simple: the countries of Latin America signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco on their own initiative; the countries of the South Pacific signed a similar undertaking... and there was a famous commission, convened by the UN, called the Palme Commission, presided over by the late Olaf Palme of Sweden, who also state that the nuclear-weapon-free zone was one which could only originate from free negotiation and agreement between the parties of the region. The big difference between the NPT and a nuclear-weapon-free zone is this: that NPT, as everybody can see, allows you to go on and being entirely untrammeled, in conducting conventional wars. You'll find that most conventional wars being conducted in the world nowadays are between countries who've signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, if you negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone with your neighbors, and this includes mutual arrangements, not only a central agency in Vienna inspecting everything, but you are inspecting each other, for example, then it is inconceivable that conventional wars continue to be the order of the day. And that all these mutual reassurances were... are in suspense, while you're conducting a conventional war. And so the Israelis came and said, "Just a moment. Our problem are conventional wars. So don't press us with NPT, because we do want to gain both things: we want you to encourage the Arabs to sit down with the Israelis, and negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone, because when they sit down, and we begin to negotiate such a zone, then indeed there's a chance that warfare in the Middle East might cease altogether, because the specter of an eventual nuclear war is just too... just overawing.

WHAT WAS THE RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL SO FAR PROM ARAB STATES?

Well, the Arab states, the Arab states have not taken up the Israeli challenge at all, and the Israeli challenge was genuine. And rather than always harp on the Israelis, and harping on their nuclear stance, it was, we felt that... what all the good countries of the world should do is tell the Arabs, "Sit down with the Israelis, take up the challenge, and negotiate with them a nuclear-weapon-free zone." The Israelis did not even insist that all the countries, from Libya to Iran or Pakistan, immediately join these negotiations; they're perfectly ready to have a representative number of Arab countries simply begin to sit down, and see what the problems were, involved in having such a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East. The the proposal made by Egypt, which is... religiously introduced every year, and voted on, by general consensus for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East says... first sign NPT, or first, accept full-scope safeguards by the international atomic energy agency, and fore-swear the development of nuclear weapons, and that's all. And then you have a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The one thing... which is not mentioned at all, is that the states of the region should negotiate with one another, and so the Israelis say, "Well, that's just is phony." They vote in favor because they're in favor of a nuclear-weapons-free zone, but they say, "Why reverse the procedure with respect to the Middle East, which is eminently—

CAN YOU EXPLAIN AGAIN, IN YOUR JUDGEMENT, THE NUCLEAR FREEZE...TO BE ACHIEVED AND HOW THE...?

Yes. In my view, the way to achieve a nuclear weapon freeze -- first of all I should say that a nuclear weapon free zone for the Middle East, I believe, is most important. And as I said earlier, it is important because it does two things. And one is that, one is that it's essentially through free negotiation between the parties concerned, it really obviates the easy possibility of conducting of conducting conventional wars while you are negotiating. And secondly because it contains elements of neutral reassurances. And not only assurances giving...international body, and it is even less conceivable that if you rest your confidence on nuclear matters and nuclear reassurances, that in between you conduct conventional wars just when it pleases you. And, and have all these mutual reassurances in the...for the time being. So this is really why the Israelis insist on a nuclear weapon free zone. I do know, and it's, it's been put to me that of course, this is an Israeli gimmick because the Arab states will not sit down with you and negotiate a nuclear weapon free zone. But on this my view is very strong. If this is a gimmick, as far as I'm concerned it means that the Arab states even poo-poo the danger of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East as long as they can go on waging conventional wars against Israel. And I believe the international community is making a big mistake in always insisting that Israel sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, rather than insist that the Arab states sit down with Israel to negotiate a nuclear weapon free zone, because it's no longer a question of good will. It was good will up till now, did not exist in the Arab countries to sit down and negotiate anything with Israel except for Egypt lately. But the specter of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East should carry sufficient conviction simply for reasons of self-preservation in the Middle East, for all the countries to convene together and see how they could settle their differences peacefully.

IS IT SO WITH THE ISRAELI INTEREST TO PRESSURE THE ARAB COUNTRIES INTO DIRECT PEACE NEGOTIATION BY SUGGESTING THAT THERE IS A DANGER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE?

No, I think the only... I think the danger of a nuclear arms race is exists everywhere as it exists in the Middle East. And if I'm speaking of pressuring, it's not it is in my view, it's the interest of the international community to tell the Arabs to sit down with Israel and negotiate a nuclear free zone. The way it is conceived in the international community and very designedly so, it speaks of negotiation between the parties as being more of a confidence building measure than anything else. And I mentioned earlier on that NPT countries just wage wars against one another irrespective of the signature they gave.

WHAT OTHER RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL WITH IAEA NEVERTHELESS?

Yes. Well... I should make a...in speaking of the International Atomic Energy Agency between the stuff of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the board of governors. Because as you speak of the staff of the agency as probably quite a number of other international organizations, the Israelis do not feel necessarily singled out, but they feel very accepted as is any other country. However we have to take account of the fact that all these international bodies are governed by boards of governors who are inspired mainly by their political motives and s... as far as that is concerned, the Israelis have every reason to be distrustful of the judgment of that board. Yet Israel realizes that on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency there's a country like India who is... to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and who has set off an explosive device, and of whom everyone privately believes that they are developing nuclear weapons. If we went to Pakistan, which is also supposed to be developing nuclear weapons on the board governors. In such countries, Libya, Iraq, and others, they have to decide whether Israel is a good country or a bad country, then Israel is very distrustful of their judgment. In fact, I will go further. That if Israel were to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, these countries would take every opportunity of having Israel up before a security council for any...reason whatever, because this is the way this is the way the international community conduct their affairs with respect to Israel. And nothing matters. Not facts not facts. Um, I say facts do not matter. It is pure political expediency. And and there is another reason, one reason, I, I did not mention before because it is secondary really. But any kind of inspection to which Israel submits, which is ultimately governed by the judgment of a political body in which Israel was always singled out to its own detriment almost invites a recommendation for Israel to undertake as little international commitments as possible, yet it is always subject to, as I see it, victim to judgments which, themselves, are guided by political expediency.

I WANT TO ASK YOU A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION. THE NOTION THAT, THE STATES IN THE STATES, THAT UNITED STATES AND ALSO BY THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE SORT OF A RIGHT OF BIRTH TO DECIDE THE FATE OF THE WORLD. AND THAT SMALLER COUNTRIES MAYBE ARE DEFICIENT IN DOING SO, AND MAYBE INAPPROPRIATELY SO. DO YOU SHARE THIS OBSERVATION?

I, I think I think there is very little doubt that on a general, on the general level, I think this argument is perfectly true. The ones who happen, either happened to have nuclear weapons by the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty was, came into force, are those who could simply who could simply do as they pleased and incur public censure without any punishment. The Chinese, the French and as I believe, others too like India. So, they would just go forward and do it. And since everybody realizes a bad thing for the world to be, for every country to have nuclear arms so they would just tell the world how to behave. And on this level you can say that any country which says, "Don't tell me what to do before you don't do the same thing," is perfectly right. But politics in...is not conducted this way. Some people say might is right. You say right is might. In any case the what I, what I do admit is that, or what I feel rather under the circumstances is that if the Indians or others give you this argument as they, as for, as far as the argument is concerned it is unassailable. If they say, "What you can do, we're equally entitled in doing." But since they do not wish to say they have nuclear weapons, so they tell everybody that they're against the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it is not an equitable partnership between the haves and the have-nots. However so I believe that, I believe that since I believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a bad thing and the world being what it is, it is really up to --it does not result that since the big ones have nuclear weapons and seem to continue to stockpile them and approve them, it should not simply result from that so that everybody should happily also go along and make his own nuclear weapons. But really it's necessary s... to exert as much pressure as one can on the big ones, at least to begin to introduce an atmosphere of a reduction. And of a diminished reliance on these weapons to take care of the problems you might have with your neighbor. And so I think, I think a great difference should be made between what sounds as a good argument, that probably is unassailable and what is really best for the world.

WHAT IS YOUR JUDGEMENT ON THE SITUATION OF PAKISTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Really all I know is what I read. And —

BUT YOU'RE A SCIENTIST. YOU'RE WELL EQUIPPED TO GIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEWS.

Yes. Well... see, and, even without being a scientist I think from what you read is--you h... they have the installations necessary and probably the requisite knowledge to make bombs. And I guess some material too.

IS THERE AN ANXIETY WITHIN THE ISRAELI COMMUNITY OR IN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AS TO THAT BEING A SOURCE OF WEAPONS AGAINST EACH OTHER?

Well... I, I should say that any nuclear effort by a country which not only does not recognize Israel but supports whatever moves there are to de-legitimize Israel, is worrisome to the Israelis. To jump to the conclusion that the Pakistanis would either use bombs against Israel or give them a way as presents for anyone who wants to use them, I believe this is rather a, a far-fetched notion. But it is quite certain that if the Pakistani effort is on the one hand in a country which is certainly against the existence of Israel, and if on the other hand it is bolstered by money coming from, as I am told, from Libya or possibly Iraq in other countries which, who in turn are able to obtain nuclear knowledge technology and perhaps even more from Pakistan. In this sense I would say it is worrisome.

RECENT REPORT OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR TECHNICIANS TRIGGERED A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF PRESS, ABOUT ISRAELI POTENTIAL. CAN YOU RESPOND?

There is really very little I can say except for having myself read the article in The Sunday Times and essentially believe is that there have been, there's been so much literature which I have read about the Israeli nuclear potential; what they, what they might be doing or what might be able to do is that I for one would not say that it has added anything of particular interest to those very conflicting reports on what Israel is doing. You must know that the United Nations I believe have had several commissions to inquire into what Israel is doing. For some reason only Israel, not Iran, not Iraq, not Libya, it is only Israel. But... So I would say that I should say, many of these things were more carefully done than the article in The Sunday Times. I should also add that it just happened that I believe a week earlier The Sunday Express also had an article in which they poo-pooed all the knowledge brought to The Sunday Times by Mr. Vanunu. So I really, I find it very difficult to attach that much important to just one additional piece of news on Israel's nuclear activities.